According to Karl Marx, “religion is the opium of the people,” and, as a Marxist party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has traditionally regarded religion as a tool used by the bourgeoisie to dull the revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat.Footnote 1 During the Cultural Revolution, traditional Chinese beliefs were classed as one of the “four olds” (sijiu 四旧) and temples were targeted for destruction. However, with the onset of the reform era in the 1980s, the CCP adjusted its policy on religion, incorporating it into the Party’s united front effort. In 1982, the CCP issued its “Basic views and policies on religious issues during the socialist period in China” (Guanyu woguo shehui zhuyi shiqi zongjiao wenti de jiben guandian he jiben zhengce 关于我国社会主义时期宗教问题的基本观点和基本政策), which allowed for the resumption of religious activities under certain conditions and emphasized the preservation of religious artifacts.Footnote 2 This policy has remained unchanged to this day. With the exception of organizations that the CCP considers to be “cults” or “underground religions,” religious organizations – such as the (Buddhist) Shaolin Temple discussed in this article – are permitted to conduct limited religious activities as long as they abide by Party regulations and state laws.
Since the beginning of reform and opening-up, the CCP has adapted its policies on religion to meet the needs of national development and to enhance the resilience of its regime.Footnote 3 In the words of Robert Weller, the CCP has adopted a policy of “blind-eye governance” regarding religion; many religious activities take place quietly outside the policy framework, yet officials do not strictly prohibit them.Footnote 4 Moreover, we find that the CCP has used the Shaolin Temple to help promote party-state policies, such as poverty alleviation.
In this article, we analyse the CCP’s management of religion during the Xi Jinping 习近平 era by examining the case of the Shaolin Caring Orphanage (Shaolin ciyouyuan 少林慈幼院). We also explore the role of Buddhism in the CCP’s united front effort under Xi Jinping. Compared to other religions, Buddhism has been valued as a tool for governing Chinese society and the CCP has sought to transform and utilize it.Footnote 5 One reason why the Shaolin Temple is particularly valued is the important position it occupies in the minds of the Chinese people. The temple, which is located in Dengfeng 登封, Henan province, has a long history, having allegedly been founded in AD 495. During the Cultural Revolution, the temple shared the fate of other religious organizations in China in that it was shut down and the building itself was severely damaged. Since it was reconstructed in the 1980s, the Shaolin Temple has been revitalized, and it now enjoys a close relationship with the regime. The current abbot, Shi Yongxin 释永信, served as a member of the National People’s Congress from 1998 to 2018. He is currently a member of the Standing Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) of Henan province and vice-president of the Buddhist Association of China.
In this article, we reference Lynette H. Ong and identify the Shaolin Temple as a “broker,” specifically a “cultural broker,” in contemporary Chinese governance.Footnote 6 We use the term cultural broker to refer to a social organization with an ideological discourse, such as a religious institution, that assists the authorities in governing society. However, owing to their ideological discourse function, cultural brokers are a double-edged sword as far as the CCP is concerned. For example, the Shaolin Temple is valued and trusted by the public on account of its charitable activities, which the regime has found useful in its poverty alleviation efforts, but the temple’s prestige gives it the potential to become an ideological competitor to the Party and a threat to the CCP’s rule. This scenario illustrates the “dictator’s dilemma” in Chinese politics.Footnote 7 Although the CCP uses the temple to achieve its governance goals, it also fears that the power wielded by the temple could undermine the regime’s position.
The CCP under Xi Jinping has placed a particular emphasis on the development of a united front, or what it terms the “grand united front” (da tongzhan 大统战).Footnote 8 The Shaolin Temple, given its prominent position within the religious world and its potential to help the regime promote its policies, has inevitably become a focal point of the united front effort. To gather first-hand information, we conducted a series of interviews with Shaolin monks starting in January 2024 and conducted fieldwork at the temple from 22 March to 22 June of that year. We also conducted several video interviews after May 2024. We were assisted in our fieldwork by members of the Dengfeng Political Consultative Conference. We used snowball sampling to find our interviewees, who included seven monks from the temple, one lay disciple, three lay staff members, one civil servant involved in the organization of the temple’s charitable activities, one scholar researching the history and literature of the Shaolin Temple and three managers of hotels and restaurants in the vicinity of the Shaolin Temple. All of the interviewees have played some part in the Shaolin Temple’s charitable activities, so we consider the information they provided to be highly credible. The CCP exercises tight control over religious affairs, and for that reason, many of the temple’s monks and employees refused to be interviewed.
