For EU jurisdictions, Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of judgments (the Brussels I Regulation) and the 2005 Hague Choice of Court Convention (the 2005 Choice of Court Convention) are the pivotal instruments to assess “consent to jurisdiction” in a choice of court agreement. This Article examines the symmetries in both instruments. The relevant rules combine inferred consent with a residual reference to the law of the chosen court, as opposed to providing a uniform substantive standard on the notion of “consent” to jurisdiction. The practical operation of this hybrid solution is examined by reference to the relevant case law of CJEU and selected domestic courts. The Article then considers specific matters where consistency between the two regimes is uncertain. In conclusion, while alignment on consent to jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation and the 2005 Choice of Court Convention is desirable, it is expected that autonomous standards on consent to jurisdiction will be consolidated within the respective scopes of application of the instruments under review.

Why do national jurists commit what appears to be blatant breaches of EU law even when they intend to comply? Instead of viewing such incidents as mere errors, I suggest one possible way of reconstructing them as meaningful social action. Drawing on Bourdieusian sociology I import the concept of allodoxia as a framework to understand the transplant of ideas about EU law into the national legal field. Allodoxia helps to unpack the structural tension that occurs between the habitual dispositions of the national jurists and the increased pressure from EU. Adding to this, I also use the notion of ontological primacy to conceptualise the symbolic dominance asserted by EU law over the worldview of national jurists, a dominance which obscures a proper understanding of the latter’s actions. I illustrate the argument with a case study of one such blatant ‘error’, when prominent Danish jurists in the late 1980s drafted and defended a buy-Danish clause in the tender materials for a major infrastructure project, the bridge over the strait of Storebælt. By insisting on the ontological parity of European EU law and national EU law respectively, and by using allodoxia as an analytical framework, we can better understand misapplication of law beyond the tradition error-paradigm, adding to our understanding of national reception of EU law. In a broader context, the Article aims to continue and broaden the introduction of a Bourdieusian approach to EU legal scholarship, in particular by drawing attention to the functioning of EU law within Member States.

The question to what extent EU law is constitutive of European society as articulated in Article 2 TEU is, at its core, a question about the nature, scope and limits of EU law. This article suggests certain clear limits to EU law’s ability to make the European society visible in law, or legible for law – let alone composable through law. The article is entitled ‘Is this Europe?’ as a direct challenge to the widely held belief that EU law is somehow constitute of European integration; that EU law contains all that European integration is, can and will be. Sure, the Europe that we see when analysing cases, treaties and legislation matters. But the ‘real’ Europe – the one that is felt, experienced, lived – resides in what happens due to, in spite, or irrespective of those cases, treaties and legislation. For EU law to remain sensitive to its society, then, EU law needs to reformulate the expectations it has of itself and create an analytical framework that allows it to transcend its immanent nature. This requires three changes to the way we ‘do’ EU law. First, more sensitivity to the material and relational context in which EU law operates. Second, creating space for forms of lay knowledge that are rooted in social praxis. Third, more ambition and playfulness in the way we – as scholars – ‘speak’ EU law.

This article critiques the case-law of the CJEU on when Member States are ‘implementing’ EU law under Article 51 of the Charter, and tables a proposal for amending Article 51 to enhance the effectiveness of EU fundamental rights protection. It also suggests modifying and updating the explanations. Given that Member State judges have alternative routes available to them to resolve fundamental rights disputes, namely via Member State rules and the ECHR, and which do not require consideration of a complex threshold question before the pertinent substantive laws can apply, it suggests that review of Article 51 of the Charter might be timely.

The concept of constitutional identity has recently been invoked to impose limits on fundamental rights. In this article, I explore the relation between constitutional identity and fundamental rights and argue that constitutional identity – when properly understood – does not stand in tension but rather presupposes respect for fundamental rights. In the first part of the article, I develop a conception of constitutional identity as a set of normative commitments of a community that reflects its shared experience of establishing, and being subject to, a constitutional form of authority. In the second part, I argue that, while different constitutional identities can be idiosyncratic, they must incorporate respect for fundamental rights if their claim to reflect such common experience is to be credible. The upshot of the argument is that fundamental rights should not be understood as external constraints that limit the scope of constitutional identity, but as internal requirements inherent to the concept of constitutional identity. Although this understanding does not eliminate the difficulties which arise from different interpretations of fundamental rights, it does allow for a more productive engagement with constitutional identity claims, and for analysing them in light of fundamental rights standards they must already accept.

