Using data from the 2018–2019 National Congregations Study, I explore the relationship between women’s descriptive and substantive representation in American religious congregations. In particular, I examine the relationship between the presence of clergywomen or gender inclusive leadership policies (i.e., congregational policies allowing women to serve as the head pastor or priest) and a congregation’s participation in “women’s issues” political activism. Statistical analysis reveals partial support for my hypotheses. Collective gender representation, as demonstrated through the presence of gender inclusive leadership policies within a congregation, predicts pro-LGBT activism and the number of “women’s issues” a congregation pursues. This project serves to extend understanding of 1) how descriptive gender representation relates to the substantive representation of women’s interests in religious congregations and 2) the comparability of women’s leadership across political and religious contexts.

Houses of worship are often shelters after the storm. Yet, as climate change fuels natural disasters and communities increasingly rely on congregations during disaster recovery, are houses of worship ready to be houses of refuge? Examining clergy influence, does a higher concern about climate change by clergy result in improved congregational disaster readiness? Data for the study come from a 2019 nationwide survey of clergy. The survey includes measures of congregational disaster preparedness along with one of the first applications of the SASSY climate concern measure to clergy. Results show that clergy have mixed opinions about climate change and that congregations led by high climate-concern clergy are no more prepared for disasters than those led by unconcerned clergy. While seemingly a null result, understanding the relationship between leaders, climate change, and disaster preparedness benefits the study of leader influence on organizations, religion and climate change, and the politics of disaster resilience.

Attitude towards assisted dying was assessed among 3,230 people who took part in the Church 2024 survey. Asked to respond to the statement ‘I am in favour of allowing assisted dying’, 51% disagreed, 28% agreed and 21% were uncertain, suggesting a sizable minority were either in favour of changing the law or undecided. Those against changing the law tended to agree that it is wrong for someone to take their own life, that only God can give and take life and that the risks of abusing any process are too great. Opinion varied across various groups, with women more in favour than men, the old more in favour than the young, laity more in favour than clergy and Anglo-Catholics or Broad Church more in favour than Evangelicals. Personal and psychological disposition predicted some variations in attitude towards assisted dying, probably because they predisposed individuals to taking more general liberal or conservative stances. The patterns are similar to those seen in several different moral issues debated in the Church of England in the last three decades, suggesting assisted dying might follow a similar trajectory in years to come.

Even amidst a decline in religious affiliation, nearly half of the U.S. population still attends religious services at least once a month, and congregations remain the single largest non-profit organizational type across the nation. Therefore, congregational influence on political attitudes and behavior is a crucial line of inquiry. We analyze interviews of 94 congregational leaders to better understand why they address or avoid political issues when preaching. Our research reveals that clergy use theological and pragmatic reasoning to determine whether they explicitly include political discourse in their sermons. Our findings are noteworthy in that clergy from a wide range of religious traditions use similar reasoning, and the same rationale can lead different clergy to adopt contrasting approaches to political content in sermons. Thus, this paper provides nuanced insight into the relationship between religion and politics and may help foster greater mutual understanding in a deeply divided political and social climate.

Applying the balanced affect model of clergy psychological wellbeing, as conceptualised by the Francis Burnout Inventory (FBI) and operationalised by The Index of Balanced Affect Change (TIBACh), this study explored the impact of seven sets of variables on individual differences in perceived changes in positive affect and negative affect among 737 clergy in the USA serving in the Episcopal Church during the Covid-19 pandemic. The seven sets of variables were: personal, psychological, contextual, ministry-related, church orientation, theological stance, and attitudinal. The data supported the balanced affect model of clergy psychological wellbeing by demonstrating how different variables predicted individual differences in negative affect and in positive affect. For example, clergywomen showed no differences from clergymen in terms of positive affect, but higher levels of negative affect; active self-supporting and retired clergy showed no differences from stipendiary clergy in terms of positive affect, but lower levels of negative affect; Evangelical clergy showed no differences in negative affect, but higher levels in positive affect. The balanced affect model provides insights into how clergy may be better supported during a pandemic.

We use data from the new and nationally representative National Survey of Religious Leaders, supplemented with the 2018 General Social Survey, to examine the extent to which clergy are politically aligned with people in their congregations. Two assessments of alignment—clergy reports of how their political views compare to the political views held by most people in their congregations, and comparisons between clergy and lay voting preferences in the 2016 election—yield the same findings. Clergy in Black Protestant and predominantly white evangelical churches are much more likely to be politically aligned with their people than are Catholic or, especially, white mainline Protestant clergy, who often are more liberal than their people. Contrary to media reports suggesting that evangelical clergy are now likely to be less conservative than their people, the vast majority are either politically aligned with, or more conservative than, their members.

Scholars have acknowledged that there is a systemic aspect to Catholic clerical sex abuse that acts as a type of grammar structuring behaviors and responses. Feminist critics in particular stress the patriarchal nature of the abuse that connects bishops, priests, and boys together. This essay argues that in addition to public systems dominated by men, there are also private structures that facilitate abuse. Using the extensive primary documentation assembled by BishopAccountability.org, I focus on the space of the home and the unique orientations of mothers and fathers to better understand the dynamics of clerical sex abuse in the American Catholic church. The essay begins with the abuse of a Milwaukee priest who tormented his parishioners from 1945 until his forced “retirement” in 1970. Drawing on themes found in this case, I examine other abuse narratives—focusing on how the Catholic understanding of alter Christus and mid-twentieth-century gender roles made the “good Catholic home” a particularly vulnerable place for abuse. Since public and private systems overlap, it is essential that the domestic aspects of clergy sex abuse also receive a full analysis.

The English Parliament's conquest of Ireland in the mid-seventeenth century left memories of violence that persist even in modern Ireland. This article considers one important but neglected dimension to the English campaign and subsequent rule: the attack on Irish Catholic devotional objects, including statues, images, vestments. The damage to the physical fabric of Irish Catholicism coincided with the wider effort to suppress all its public rituals and structures and must be considered as a key element to Parliament's campaign to punish, reform, and convert the Irish. Reconsidering both older and recently published sources allows for significant new insights and contextual questions surrounding parliamentarian iconoclasm, its Irish manifestations, and indeed early modern iconoclasm more widely. In particular, it is argued here that this is not and cannot be an Irish story alone: while previous accounts have emphasized Ireland's tragedy in these years, there are wider English and British contexts that must be brought to bear. Irish iconoclasm can be placed into a chronology of English violence since the late 1630s and points to a wider British preoccupation with popish plots and idolatry, in which the Irish were central characters. The iconoclasm unleashed in Cromwellian Ireland underlines the braided nature of conflict across the mid-seventeenth century.