The CCP has adopted a two-pronged strategy in dealing with the Shaolin Temple’s charitable activities. While the regime has injected resources into the Shaolin Caring Orphanage, enabling it to assist the local government in alleviating poverty, particularly among children, the bureaucracy has maintained tight control over the orphanage for reasons of “political security.” Political security (zhengzhi anquan 政治安全), a concept that first appeared in 2018, dictates that everything must align with Xi Jinping’s ideas; only when “politics are emphasized” (jiang zhengzhi 讲政治) can Xi’s position be secured.Footnote 9 For example, Xi Jinping reinforces the fear and loyalty of Party cadres through laws and regulations designed to secure his political status.Footnote 10 This practice is also seen in the CCP’s social management. In short, although the Shaolin Temple, as a cultural broker of the CCP, has been encouraged to assist the regime in its poverty alleviation efforts, the temple is also closely monitored to prevent it from becoming an “independent kingdom” (duli wangguo 独立王国)Footnote 11 and a potential rival to the Party.Footnote 12
This article is organized as follows. Next, we present our analytical framework – namely, the dictator’s dilemma as it relates to cultural brokers. Then, we examine the CCP’s manipulation of Buddhist symbolic capital. We go on to discuss how the CCP bureaucracy manages the Shaolin Caring Orphanage, before showing how the CCP has exerted control over the orphanage with injections of resources and actions aimed at achieving political security. We present our conclusions in the final section.
Cultural Brokers and the Dictator’s Dilemma
For some time, the CCP has sought to co-opt new social classes or groups that might assist it in the governance of Chinese society,Footnote 13 thereby transforming itself from a revolutionary party to an inclusive one.Footnote 14 Much of the literature suggests that the CCP uses intermediary organizations, and even individuals, to help it implement its policies.Footnote 15 For example, local governments may use the friends and relatives of petitioners to pressure them to withdraw their protests against the government, a phenomenon described by Yanhua Deng and Kevin J. O’Brien as “relational repression.”Footnote 16 In short, the CCP governs through social organizations or individuals.
Lynette H. Ong identifies three types of brokers in contemporary China: political brokers, economic brokers and social brokers.Footnote 17 Political brokers are grassroots autonomous organizations, such as residents’ committees (juweihui 居委会) or villagers’ committees (cunweihui 村委会), which assist in governing at the grassroots. Economic brokers include individuals, such as huangniu 黄牛, who accept rewards for acting on behalf of either members of the public or the government in conflicts between the state and society, including disputes over home demolitions, forced relocations and lawsuits. The services offered by social brokers are based on the trust they inspire in the public.Footnote 18 The relatives of petitioners mentioned above fall into this category.
Cultural brokers have their own ideological construction and discourse capabilities. At the CCP’s 18th National Congress in 2012, the call went out for China to become a “cultural great power” (wenhua qiangguo 文化强国) by 2035. Against this backdrop, religious sites such as the Shaolin Temple and Buddhist culture in general are seen by the CCP as useful instruments of soft power.Footnote 19 However, the regime is wary of the temple’s ability to engage in ideological and cultural discourse, examples of which include Abbot Shi Yongxin’s 释永信 idea of “Buddhism for all” (dazhong fojiao 大众佛教) and the popularization of the faith.Footnote 20 This discourse presents a serious threat to the Party’s ideological dominance and its atheistic stance.
The influence of political brokers derives from their political credentials. For example, since villagers’ committees are appointed by township Party committees or governments, they are trusted by the authorities. Economic brokers exploit the information asymmetry between the government and the public, allowing them to obtain benefits from both sides. Social brokers rely on a network of relationships, and because they are trusted by the public, the government uses social brokers to assist in policy implementation. In contrast, cultural brokers leverage their “symbolic capital,” which Pierre Bourdieu defines as the ability of an individual or organization to convey knowledge of value and to form this knowledge into socially constituted cognition.Footnote 21 One example of the Shaolin Temple’s symbolic capital is the principle of benevolence, which is intrinsic to Buddhist teaching (Table 1).
Table 1. Four Types of Brokers
The Shaolin Temple, as a cultural broker rich in symbolic capital, is respected by the public and thus can be extremely helpful to the CCP. However, this symbolic capital also makes the temple a potential rival to the Party, capable of inflicting more harm than any other type of broker because of its ability to influence political discourse. We argue that it is this capability that makes the CCP particularly eager to curb the influence of cultural brokers and especially vigilant concerning their activities. Next in order of importance are economic brokers, with social brokers in third place. The CCP regime is most at ease with the political brokers. Our identification of a new category of broker, the cultural broker, represents a significant contribution to the literature on broker politics in contemporary China.
