Introduction
On 3 January 1852, as a British Royal Navy squadron was being provisioned to search for Sir John Franklin and his missing Arctic expedition, The Times newspaper reported “some horrible facts” concerning the quality of preserved (that is, canned) meats which had been supplied to the fleet by the contractor Stefan Goldner. It was alleged that only 197 of 2,702 cans inspected at the Navy’s Clarence victualling yard had been found fit for consumption, the rest being putrid, containing highly offensive materials. The fate of the Franklin expedition was much in the public mind and The Times warned that Goldner’s supply of preserved meats to the expedition in 1845 might have “bred a pestilence or famine […] and been their destruction” (Times, 1852a, 3 January, p.7) As the allegations were repeated across the press and had the makings of a national scandal, the Parliament agreed that a Select Committee should investigate.
The Committee would conclude that Goldner’s meats were of a satisfactory standard from 1844 until 1849 when staffing problems at his factory began to cause a serious decline in quality (Parliamentary Papers, 1852). More generally, the Committee found that several factors caused preserved meats to decompose so that some 5% of all contractors’ meats, including those of Goldner, would be condemned (that is, rejected as unfit for consumption) on board Navy ships. Therefore, while it has been correctly concluded that the Committee’s investigation exonerated Goldner from any role in the loss of the Franklin expedition, it neglects the fact that a proportion of his supplies to the expedition would almost certainly have been deficient.
Aim of the present study
The study will use evidence from the enquiry and recently published letters from the crews of the Franklin expedition to estimate the likely condemnations of their preserved meats from the first issue in 1845 until the time in 1846 when officers prepared to leave Beechey Island. The estimate will give insight into the serviceable quantity of meats that would have been available to the crews over the projected three-year mission. A further estimate will be made of the adequacy of the nutritional content of the meats and potential consequences for health.
The formal report of the Select Committee Enquiry has been subject to review by Farrer (Reference Farrer2001). Here, the Introduction will summarise the most relevant outcomes and note significant shortcomings in the investigation, which were not included by Farrer and which left unclear the true extent of the supposed ‘scandal’.
The parliamentary select committee enquiry
The government acted quickly to establish a Parliamentary Select Committee Enquiry (hereafter, “the Committee”) in response to The Times’ allegations about the quality of preserved meats supplied to the Navy. However, the first debate on 12 February 1852 did not encourage confidence in the likely accuracy and impartiality of the investigation. The Committee chair, Sir William Joliffe, began with an uncritical summary of the sensational press coverage, the dire implications for the Franklin expedition, and naming Stefan Goldner as the contractor who supplied the preserved meats (Hansard, 1852). Inexplicably, Joliffe proposed that Goldner’s meats should be investigated from 1847 to 1851, which would omit the period when he had supplied the expedition in 1845. Joliffe was also one of several members of parliament who commented disparagingly on Goldner’s Hungarian and Jewish heritage. Joliffe referred opaquely to “Jewish disabilities,” while Colonel James Chatterton, a Committee member, was perplexed that Goldner had been allowed to compete for an Admiralty contract on equal terms with “other subjects of Her Majesty” (Goldner became a naturalised British subject in 1846). It was then critical that Sir Francis Baring (First Lord of the Admiralty, 1849–1852) also served on the Committee and intervened with two amendments, having advised Parliament that Goldner’s heritage should not disadvantage him. Baring stated that the Enquiry should investigate Goldner’s meats from 1844, which would include the supplies to Franklin, and investigate other contractors whose meats had also been condemned. Baring had attended inspections of Goldner’s meats and questioned Joliffe’s uncritical acceptance of sensational press reports, advising him that “if he relied upon the newspapers for his information he would make many errors” (Hansard, 1852, 12 February, c450). Baring’s amendments were accepted and the Committee convened for the first of eight meetings on 23 February 1852.
