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Andrews ” Reath offers a new interpretation of the doctrine, set forth in the Critique of Practical Reason, that the moral law is given to us as a “fact of reason.” Reath proposes that we understand this doctrine through the idea that what is given in this fact is the reality of a basic rational power. He argues that Kant accepts a generally ‘Aristotelian’ conception of a rational power, so that pure practical reason is a rational power with its own formal end and its own formal principle, which we know to be the moral law. Exercises of this power are (in some sense) guided by a subject’s consciousness of its formal principle, and therein lies its spontaneity and self-activity.
This chapter lays out the book’s argument in two parts. First, it first develops the concept of self-determination as understood by state and non-state actors in the Global South to apply to the legitimate exercise of power in the international system. Rather than requiring strict sovereignty and exclusion of outside actors, self-determination is about the nature of cooperation and international involvement. It requires that people, through their governments, be able to domestically affirm international rules and to meaningfully participate in their enforcement. The second part of this chapter explains how establishing regional organizations as an authority over issue areas can be a strategy for realizing self-determination and why, in the case of human rights, it necessitated compromising on the norm of non-interference. This strategy is effective at deterring pressure from Western governments because it combines and appeals to widely held beliefs about the legitimacy of self-rule with beliefs about the importance of exercising power through international organizations.
Why have regional organizations become authorities over human rights and international intervention, and what explains the differences in regional authority across different regions? Why did leaders in some parts of the Global South go from rejecting any interference to arguing for the central role of regional organizations in international interference? This chapter introduces the central questions addressed by this book and provides an overview of its core argument, focusing on the creation of new regional authority at one important moment: the emergence of regional organizations as authorities over human rights. This was the first time when leaders in the Global South changed from arguing for complete non-interference to arguing that legitimate interference should be carried out by or with the involvement of regional organizations. They did so as a strategy of subtle resistance to new challenges to self-determination, in the form of economic enforcement of human rights by Western governments. In regions targeted by this enforcement, leaders responded by establishing their regional organizations as authorities over human rights, accepting regional interference for the first time.
This chapter explores implications of the argument made in this book for other areas of international relations scholarship and for contemporary international politics, with regional authority and self-determination continuing to occupy an important place in the international politics of the Global South. It considers how incorporating the importance of self-determination, and the idea of regional organizations as a means of realizing it, can provide more complete understandings of contemporary political phenomena. I discuss how the argument in this book sheds light on the Global South’s dissatisfaction with liberal norms and institutions, the openness of democratic states in the Global South to cooperation with illiberal powers, and present-day dynamics of regionalism, including the creation of “new” regions and the growth of “authoritarian” regional organizations.
The idea that regional organizations rightly occupy a central place in human rights, global governance, and international intervention has come to be taken-for-granted in international politics. Yet, the idea of regions as authorities is not a natural feature of the international system. Instead, it was strategically constructed by the leaders in the Global South as a way of maintaining their voice in global decision-making and managing (though not preventing) outside interference. Katherine M. Beall explores changes in the norms and practice of international interference in late 1970s and early 1980s, a time when Latin American and African leaders began to empower their regional organizations to enforce human rights. This change represented a form of quiet resistance to the imposition of human rights enforcement and a transformation in the ongoing struggle for self-determination. This book will appeal to scholars of international relations, international history, and human rights.
The major purpose of this chapter is to reduce the confusion that exists in the marketing discipline as to the meaning of power. Thus, channel power is first defined as a construct. The value of the supplier achieving major channel coordination objectives through power and its appropriate use cannot be overestimated. An explanation is given as to why sales manager power is critical in direct channels. Then, how firm power can be built in inter-firm relationships with distributors and retailers is explained. An evaluation is made of the strengths and weaknesses of channel coordinators applying supplier power through alternative communication strategies with intermediaries. Importantly, the factors leading to firm control of company salespeople and independent channel members are recognized. Finally, an analysis is made of how suppliers can effectively deal with powerful intermediaries.