In its management of the Shaolin Temple, the CCP is faced with the “dictator’s dilemma.” The temple’s work with the poor may accord with official policy on poverty alleviation, but at the same time, the Party knows it must prevent the temple from gaining too much power and prestige among the people. Ronald Wintrobe argues that dictatorships may introduce innovations, but they will stop doing so when those innovations jeopardize the survival of the regime.Footnote 22 In other words, dictatorships tend to creep along the spectrum of reform and stabilization. The “dictator’s dilemma,” as conceived by Bruce Dickson, is particularly relevant to the CCP’s governance of Buddhism in China.Footnote 23
In the case discussed in this article – the CCP’s management of the Shaolin Caring Orphanage – the dilemma arises from the regime’s need to balance two priorities. On the one hand, it must provide the orphanage with sufficient resources to enable it to play a part in Xi Jinping’s poverty alleviation efforts; on the other, it must ensure that the orphanage complies with Party policy, in particular by guarding against the indoctrination of the orphans with Buddhist teachings as a substitute for Xi Jinping’s ideology.
Cultural brokers in a dictatorship are inevitably managed and controlled by the bureaucracy, and bureaucrats have two contradictory responsibilities when managing cultural brokers: providing them with resources and curbing their activities to ensure political security. In the next section, we will first discuss how the CCP manipulates Buddhism’s symbolic capital and then explain the related bureaucratic operations. The CCP is prepared to accept Buddhist teachings as long as they help the regime to achieve its policy and united front goals and do not contradict the Party’s ideology. As Kuei-min Chang points out, the CCP is adept at using religious resources for its own ends.Footnote 24
Manipulating the Symbolic Capital of Buddhism
The Shaolin Temple’s symbolic capital makes it particularly useful as a cultural broker. It is noteworthy how the CCP organically integrates (youji jiehe 有机结合) its own ideology with Buddhism, ensuring that the beliefs propagated by the temple align with the Party’s ruling line and assist the CCP with achieving its official goals.
In addition to providing religious solace to believers, China’s Buddhist organizations leverage their symbolic capital to mobilize the masses to participate in public service. Consequently, religion has a significant impact on political operations in contemporary China.Footnote 25 The CCP is adept at integrating Buddhism’s symbolic capital with its official discourse, using it as a tool for serving and governing society.Footnote 26 For example, one of the Shaolin Temple’s mottos is to “Treat even strangers with compassion; if strangers suffer, we suffer with them” (wuyuan daci, tongti dabei 无缘大慈, 同体大悲), a perspective that aligns well with the CCP’s official poverty alleviation drive. The Party has officially recognized the value of religious charities and has mobilized temples to undertake public welfare activities. This approach allows the CCP to reproduce Buddhist ideas and use the temples’ symbolic capital for its own ends.Footnote 27 In addition, the CCP is able to effectively implement its policies through its integration and adaptation of religious principles.Footnote 28
The above discussion highlights what distinguishes a cultural broker from other types of brokers. A cultural broker, such as a Buddhist organization, possesses a strong cultural discourse capability, so the CCP must manipulate this symbolic capital to prevent any clashes with the Party’s ideology. Many Buddhist temples engage in charitable and benevolent activities, which they generally use to propagate Buddhist doctrines.Footnote 29 However, Buddhism has traditionally avoided any involvement with state power, following the maxim: “Buddhism is not affiliated with royal power, so monks do not have to kneel in front of the ruler” (shamen bujing wangzhe lun 沙门不敬王者论). However, in China under Xi Jinping, Buddhist organizations cannot keep the state bureaucracy at arm’s length; to be useful in poverty alleviation work, their leaders must maintain good relations with local officials and be prepared to toe the official line.Footnote 30 As Gareth Fisher states, the Chinese party-state has never allowed religious groups to use their charitable activities to escape CCP control or to expand their power.Footnote 31
This relationship of “both unity and struggle” (ji lianhe you douzheng 既联合又斗争) is characteristic of the CCP’s united front efforts.Footnote 32 This article highlights how the CCP uses the symbolic capital of its united front “targets” to enhance its own governing capabilities, while at the same time endeavouring to keep a tight rein on these targets’ religious activities.Footnote 33 Although Buddhist organizations tend to cooperate with the CCP, they are never fully trusted by the Party.Footnote 34 From a united front perspective, manipulating the symbolic capital of Buddhism not only allows the CCP to use the religion to promote its policies but also allows it to monitor these organizations.
