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After the establishment of the state of Israel, the Truman and the Eisenhower administrations tried to apply an even-handed policy towards Israel. Both administrations acted under the assumption that favouring Israel over its Arab neighbours would alienate the latter and would push them into Soviet arms. Washington was concerned that the Soviets would gain a foothold in the Middle East, which was under sway of the West. The very strong attachment of the United States towards Israel would preclude a truly even-handed policy. Israel needed urgent economic aid during its first years of existence, and while both administrations attempted to provide such assistance as a part of universal programmes of aid, they also helped Israel significantly more than what they were gave to other nations. Militarily, both administrations managed to thwart pressures to supply arms to Israel, but in the process, the set two principles ramifications lasting for years to come. The administrations argued that Israel was militarily stronger than its neighbours, and that if it was need, it could purchase arms from other suppliers. This meant that when the two provisions were no longer valid, the administration would supply arms to Israel. The establishment of the state of Israel also thrilled Americans from various walks of life, including Evangelicals and American Jews. The press delivered to the American people a message of a new, pioneering Israeli, justifying the American support for Israel and setting conditions for its continuation.
Religion, shared values, and history led American politicians to support the Zionist cause during the inter-war years. Presidents, politicians, and the American people supported the Zionist aspirations, although, it was only after the Second World War that the Americans became actively involved in Zionist affairs. During the inter-war years, the British government acted to fulfil the commitment it made in 1917 to help the Jews to establish a national home in Palestine. When the winds of war were blowing across Europe, the British began to back out of from the mandate and their commitments, and the Zionists turned to the United States for support. This marked a change in the Zionist attitude toward the United States – they wanted to see the United States extend its sponsorship of the Zionist enterprise. The ideological infrastructure for such a tutelage already existed; now the Zionists expected the Americans to act upon their ideology. During the war years, more promises were made than actions taken. However, when the war was over, and a new president, Harry S. Truman, occupied the White House, ideas inspired action, and President Truman acted to assist the Jews in attaining their goal of statehood.
When Robert McNamara accepted President Kennedy’s offer to serve as the United States’ eighth Secretary of Defense, the role was still new, a barely decade-old innovation emanating from World War II. As a young agency, the OSD was still defining its place in the national security decision-making landscape and, in so doing, trying to find the appropriate balance of power between civilian and military authorities. President Eisenhower had left the new administration with the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, a congressionally mandated program for change at the Department of Defense. McNamara recognized its sweeping potential to pave the way for his bureaucratic revolutions as the longest-serving Secretary of Defense.
Franklin D. Roosevelt and his colleagues expected the United States to emerge from the postwar as the greatest power on earth. And after this war, unlike the aftermath of World War I, they were determined to assert American leadership. The apotheosis of the American-vision emerged from the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944. The principal goal at Bretton Woods was the creation of mechanisms for assuring stable-exchange rates. Indeed, Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese-leader, to the irritation of the Americans, had posted half a million of his best-equipped forces as a barrier to Communist-expansion rather than risk those assets against the Japanese. Roosevelt died and Harry S. Truman became the thirty-third president of the United States. In 1945, Truman went to Potsdam where, amid the ruins of Hitler's Reich, he met with Churchill and Stalin in the last major conference of the war. Truman set sail for home, ordered atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and World War II was over.
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