We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
This book chapter advances a hypothesis that judges tend to avoid ex post inefficiency (that is, inefficiency falling to litigants), but judges are less inclined to avoid ex ante inefficiency (that is, inefficiency incurred by future parties). Drawing on three empirical studies which the author has conducted on property cases rendered by courts in Taiwan, this chapter presents preliminary evidence to test this hypothesis. The three studies are consistent with the hypothesis, as judges avoid ex post inefficiency in two studies (co-ownership partition and building encroachment) but fail to avoid ex ante inefficiency in one study (trespass to land).
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.