In China, religious and charitable organizations are managed by united front work departments (UFWDs), which coordinate the work of other relevant sectors within the bureaucracy. This system of “integrated fragmentation” is characteristic of China under Xi Jinping,Footnote 35 and involves one lead department coordinating the work of other agencies and institutions to achieve a particular goal.Footnote 36
Case Study: The Bureaucracy and the Charitable Activities of the Shaolin Temple
The relationship between the CCP and the Shaolin Temple changed after the beginning of the reform period. As a Buddhist organization, the temple was a pioneer in poverty alleviation, offering assistance to the sick and elderly in its vicinity from the 1980s. In 1993, the temple established the Shaolin Charitable Foundation, which has cooperated with the government in disaster relief efforts and has donated supplies and relief funds to disadvantaged groups around the world.Footnote 37 Since its aim was to alleviate poverty – and poverty alleviation was, until recently, a priority goal of the regime – it was officially recognized as a “patriotic religious organization.”
The Shaolin Temple’s close relationship with CCP officialdom is due in part to the influence of its current abbot, Shi Yongxin, who has been in post since 1999. Abbot Shi believes that the temple should serve the community as well as politics, and in recent years, the temple has gained a degree of political prominence through its involvement in poverty alleviation, one of Xi Jinping’s favoured policies. The temple has also participated in relief efforts for natural and man-made disasters,Footnote 38 provided support for orphans and helped poor families. These initiatives have allowed the temple to play an important religious role and have garnered it prestige among the public.
The charitable work of the Shaolin Temple is complex and wide ranging. For the purpose of this analysis of the CCP’s management of religious charities, we focus on just one aspect of these activities: the Shaolin Caring Orphanage (see Figure 1). Originally established in 2004 under the “One thousand orphans relief” (qianming guer jiuzhu 千名孤儿救助) programme, which was jointly sponsored by the Shaolin Temple and the Henan Provincial Charity Federation, the orphanage has since become the most institutionalized of the temple’s charitable organizations.Footnote 39
Figure 1. The Shaolin Caring Orphanage
Table 2 shows the number of poor children rescued by the Shaolin Caring Orphanage between 2015, when China launched its targeted poverty alleviation strategy, and 2019, when the Zhengzhou government announced that it had reached its poverty alleviation goal. During this period, the orphanage provided for the children in its care at a cost of 20,000 yuan per child per year, and it also donated supplies to poor families in Zhengzhou city. After 2019, the orphanage was forced to adjust its activities.Footnote 40 Although it continued to take in young children in need of help, it was not permitted to call them “poor children” (pintong 贫童). This case demonstrates that while the CCP was eager to make use of the temple’s standing to achieve its social welfare and poverty alleviation goals, it also recognized that it must keep that prestige in check to ensure that its own position was not threatened.
Table 2. Number of “Poor Children” Admitted to the Shaolin Caring Orphanage, 2015–2019
Source: Based on information from interview with monk from Shaolin Caring Orphanage, Henan, 7 April 2024, as well as the official WeChat account of the Shaolin Temple and reports from the Henan Provincial Charity Federation. See “Shaolin ciyouyuan 5ge xiaohuo zuotian dou lingdaole dahong bao” (Five children from Shaolin Caring Orphanage all received big red envelopes yesterday). Shaolinsi guanfang wangzhan, 24 August 2016, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/MD4sb29pOQ0MONSbVj-ozA. Accessed 3 February 2025; “Cishan nuandongxing zoujin Dengfeng wei 146ming guer songqu xinchun zhufu” (“Charity warm winter tour” went to Dengfeng to send New Year blessings to 146 orphans). Henan sheng cishan zonghui, 28 January 2019, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/LxJoOPvgxM2WaPuOtl59-Q. Accessed 3 February 2025.
Figure 2 shows how the CCP bureaucracy governs the charitable activities of the Shaolin Temple. The Party and government departments that interact with the charitable organization, and the lines of authority between them, are shown on the left-hand side of the figure. All of the departments are ultimately controlled by the Henan provincial UFWD, which leads the process of “integrated fragmentation.” The right-hand side of the figure shows how the CCP has made use of the Shaolin Caring Orphanage and injected resources into it while at the same time ensuring that it does not threaten political security. We elaborate on this later in the article.
