Contemporary issues such as the COVID-19 pandemic and Big Tech offer opportunities to recapitulate and extend the book’s insights in this concluding chapter. More specifically, debates over public health and digital technology reveal the practical implications attending more theoretic inquiries about private actors’ status in constitutional politics. The weightiness of these issues thus supports increased urgency to study the position of private actors vis-à-vis the constitution and brings to the fore the particular value of the book’s republican framework in this enterprise. The republican framework may offer guidance regarding the contexts and goals to which horizontal application is suited, as well as the ways in which it may be further supported as a practical and a normative matter. By appreciating the ways in which horizontal application is republican, constitution-makers and courts might shore up this practice by taking steps to make it even more republican. This may come through renewed emphasis on the legislative function or contestation more generally in constitutional politics.

The rise of the European Union elicits both theoretical and practical questions about notions of citizenship, and citizens’ duties, that transcend nation-state boundaries. Indeed, its supranational nature invites reevaluation of the concepts of citizenship and political community more generally. In a similar vein, this chapter considers the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) practice of horizontal application in light of republican theory. The fact that the ECJ has introduced horizontal application in EU law at all is itself a point of interest, given the debatable status of the Union as a political community in the republican sense. This book’s republican framework points toward a conceptual relationship between the development of horizontal application and the fate of the European Union as, in fact, something more than a loose union of nation-states. Put differently, a full flowering of horizontal application is theoretically tied to wider acceptance of the European Union as a fully fledged political community, complete with citizens’ duties to one another and a common good of which to speak.

Citing contemporary issues, this introduction situates horizontal application as one potential response to political-legal questions involving private actors. It makes the case for renewed scholarly attention to horizontal application as an increasingly common practice in constitutional politics. More specifically, examining horizontal application through the lens of republican political theory uncovers new significance in the discourses surrounding this constitutional practice. This theoretical perspective also elucidates how horizontal application is different from traditional constitutional understandings. After introducing the book’s republican framework, Chapter 1 explains the rationale underlying the choice of contexts examined in subsequent chapters. It concludes with an explanation of the stakes, as well as the potential benefits and drawbacks of horizontal application considered in the following chapters. Finally, it previews the concluding chapter’s argument that horizontal application may be further supported with certain political and institutional adjustments to make this practice even more republican.

While the traditional vertical understanding of rights remains rooted in an older liberalism, the horizontal model possesses affinities with republican thought. This chapter makes these connections between constitutional practice and some of the core texts in the history of political thought. In addition to different understandings of the relationship between spheres, or the individual and community, liberal and republican thought generally conceive of liberty differently, a distinction that also maps onto the vertical and horizontal models in important ways. Rights in a horizontal understanding take on a new significance as more than mere rights, but ends as well, that potentially implicate the polity as a whole. Thus, horizontal application gives rise to new calls for parity between public and private spaces, which, in turn, amounts to a new source for understanding the duties of private actors. Such concepts as the common good and duty, integral to republican thought, come to the fore and offer a baseline for conceptualizing the parity and duties to which horizontal application gives rise. The chapter illustrates how these republican concepts occur in the context of actual cases and larger constitutional discourses, drawing examples from Germany, India, and South Africa.

Human beings are inherently social. Millennia of evidence show that people improve their lives through various forms of social organization (societies). Therefore, individual, group, and community thriving is intrinsically connected to the advancement of society. Guided by the theory of the common good, this chapter defines the characteristics of a thriving society through the fundamental contribution of fairness, worthiness, and wellness. In terms of fairness, thriving societies require an equitable distribution of benefits and responsibilities (distributive fairness), transparent procedures and active participation (procedural fairness), and a system that both punishes wrongdoings and rewards honorary behaviors (reciprocal fairness). Regarding social worthiness, a thriving society embraces inclusion and diversity, promotes active citizenship, and recognizes the contribution of those who contribute towards societal betterment. Lastly, social wellness emphasizes that a society must prioritize the holistic well-being of all members. Finally, we argue that the synergistic contribution of fairness, worthiness, and wellness can transform societies into places where everyone can thrive.

Humankind has entered the Anthropecene era. The world faces numerous threats to the survival of humanity and other species. While diverse disciplines have risen to meet global challenges, psychology has largely focused on individual aspects such as cognition, emotion, and behavior. This chapter aims to support psychology in adapting to global challenges by introducing a novel tool, the panological model. This model comprehensively accounts for the complex relationships between multiple levels of analysis. The first part of the chapter introduces the core characteristics and innovations of the panological model, which seeks to expand upon Uri Bronfenbrenner’s bio-ecological model. These advancements include: a paradigm shift from anthropocentrism to ecocentrism, a new systemic vision, and a redefiniton of the role of time. The second part of the chapter combines the model with the principles of global fairness, wellness, and worthiness. This integration shows how psychology can gain a deeper understanding of macro-level phenomena, enabling it to address pressing global challenges like international conflicts, pandemics, and environmental sustainability.

Provides a brief overview of elements of the Islamic normative tradition. I consider three key concepts – justice, the common good and community – and ambiguities of their contemporary application. The primary focus of the discussion concerns resources (including wealth and property) – their attribution and distribution. To whom do wealth, property and resources belong, and what are their responsibilities? How, by whom, and for what purposes are wealth and resources to be distributed, and who has the authority to make such determinations? In broad strokes, I outline how, according to religious norms, resources ought to be utilized and managed for the sake of the "common good." The purpose of this discussion is to provide a framework that facilitates a deeper understanding of the extent to which religious norms have been instrumentalized and at times, reformulated in the conduct of the four oil-financed institutionalized practices explored in subsequent chapters.

