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The last major chapter of the book reflects on the question of ‘happiness’ as discussed by Popper, Hayek, and Neurath, but also presents a case study of how Neurath not only theorized on such matters but also sought to make a practical difference by collaboration in planning projects. He became a consultant for the redevelopment of Bilston, a small town blighted by the legacy of the Industrial Revolution. In discussion with town councillors and architects, he steered plans by taking into account the needs of residents, seeking to represent those whose voice was generally not heard. This finally led to Neurath being interviewed in the mainstream media, marking acceptance and respect for Neurath in British culture. He did not want to use his broad learning to set himself apart as an intellectual but instead to articulate the needs of ordinary people.
This essay situates Mary Astell’s understanding of women’s moral freedom in the context of her under-studied vocabulary of “Epicurism.” It foregrounds Astell’s engagement with two contemporaneous accounts of the will, both of which can be broadly characterized as hedonistic. On the first, developed by John Norris (1688, 1693), God ensures conformity between his will and the human will by endowing agents with a love of pleasure that moves them in his direction. On the second, delineated by John Locke (1690), human wills are motivated by a morally neutral desire for pleasure, which acquires moral significance only when agents exercise their power of freedom or bring their reason to evaluate the goods that give them pleasure. In her writings of the 1690s, Astell develops a feminist ethics that is far closer to Locke’s than has been recognized. Like Locke, and unlike Norris, she suggests that agents are themselves responsible for aligning their wills with God’s, and they must do so by cultivating reason and a taste for virtuous pleasures. In a distinctively feminist move, she maps how patriarchal society corrupts women’s wills by directing their desires to sense-based goods only, preventing them from achieving the happiness due to them as rational beings. While Astell is routinely characterized as a rationalist philosopher, she is a rationalist who, like Locke, is highly aware of the limits of reason, and deeply interested in the potential of agents to transform their likes and dislikes so that they find pleasure in the exercise of virtue.
Ostensibly, Hume’s Essays do not have much to say about religion. ‘Of Superstition and Enthusiasm’ (1741) may contain an incisive treatment of the psychological origins of religious error and its ecclesiastical and political consequences, but it was the one Essay dedicated to religion published in Hume’s lifetime. But when the topic of religion does come up in the Essays, as it frequently does in examples, asides and footnotes, we find Hume doing two things: outlining the character and dangers of institutional religion on individual happiness and social stability and doing so in a neutral manner characteristic of his wider ‘science of man’. He brought religious belief and priestly power down to the level of another aspect of human life, comparable to the other themes discussed in this guide, and which could subject to ‘scientific’ observation that led to identification of general principles. Piecing together the various discussions of religion, we find Hume articulating a strong anticlericalism in which religion is understood to be a natural propensity of human nature, exploited by priesthoods claiming power over others, but which could be managed through increased scepticism about clerical claims amongst the citizenry and the subordination of church to state.
Is there a connection between pro-social behavior and well-being? This question has long been of interest, with Aristotle famously suggesting a nexus between virtues and well-being. To delve into this relationship, I conducted an extensive study encompassing multiple classical economic games and nearly 100 well-being questions. My findings confirm that different patterns of pro-sociality are robustly correlated with each other. On top, I find reliable correlations between well-being and pro-social behavior, as well as certain forms of punishment. In terms of underlying explanations, I observe that pro-sociality is particularly associated with a form of long-term well-being known as eudaimonia, suggesting that pro-social behavior plays a fundamental role in people perceiving their life as meaningful.
This Element concerns the civic value of contemplation in Plato and Aristotle: how does intellectual contemplation contribute to the happiness of the ideal state? The texts discussed include the Republic, the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics, works in which contemplation is viewed from a political angle. The Element concludes that in the Republic contemplation has purely instrumental value, whereas in the Politics and Nicomachean Ethics it has purely intrinsic value. To do justice to the complexity of the issues involved, the author addresses a broader question about the nature of civic happiness: whether it is merely the aggregate of individual happiness or an organic quality that arises from the structure of the state. Answering this question has implications for how contemplation contributes to civic happiness. The Element also discusses how many citizens Plato and Aristotle expected to be engaged in contemplation in the ideal state.