Figure 2. How the Bureaucracy Governs the Shaolin Caring Orphanage
Here, we show how the CCP bureaucracy coordinates its management of the Shaolin Temple’s charitable activities. Figure 2 shows that the Henan provincial UFWD is ultimately responsible for controlling the activities of the Shaolin Caring Orphanage; the provincial UFWD directs the work of the provincial ethnic and religious affairs commission (ERAC) and the civil affairs department (CAD) (as a Buddhist organization, the orphanage is registered with the CAD). Arrow ① indicates how both the Henan provincial ERAC and CAD receive operational guidance from the provincial UFWD. In 2012, the “Opinions on encouraging and regulating the religious community’s participation in public welfare and charitable activities” (Guanyu guli he guifan zongjiao jie congshi gongyi cishan huodong de yijian 关于鼓励和规范宗教界从事公益慈善活动的意见, Opinions hereafter), jointly issued by the National Religious Affairs Administration, the Central United Front Work Department (CUFWD) and the Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA), called for religious organizations engaged in charitable activities to be supervised by the Party and to receive guidance to ensure that they adhered to socialist principles.Footnote 41 Through a process of institutionalization, the CCP has allowed religious organizations, under the supervision of the bureaucracy, to assist in the governance of society.Footnote 42 At a time when Xi Jinping was calling for the establishment of a “grand united front,” the united front work system was playing an extremely important role in coordinating and leading the CCP’s efforts to control religious charities.
In Figure 2, the two arrows labelled ② indicate power relationships within the united front work system. Particularly since Xi Jinping came to power, candidates for the position of head of the subordinate organizations of the Henan provincial UFWD – such as the UFWDs of Zhengzhou, a prefecture-level city, and Dengfeng, a county-level city – are nominated by the head of the immediately superior UFWD.Footnote 43 These nominations are discussed and approved by the Party committee at the same level, and the final decision rests with the secretary of the Party committee. This system gives the heads of superior-level UFWDs more power than they had under Xi’s predecessor, Hu Jintao 胡锦涛, as in most cases, the Party secretary respects the opinion of the head of the superior-level UFWD.
Arrow ③ indicates how the Dengfeng UFWD offers “professional guidance” to other departments in the city. Dengfeng is home to several Buddhist sites in addition to the Shaolin Temple and is one of the poorest areas of Zhengzhou city. Following the promulgation of the Opinions, Zhengzhou’s UFWD intensified its supervision of Buddhist charitable activities, recognizing their potential usefulness in alleviating poverty in the city by, for example, taking in orphans. However, the Zhengzhou UFWD was uneasy about allowing the Shaolin Temple to carry out these activities independently, and it hoped that other departments could provide proper “guidance,” which in this context means monitoring and control.Footnote 44 These departments include the Zhengzhou CAB, the ethnic and religious affairs bureau (ERAB) and the propaganda department. All three receive operational guidance from the Zhengzhou UFWD. Overall, the leading department in the “integrated fragmentation” discussed in this article is the Henan provincial UFWD.
The following two sections discuss the operation of these departments in relation to the orphanage. This is summarized in Table 3.
Table 3. How the CCP Bureaucracy Controls the Shaolin Caring Orphanage
Injection of Resources
The CCP recognized that the Shaolin Caring Orphanage, through its efforts to care for impoverished children, could contribute significantly to the Party’s poverty alleviation goals. This initiative began under Hu Jintao and has been continued by Xi Jinping, who developed the policy of “targeted poverty alleviation.” Both leaders emphasized the importance of mobilizing grassroots organizations to achieve these objectives. For instance, in 2014, the State Council published its “Guiding opinions on promoting the healthy development of charitable activities” (Guowuyuan guanyu cujin cishan shiye jiankang fazhan de zhidao yijian 国务院关于促进慈善事业健康发展的指导意见), which advocated for an expanded role for charities in social relief efforts.Footnote 45
One of the core tenets of Buddhism is compassion, and the Shaolin Temple’s emphasis on “Buddhism for all” aligned with the CCP’s poverty alleviation policy.Footnote 46 In 2003, the temple and the Henan Provincial Charity Federation jointly launched the “One thousand orphans relief” programme. This initiative aimed to raise enough funds to provide 1,039 orphans with 560 yuan each per year until they reached adulthood.Footnote 47 The following year, the Shaolin Caring Orphanage received official licensing from the Henan provincial department of civil affairs to accept orphans. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, strict requirements were imposed on poverty alleviation activities, and controls on religious organizations were tightened. In this context, the Henan provincial authorities mandated that all departments within the bureaucracy ensure that religious charities raised their operational standards.
Following Xi Jinping’s rise to power, Chinese bureaucrats utilized the Shaolin Temple to bolster their implementation of the poverty alleviation drive. As indicated by the arrow labelled B in Figure 2, the Henan provincial CAD, which oversees the Shaolin Caring Orphanage, funnelled resources into the orphanage. This injection of resources was authorized during the CAD’s annual work promotion conference (gongzuo cujinhui 工作促进会) on child welfare. As well as allocating its own financial resources, the CAD sought to attract additional funds from charitable foundations and community organizations.Footnote 48 One example of this collaborative funding concerned a rebuilding project at the orphanage.Footnote 49 To enhance the orphanage’s standing within the community, the provincial CAD asked it to participate in relief efforts in response to major national disasters and crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic.Footnote 50 Support from the provincial CAD has undoubtedly bolstered the orphanage’s reputation, thereby attracting additional assistance from outside organizations.
