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Half a century ago, Noam Chomsky posited that humans have specific innate mental abilities to learn and use language, distinct from other animals. This book, a follow-up to the author's previous textbook, A Mind for Language, continues to critically examine the development of this central aspect of linguistics: the innateness debate. It expands upon key themes in the debate - discussing arguments that come from other disciplines, such as psychology, anthropology, sociology, criminology, computer science, formal languages theory, neuroscience, genetics, animal communication, and evolutionary biology. The innateness claim also leads us to ask how human language evolved as a characteristic trait of Homo Sapiens. Written in an accessible way, assuming no prior knowledge of linguistics, the book guides the reader through technical concepts, and employs concrete examples throughout. It is accompanied by a range of online resources, including further material, a glossary, discussion points, questions for reflection, and project suggestions.
This chapter consists of a transcription of a fictitious forum discussion in which a number of fictitious scholars participated, including some very surprising participants. The wide-ranging discussion covers the topics discussed throughout this book, and the chapter ends with the conclusion that the nature–nurture debate is still a vibrant one in which we are seeking to understand the interplay between the nurturing experience and the role of nature, whether in the form of an innate biological endowment or in the form of natural factors that go beyond the realm of the human mind.
Major depressive disorder (MDD) is a heterogeneous with underlying mechanisms that are insufficiently studied. We aimed to identify functional connectivity (FC)-based subtypes of MDD and investigate their biological mechanisms.
Methods
Consensus clustering of FC patterns was applied to a population of 829 MDD patients from the REST-Meta-MDD database, with validity assessed across multiple dimensions, including atlas replication, cross-validated classification, and drug-naïve subgroup analysis. Regression models were used to quantify FC alterations in each MDD subgroup compared with 770 healthy controls, and to analyze spatial associations between FC alterations and publicly available gene transcriptomic and neurotransmitter receptor/transporter density databases.
Results
Two stable MDD subtypes emerged: hypoconnectivity (n = 527) and hyperconnectivity (n = 299), which had both shared and distinct regions with remarkable FC alterations (i.e. epicenters) in the default mode network.
There were several common enriched genes (e.g. axon/brain development, synaptic transmission/organization, etc.) related to FC alterations in both subtypes. However, glial cell and neuronal differentiation genes were specifically enriched in the hypoconnectivity and hyperconnectivity subtypes, respectively.
Both subtypes showed spatial associations between FC alterations and serotonin receptor/transporter density. In the hypoconnectivity subtype, FC alterations correlated with GABA and acetylcholine receptor densities, while norepinephrine transporter and glutamate receptor densities were linked to the hyperconnectivity subtype.
Conclusions
Our findings suggested the presence of two neuroimaging subtypes of MDD characterized by hypoconnectivity or hyperconnectivity, demonstrating robust reproducibility. The two subtypes had both shared and distinct genetic mechanisms and neurotransmitter receptor/transporter profiles, suggesting potential clinical implications for this heterogeneous disorder.
A previous analysis of 200,000 exome-sequenced UK Biobank participants using weighted burden analysis of rare, damaging variants failed to identify any genes associated with risk of affective disorder requiring specialist treatment. Exome-sequence data has now been made available for the remaining 270,000 participants and a two-stage process was applied in order to test for association in this second sample using only genes showing suggestive evidence for association in the first sample.
Methods:
Cases were defined as participants who reported having seen a psychiatrist for ‘nerves, anxiety, tension or depression’. Exhaustive testing of the first sample was carried out using rare variant analyses informed by 45 different predictors of impact of nonsynonymous variants. The 100 genes showing the strongest evidence for association were then analysed in the second sample using the same predictor as had been most statistically significant in the first sample.
Results:
The results for the 100 nominated genes conformed closely with the null hypothesis, with none approaching statistical significance after correction for multiple testing.
Conclusion:
Risk of common affective disorder, even if severe enough to warrant specialist referral, is not sufficiently impacted by effects of rare variants in a small enough number of genes that effects can be detected even with large sample sizes. Actionable results might be obtained with a more extreme phenotype but very significant resources would be required to achieve adequate power. This research has been conducted using the UK Biobank Resource.
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first explains fundamental concepts in human genetics. Accounts of genetic findings involve concepts which can prove challenging. Terminology may be unfamiliar and some words have specialised meanings and may not always be used consistently. The first part aims to provide an overview of the key concepts. The subject matter is intrinsically dense and can be hard to take in, so the reader may wish to skim parts of this section and then refer back to it when necessary.