This study addresses a significant knowledge gap in the literature by examining the relationship between religious involvement and subjective wellbeing (SWB) among older adults in Taiwan, a cultural context that has been underrepresented in existing research, with a focus on gender and age differences. Using data collected in Taichung City in 2017 (N = 645), this study measured religious involvement through religious affiliation, religiosity and frequency of religious participation, and assessed SWB via life satisfaction and happiness. Findings revealed no significant association between religious involvement and life satisfaction. However, religious participation was positively correlated with happiness. Gender differences were observed: Buddhism and Taoism were positively associated with life satisfaction among males, whereas religiosity and religious participation were significantly related to life satisfaction and happiness among females. Age disparities were also found, with religiosity significantly relating to both life satisfaction and happiness in the old-old group (70–89 years) but not in the young-old group (60–69 years). These findings highlight the nuanced associations between religious involvement and SWB, emphasising the importance of considering gender and age variations in future research. Future studies should further explore the cultural contexts that shape these relationships and examine other potential mediating factors to provide a more comprehensive understanding of how religious involvement influences wellbeing across different demographic groups.
Existential happiness is happiness that one has a basic life at all. Having a basic life, as I understand it, involves being the subject of experiences and being an agent in some minimal sense. As I argue, existential happiness is a fitting response to having a basic life. To make this argument, I look at two possible accounts of the fittingness of existential happiness: the value of a basic life and attachment to the constitutive elements of one’s life. I also consider a few possible sources of existential happiness, including encounters with death, counterfactual thinking, and hedonically positive feelings of awe directed toward one’s own consciousness.
What are the basic coordinates of the dispute between Heidegger and Levinas over the phenomenology of “death” and its larger ontological or ethical significance? Or, put in the “perfectionist” terms developed in Chapter 4, in what ways do Heidegger and Levinas disagree about how we human beings become genuinely or fully ourselves? Examining the convergences and divergences of Heidegger’s and Levinas’s phenomenologies of death, this chapter suggests that Heidegger and Levinas both understood themselves as struggling to articulate the requisite ethical response to the great traumas of the twentieth century. By comparing their thinking at this level, I contend, we can better understand the ways in which Levinas genuinely diverges from Heidegger even while building critically on his thinking.
In Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education (2005), I sought to establish and build upon the hermeneutic thesis that Heidegger’s concern to reform education spans his entire career of thought. In my view, a radical rethinking of education – in a word, an ontologization of education, one that situates a transformative death and rebirth of the self at the very heart of the educational vision that founded the philosophical academy in Plato’s Republic – forms one of the deep thematic undercurrents of Heidegger’s work, early as well as late. We will come back to this “ontologization” of education at the end, but I want to begin by addressing a worry I did not previously thematize and confront. If my interpretive thesis is correct, then we should expect to find some sign of Heidegger’s supposed lifelong concern with education in his early magnum opus, Being and Time. The fact, then, that little or nothing had been written on Being and Time’s “philosophy of education” before my first book came out could reasonably be taken to cast doubt upon my thesis that a philosophical rethinking of education was of great importance to Heidegger’s work as a whole. Such a worry, of course, does not arise deductively; even if Being and Time contained no philosophy of education, one might be able to explain such an omission in a way that would leave my general thesis intact. Rather than trying to preserve the thesis in the face of such a hermeneutic anomaly, however, I will instead demonstrate that no such anomaly exists. This chapter will seek both to show that Heidegger’s philosophy of education deeply permeates Being and Time and to explain some of the context and significance of this fact, thereby coming to understand yet another interlocking set of philosophical implications arising from Heidegger’s phenomenology of existential death.
This Element explores the connection between God and happiness, with happiness understood as a life of well-being or flourishing that goes well for the one living it. It provides a historical and contemporary survey of philosophical questions, theories, and debates about happiness, and it asks how they should be answered and evaluated from a theistic perspective. The central topics it covers are the nature of happiness (what is it?), the content of happiness (what are the constituents of a happy life?), the structure of happiness (is there a hierarchy of goods?), and the possibility of happiness (can we be happy?). It argues that God's existence has significant, positive, and desirable implications for human happiness.
