This chapter introduces the central ideas in Darwin’s Expression, poses the main interpretive questions that scholars have raised, and outlines my answers to those questions. Why does Darwin analyze expressions in terms of heritable habits, recalling Lamarck’s debunked theory of evolution, when his own theory of natural selection provides a superior alternative? My answer is that Darwin embraces Hartley’s associationist theory of mind, which posits habit as the basis of thought. I claim that multiple puzzling features of Expression are resolved once we view Darwin as an associationist philosopher.

This chapter traces the development of Darwin’s theory of emotion and expression from 1838 to 1872, emphasizing his many engagements with associationist philosophers. I demonstrate that all three of Darwin’s principles of expression are derived from the works of associationist philosophers, especially David Hartley, Erasmus Darwin, Herbert Spencer, and Alexander Bain.

This chapter surveys associationist theories of emotion leading up to Darwin’s Expression. These theories analyze emotions as sequences of thoughts, feelings, and actions, linked together by principles of association. Thomas Hobbes contributes to this tradition the idea that emotions can be analyzed as “trains of thoughts.” John Locke contributes the idea that these trains are connected by the “association of ideas.” David Hume contributes the idea that association can occur via contiguity, resemblance, or cause and effect. David Hartley puts these ideas together to present the first full-fledged associationist theory of mind and emotion. Harley’s ideas are developed further by Joseph Priestley, Erasmus Darwin (Charles’s grandfather), Thomas Brown, James Mill, Alexander Bain, and Herbert Spencer, among others. This tradition in the philosophy of emotion has never before been described or analyzed.

Janum Sethi investigates Kant’s application of hylomorphism to the theory of self-consciousness, as evident in the distinction he draws between transcendental and empirical apperception. According to Sethi, the standard reading of this distinction overlooks that it is drawn in terms of a distinction between transcendental and empirical unity of apperception, which can be traced to the distinct natures of the two faculties that produce these unities: whereas the former is brought about according to the rational laws of the understanding, the latter is a result of the psychological laws of the imagination. In light of this, Sethi argues that the two types of apperception amount to a subject’s awareness of two cognitively essential aspects of herself: namely, her spontaneity and her receptivity – that is, of her capacity to receive the material for cognition through the senses and of her capacity to impart a certain form to this material through the use of the understanding.

We have seen how imagination can plausibly be taken to be part of a perceptual referential apparatus. Sensory imaginations therefore contribute to the fulfillment of an empirical intuition’s cognitive roles. The aim of the analysis in this chapter is three-fold: (1) to throw more light upon what is added by imagination to empirical cognition of objects, in the form of perceptual memories and quasi-perceptual anticipations – this is lower order objectification that goes beyond mere perceptual objectification in its own right but which may also be part of higher order objectification through concepts; (2) to show how imagination that mixes with perceptions may also lead to false perceptual judgments – misperception is a topic of this chapter, whereas hallucination is discussed in Chapter 9; (3) to bring out the lack of reality-character of fictional imaginations, even when these imitate perceptions, so as to throw more light upon the nature of perceptions.

A survey found that 1 in 6 (16%) of children aged between 5 and 16 years has a probable mental illness. Furthermore, research has shown that most of these disorders have their origins in childhood, even if they are typically diagnosed in adulthood. Childhood represents a critical period of physical, cognitive, psychological, behavioural and social transformation. Identifying risk and protective factors that alter the typical developmental trajectory could have long-term educational, social, societal and economic implications. This chapter will address what is meant by the term risk factor and how these can be identified, provide examples of risk factors thought to be important in child and adolescent psychiatry. It concludes with some case vignettes to highlight the importance of taking a developmental biopsychosocial approach to identifying risk, considering predisposing, precipitating, perpetuating and protective factors.

This chapter contends that colonial-era rules permeated EEC development cooperation through the European Development Fund. But more importantly, it shows that with personnel transitions from colonial to European administrations, a colonial attitude towards legal compliance was transferred within the European Commission.

Chapter 10 examines correlation, the statistical procedure used to measure the degree of association or relationship between variables. It is bivariate, since we typically apply this statistical technique to measure or describe the association between two variables or groups. The correlation coefficient, which measures the degree and direction of an association, is discussed, as are some of the issues regarding the application and interpretation of correlations. The chapter also outlines the many different measures of association but focuses on Pearson’s r. It emphasizes the definitional formula and z-scores for understanding and computing the correlation coefficient.

This chapter addresses symmetry’s implications for expressive freedom and religious liberty. Symmetry supports maintaining First Amendment law’s current focus on neutrality, notwithstanding emerging critiques that this approach lacks a strong historical foundation and unduly limits governmental regulation of offensive or dangerous ideas. At the same time, symmetric interpretation counsels against expanding the emerging “First Amendment Lochnerism” that threatens to extend constitutional protections for free expression into areas of economic and workplace regulation. A preference for symmetry also supports protecting religious groups, when possible, through more general protections for freedom of expressive association rather than through religion-specific constitutional doctrines. Although religious liberty may once have been a symmetric principle, today religion-specific protections risk placing constitutional law on one side of a fraught political divide over religion’s place in public life.

The search for the causes of disease is an obvious central step in the pursuit of better health through disease prevention. In the previous chapters we looked at how we measure health (or disease) and how we look for associations between exposure and disease. Being able to identify a relation between a potential cause of disease and the disease itself is not enough, though. If our goal is to change practice or policy in order to improve health, then we need to go one step further and decide whether the relation is causal because, if it is not, intervening will have no effect. As in previous chapters, we discuss causation mainly in the context of an exposure causing disease but, as you will see when we come to assessing causation in practice, the concepts apply equally to a consideration of whether a potential preventive measure really does improve health.

“Dream Defenders and the Inside Songs” explores the extent to which Percy Shelley's poetic legislation is able to counter racial divisiveness and antiBlackness in “our” communities and universities. It enlists Fred Moten’s poem “barbara lee” and Benjamin Zephaniah’s characterization of Shelley as the “original dub poet” to claim that what is “wholly political” about the semantic and sonic relays activated in Shelleyan songs is their capacity to disrupt the associational logics undergirding white-body supremacy and literary Anglo-Eurocentrism. Tracking the process enacted in “barbara lee,” by which reliance on “the inside songs” enables Representative Lee to vote against President Bush’s military authorization act, the chapter proposes some pedagogical and creative-critical revisions to Shelley studies that might effect a similar “inside outward opening” of Shelley. Leftist celebrations of “Red Shelley” have emphasized the collective and street-performative dimensions of his then-unpublished protest songs. The chapter probes the salience of a “black” Shelley by recasting two familiar Shelleyan devices. One emphasizes sound’s activation of embodied knowledge that circumvents the priority granted to textual literacy. A second accentuates association as a process that expands the affective-cognitive connections mobilized by a word and by encounters with another person. In other words, the intimacy between who we know and what we know is an underacknowledged fact of scholarly method. Diversifying one is key to diversifying the other in an ongoing cycle. Cultivating the two promises to transform “defenses” of poetry into live performances of antiracism.