Chapter 9 examines the resurgence of Israel’s policy of engagement under the premiership of Ehud Barak, who used his position as primary decision-maker to redirect the focus of Israel’s peace negotiations from the Palestinians to Syria. The chapter scrutinizes this process by focusing on the Blair House meeting, the Shepherdstown summit and the encounter in Geneva betweenUS President Bill Clinton, and Syria’s President Hafez al-Assad. The chapter provides a novel explanation of how Barak remained hostage to a set of domestic factors, which was decisive in the failure of the Israel-Syria peace process. These domestic factors included hostile Israeli public opinion to withdrawing from the Golan, Barak’s fractured coalition, and attempts to impose tough conditions through legislation on subjecting any peace agreement with Syria toreferendum. However, the Syrian president was equally inhibited by domestic factors, which determined his decision to reject the Israeli offer relayed by US President Clinton, to withdraw from the Golan Heights in exchange for a comprehensive peace. Al-Assad’s domestic constraints included his own ill health, his commitment to Ba'ath ideology, and his concern that concessions to Israel might torpedo the succession of power from him to his son, Bashar.

Chapter 10 explores the foreign policy of Israel towards the Middle East in the wake of the collapse of the Israeli-Syrian peace process, focusing on its relations with Iran, Lebanon, and the Palestinians. The chapter provides the first account of Israel’s foreign policy towards Iran, arguing that, by 2000, it had matured around four principles - deterrence, defence, interception, and support for multilateral efforts to curb Iran’s nuclear program. In addition, it is the first analysis to demonstrate how and why the demise of Israel’s foreign policy of engagement gave rise to its unilateralism foreign policy posture. The analysis shows that, despite nine years of negotiations, rigid historical, national and religious narratives, political opposition, and hostile public opinion, were still preventing a land-for-peace exchange to end Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians. Israeli-Lebanon relations were free of these shackles, which is why Ehud Barak was able to order the IDF to withdraw unilaterally from Lebanon. Barak’s foreign policy style, which was based on untying Gordian knots swiftly and decisively, was a clear advantage in this context, as domestic political conditions were ripe and international legitimacy was forthcoming.