The day-to-day operations of the Shaolin Caring Orphanage are supervised by the Dengfeng CAB (see arrowed lines C and D in Figure 2). For example, during the poverty alleviation drive, the CAB controlled the admission of impoverished children to the orphanage by providing it with information about those in need of assistance. After the orphanage conducted a preliminary assessment, the Dengfeng CAB would issue a notice to the civil affairs departments of the townships and villages where the impoverished children were located and send staff to assess whether they needed to be taken into care. Once these investigations were completed, the CAB would ask the orphanage to publish the list of children and confirm through telephone interviews with family members whether the children’s family situations met the official poverty standard. If all the criteria were met, the Shaolin Caring Orphanage would apply to the CAB for legal responsibility for the child to be transferred to the orphanage until the child reached the age of 18.Footnote 51 According to our interviews, a child was more likely to be admitted to the orphanage if both parents were dead.Footnote 52
The Dengfeng CAB also provided guidance and assistance to the Shaolin Caring Orphanage to improve its care of the children by, for example, recruiting teachers and local volunteers. On weekday evenings, volunteers would help the children with their reading of Chinese philosophy classics such as The Analects of Confucius (Lunyu 论语) and The Great Learning (Daxue 大学), while on Tuesdays, Sundays and during the summer holidays, teachers from regular schools would come to the Shaolin Caring Orphanage to provide after-school counselling. The orphanage aimed to educate the children to such a standard that they could transfer to a good high school in Zhengzhou, from where they might have a chance of gaining entry to a top university.Footnote 53 This would not only enable the children themselves to escape poverty but also ensure that future generations would not fall back into a cycle of poverty.
The CAB also promoted exchanges between the children of the Shaolin Caring Orphanage and charitable organizations both at home and abroad and encouraged their participation in public welfare activities. For example, in response to the CCP’s growing concerns about China’s aging population, the bureau prompted the orphanage to organize activities at local rehabilitation hospitals and nursing homes to enhance the children’s understanding of the challenges facing seniors. Additionally, in alignment with the CCP’s foreign policy aims of fostering a “community of common destiny” (renlei minyun gongtongti 人类命运共同体), the CAB encouraged the orphanage to participate in international exchanges, such as participating in the initiatives of global charitable organizations. The CAB, in collaboration with the municipal UFWD and the propaganda department, coordinated these activities upon receipt of an application from the orphanage.Footnote 54
The civil affairs bureaucracies of both Henan province and Dengfeng city were actively engaged in channelling resources into the Shaolin Caring Orphanage to enhance its care of impoverished children. In this role, the orphanage served as a cultural broker, assisting in the promotion of the CCP’s poverty alleviation policy. However, from a united front perspective, this religious charity had the potential to undermine the Party’s influence in charitable affairs. Consequently, the CCP was also actively involved in overseeing and managing the Shaolin Caring Orphanage to ensure political security and maintain the Party’s legitimacy.
Political Security
The CCP’s need to exercise control over the Shaolin Caring Orphanage stemmed largely from the orphanage’s role as a cultural broker. The dictator’s dilemma in this context revolved around how the authorities could leverage this prestigious charitable organization while preventing it from undermining public confidence in the effectiveness of the government’s own poverty alleviation efforts.Footnote 55 In addition, the Shaolin Temple’s strong religious discourse of service to the poor and needy, embodied in the concepts of “engaged Buddhism” (rushi 入世) or “Buddhism for all,” runs counter to the CCP’s atheistic ideology, thereby posing a potential threat to the Party’s rule.Footnote 56 To guard against this threat, the CCP’s united front work system joined forces with its religious affairs, civil affairs and propaganda departments to control the Shaolin Caring Orphanage (indicated by the dashed lines in Figure 2).Footnote 57
The Henan provincial ERAC is responsible for formulating regulations governing religious affairs in the province. Since the revised version of the “Regulations on religious affairs” was issued at the end of 2017, the Party’s control has become increasingly comprehensive. Not only has the Party tightened its oversight of religious venues and practices, but it has also intensified its supervision of individual religious figures. In the case of the Shaolin Caring Orphanage, the provincial ERAC became involved in devising the orphanage’s religious studies curriculum. Our interviewees noted that following the CCP’s announcement of its “Sinicization” policy for religion (zongjiao Zhongguohua 宗教中国化) in 2016, the number of courses organized by the provincial ERAC increased significantly, and the content of these courses changed. Instead of concentrating on the tenets of Buddhism, the courses now include “patriotic education” related to the history of the CCP.Footnote 58 In other words, the children were being subjected to ideological indoctrination designed to ensure political security.