Chapter 4 elaborates a new theory of chilling effects – as conformity and compliance. The author argues that chilling effects are best understood as a more powerful form of conformity and compliance – just like conformity, chilling effects reflect a behavioral tendency to self-censor and conform in the face of threats like surveillance, uncertain laws, or personal threats. The chapter also elaborates what the author deems the four “chilling effect” factors: observation; uncertainty; personalization or personal threats; and power and authority, which help predict and explain chilling effects. The chapter explains not only why chilling effects are so powerful in their impact on our behavior, but also their additive effects – how each additional chilling effect “factor” amplifies or magnifies the impact and scope of a chilling effect.
Chapter 3 examines what has given Trump a motive to publicly challenge IHL. Section 3.1 details how foundational moral values tend to make conservatives more receptive to overt challenges to IHL. It describes how Trump and various right-wing allies have activated these values, which mirrors tactics Trump has used in other areas of campaigning and governance. Section 3.2 presents findings from an original, national survey of U.S. respondents fielded in 2020 during Trump’s first term. Results from four separate experiments show that conservatives tend to disregard IHL more than other respondents, which correlates with emphasizing their foundational moral values. Additionally, treatments using real-life video clips of Trump demonstrate that impunity coalition messaging can magnify these effects.
In the early decades of the twentieth century, young and mostly urban Egyptian men and boys started writing in new ways. Inspired by the recent emergence of mass-circulated print fiction in both books and periodicals, they became infatuated with writing fiction. Their writerly endeavours often clashed with the textual preferences of their fathers, and represented a major shift in the understanding of what written texts are for, and who can write them.
One check on the abuse of power by the political elite is the ability of people to move away from those who abuse their power. In agricultural societies, this is difficult to do because individuals who move must leave their land behind. Land is not mobile. One result of the Industrial Revolution was that capital displaced land as the most significant factor of production, and capital is more mobile than land. The mobility of physical and human capital has constrained the abuse of authority and has contributed to the shift from feudal political institutions toward democracy.
The scope of authority of the political elite tends to expand because those in authority seek more power, and the masses often perceive problems and demand that those in power do something to address those problems. The demands of the masses are supported by the academic concept of market failure, which legitimizes the expansion of the elite’s scope of authority. Despite theories of market failure that are used to justify government action, most government programs do not correspond with the problems identified by economic theory. Interventions in response to the demands for government action often create additional unforeseen problems, which leads to more demands for government action. The result is that the scope of authority of the ruling class tends to continually expand as the political elite identify problems and the masses demand that the elite address those problems.
Institutions that lower transaction costs are effective only to the extent that they are enforced. Effective enforcement requires that the enforcers are able to display a capacity to use force sufficient to make people perceive that noncompliance would be futile. Institutions of authority, based on the threat of force to be used against those who do not comply, are controlled by the political elite. Once the ruling class has this authority, they can use their power to extend their scope of authority to other activities, such as producing goods and services and redistributing income and wealth. Because institutions of authority are a necessary foundation for an orderly society, there is no effective way for the masses to escape from being subject to them.
This chapter gives an overview of dictionaries, broadly conceived to include monolingual and bilingual wordlists for readers at all levels, in the history of English from the beginnings of Anglo-Saxon literacy to the present day. It argues against a reductive view of dictionaries as primarily agents of standardisation and authority, expressions of the ‘dismal sacred word’. Its arrangement is roughly chronological, beginning with Anglo-Saxon glossography and the lexicography of later medieval English, before turning to the bilingual and monolingual English dictionaries of the early modern period; to the monolingual dictionaries of the eighteenth century; and to the relationship of lexicography to two very important aspects of Late Modern English, namely its pluricentricity and its use as an acquired language. It concludes with a last look at the relationship of English lexicography with the ‘dismal sacred word’.
To the extent they consider the matter, tort theorists sometimes assume that the subjects of authority in tort law are the citizens of the state whose tort law applies. This assumption underlies democratic and social contractarian accounts of how to justify the authority of tort law. But as the doctrine of private international law—particularly choice of law—reveals, the subject of tort law is not the citizen, but the generic person; and authority in tort law is not grounded in the state-citizen relationship. Instead, choice of law rules reveal a more complex picture of how tort structures authority. Here, I offer a sketch of an approach that can justify tort law’s authority over persons, not citizens. And I discuss how this analysis may require us to rethink not just the subjects of tort law but also the subject of tort law: the nature of its primary rights and duties.
