Digital technologies are often seen as a powerful means for poverty reduction. Yet, much of the existing research focuses on macro-level outcomes, leaving gaps in understanding individual-level mechanisms and the processes behind successful digital interventions. This study addresses these gaps by examining how online platforms, developed as social innovation efforts, enable smallholder farmers in Japan to escape poverty. Using a qualitative, case-based approach, we analyze six social enterprises and explore how stakeholder mobilization drives the success or failure of these platforms. We developed a schematic model that captures the nonlinear, collaborative nature of the social innovation process. Our findings reveal a systemic account of why and how only two of the six platforms achieved meaningful impact, offering insights into the factors that shape the effectiveness of digital technologies in reducing poverty. In the end, our model offers practical implications for future digital poverty reduction initiatives.

Using quantitative analysis and qualitative in-depth interviews conducted in China in 2022–2024, this study explores a new form of grievance expression and dispute resolution adopted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP): the online petition. While digital technology can receive and handle public complaints more efficiently, local officials under intense top-down pressure and increased accountability often only address citizens’ demands performatively to satisfy the political needs of their superiors. The study of “mechanical responsiveness” reveals that the CCP’s reinforced scrutiny of petitioners as well as local officials not only fails to prevent and resolve disputes at the source but also may lead to increased social discontent and pent-up resentments in the long run when the government fails to live up to its promises. Citizens will also lose faith in the institution and become politically disengaged if grassroots officials are always trying to curry favour with their superiors and avoid punishment rather than address public demands.

Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) in China often struggle to secure loan financing. In response, the government has required banks to increase credit for MSMEs and incorporate digital technologies into traditional credit evaluation models. In 2018, the state introduced “credit easy loan” digital lending platforms under its social credit system to facilitate collateral-free loans for MSMEs in a bid to enhance financial inclusion and social trust. Meanwhile, the actual implementation of these initiatives remains understudied. Drawing on six months of ethnographic fieldwork, this paper examines how “packaging agencies” act as intermediaries in preparing and “beautifying” bank loan applications. These agencies may manipulate credit data and leverage close relationships (guanxi) to help clients obtain loans, while banks may tacitly approve their practices to fulfil their financial inclusion requirements. Through such processes and in a supposedly digitalized system, a single MSME loan multiplied into ten loans, large companies became small businesses, and one housewife became a creditworthy microentrepreneur.

The Digital Silk Road (DSR) is usually described as the digital component of the Belt and Road Initiative that is reshaping the digital world order. Most existing research is concerned with the possible long-term consequences of the DSR rather than on what the DSR encompasses, how it developed and how it has changed since it was announced in 2015. We address this gap by reconstructing the origins of the DSR within China, with a focus on both rhetoric and concrete plans as they developed between central and provincial actors. We collected and analysed a corpus of 31 national and 130 provincial DSR-related plans. In contrast to prevailing views of the DSR as a unified, outward-facing strategy, we show that after an initial surge of related documents, the central government ceased to discuss the DSR in a meaningful way. Provincial governments then appropriated its rhetoric to legitimize their own digitization agendas, including upgrading infrastructure in poorer provinces and remaining plugged into export markets for those with an IT industry. Rather than reshaping the digital world order, the DSR has been appropriated by some provincial governments to attempt, mostly unsuccessfully, to shore up their own digital ambitions.