The Committee took evidence on the decline in quality of Goldner’s preserved meats and their mass condemnation in Admiralty stores, and drew conclusions that included the quality of meats supplied to the Franklin expedition. The subsequent report (Parliamentary Papers, 1852) ran to 495 pages, including verbatim examination of witnesses, which involved 3,154 questions, with each question/answer pair being numbered chronologically in the report and referenced here by their number in square parentheses, for example [374]. As the Committee’s report and all other documents at the time gave the weight of preserved meats in pounds (lbs), that metric will be continued here. The equivalent weight in kilograms is easily estimated by multiplying the pound weight by 0.45.
Goldner’s contract
Preserved meats were initially supplied as “medical comforts” and were well received by Arctic expeditions such as Parry’s voyages of 1824 and 1826 (ADM 114/16). Stefan Goldner had patented a preserving process in 1840, which was recommended by leading scientists of the day [420, 2313, 2806] and led to his “excellent” meats being purchased to provision the Royal Navy’s expedition to the Niger River in 1841 (ADM 101/82/2). On 28 December 1844, the Admiralty awarded Goldner a running contract to supply meats “as demanded” from his factories in London and in Galatz in present-day Romania.
Table 1 summarises Goldner’s contracts from 1844 to 1851 and includes the number of cans of given weights supplied to the Franklin expedition according to the victualling record (ADM 114/17). As the expedition was over-supplied with 1,231 lbs of meat in cans of unknown weight (Cyriax, Reference Cyriax1939, p.114), the number of cans would have been more than shown in Table 1. Moreover, the victualling record does not explain why cans of four-lb weight were by far the greatest proportion (69%) of those supplied. Expeditions sent in search of Franklin received cans in a similar range of weights; for example, James Ross in 1848 and Richard Collinson in 1850, but the proportions were not specified (ADM 114/21, 29 February 1848; 25 January 1850). Ross explicitly rejected cans smaller than four lbs because they wasted storage space and caused “an additional degree of trouble in breaking open so many small canisters” (ADM 114/21, 5 April 1848). Perhaps for the latter reason, two-lb cans composed only 6% of the total supplied for Austin’s search in 1850, the remainder being equal numbers of eight, six and four-lb cans (ADM 114/17, 28 March 1850). Belcher ordered only four-lb cans for his 1852 search, and a similar restriction for the support ship HMS Phoenix (ADM 114/19, 26 February & 31 March 1852; 7 March 1853).
Table 1. Preserved meats ordered from Goldner from 1844 to 1851

The quantities ordered according to dated contracts (Parliamentary Papers, 1852, p.430).
a 424,752 lbs were delivered instead of the 500,000 ordered.
b The contract was cancelled and deliveries prohibited following the Admiralty investigation. The number and weight of cans ordered for the Franklin expedition.
c Goldner supplied 1,231 lbs more meat than ordered (Cyriax, Reference Cyriax1939, p.114), but the size of cans in which it was supplied was not recorded so they cannot be included here.
The favouring of four-lb cans would be consistent with evidence that cans of medium weight gave better service than larger cans because, during manufacture, it was more difficult to ensure that meat in the centre of large cans was fully cooked. The unwieldy bulk of large cans also made them prone to damage during handling and storage, which would spoil the contents [1001–1003, 1563–1580]. The fact that cans of four and six lbs weight composed the main supply to Franklin might imply early recognition of their greater reliability. By 1852, it was recommended that supplies to the Navy should be limited to cans of six lbs as they gave the most robust service [374].
The Committee established that consistently good-quality preserved meats were not guaranteed from any contractor because decomposition would occur when inadequate cooking failed to kill bacteria in the meat, and when air-borne bacteria entered cans through poorly-sealed lids and seams [620, 641, 997, 1541]. Cans on ships were particularly vulnerable to rough handling – “They throw it (the cans) about anywhere” – which caused decomposition due “entirely to the canisters being broken and the air getting into them” [802, 839]. Damp conditions in ships’ holds from condensation and ingress of saltwater also allowed corrosion gradually to penetrate cans so that spoiled contents became evident after some months into a mission. On average, 5% of cans on Royal Navy ships would be condemned for these reasons [155, 166, 192, 198, 355, 641, 789, 895, 3127]. The care, or otherwise, with which cans were stored and handled on HM Ships Erebus and Terror for Franklin’s expedition is unknown, but it is significant that when the latter ships were under Ross’s command for his Antarctic expedition (1839–1843) he complained that cans in their holds would “rust through” (Ross, Reference Ross1847, pp. XIX–XX). If their holds were prone to damp, then, two years later when under Franklin’s command, the canned provisions might again have become vulnerable to corrosion as the mission proceeded.