This article establishes a foundation for the development of Marxist approaches to European Union (EU) law. While Marxist scholarship has engaged with European integration throughout its history, it has largely overlooked the legal architecture of the EU. Conversely, EU legal studies have remained largely insulated from Marxist thought, even as critical approaches have begun to gain traction. Bridging this mutual neglect, the article argues that EU law must be understood not as a neutral or technocratic system, but as a central element of capitalist social relations both in Europe, and in terms of Europe’s wider integration in the global market. In this way, EU law is bound up with processes of accumulation, imperialism, and racialised social reproduction. Drawing on key currents within Marxist theory, the article situates EU law within the historical dynamics of capitalist development, demonstrating how a materialist legal analysis can deepen and enrich existing critiques of European integration.

This paper examines in what way providers of specialized Large Language Models (LLM) pre-trained and/or fine-tuned on medical data, conduct risk management, define, estimate, mitigate and monitor safety risks under the EU Medical Device Regulation (MDR). Using the example of an Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based medical device for lung cancer detection, we review the current risk management process in the MDR entailing a “forward-walking” approach for providers articulating the medical device’s clear intended use, and moving on sequentially along the definition, mitigation, and monitoring of risks. We note that the forward-walking approach clashes with the MDR requirement for articulating an intended use, as well as circumvents providers reasoning around the risks of specialised LLMs. The forward-walking approach inadvertently introduces different intended users, new hazards for risk control and use cases, producing unclear and incomplete risk management for the safety of LLMs. Our contribution is that the MDR risk management framework requires a backward-walking logic. This concept, similar to the notion of “backward-reasoning” in computer science, entails sub-goals for providers to examine a system’s intended user(s), risks of new hazards and different use cases and then reason around the task-specific options, inherent risks at scale and trade-offs for risk management.

Almost 10 years ago, the Ordonnance of 10 February 2016 reforming the French Civil Code (CC) removed the cause from the conditions for validity of the obligation. Thus, it broke with the tradition of the Code Napoléon, and a large number of civil codifications followed. Since 2016, French scholars have argued that, notwithstanding its conceptual implications, the disappearance of the formula of the cause has resulted in semantic rather than substantial changes. Whereas, in one opinion, the cause is still found underlying ‘contenu litice et certain’ (Article 1128), its various forms and functions today appear in several CC provisions.

The numerous scandals that have marred the world of football suggest that reform is badly needed. As governing bodies like FIFA and UEFA fail to make meaningful improvements, calls for public regulation are gaining ground. This article explores what the European Union (EU) could do to effect change. Although long hailed as a powerful sports regulator, there is a widespread feeling that the EU’s regulatory potential remains unfulfilled. The article argues that the Union is in a unique position to leave a positive mark on football governance if it decides to regulate the sport more extensively. Three options are outlined: increasing the intensity of scrutiny exercised under the internal market rules, changing the approach towards cooperation with football stakeholders, or enacting a European Sports Act. After examining the benefits and drawbacks of each route, it will be claimed that, on balance, the most promising avenue is EU legislation which sets out minimum governance standards as well as substantive requirements, including on human rights, gender equality, and athlete welfare. The conclusion will offer some reflections on what would need to happen for the proposal to materialize, discussing the role of advocacy coalitions and crises in bringing about regulatory change.

Energy has been a fundamental precondition for human survival, economic development, and preserving dignity throughout history. At the same time, the increasing digitalisation of energy systems, especially in the EU’s energy transition, creates new challenges, especially concerning rights such as data protection and privacy. Although European Law restricts the right to energy as a consumer right, it expressly recognises data protection and privacy as fundamental rights. This article outlines the theoretical, historical and legal foundations of the right to energy and analyses the implications of digitalisation for its realisation while also addressing emerging concerns about data protection and privacy rights. Furthermore, it identifies the tension points between the Recast Electricity Directive (RED) and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and provides recommendations for a legal framework that harmonises the abovementioned rights.

This paper discusses how epistemic and ontological commitments shape different understandings of European Union (EU) law and why it matters. Many key debates on EU law—and some of the fiercest disagreements in European legal scholarship—go back to divergent epistemic and ontological commitments. While these philosophical commitments usually operate in the background, this paper foregrounds them. A core aim of the paper is to denaturalise the epistemic and ontological groundings of mainstream approaches to EU law and, thus, to demarginalise approaches more peripheral to the centres of power in EU law-making and in EU legal academia.