Since the advent of Web 2.0, the interaction of user-generated content on participatory platforms has democratized content creation and reshaped communication, identity, authority, and knowledge across various fields, from health to politics, amid the post-truth phenomena. This timely book provides essential insights into the transformative effects of the evolving digital landscape. It gives a comprehensive analysis of how areas such as health, politics, and language ideology have been influenced by digital communication, and explores how online spaces have amplified minority voices, promoting inclusion and representation, while also addressing the backlash that challenges human rights associated with Internet use and the free exchange of information. The book also examines the intersection of law and digital crime, revealing the legal challenges posed by the online world. As our understanding of identity, knowledge, and authority increasingly intersects with Generative AI, it also discusses the impact of intelligent tools and the challenges they present.
It is both unavoidable and rational to form beliefs on the basis of testimony. But whose testimony should I trust? To whom would it be rational to outsource my beliefs? In this paper, I explore the role (if any) that intellectual virtues might play in rational belief formation on the basis of testimony. I begin by considering Linda Zagzebski’s proposed intellectual virtue of being able to recognize reliable authority. I argue that this quality, which is surely an excellence, is better categorized as a skill than a virtue. Then I explore whether other intellectual virtues contribute to assessing the reliability of a testifier. I consider two options: the role of virtues in (1) directly assessing a testifier and (2) indirectly assessing a testifier. With respect to (1), I follow Neil Levy and argue that such assessment requires like expertise to the testifier as opposed to intellectual virtue. With respect to (2), I argue that intellectual virtues are helpful in performing indirect assessment and they enable us to avoid social structures that undermine our ability to perform this assessment. Given that we all must form beliefs on the basis of testimony, this role for intellectual virtues is of great importance.
Heresiological catalogues are one of the most distinctive forms of literature concerning heresy and have also traditionally been one of the most difficult to interpret. This chapter traces the development of this form of writing, focusing on the most productive period in late antiquity, and explores how much such works were intended to be employed in active ‘heresy-hunting’ and what other purposes they might have had, including increasing the authority and status of their authors.
This chapter surveys different ways in which ‘heresy’ has been conceptualised by a variety of writers, both within the periods in which it arose and in later centuries. Tracing a number of different inflections to the charge of heresy, the chapter suggests that we might see it not only as constructed by orthodox authority but as a means by which ‘authority’ itself is reaffirmed; and in conclusion suggests some ways through which modern historians might then reconceptualise their search for ‘dissent’ in past times.
This chapter addresses the question of how to understand Socrates’ willingness to obey the law and accept the death penalty in the Crito, seemingly in contrast to his rebellious attitude towards legal authority in the Apology. Its aim is to show that in submitting to the laws of Athens, Socrates does not betray his own ideal of self-government, in the sense of personal autonomy and freedom, which he explains and defends in several dialogues. However, it argues that Socrates conceives of self-government as the freedom to subject oneself to what used to be an external authority, but in such a way that this authority now becomes an integral part of one’s own moral stance. In order to throw further light on this issue, it also draws upon the discussion of the rule of law in the Statesman, where the notion of self-government similarly plays an important role.
This chapter “deprovincializes” the histories of Lake Kivu’s societies in the “frontier”, (present-day Rwanda and Congo), during the second half of the nineteenth century. It challenges the dominant narrative of the “greater Rwanda” thesis, which argues that colonial border-making “amputated” Rwanda from a significant portion of its territory. The chapter shifts the attention to the societies Rwanda claimed were part of Rwanda since centuries. The chapter shows that while the Nyiginya kingdom – Rwanda’s antecedent – indeed increasingly sought to exert control over and integrate some of these societies, especially under mwami [s. King] Rwabugiri, their control was incomplete, at times impermanent, and often contested. Such complexities are overlooked when considered from a state-centric, often ideological perspective premised on the stability of a centralized authority. The histories and memories of local communities within the region defy these narratives and provide critical alternatives to what has been largely accepted as mere prologue. These questions are not merely a matter of historical debate, they remain crucial for understanding contemporary debates. While the geographical complexity of this chapter makes it a challenging read, it is foundational for understanding the historical continuities and contradictions throughout the book.