The Dengfeng ERAB oversees the day-to-day operations of the Shaolin Caring Orphanage (dashed line E in Figure 2). The first aspect of this oversight concerns financial control. City bureaucrats require the monks to submit details of all donations received as well as to report on their activities and the orphanage’s expenses.Footnote 59 This enables the CCP authorities to control the orphanage’s finances and to check that it is not receiving money from unknown sources. The second aspect of the ERAB’s work is to monitor the children’s religious education. The Shaolin Caring Orphanage requires its children to engage in Buddhist studies, but the Dengfeng ERAB is nervous about this exposure to religious doctrines. Consequently, the orphanage must submit detailed reports, including lists of all those engaged in religious studies, the purpose of any religious activities, and the time and place of such activities, to the bureau. ERAB staff members also attend all activities to monitor the teaching delivered by the monks.Footnote 60 Such measures illustrate that the CCP does not want the children to be exposed to an excessive amount of religious doctrine lest they begin to question the CCP’s own ideology.
The Dengfeng CAB is responsible for managing the Shaolin Caring Orphanage in terms of political security (dashed line D in Figure 2) and for providing resources to the orphanage (line C). According to an official announcement by the Zhengzhou authorities, the city was lifted out of poverty in 2019. Since the end of 2020, when it was announced that the goal of “total poverty eradication” (quanmian tuopin 全面脱贫) had been achieved, the Shaolin Caring Orphanage has been something of an embarrassment to the CCP. Officially, there should be no more impoverished households and no more impoverished children in China, so the orphanage should no longer need to take in impoverished children. For this reason, under the supervision of the Dengfeng CAB, the orphanage now primarily cares for disabled children (canji ertong 残疾儿童), orphans (guer 孤儿) and “left behind” children (liushou ertong 留守儿童).Footnote 61 In 2023, the Dengfeng CAB helped the Shaolin Caring Orphanage to set up a new programme called the “Sunshine scholarship” (yangguang zhuxue 阳光助学) to provide scholarships for children in these categories.Footnote 62 Given the official narrative that poverty has been officially eradicated in China, charitable organizations can no longer use the term “poverty.” Doing so would be tantamount to questioning Xi Jinping’s prestige and legitimacy, thus posing a threat to what this article refers to as political security.
Finally, the Dengfeng city propaganda department is involved in preventing the orphanage from overly promoting Buddhist teaching (dashed line F in Figure 2). To this end, the department has imposed specific requirements for the provision of “red education” in the orphanage. For example, the children must watch the CCTV news broadcast (xinwen lianbo 新闻联播) at 7:00 pm every day, and the orphanage is encouraged to organize “red study” (hongse yanxue 红色研学) activities. During the summer holidays, the propaganda department lays on educational activities on various themes, such as Chinese culture, Chinese history and CCP history. The children are also taken on visits to various sites connected with the Chinese revolution.Footnote 63 In addition, during important festivals, such as Labour Day on 1 May, the department encourages the orphanage to arrange for the children to clean up the local environment or participate in farm work to instil in them a sense of collective responsibility and an understanding of the moral value of manual labour.Footnote 64
The propaganda department instructed the orphanage to display posters promoting the “two studies and one action” (liangxue yizuo 两学一做) – that is, to “study the Party constitution and rules, study the series of speeches, and be a qualified Party member” – as seen in Figure 3.Footnote 65 Additionally, staff from the propaganda department patrol the Shaolin Caring Orphanage and its surrounding areas to ensure that no Buddhist terminology is displayed within the building or on the notice boards outside.Footnote 66
Figure 3. Posters Publicizing “Two Studies and One Action” in the Hall of the Shaolin Caring Orphanage, Henan Province
The Dengfeng propaganda department’s control over the Shaolin Caring Orphanage also extends to censorship of the orphanage’s publications, which may not contain too many Buddhist concepts – even the word “zen” 禅 is forbidden.Footnote 67 Instead, publications must promote official CCP slogans. Books published by the orphanage may only contain a minimal amount of Buddhist teachings.Footnote 68 Before 2021, the orphanage was still publishing some religious texts on poverty alleviation for its children. However, after the authorities declared that poverty had been eradicated, the term “poverty alleviation” had to be replaced with more neutral phrases, such as “helping needy people” (zhukun 助困), in order for the publications to be approved by the propaganda department.Footnote 69
Overall, the bureaucratic control exercised over the Shaolin Caring Orphanage reflects the importance that the CCP attaches to political security. All utterances, whether written or spoken, must be politically correct. Particularly since 2022, as China’s economy has declined and domestic tensions have mounted, the bureaucracy has become more focused on political security than on allocating resources to the orphanage. For example, Dengfeng CAB funding for Shaolin orphanage children to participate in foreign exchanges has been reduced because of tensions in China’s foreign relations.Footnote 70
Conclusion
This article uses the case of the Shaolin Caring Orphanage to illustrate how the CCP both utilizes and controls a cultural broker. The Party authorities recognized the value of the Shaolin Temple’s ideological discourse for their poverty alleviation efforts; at the same time, it was essential that they prevented the orphanage from becoming a potential threat to the CCP’s legitimacy. To ensure this, the Party’s united front system has coordinated the efforts of various bureaucratic branches to achieve complete control over the temple and its orphanage as part of the CCP’s broader “grand united front” strategy.