The reason for the inspection of Goldner’s preserved meats
From 1844 to early 1849, Goldner supplied 1,940,000 lbs of “very satisfactory” meats where only occasional cans were condemned due to putrefaction caused by damage in transit or mishandling which was not the fault of the contractor, and “when compared with the immense quantities that had been delivered, that was not a quantity to alarm us” [545–547, 611, 788, 802, 1085, 1115, 1133–4, 2760, 2785–2787]. However, complaints increased through 1849 when bone and offal began to be found, which were certainly the contractor’s responsibility. Matters then became very serious when manufacture began under the contract of 1850 and a lack of trained staff in Galatz and failure of oversight by Goldner allowed meat to be poorly-prepared, mixed with offal and prone to decompose. Worse still, pay disputes led aggrieved staff to fill some cans with putrid parts of carcasses and highly offensive materials, including excrement. An employee informed Charles Cunningham, the British Vice Consul in Galatz, that an unspecified number of cans containing “filth” had been included in consignments for delivery during January and February 1851 [248, 249; Ardeleanu, Reference Ardeleanu2012; Parliamentary Papers 1852, pp.393-396]. Witnesses conceded that any manufacturer would be vulnerable to the same unskilled or malicious practices due to the difficulty of monitoring the entire production process [619, 2351].
In March 1851, tongue was found in a “small number” of cans from the 1850 contract and, as offal (tongue, heart, cheek, kidney, liver) was excluded by contract, the entire delivery of 22,000 lbs was condemned although the meat itself was “excellent quality” [922, 1176, 2782, 2806]. A further 73,000 lbs were condemned because some was overcooked to a pulp, included offal and inedible parts of carcasses, and was prone to decompose. [1419, 1459]. As the situation was intolerable, the Admiralty cancelled Goldner’s contract and prepared to sue him for the loss. However, the Admiralty lawyer advised that, to do so, every can in stores and on ships would have to be inspected because, if simply destroyed, lack of evidence about their condition would preclude redress [325]. It would be a daunting task, so the lawyer proposed that if local magistrates were led to conclude that cans in the Navy’s Clarence victualling yard posed a health risk, they might summarily seize and dispose of them, then allowing the Admiralty to take legal action without inspection (quite how this scheme would circumvent the problem of lack of evidence is unclear). However, the ploy foundered when magistrates refused to condemn the meats so that “the Admiralty must find their own remedy” [326, 327, 1285]. Having no alternative, the Admiralty issued an order on 31 October 1851 that all ships and foreign stations should return Goldner’s meats to be inspected with stocks held at the Clarence (Portsmouth), Deptford and Plymouth victualling yards [113, 136, 325, 1298].
Cans containing only good meat were classed as sound but were condemned if any trace of offal was found, although, as will be shown below, the Committee would later establish that offal was perfectly fit for consumption [1045, 1061]. Cans containing putrid matter or excrement were defined as “filth” and, obviously, were also condemned. However, as edible offal and inedible filth were both “condemned,” then, as will be seen, when the proportions condemned for those different reasons were not made explicit, the extent to which a consignment was truly bad could be overstated.
The Clarence yard inspection, and press exaggeration
It is not known how journalists from The Times gained access to the Clarence yard to report that initial inspections of the cans found, “the most part containing (…) heart (…) tongue (…) coagulated blood, pieces of liver (…) pieces of intestines” and summarised as “garbage and putridity in a horrible state, the stench arising from which is most sickening and the sight revolting” (Times, 1852a, 3 January p.7). When the inspections concluded three weeks later, a total of 5,468 of 6,378 cans had reportedly been condemned (Times, 1852b). As The Times did not distinguish between condemnations due to offal or “filth,” it was quite unclear how much was truly inedible.
