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This chapter examines how the collapse of the Protocols of Paris negotiations with Berlin and the vulnerability of Italian forces in Libya resulted in a brief but significant experiment in military collaboration between France and Italy. The episode marked a high point in Vichy’s belief that it could manipulate Berlin and Rome to the French advantage. By offering Rome the concessions that Vichy had refused to grant Berlin on the use of Tunisian ports, Darlan sought to fulfil three objectives. The first was to gain concessions on the armistice terms, the second was to use Rome to counterbalance Berlin and the third was to use the Allied threat as a cover to strengthen French defences in North Africa against the threat from Italy. If Vichy’s decision to collaborate with Germany had been taken from a position of weakness and self-delusion, its decision to collaborate with Italy was taken from a position of opportunism. However, the strategy failed to yield any tangible results. Vichy’s brief engagement in military collaboration with Italy was opportunistic and voluntary, but it was also poorly conceived and executed.
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