In chapter 15, Going off the gold standard? (July 14 - August 21) attention shifts to Great Britain and the weakness of sterling. As pressure on sterling increases, Norman fall sick with ’stress’ and he has to take leave of absence from the bank in late July, only to return after Britain has left gold on September 21, 1931. With Norman out of the picture, his deputy Ernest Harvey takes over as the Banque de France and the New York Fed arrange a $200 million credit to the Bank of England. Tensions arise between Harvey on the one hand and Clément Moret (Banque de France) and Harrison on the other, about the use of the credit. The weakening of sterling continues and in late August, Harry Siepmann writes an ominous note discussing the consequences of Great Britain leaving gold.

Chapter 11, Francis Rodd makes sense - and a plot, (June 9 - June 20). In this chapter I change focus to Rodd’s retrospective sensemaking. I quote in full a long note by Rodd written in the aftermath of the loan from Bank of England where he tells his narrative of what happened from the BIS board meeting on June 8 to June 16. Rodd clearly blame the French government, but not the Banque de France. After this, the perspectiev shifts to that of Pierre Quesnay, who tells his view about the British loan and how it came about. The chapter ends by showing how Rodd leaving Vienna.

In chapter 2, central bankers and their world, I first present the most important protagonists and a few other actors. They include Montagu Norman and Harry Siepmann of Bank of England, George L. Harrison of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Francis Rodd of the Bank for International Settlements. I discuss their background and worldview as they were headed into the 1931 crisis. Having presented these main actors and a few others, I proceed to present their world and how they saw it in 1930 and early 1931. The world was already in the midst of the great depression and private bankers as well as central bankers and other decision-makers were aware that they were dealing with crisis and radical uncertainty that might bring about the end of the gold standard and capitalism. I discuss the actors view of the "present world depression" and how they viewed the gold standard and their options as they got ready for trying to save the world from economic disaster.

This chapter narrates the twists and turns in monetary relations that culminated in the Tripartite Agreement. After discussing the franc's deteriorating position from the spring of 1935 and the implications for Britain's management of the pound, it turns to the pivotal Anglo-American relationship. Distrust was pervasive, but the two sides eventually came to an understanding, assuring each other that they would not further depreciate their currencies in response to a fall in the franc. With London and Washington talking again, there was now space for an agreement to facilitate French devaluation. The resulting Tripartite Agreement, announced on September 26, 1936, set forth revolutionary principles for monetary cooperation, including the rejection of competitive depreciation and exchange controls. With time, the Agreement--informal and vague, unconventional and pathbreaking--would turn the page on the chaos of earlier years and redefine the international monetary landscape.

This chapter focuses on the reciprocal gold facilities created in the weeks after the Tripartite Agreement to enable exchange intervention, viewed as essential for the Agreement to have any chance of success. Each country agreed to convert its currency into gold for other members at a price set each day. The system squared the circle of how to enable countries to intervene in currencies that were not universally convertible into gold and played a crucial role in keeping members on the same page during a time of immense political and economic strain. It established a technical foundation for broader collaboration and was integral to the Tripartite Agreement's success in preventing policymakers from relapsing into the antagonisms of earlier years.