Witnesses who had inspected the cans gave a more measured account [1242–1642]. There were 54,000 lbs in store, of which 30,000 lbs were from the 1850 contract, which had already been condemned in March 1851 [1358, 1359, 1419, 1459]. Twelve hundred of 6,916 cans (that is, 9,258 lbs of the 54,000 lbs) were sound. The remainder were condemned because they included offal mixed with meat, which itself was often “excellent,” while an undefined “great many” were putrid [1219, 1314, 1360, 1361, 1548]. Sixty-eight per cent of condemned cans were from the 1850 contract, and 12 contained intestine, of which nine included excrement. The outcome was consistent with the known manufacturing problems that year [1292–1294, 1348, 1454, 1552, 1596, 1614]. Meat in cans from contracts prior to 1850 was “decidedly of a better description” but was not quantified [1453, 1457–1459].
The outcome was clearly highly unsatisfactory and some contents were undoubtedly revolting, but it was not the mass of “garbage and putridity” alleged by The Times. Witnesses who had inspected the cans agreed that putrid contents were highly offensive but that “more was made of it (by the press) than the case deserved” [607, 720]. Further significant inaccuracies were evident in the Manchester Guardian’s (1852) exaggeration that all the condemned cans were putrid, and Lloyds Weekly Newspaper’s (1852, 18 January p.5) statement that it was “confidently asserted that a large portion of this foetid stuff was put on board the ships of Sir John Franklin.” No witness made any such assertion. It will be recalled that, during the Parliamentary debate, Baring had questioned Joliffe’s uncritical summary of the press coverage whose influence would lead the enquiry to make “many errors,” but Baring’s advice would go unheeded by Joliffe in a way that did not reflect well on his chairmanship. The Medical Times and Gazette (1852) had reported Chatterton’s unsupported allegation, made during the debate, that the meats had caused an outbreak of cholera on the troop ship Apollo, and Chatterton duly called the ship’s officers to give evidence which he anticipated would confirm the allegation. The journal subsequently failed to report that the officers stated clearly that the meats played no part in the outbreak because the troops had symptoms of cholera before the meats were issued [2829, 2850, 2855, 2871, 2918, 2955, 3107]. Despite this clear rebuttal, Joliffe allowed Chatterton to persist with futile and highly leading questions to cast doubt on the general quality of the meats [3133–3136] until shut down by Admiral William Bowles [3137–3139]. Further press coverage did not influence the Committee.
The Deptford yard inspection
The outcome at Deptford was different. All 2,726 cans had been returned from ships [1045, 1099, 1179]. As any trace of offal was contrary to contract, 2,400 cans (22,579 lbs of meat) were condemned, of which 4,343 lbs (19%) were from the 1850 contract [290]. An unspecified number of cans were dented and perforated due to rough seas and mishandling, and with some contents decomposed and one containing intestine and excrement [1046–1061, 1184–1191, 1198]. Baring enquired specifically whether cans condemned for containing offal were fit to eat and was informed by the yard’s storekeeper and medical officer that much that was condemned and buried was considered “good food” and “it was a mere matter of opinion whether it should be rejected or not” [1055,1056]. The point was also made that inclusion of offal such as tongue, liver and heart might be welcomed because it enlivened the otherwise monotonous diet. Baring’s question, therefore, confirmed that substantial numbers of condemned cans were entirely fit for consumption, but the Committee again failed to establish the numbers which were sound and contained edible offal versus those which had decomposed.
The Plymouth yard inspection
All 111,108 lbs of meat were from the 1850 contract and were “provisionally condemned” without inspection or explanation, so that its condition was never established [229, 303].
