In oligopoly, imitating the most successful competitor yields very competitive outcomes. This theoretical prediction has been confirmed experimentally by a number of studies. A recent paper by Friedman et al. (J Econ Theory 155:185–205, 2015) qualifies those results in an interesting way: While they replicate the very competitive results for the first 25–50 periods, they show that when using a much longer time horizon of 1200 periods, results slowly turn to more and more collusive outcomes. We replicate their result for duopolies. However, with 4 firms, none of our oligopolies becomes permanently collusive. Instead, the average quantity always stays above the Cournot–Nash equilibrium quantity. Thus, it seems that “four remain many” even with 1200 periods.

Cooperation motives are traditionally elicited in experimental games where players have misaligned interests that yield noncooperation in equilibrium. Research finds a typology of behavioral types such as free riders and conditional cooperators. However, intrinsic motives in conflict settings such as appeasement, punishment, and greed are elusive in such games where noncooperation is the equilibrium prediction. To identify types in the dark side of human interaction, we apply hierarchical cluster analysis to data from the Vendetta Game, which has a payoff structure similar to public goods games but a dynamic move structure that yields cooperation in equilibrium. It allows us to observe diverse non-equilibrium conflict strategies, and to understand how feuds perpetuate. We relate our method and typology to other social dilemmas.

This empirical study extends the public choice literature on the allocation of death during war by examining the political economy of foreign fighter deaths in the Russo-Ukrainian War since the 24 February 2022 invasion. The study explores the roles played by various demographic factors, military institutions, and international trade relations in determining the number of foreign fighters from a variety of countries who have died in support of either Ukraine or Russia during the Russo-Ukrainian War. Unlike other related studies, this study also investigates the importance of, and finds evidence in support of, both economic freedom and a robust democracy in shaping the choices made by individuals around the globe to venture to, and die fighting on, the battlefields of Ukraine.

We show that the exposure to war-related violence increases the quantity of children temporarily, with permanent negative consequences for the quality of the current and previous cohorts. Our empirical evidence is based on Nepal, which experienced a 10 year long civil conflict of varying intensity. We exploit that villages affected by the conflict had the same trend in fertility as non-affected villages prior to the onset of conflict and employ a difference-in-differences estimator. We find that women in affected villages increased their fertility during the conflict by 19%, while child height-for-age declined by 10%. Supporting evidence suggests that the temporary fertility increase was the main pathway leading to reduced child height, as opposed to direct impacts of the conflict.

There is little research studying the effects of political violence on financial markets over decades, especially in an atmosphere where the violence manifested itself in heterogeneous and geographically widespread ways. This article examines the authoritarian edifice of Tsarist Russia in the nineteenth century to examine the way in which capital markets perceived political instability in a country which had paradoxically strong financial institutions but weak political ones. Using a novel database on political violence in Russia in the nineteenth century matched to monthly financial data from Russian equity markets, this article provides strong evidence that Russia's financial markets were negatively affected in the long run by political violence. Consistent with modern views of financial information, the effects of political violence were quickly incorporated into asset prices, but the specific magnitude of such violence was different depending on where the violence occurred and in what manner. Overall, it appeared that political violence was perceived very negatively by investors in Russian equity markets.

How do deported migrants engage in civic and political life after being forcibly returned to their home countries? Do experiences during the migration journey impact how deportees (re)engage? We explore how extortion experienced during migration alters political and civic engagement preferences. We utilize a multi-method approach combining original survey data of Guatemalans deported from the United States and a series of qualitative deportee interviews. We find that extortion during migration has a significant direct effect on increased citizen engagement. Economic hardship exacerbated by extortion may mediate this effect. Overall, extortion experienced while migrating has long-term financial consequences for deportees, with implications for their reintegration and the broader health of civic institutions in their home countries.

How stable are democracies? Building on Ghosal and Proto (2009, Journal of Public Economics, 93, 1078–1089), the conditions under which democracies are stable are analyzed. How these conditions relate to the threat of the rise of right wing populism poses to democracies is discussed.