This study explores the relationship between maternal working hours and a child's emotional well-being using data from the UK Millennium Cohort Study. Child well-being is assessed through self-reported happiness and a well-being index that includes concerns, temperament, bullying, and behaviour. Results show a positive association between maternal employment and child well-being, supported by factor analysis combining child, mother, and teacher reports. The association remains consistent across income levels and is unaffected by commuting time or cohabitation status. These findings highlight the importance of maternal employment and contextual factors in shaping child well-being.
While in his early years, Kahneman followed the world of classic utilitarianism in which smart individuals base decisions on how they will truly feel each moment in the future, Kahneman in Mandel (2018) adopted a very different position, namely that what matters is the story people tell of their lives. He thus grappled with evolving stories of both the future and the past, and the presence of different decision-supporting evaluations for the short-run and the long-run.
The current study examined how happiness is affected by optimism, self-efficacy, and occupational compromise (OC), among young workers (aged 20–30 years) in the post-Covid-19 pandemic period. A sample of 211 young people (aged 20–30 years) who were currently or formerly employed participated in the study. The research findings indicate negative correlations between (a) the optimism and self-efficacy of the employees to their OC and (b) between their OC to their sense of happiness. In addition, as hypothesized, positive correlations were found between (a) feelings of optimism and self-efficacy to the degree of happiness and (b) between optimism and self-efficacy. Finally, the study tested a mediation model that indicated optimism as a mediating variable in the relationships of self-efficacy and OC with happiness. In light of these findings, several conclusions emerged from the study. First, according to general trends in the Israeli economy, even among young workers, who make up the new generation of workers in the post-Covid-19 period, there is a reduction in the degree of OC in order to achieve happiness. But this depends on several personality elements, such as their feelings of optimism and self-efficacy. Second, in accordance with the mediation model tested in the study, it seems that optimism has a central role in enhancing happiness among young workers in the post-Covid-19 era, at the beginning of their career path. Eventually, it appears that the reduced OC and elevated happiness among young workers in the post-pandemic period, has the potential to shape the future job market as filled with content employees that can also improve their organizations’ economic output.
In this study, we examined the patterns of subjective well-being (SWB) measures among pregnant women and quantified the extent to which pregnancy intendedness is associated with low SWB measures during pregnancy. We analyzed data from the 2021 Nigeria Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey comprising 3,491 pregnant women. The associations between pregnancy intention and low SWB measures (unhappiness, low life satisfaction [LS] and diminished optimism) were determined by fitting series of multilevel logistic regression models with random intercepts. Among pregnant women in our sample 20%, 37.5% and 9.6%, reported being unhappy, experiencing low LS and having diminished optimism, respectively. However, we found no significant association between pregnancy intention and being unhappy (mistimed: adjusted odds ratio [aOR] = 1.19, 95% CI = 0.88–1.60; unwanted: aOR = 1.16, 95% CI = 0.71–1.91), experiencing low LS (mistimed: aOR = 1.07, 95% CI = 0.83–1.37; unwanted: aOR = 1.06, 95% CI = 0.69–1.65) and having diminished optimism (mistimed: aOR = 1.22, 95% CI = 0.82–1.82; unwanted: aOR = 1.07, 95% CI = 0.56–2.04). Findings from the study suggest that pregnant women in Nigeria who reported having either a mistimed or unwanted pregnancy were just as likely to report being unhappy, experience low LS and have diminished optimism as women whose pregnancy was intended.
