This chapter explains the third strategic dimension of lawfare: externalities. As a form of strategic legal action, hegemonic environmental lawfare aims to create projective externalities, referring to the consequences that seek to be borne by environmental movements beyond the actual legal cases. The chapter is divided into two subheadings: (a) Leadership Decapitation, which discusses the outcomes of hegemonic environmental lawfare targeting those who are regarded as the central figures or leaders of environmental struggles, and (b) Creating Externalities, which elaborates on the impacts of lawfare beyond lawsuits concerning environmental movements in the countries.

Chapter 3 presents the political contexts of the United Kingdom (UK) and Sweden ahead of the Iraq war, demonstrating how the foreign policies of each host country affected diasporic state-building. While the UK’s involvement in the intervention opened the doors for the diaspora to join in the post-2003 governance and institution building of Iraq, Sweden’s anti-war stance and lack of involvement diverted mobilisation largely towards civil society building and transporting the tradition of democracy from the bottom-up. The chapter introduces the Iraqi opposition groups who mobilised and collaborated with the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency in the United States, and Foreign and Commonwealth Office in the UK. It explores the divergences between the groups and how they shaped the coalition’s thinking ahead of the intervention, as well as laying the foundations of the post-2003 state. It also investigates the diasporic groups and actors in Sweden and how they mobilised through civil society. Sweden’s anti-war movement and global protests against the Iraq War galvanised a very different locus of political activism and mobilisation towards preventing the war from taking place and curbing Sweden’s role in the intervention. It thus diverted involvement towards supporting Iraq’s civil society and its democratisation process.

The book’s introduction draws the reader to the unique case study of the Iraqi diaspora and its involvement in state-building following military intervention in 2003. The chapter introduces the book’s puzzle, which questions why diasporas have thus far been ignored in analyses of state formation and state-building. Contextualising the book within the diaspora and state-building literature will also delineate the book’s unique contribution to both fields and its wider appeal to policymakers, the media, and thinktanks. The chapter then underlines the book’s original conceptual and empirical contribution to the study and understanding of the role of diasporas in state formation and state-building processes, which also includes the role of civil society in weak, postcolonial, post-conflict states. This is then followed by an outline and breakdown of the book to guide the reader.

Chapter 1 discusses the main concepts of the book, including diaspora and transnationalism, providing an understanding of the cross-border connections that link people and nations across time and space under modern processes of globalisation, facilitating diasporic political engagement. This is then followed by introducing the conceptual framework of diasporic state-building, which is drawn from three theoretical discussions related to the state, state-building, and civil society literature. The framework captures how diasporas are engaged in this process through an original conceptual and typological framework that operationally captures the two categories associated with building a state: firstly, diasporic mobilisation towards building the apparatus of the state and, secondly, supporting and challenging the state through civil society. This original conceptual approach to state-building captures the plethora of activity that is shaping the evolution of conflict, post-conflict, and post-colonial states. The framework guides the reader as well as demonstrating the multiple domains in which diasporas are influencing state formation under modern processes of globalisation.

This chapter analyses the public and private governance structure of the EU AI Act (AIA) and its associated ecosystem of compliance and conformity. Firstly, the interaction of public and private governance in the making of AI law meant to concretise the rules in the AIA is analysed. Secondly, the focus shifts to the interaction of public and private governance in the Act’s enforcement through compliance, conformity and public authorities. Thirdly, it is argued that the EU legislature has neither fully developed public private governance nor the interaction between the two. As a result, there are many gaps in the involvement of civil society in compliance, conformity and enforcement of private regulations, in particular harmonized technical standards, Codes of Practice and Codes of Conduct. Moreover, the extreme complexity of the AIA’s governance structure is likely to trigger litigation between AI providers and deployers and the competent surveillance authorities, or more generally in B2B and B2C relations.