Nigeria has experienced bouts of violent conflict in different regions since its independence leading to significant loss of life. In this article, we explore the average effect of exposure to violent conflict generally on labor supply in agriculture. Using a nationally representative panel dataset for Nigeria from 2010 to 2015, in combination with armed conflict data, we estimate the average effect of exposure to violent conflict on a household's farm labor supply. Our findings suggest that on average, exposure to violent conflict significantly reduces total family labor supply hours in agriculture. We also find that the decline in family labor supply is driven by a significant decline in the household head's total number of hours on the farm.

This paper studies the spatial deployment of temporary settlements in Extremadura in 1932-1933 and 1936. The literature has stressed the role of bottom-up forces driving settlements in 1933 and 1936, perhaps making land reform in Extremadura an interesting case study of local collective action-driving policy implementation in a developing economy. Contrary to this view, we argue that there was an equal or more important role of the top-down, programmatic design of land occupations, which explains a large share of the spatial and temporal variation of expropriations and settlements.

The role of citizens' collective action for the emergence and consolidation of democracy is generally analysed within bottom-up theories. However, top-down theories show that elites might impede or promote both democracy and collective action through a set of strategies which are often unobserved and vary over time. Democratic persistence and change require then to be assessed in a dynamic framework which considers both citizens and elites' strategies. For such reason, on a large sample of countries in the period 1971–2014, we jointly estimate the probability of collective action and democracy using a Structural Dynamic Model. This allows us to account for the dynamic nature of the two political phenomena under investigation by controlling for their persistence, for initial conditions and time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. We find that collective action matters for the emergence of democracy but not for its consolidation which seems to be related to more structural economic factors.

Social theorists frequently argue that social cohesion is under threat in developed societies from the multiple pressures of globalisation. This article seeks to test this hypothesis through examining the trends across countries and regions in key indicators of social cohesion, including social and political trust, tolerance and perceptions of conflict. It finds ample evidence of long-term declines in cohesion in many countries, not least as exemplified by the erosion of social and political trust, which is particularly dramatic in the UK. The trends are not entirely convergent, since on most indicators Nordic countries have become more cohesive, yet each country faces challenges. In the final section the authors argue that different ‘regimes of social cohesion’ can be identified in specific clusters of countries which are based on different cultural and institutional foundations. In the ‘liberal model’, which applies in the UK and the US, the greatest threat to cohesion comes not from increasing cultural diversity, but from increasing barriers to mobility and the subsequent atrophy of faith in individual opportunity and meritocratic rewards — precisely those beliefs which have traditionally held liberal societies together.

Le présent papier s'articule autour des problèmes environnementaux globaux, et se propose de lier les négociations internationales au comportement de précaution. Cela nous conduit à montrer que le comportement de précaution peut aussi bien survenir à la suite d'un échec des négociations qu'à la conclusion d'un accord. Dans le premier cas, ce comportement a moins d'impact que la coopération de tous, mais tend tout de même à réduire la portée de la défection. Dans le second cas, si un accord est signé entre un petit nombre de pays, le comportement de précaution constitue un moyen d'élargir la portée de la coopération sans déstabiliser la coalition coopérante. Nous montrons, enfin, que l'adoption de sanctions à l'encontre des pays non-coopérants ne garantit pas pour autant l'émergence d'un large mouvement de coopération.

This paper presents a growth model in which property rights are insecure and costly to enforce. Losses of property provide the impetus to establish institutions which seek to enforce property rights. Institutions are shown to implement policies that enforce property rights. The model establishes that economies in which the institutional structure does not adequately protect property rights grow slowly, or not at all, while countries with better property rights protection grow in accordance with the standard neoclassical model. Because income inequality is a primary incentive to violate another’s property rights, the model also provides a positive theory of income redistribution. Empirical tests of the model’s predictions demonstrates that government expenditures that enforce property rights raise per capita income growth.