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Few studies have examined the effects of early-life nutrition interventions on adolescent physical activity (PA). We aimed to examine the long-term effects of small-quantity lipid-based nutrient supplements (SQ-LNS) on adolescent PA and sedentary behaviour (SB) and to describe current adolescent PA and SB levels in this cohort. In the International Lipid-Based Nutrient Supplements (iLiNS)-DYAD-Ghana trial, 1320 mothers were enrolled and randomly assigned to one of three conditions: (1) daily iron and folic acid during pregnancy and placebo (calcium) from birth to 6 months postpartum (IFA), (2) multiple micronutrient supplements during pregnancy to 6 months postpartum (MMN) or (3) SQ-LNS during pregnancy to 6 months postpartum (LNS). Infants from mothers in the LNS group received SQ-LNS designed for children from 6 to 18 months. We recruited 11–13-year-old adolescents of mothers enrolled in the iLiNS-DYAD-G trial for a 7-d PA and SB assessment using accelerometers (n 305) and self-reported PA and SB (n 508). We compared the LNS with non-LNS (IFA+MMN) groups using ANCOVA models for the following outcomes: mean vector magnitude counts per minute, PAQ-C score and percentage of time in SB, light PA and moderate-to-vigorous PA (MVPA). There were no significant differences between the LNS and non-LNS groups in any PA outcome in minimally or fully adjusted models. Only approximately 50 % of adolescents met the PA recommendation of 60 min/d MVPA, with males more active than females; however, there is room for improvement. SQ-LNS in early life does not appear to have a sustained impact on PA or SB.
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is one of the most important works in the Western philosophical tradition, which made seminal contributions to epistemology, metaphysics, and the foundations of moral philosophy. This second edition streamlines and updates its editors' Introduction, and extensively updates its Bibliography. It renders Kant's terminology and style of argument more accurately and accessibly than any other translation into English. It also supplies more extensive annotation and contextualization of Kant's work than any other edition in English or even in German, recording not only all the variations between the two substantially different editions of the book that Kant published in 1781 and 1787 but, for the first time in any edition, all of the notes he made in his own copy in the period between those two editions. This translation makes well-informed study of the Critique in English more possible than ever before.
Kant presents his conception of the highest good as steering a path between Epicureanism and Stoicism. However, in spite of his differences with Stoicism, namely, his rejection of the ideal of the sage as unattainable for human beings and his insistence upon a conception of freedom of the will that is absent from the ancient doctrine, Kant’s position, especially in the 1790s, ends up being closer to original Stoicism than he recognizes, or at least lets on. Contrary to Kant’s interpretation, the Stoics did not reduce happiness to consciousness of one’s virtue, but allow for the pursuit of happiness as ordinarily conceived within the limits of nature – and so does Kant. Yet Kant’s later conception of the highest good as happiness to be realized in the natural history of the human species, thus in nature, is close to the Stoic doctrine. And, contrary now to some commentators, while Kant still thinks that the possibility of the highest good on this conception needs a theistic underpinning, this is definitely not a specifically Christian position, because it involves no salvific role for Christ.
In his Doctrine of Right, Kant claims that freedom is the only innate right. The Feyerabend Lectures, in contrast, contains a list of many innate rights. I compare Kant’s conception of innate right with Achenwall’s as well as those of Heineccius, Meier, and Hutcheson. Although in Feyerabend Kant lists various innate rights (plural), they roughly correspond to the “authorizations” that Kant develops in the Doctrine of Right from the single innate right of freedom, and even in Feyerabend they are linked to freedom. Not only did Kant have a different basis for right in freedom, his explanation of what the others call innate rights in terms of freedom better explains their importance.
Kant defined 'Right' (Recht) as the condition that obtains among a population of physically embodied persons capable of setting their own ends who live on a finite surface and therefore cannot avoid interaction with each other if each is as free to set their own ends as is consistent with the freedom of all to do the same. He regarded this rational idea, heir to the traditional idea of 'natural Right, as the test of the legitimacy of the laws of any actual state, or 'positive Right.' He clearly considered Right to be part of morality as a whole, namely the coercively enforceable part, as contrasted to Ethics, which is the non-coercively enforceable part of morality. Some have questioned whether Right is part of morality, but this Element shows how Kant's "Universal Principle of Right" follows straightforwardly from the foundational idea of Kant's moral philosophy as a whole.
Can Kant’s theory of fine art serve as a theory of modern art? It all depends on what ‘modern’ means. The word can mean current or contemporary, indexed to the time of use, and in that sense the answer is yes: Kant’s theory of genius implies that successful art is always to some extent novel, so there should always be something that counts as contemporary art on his theory. But ‘modern’ can also be used adjectively, perhaps more properly as ‘modernist’, to refer to art of a particular moment, in some cases superseded by postmodern art. Kant’s theory is not a theory of modernist art in at least one prominent form, the formalism of Clement Greenberg. But other theories, such as those of George Dickie and Arthur Danto, although triggered by particular works of modernist art and meant to accommodate them, were meant to be theories of what art was always doing, and Kant’s is too. In that sense it can be considered a modern theory of art but not a theory of modern art.
What should our buildings look like? Or is their usability more important than their appearance? Paul Guyer argues that the fundamental goals of architecture first identified by the Roman architect Marcus Pollio Vitruvius - good construction, functionality, and aesthetic appeal - have remained valid despite constant changes in human activities, building materials and technologies, as well as in artistic styles and cultures. Guyer discusses philosophers and architects throughout history, including Alberti, Kant, Ruskin, Wright, and Loos, and surveys the ways in which their ideas are brought to life in buildings across the world. He also considers the works and words of contemporary architects including Annabelle Selldorf, Herzog and de Meuron, and Steven Holl, and shows that - despite changing times and fashions - good architecture continues to be something worth striving for. This new series offers short and personal perspectives by expert thinkers on topics that we all encounter in our everyday lives.
This chapter shows how Vitruvius developed his three fundamental categories within a naturalistic and empiricist conception of human life and perception. In the Renaissance, Leon Battista Alberti and Andrea Palladio, inspired by Neo-Platonism, took a more rationalistic, mathematical approach to beauty in their theories and their buildings. In the eighteenth century, the Scottish philosopher Lord Kames returned to Vitruvius's empiricist approach, while the French theorist Marc-Antoine Laugier, inspired by the aesthetic theory of Charles Batteux, identified beauty with the imitation of nature, but specifically with the identification of beauty with structural functionality.