This chapter provides an introduction to the book. It sets the stage by highlighting contrasts in India’s economy, democracy, and society. It then discusses the main topics covered in the book – democracy and governance, growth and distribution, caste, labor, gender, civil society, regional diversity, and foreign policy. The chapter also outlines the three themes that comprise the main arguments of the book. First, India’s democracy has been under considerable strain over the last decade. Second, growing economic inequalities that accompanied India’s high-growth phase over the last three and a half decades are associated with the country’s democratic decline. Third, society has reacted to changes from below but there are limits to societal activism in contemporary India.

Chapter 3 focuses on Hegel’s critique of liberalism. It starts by discussing the preface to the Philosophy of Right in order to challenge the widespread assumption that Hegel is averse to robust social criticism. Afterwards, the chapter considers two main causes for the limited recognition of his work’s critical dimension. The first is the tendency to read Hegel’s book as a horizontal progression, fuelled by the accumulation of different aspects or layers of freedom. This kind of approach misrepresents the qualitative transformation that is at stake in the transition from civil society to the state, which only a vertical reading can adequately convey. Second, the Philosophy of Right’s critical import has also been obfuscated by some of Hegel’s own philosophical positions. Despite his intended sublation of the stage of civil society, his account of the state remains wedded, in important ways, to the former’s underlying logic. As the chapter seeks to show, if we accept Hegel’s claim that a rational state must synthesize the particular and the universal dimensions of human freedom, we must reject some of his political options as partly or wholly un-Hegelian.

Chapter 4 reassesses Hegel’s views on property and its role within a rational state. In the Philosophy of Right’s initial stage, devoted to ‘abstract right’, each person is defined as an independent legal agent, with the right to own and exchange property. From this standpoint, the political sphere is but a prolongation of the legal sphere and the state is reduced to an external authority, charged with regulating existing property relations. As the progression unfolds, however, this legalistic framework is called into question: it turns out that individual rights are not the true foundation of the state, but a part thereof, subordinated to a wider commitment to the common good. Yet while this commitment is clearly affirmed by Hegel, it is at odds with the priority he accords to private property, in the progression’s later stages, over other forms of ownership. Taking a different path, the chapter argues that a Hegelian theory of property entails a critical revision of Hegel’s actual treatment of property rights. If the state is to bring together the citizens’ particular interests and the common good, the ownership of society’s productive resources must be shared by all of its members.

The concept of post-Kantian perfectionism clarifies the mutual polemics in the Hegelain School, contrasting Feuerbach’s naturalism, which combines pre- and post-Kantian motifs, with the more exigent Kantianism of Bruno Bauer; and it elucidates sharp disagreements with anti-perfectionists like Max Stirner. The concrete historical situation comes under scrutiny of post-Kantian perfectionist thinking. French Revolutionary factions and the contending parties in the German Vormärz express distinct views of freedom and follow different developmental trajectories. Civil society too reveals its inner dynamics. Rejecting Leibniz’s pre-established harmony and Wolffian mutuality, but also markedly differing from Kant and Schiller, the non-compossibility of interests in civil society is the theoretical innovation here. The irreconcilable opposition of interests, central to Marx, is not a view original with him. In Bauer, autonomy means divesting oneself of particular interests to the extent that they inhibit institutional transformation.

History for German idealism is the expression of practical reason, the process of gradually bringing about the accord of subject and object. In Hegel’s conception of the history of freedom, different configurations of ethical life embody changing assessments of the self and the world, and contain essential contradictions whose resolution is the key to progress towards new and more complex forms. The dialectic of the will in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right is an exposition of the idea of spontaneity, endowing itself with concrete content as it moves through its dimensions of universality, particularity, and singularity. Hegel demonstrates that modern institutions are not mere limitations, but legitimate conditions for the exercise of freedom. The rationality of the real, however, does not preclude a critical engagement. Close examination of current relations and institutions as exemplifying ideas of freedom reveals nodal points where practical interventions are likely to be fruitful in effecting change. An implicit, historicised ‘ought’ in Hegel, arising from his reworking of the logical categories, marks his place within post-Kantian perfectionism.