It is common to argue that the communist-led Democratic Republic of Vietnam, following the theory of "people's war," defeated the French in the First Indochina War. This argument is correct everywhere except for southern Vietnam. France's slow and systematic implementation of what it called "pacification," in concert with allied self-defense and paramilitary forces, slowly brought increasing parts of the Mekong Delta under the control of France and its allies. In reaction, The Resistance pursued a four-prong strategy: 1) they strengthened the communist core of the Resistance by recruiting cadres, purging "unreliable" non-communists, and working to capture control of the Resistance at all levels; 2) they reached out to potential allies like the Khmer, Chinese, Buddhists, and Catholics; 3) they practiced outreach towards rivals and enemies through proselytization (Địch vận); 4) they strengthened Resistance ability to engage in a sophisticated repertoire of violence ranging from intimidation to conventional warfare. Despite this sound strategy, the Resistance precipitously shifted to conventional warfare. The French-led forces took advantage of this costly mistake. France's commission of war crimes in keeping food from the population, its access to increased American funding after 1949, and contingent factors also contributed to Resistance failure.

In the standard narratives of modern Vietnamese history, France's agreement to make Vietnam "independent" in 1949 within the framework of a new entity, the French Union, is seen as a sham. Instead, the DRV's military victory over France at Điện Biên Phủ in 1954, immediately followed by negotiations in Geneva, marks the key point of rupture: the collapse of the French empire in Indochina and the beginning of a new era of contested sovereignty in which two Vietnamese states vied for control of one Vietnam. In this view, the non-communist State of Vietnam (1949-1955) is treated as an ersatz state, a product of French machinations. This chapter contests this view. The creation of a new Vietnamese state, despite all its flaws, inaugurated the transition of sovereignty from the French colonial state to its new Vietnamese successor. The chapter shows the relevance of the precolonial heritage to decolonization. It looks at the "unmaking" or "disassemblage" of the French colonial state and its "reassemblage" into the new Vietnamese state. It examines issues of ethnicity and citizenship.