I conclude with a review of my findings in Chapters 3–7. I elucidate the relationship between “oil” and “Islam” and what that relationship teaches us about politics in Gulf monarchies. The overwhelming message is that with their abundant wealth, Gulf rulers have been exploiting not only oil rents but also religious doctrine and its (re-)formulations to function as tools of social management and social control. Their aim is to bolster their authoritarian ambitions: ruling families’ capacity to both dominate and shape their societies and retain their monopoly over resources. For the sake of maintaining – and enriching – dynastic states and constructing the nation, oil and Islam are their principal tools.

In this treatise Bartolus applies the Aristotelian schema of constitutions to the city republics of his own day and argues that for the smallest such cities, such as Perugia, where Bartolus lived and worked, the most appropriate form of government is ‘government by the people’ or regimen ad populum. He argues that aristocracy is preferable in larger cities such as Venice and Florence, and then corrects Giles of Rome’s universal endorsement of monarchy as the best constitution by limiting it to much larger political organizations which hold sway over other peoples. He argues that where monarchy is appropriate at all, elective monarchy is superior to hereditary, and established by law for the Roman empire and for the church. Bartolus uses Roman constitutional development as presented in the Roman law to exemplify the different systems of rule brought into being by the growth in numbers and influence of a people. He casts his treatise in part as a lawyer’s version of the Aristotelian constitutional analysis made popular by the theologian Giles of Rome. The concept of the common good is central to Bartolus’s treatment.

In this treatise, Bartolus of Sassoferrato explores the phenomenon of factionalism in the fourteenth-century Italian city republics. He gives an account of the local nomenclature of Guelfs and Ghibellines, relating these labels historically to the papal and imperial camps in the contested region of northern Italy. He explains that, nowadays, such labels have only local relevance, not ideological significance. He then analyses the legality of joining such parties, concluding that if the reason for doing so is to uphold the common good, it is lawful.

Chapter 9 concludes this discussion of human perfection by looking at what many see as the most pressing global issue today – human environmental pollution and destruction. Viewed through the lens of the luminous television series A Perfect Planet, this chapter addresses the issues of unwarranted suffering from natural forces, religious and secular experiences of awe at biodiversity, and secular eschatological fears of ecological catastrophe. Damage to a perfect planet is viewed as a serious challenge to claims about human perfection. The Dominican theologians Herbert McCabe and Brian Davies (the latter debating with the philosopher Michael Ruse) are both used critically. Hope, however, is seen in the leadership offered by Pope Francis’ encyclical Laudato si and in a growing consensus among both faith and secular traditions that this damage must be addressed by effective action, based upon the moral concept of the common good, for the sake of both a perfect planet and the astonishing biodiversity (including human beings) within it.

After evaluating the different elements explaining the power structure, the final chapters of the book are devoted to policy strategies. As an introduction to these, the chapter considers ethical issues: the individual-society opposition, the notion of the common good, the debate concerning the notion of justice (deontological versus consequentialist conceptions, meritocratic versus equalitarian views, equality of starting points versus equality of points of arrival), the different notions of freedom (such as positive versus negative freedom. Rossellis liberal socialism is illustrated, together with Croces criticism. Finally, a distinction is drawn between fanciful and realistic utopias.

This chapter focuses on transnational solidarity conflicts, that is, a new type of distributional conflict which encompasses both quarrels about the adaptation of domestic welfare systems to EMU requirements and the distribution of costs and benefits between Member States. It seeks to understand how constitutional accountability may contribute to constructive management of such conflicts. In addressing this question, the chapter focuses specifically on the accountability goods of openness and publicness. It analyses the case law of the German and the Portuguese constitutional court as well as of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) following the Eurozone crisis. Domestic courts applied mostly a deductive approach to accountability in the EMU and thereby also tended to ‘nationalise’ transnational solidarity conflicts rather than acknowledge their European dimension. By contrast, the CJEU made the European constitutional dimension visible, thereby contributing more to openness. However, by focusing mostly on economic constitutional values, while only hesitantly applying other constitutional values such as social rights as a benchmark for substantive accountability it ensured publicness only to a limited extent. In conclusion, both domestic and European constitutional accountability mechanisms did not ensure meaningful accountability in the sense of concretizing and re-negotiating constitutional common goods.

There is no getting around the fact that we live in a social and cultural environment and there is no denying the fact that the laws of our society deeply affect its character. From the fact that law impacts the environment of those who are subject to it, it does not follow that legal officials should attempt to improve its ethical character. This chapter presents a presumptive case for why legal officials are not only permitted but also have a duty to do so. Ethical environmentalism is the political project that aims to satisfy that duty. After clarifying the notion of an ethical environment, and relating it to the aspirational ideal of the common good of a society, the chapter argues that ethical environmentalism is supported by considerations of fairness. The relation between fair treatment and neutral treatment is then explored and clarified. Ethical environmentalism presupposes a public/private distinction. The shared public world, as contrasted with the private thoughts and activities of individuals, defines its scope. With that in mind, the chapter distinguishes two forms of legal moralism, character-centered and status-centered, and discusses how each form relates to the project of ethical environmentalism.