Chapter 3 rewrites two cases that deal with pregnancy discrimination: International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, and Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. The original Johnson Controls case struck down a broad fetal protection policy forbidding women of childbearing age from working in jobs with lead exposure, but the Court failed to acknowledge the hardships of the individual women excluded, ignored evidence that men’s offspring also suffer harm from excess lead exposure, and failed to suggest cleaning up workplaces with toxic substances, rather than excluding employees from valuable jobs. The rewritten opinion cures these omissions and disavows the stereotypes of a policy assuming that all women are potentially mothers. The feminist judgment in Young holds that an employer providing accommodations for employees with physical restrictions similar to those of pregnancy must provide the same accommodations to a pregnant employee. It highlights the history of discrimination against pregnant women – a significant cause of women’s subordination in the workplace, with many women forced to quit as a consequence of employers’ shortcomings.

Chapter 4 examines three cases highlighting intersectional approaches to appearance discrimination. The rewritten Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co. exposes the harm caused when employers have gender-specific grooming policies. It rejects the unequal burdens test and concludes that any sex-specific grooming policy violates Title VII unless the policy is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). The rewritten opinion of EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions holds that refusing to hire black women who wear their hair in locs is race discrimination under Title VII. It explores the history of discrimination against black women because of their hair and eliminates the immutability requirement, confirming that discrimination against race-related cultural practices is race discrimination. Finally, the rewritten opinion in Webb v. City of Philadelphia reverses the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to a City that fired a Muslim female police officer because she wore a religious headscarf. The rewritten opinion focuses on the intersectional harm based on sex and religion, and concludes that the City offered no evidence of harm at all, much less evidence of undue burden.