The second part shows how these concepts relate to a range of neuropsychiatric conditions. Before considering individual conditions, it is worth presenting some general principles which characterise the relationship between genetic variation and human disease, in particular in relationship to neuropsychiatric conditions. Modern research has impacted on how we think about this relationship, and so current accounts are somewhat different from what one finds in older sources.
Genetically informative twin studies have consistently found that individual differences in anxiety and depression symptoms are stable and primarily attributable to time-invariant genetic influences, with non-shared environmental influences accounting for transient effects.
Methods
We explored the etiology of psychological and somatic distress in 2279 Australian twins assessed up to six times between ages 12–35. We evaluated autoregressive, latent growth, dual-change, common, and independent pathway models to identify which, if any, best describes the observed longitudinal covariance and accounts for genetic and environmental influences over time.
Results
An autoregression model best explained both psychological and somatic distress. Familial aggregation was entirely explained by additive genetic influences, which were largely stable from ages 12 to 35. However, small but significant age-dependent genetic influences were observed at ages 20–27 and 32–35 for psychological distress and at ages 16–19 and 24–27 for somatic distress. In contrast, environmental influences were predominantly transient and age-specific.
Conclusions
The longitudinal trajectory of psychological distress from ages 12 to 35 can thus be largely explained by forward transmission of a stable additive genetic influence, alongside smaller age-specific genetic innovations. This study addresses the limitation of previous research by exhaustively exploring alternative theoretical explanations for the observed patterns in distress symptoms over time, providing a more comprehensive understanding of the genetic and environmental factors influencing psychological and somatic distress across this age range.
The process of how we get from gene to protein is one of the most intensely studied and best understood in biology. The reading of DNA, the generation of a messenger ribonucleic acid (mRNA) and the translation of that transcript into a protein through assembling chains of amino acids. But what we thought we knew about the gene pathway changed forever in 1993, when Gary Ruvkun and Victor Ambros discovered microRNAs. This chapter begins by explaining the basic biochemistry of genes and proteins before moving on to the seminal work of 30 years ago. The objective of those experiments was to understand which genes controlled the timing of animal development in a worm called Caenorhabditis elegans. That led to the realisation that a gene called lin−4, crucial for worms to transition from juvenile to adult stages, did not code for a protein; instead, its RNA acted by sticking to the mRNA of a protein-coding gene. Lin−4 was a gene silencer, working to lower the amounts of protein in cells. The finding of a new step on the journey from gene to protein would go on to transform our understanding of the biology of living organisms.
In recent years, the incidence of teratospermia has been increasing, and it has become a very important factor leading to male infertility. The research on the molecular mechanism of teratospermia is also progressing rapidly. This article briefly summarizes the clinical incidence of teratozoospermia, and makes a retrospective summary of related studies reported in recent years. Specifically discussing the relationship between gene status and spermatozoa, the review aims to provide the basis for the genetic diagnosis and gene therapy of teratozoospermia.
What are genes? What do genes do? These questions are not simple and straightforward to answer; at the same time, simplistic answers are quite prevalent and are taken for granted. This book aims to explain the origin of the gene concept, its various meanings both within and outside science, as well as to debunk the intuitive view of the existence of 'genes for' characteristics and disease. Drawing on contemporary research in genetics and genomics, as well as on ideas from history of science, philosophy of science, psychology and science education, it explains what genes are and what they can and cannot do. By presenting complex concepts and research in a comprehensible and rigorous manner, it examines the potential impact of research in genetics and genomics and how important genes actually are for our lives. Understanding Genes is an accessible and engaging introduction to genes for any interested reader.
Are individual differences in trust subject to genetic influences? If possibly heritable, which specific gene is associated with trust? This chapter reviews previous studies to answer these questions and introduces the genetic basis of trust, including trust behavior and trust attitude. In twin studies, trust was demonstrated to be influenced by genes to some degree (about 10%–20% in trust behavior and above 30% in trust attitude). To determine which specific gene is associated with trust, researchers used molecular biological techniques to determine the genetic polymorphisms of specific genes and examine the relationship between trust and genes. Thus far, it has been found that the oxytocin receptor gene, arginine vasopressin receptor 1A gene, dopamine D4 receptor gene, and serotonin transporter gene are associated with trust level. In this chapter, we will introduce these genes and the relationship between trust and genes.