This article uses the well-being valuation (WV) approach to estimate and monetize the well-being impacts of informal care provision on caregivers. Using nationally representative longitudinal data from the UK, the British Household Panel Survey, we address two challenging methodological issues related to the economic valuation of informal care: (i) the anticipatory nature of informal care; and (ii) the sensitivity of income estimates used in valuation. We address the anticipatory issue by focusing on well-being impacts associated with caring for a relative who had recently suffered a serious accident. We use the fixed effects filtered (FEF) estimator to estimate a “time-invariant income” coefficient free from individual fixed effects bias, which helps to partially improve the quality of the income estimate as an alternative to using instrumental variables. This estimate is used in the calculation of shadow prices of informal care. Our estimates suggest that, focusing on the first year of unanticipated care provision, those experiencing the well-being losses from providing unanticipated informal care would be willing to pay approximately £13,167 on average to avoid it.
This article explores the potential for the greater infusion of well-being concerns into the teaching of history in UK HEIs. Drawing upon results from a survey of over 100 current undergraduates in one UK History department, alongside a scoping study of well-being provision provided by history departments or their equivalent in about ninety UK HEIs, this article considers ways in which well-being can be promoted through the teaching and learning strategies of historians. The article discusses the meaning of the term ‘well-being’ and asks why historians have sometimes been reluctant participants in the ‘eudaemonic turn’. The negativity bias of history as an endeavour, and the potential for understanding the past to enhance or diminish an individual's sense of well-being is discussed, as is the value of historicising the concept of well-being itself. The case for integrating well-being as a key element in the degree-level study of history is made, and the article concludes by urging all HEI history practitioners to consider the value of curricular infusion and mapping the design and delivery of their modules onto the New Economics Foundation's ‘five ways to well-being’.
Is happiness possible in the Anthropocene? If, as Sarah Ahmed suggests, happiness is the mark of an accommodation with the future, then what becomes of the possibility of happiness when our planetary relation to the future has become estranged?
This essay considers this question, in relation to two performances staged in the summer of 2021, a site specific piece entitled Beckett in Folkestone, and a production of Beckett’s Happy Days, directed by Trevor Nunn at the Riverside Studios.
Both pieces, staged as we were emerging from the Covid lockdown and in the midst of ecological and biopolitical crisis, conduct a forensic examination of how it is possible now to share each other’s lives, enter into collective futures, or look forward, like Beckett’s Winnie, to another happy day.
In reading the pieces together, the essay looks to the imaginative forms in which we can encounter happiness, not as an accommodation with the future, but as the expression of a radical hope.
This chapter argues that the New York School of Poets occupy a complex transitional moment in relation to both the history of sexuality and the history of poetry and modern art. Their work is governed by both the epistemology of the closet that shapes high modernism from earlier in the twentieth century and, looking forward to Stonewall and Gay Liberation, also presents utopian potentialities in its experimental forms of sociability.
When Lady Philosophy suggests that Boethius’ definition of himself as a rational mortal animal is inadequate, it implies that a superior self-understanding is contained within the Consolation. This chapter argues that this more adequate self-understanding – that Boethius, via participation in God, is himself divine – is implicit in the text and unpacks the profound implications and consolations of this interpretation of the self. Being a rational animal is more than being this specific living thing; it is also an opportunity to manifest divine intelligibility and goodness in the world. The chapter focuses on two perplexing arguments in Book IV that are unsatisfying without this interpretation of Boethius’ identity: that the punished are happier than those who escape punishment and that it is possible to attach ourselves to Providence and escape from Fate. The difficulties that most people will face in accepting these arguments are the direct result of the challenge of adopting this self-interpretation.
Employing “Asia as method,” this chapter examines the twofold pedagogical practice of cultivating learners’ abilities to cognize truth and create value from it as the font of authentic happiness. The chapter first summarizes the intrinsic nature of sōka kyōikugaku, or “value-creating pedagogy,” in the work of Japanese educators Makiguchi Tsunesaburō (1871–1944), Toda Jōsei (1900–1958), and Ikeda Daisaku (b. 1928) and defines the concepts of truth, value, and happiness therein. It then considers the extrinsic relevance of these in the context of today’s politicized, semantic war on truth in the United States and the implications this has for modern notions of schooling and young people’s happiness. The chapter advances our understanding of value-creating approaches to knowledge, society, and power that increasingly inform the perspectives and practices of thousands of educators around the world and has significance for ethics in education.