We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
The Introduction gives a brief account of Bartolus’s life, explains the world of medieval law in which he worked, and then explains the political context of the northern and central Italian city republics for which he worked, and whose problems he sought to analyse. It explains that tyranny was Bartolus’s main preoccupation, even in the two treatises ostensibly concerned with other questions. It then presents the main arguments of his three political treatises and Bartolus’s main political theory in his academic legal commentaries, and describes the later influence of these treatises in European political theory. The Introduction also argues that Bartolus conceived of these three treatises as one composite treatment of tyranny.
Bartolus of Sassoferrato, the leading jurist of his day, whose influence spanned several centuries, first formulated an equation of family and its property (substantia) that cast an image of family enduring over time in the immediate passage of property from father to son. That tie was so pivotal that a son could be termed, however incorrectly in strict legal terms, as a co-owner of the estate with his father. Disinheritance was difficult to conceive of in these terms, although it was an allowed legal institution. Subsequent jurists followed Bartolus's lead, even though they were likely to face only situations where the paradigmatic passage of haereditas from father to son was not possible.
Recommend this
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this to your organisation's collection.