There are two aspects to the CCP’s management of the Shaolin Caring Orphanage: the injection of resources and political security. To allow the orphanage to fulfil its poverty alleviation role, the bureaucracy provides it with funding and resources. However, the CCP is more concerned about the political security aspect of the Shaolin Caring Orphanage. For example, its religious, educational and media activities are strictly monitored by Dengfeng’s ERAB and propaganda department. Additionally, since Xi Jinping declared that poverty had been completely eradicated in China, the city’s CAB has forbidden the orphanage from using the term “impoverished” in relation to the children it helps.
The case of the Shaolin Caring Orphanage reflects how the Party’s dealings with the targets of its united front work are affected by the dictator’s dilemma. We contend that this is largely due to the orphanage being a religious charity. The CCP recognizes that Buddhist organizations can play a useful role in social governance, as belief in Buddhism runs deep among the Chinese people.Footnote 71 However, there is always a risk that these organizations will become a threat to political security by completely taking over the Party’s social governance role or overturning its ideology. Moreover, religious charities often raise and utilize funds in a “white-glove” manner, such as through the establishment of charitable foundations.Footnote 72 This approach creates the potential for religious leaders with ulterior motives to avoid state supervision, enrich themselves or promote their own interests. Therefore, although the CCP claims it encourages Buddhist communities to help in the fight against poverty, it is primarily concerned with exercising tight control over religious charities.
The situation regarding religious charities since Xi Jinping came to power stands in stark contrast to their treatment under his predecessor, Hu Jintao. During the Hu era, religious philanthropy had little relevance to the country’s overall strategic development. Since Xi has tightened control over the bureaucracy and society and emphasized the importance of the Party,Footnote 73 religious charities have lost much of their autonomy. They have shifted from merely providing supplementary services to becoming an integral part of national strategy. In order to operate, these organizations must now comply with the dictates of the party-state and be subjected to strict supervision by the united front bureaucracy.
Shih Yongxin has lamented that the traditions and religious practices of the Shaolin Temple have been marginalized in recent years, and that despite its devotion to charitable causes, the temple is likely to encounter policy and regulatory barriers due to its religious nature.Footnote 74 Although the Shaolin Caring Orphanage and its parent body, the Shaolin Temple, have always projected the image of “patriotic religion” and sought to convince the authorities of their political loyalty, their role as a cultural broker has prevented them from becoming a genuine political ally of the CCP, as the Party cannot entirely trust such a powerful representative of the Buddhist community. Cultural brokers are a double-edged sword for the CCP: on the one hand, their position in the community makes them useful partners, while on the other hand, they are more likely than any other category of broker to challenge the CCP’s legitimacy. We believe that this case study of the Shaolin Caring Orphanage as a cultural broker will make a significant contribution to the study of contemporary local governance in China.
Acknowledgements
The authors gratefully acknowledge the research funding received from the National Science and Technology Council (No. 112-2423-H-001-009 and No. 112-2410-H-004-082-MY2), and Taiwan Social Resilience Research Center (No. 112L900302).
Competing interests
None.
Pin-Hsuan WU is a PhD student at the Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies at National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan. Her research interests include Chinese politics, Chinese social development and cross-Strait relations.
Wen-Hsuan TSAI is a research fellow at the Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan. His main research focuses on Chinese political development, Chinese governance and innovation, comparative politics, and comparative authoritarian regimes.
Hsin-Hsien WANG is a distinguished professor of the Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies and director of the Institute of International Relations at National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan. His primary research interests include comparative politics, political sociology, state–society relations in China, and cross-Strait relations.
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