To understand what genes “do,” we have to consider what happens during development. The first and most striking evidence that the local environment matters for the outcome of development was provided by the experiments of embryologists Wilhelm Roux and Hans Driesch in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Roux had hypothesized that during the cell divisions of the embryo, hereditary particles were unevenly distributed in its cells, thus driving their differentiation. This view entailed that even the first blastomeres (the cells emerging from the first few divisions of the zygote – that is, the fertilized ovum) would each have different hereditary material and that the embryo would thus become a kind of mosaic. Roux decided to test this hypothesis. He assumed that if it were true, destroying a blastomere in the two-cell or the four-cell stage would produce a partially deformed embryo. If it were not true, then the destruction of a blastomere would have no effect. With a hot sterilized needle, Roux punctured one of the blastomeres in a two-cell frog embryo that was thus killed. The other blastomere was left to develop. The outcome was a half-developed embryo; the part occupied by the punctured blastomere was highly disorganized and undifferentiated, whereas those cells resulting from the other blastomere were well-developed and partially differentiated. This result stood as confirmation for Roux’s hypothesis.
During the 1970s, more puzzling observations were made. The first was that the genome of animals contained large amounts of DNA with unique sequences that should correspond to a larger number of genes than anticipated. It was also observed that the RNA molecules in the nuclei of cells were much longer than those found outside the nucleus, in the cytoplasm. These observations started making sense in 1977, when sequences of mRNA were compared to the corresponding DNA sequences. It was shown that certain sequences that existed in the DNA did not exist in the mRNA, and that therefore they must have been somehow removed. It was thus concluded that the genes encoding various proteins in eukaryotes included both coding sequences and ones that were not included in the mRNA that would reach the ribosomes for translation. These “removed” sequences were called introns, to contrast them with the ones that were expressed in translation, which were called exons. The procedure that removed the intron sequences from the initial mRNA and that left only the exon sequences in the mature mRNA was named “RNA splicing.”
One important, and for some the most surprising, conclusion of genome-wide association studies (GWAS) has been that in most cases numerous single nucleotide polymorphism (SNPs) in several genes were found to be associated with the development of a characteristic or the risk of developing a disease. As already mentioned, the main conclusion has been that the relationship between genes and characteristics or diseases is usually a many-to-many one, as many genes may be implicated in the same condition, and the same gene may be implicated in several different conditions. In fact, the same allele may be protective for one disease but increase the risk for another. For example, a variation in the PTPN22 (protein tyrosine phosphatase, nonreceptor type 22) gene on chromosome 1 seems to protect against Crohn’s disease but to predispose to autoimmune diseases. In other cases, certain variants are associated with more than one disease, such as the JAZF1 (JAZF1 zinc finger 1) gene on chromosome 7 that is implicated in prostate cancer and in type 2 diabetes. Therefore, we should forget the simple scheme of gene 1 → condition 1/gene 2 → condition 2, and adopt a richer – and certainly more complicated – representation of the relationship between genes and disease. Additional GWAS on more variants in larger populations might provide a better picture in the future. But insofar as we do not understand all biological processes in detail, all we are left with are probabilistic associations between genes and characteristics (or diseases). The “associated gene” may be informative, but its explanatory potential and clinical value are limited – at least for now.
This chapter is about the public image of genes. But what exactly do we mean by “public”? Here, I use the word as a noun or an adjective vaguely, in order to refer to all ordinary people who are not experts in genetics. I thus contrast them with scientists who are experts in genetics – that is, who have mastered genetics-related knowledge and skills, who practice these as their main occupation, and who have valid genetics-related credentials, confirmed experience, and affirmation by their peers. I must note that both “experts” and “the public” are complex categories that depend on the context and that change over time. There is no single group of nonexperts that we can define as “the” public, as people around the world differ in their perceptions of science, depending on their cultural contexts. We had therefore better refer to “publics.” The differences among experts nowadays might be less significant than those among nonexperts, given today’s global scientific communities, but they do exist. Finally, both the categories of experts and publics have changed across time, depending, on the one hand, on the level of experts’ knowledge and understanding of the natural world, and, on the other hand, on publics’ attitudes toward that knowledge and understanding.
If you were taught Mendelian genetics at school (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2) you should be aware that it is an oversimplified model that does not work for most cases of inherited characteristics. Human eye color is a textbook example of a monogenic characteristic. It refers to the color of the iris – the colored circle in the middle of the eye. The iris comprises two tissue layers, an inner one called the iris pigment epithelium and an outer one called the anterior iridial stroma. It is the density and cellular composition of the latter that mostly affects the color of the iris. The melanocyte cells of the anterior iridial stroma store melanin in organelles called melanosomes. White light entering the iris can absorb or reflect a spectrum of wavelengths, giving rise to the three common iris colors (blue, green–hazel, and brown) and their variations. Blue eyes contain minimal pigment levels and melanosome numbers; green–hazel eyes have moderate pigment levels and melanosome numbers; and brown eyes are the result of high melanin levels and melanosome numbers. Textbook accounts often explain that a dominant allele B is responsible for brown color, whereas a recessive allele b is responsible for blue color (Figure 4.1). According to such accounts, parents with brown eyes can have children with blue eyes, but it is not possible for parents with blue eyes to have children with brown eyes. This pattern of inheritance was first described at the beginning of the twentieth century and it is still taught in schools, although it became almost immediately evident that there were exceptions, such as that two parents with blue eyes could have offspring with brown or dark hazel eyes.
Perhaps you were taught at school that genetics began with Gregor Mendel. Because of his experiments with peas, Mendel is considered to be a pioneer of genetics and the person who discovered the laws of heredity. According to the model of “Mendelian inheritance,” things are rather simple and straightforward with inherited characteristics. Some alleles are dominant – that is, they impose their effects on other alleles that are recessive. An individual who carries two recessive alleles exhibits the respective “recessive” characteristic, whereas a single dominant allele is sufficient for the “dominant” version of the characteristic to appear. In this sense, particular genes determine particular characteristics (e.g., seed color in peas), and particular alleles of those genes determine particular versions of the respective characteristics. Mendel, the story goes, discovered that characteristics are controlled by hereditary factors, the inheritance of which follows two laws: the law of segregation and the law of independent assortment.
Among the offspring of humans and other animals are occasional individuals that are malformed in whole or in part. The most grossly abnormal of these have been referred to from ancient times as monsters, because their birth was thought to foretell doom; the less severely affected are usually known as anomalies. This volume digs deeply into the cellular and molecular processes of embryonic development that go awry in such exceptional situations. It focuses on the physical mechanisms of how genes instruct cells to build anatomy, as well as the underlying forces of evolution that shaped these mechanisms over eons of geologic time. The narrative is framed in a historical perspective that should help students trying to make sense of these complex subjects. Each chapter is written in the style of a Sherlock Holmes story, starting with the clues and ending with a solution to the mystery.
This chapter provides an overview of the debate surrounding the population of Athens in the Classical period, and the methodologies used to estimate it. It further summarizes some of the key social, economic, political, and religious groups and divisions in Classical Athenian society and how these interacted with each other and with questions of belonging and identity in the polis.
There is a common misconception that our genomes - all unique, except for those in identical twins - have the upper hand in controlling our destiny. The latest genetic discoveries, however, do not support that view. Although genetic variation does influence differences in various human behaviours to a greater or lesser degree, most of the time this does not undermine our genuine free will. Genetic determinism comes into play only in various medical conditions, notably some psychiatric syndromes. Denis Alexander here demonstrates that we are not slaves to our genes. He shows how a predisposition to behave in certain ways is influenced at a molecular level by particular genes. Yet a far greater influence on our behaviours is our world-views that lie beyond science - and that have an impact on how we think the latest genetic discoveries should, or should not, be applied. Written in an engaging style, Alexander's book offers tools for understanding and assessing the latest genetic discoveries critically.
Over the last decade, extensive research effort has been placed on developing methane mitigation strategies in ruminants. Many disciplines on animal science disciplines have been involved, including nutrition and physiology, microbiology and genetic selection. To date, few of the suggested strategies have been implemented because: (1) methane emissions currently have no direct or indirect economic value for farmers, with no financial incentive to change practices and (2) most strategies have limited, or no, long-term effects. Consequently, there is a fundamental need for research on methane mitigation strategies across disciplines. Coordinated international initiatives similar to METHAGENE could represent highly relevant coordination tool of collaboration between countries, facilitating knowledge exchange, sharing concerns and building future collaborations.