The overview of Goldner’s deliveries to stores and issues to ships
The Committee received a summary of Goldner’s overall record, which put the inspections in a broader context. Thomas Grant (Comptroller of Victualling) and Captain Alexander Milne (a First Lord of the Admiralty) explained that from 1844 to 1851 Goldner delivered 3,257,795 lbs of meat to stores, of which 198,876 lbs (6.1%) had been condemned, but they conceded that it was not known whether all the condemned meat was “really bad” because more than half included the 111,108 lbs condemned at Plymouth that had not been examined [303–305, 604–625].
As for the 2,741,988 lbs of meat issued from stores to ships, 128,919 lbs (4.7%) were condemned on board, which matched the average 5% condemnations of all contractors’ meats across the fleet. Separate figures were not given for condemnations due to edible offal or because cans were corroded or damaged. The only quantification concerned “filthy substances” which amounted to 750 lbs found in 67 cans on ships and the 13 cans at Clarence and Deptford yards, and which Grant stated would equate to 2 lbs in every 10,000 lbs of Goldner’s entire deliveries [305]. His calculation is misleading, however, because it was in 1850 that such substances were introduced. When calculated solely with respect to the 424,752 lbs of meat supplied by Goldner’s 1850 contract, intestine and excrement would account for 18 lbs in every 10,000, making a total of 765 lbs.
The Committee’s conclusions
The Committee established that there had been no increase in complaints from ships about the quality of meats from contracts prior to 1850 [2806] and concluded that Goldner “had been going on well from 1844 to 1849; the condemnations during that period not being greater than condemnations of other species of provisions” (Parliamentary Papers, 1852, p.v). The later serious decline in quality reflected the known difficulties at Goldner’s Galatz factory in 1850 and that the problem therefore centred upon deliveries from that year. The conclusion did not, however, prevent continued speculation that Goldner had supplied the expedition with bad meat when McClintock’s search of King William Island confirmed the fatal end and revived public interest (Lancet, 1859). The Committee also concluded that Goldner did not add offal or inedible parts of carcasses to cans in a cynical attempt to maximise profits. Witnesses saw no evidence of such fraud and, given Goldner’s dependence upon the lucrative contract and that such materials were so easily detected, to have done so deliberately would have been reckless and ruinous [553–554, 625]. It was Goldner’s failure in 1850 to monitor production and retain skilled operatives, and his hostile management style, which provoked malicious behaviour by staff, which Milne confirmed had made him “a ruined man” [569]. The conclusion contrasts with the recent portrayal of Goldner as an “evil” man who had “practiced a shadowy, yet well-calculated, art of deceit” and “pursued profit without conscience or qualm” from filthy and unhygienic premises in London (Cookman, Reference Cookman2001, pp.108–122). Farrer (Reference Farrer2001, p.21) described this portrayal as a “travesty” because senior Admiralty figures, including Sir John Hill, the Victualling Superintendent, had visited Goldner’s premises so that “it is inconceivable that these senior and experienced men would not have reacted vigorously to the shambles described by Cookman.” Commander George Morice had attended that visit and made no adverse comment in his evidence to the Committee [795].
The Committee was concerned that condemnations had been “sweeping” and “wholesale” when entirely edible provisions were rejected because some offal was found which, while contrary to contract, was perfectly fit for human consumption [296, 607, 609] and was, and remains, part of the British diet. It noted the “paradox” that a few traces of tongue would condemn entire consignments of meats, yet tongue was supplied separately as a delicacy for senior officers [1135–1138, 1494, 2806]. For example, James Ross received a two-year supply of tongue “as the custom” for commanding his 1848 search for Franklin (ADM 114/21, 28 April 1848), and the victualling correspondence for Edward Belcher’s search of 1852 contains hand-written orders from Belcher and Francis McClintock to be supplied with tongue, as befitted their ranks (ADM 114/18, 15 & 19 March 1852). Ox cheek was also condemned as offal, yet 2,872 lbs had been supplied to Ross’s Antarctic expedition (Ross, Reference Ross1847, p.xxi) and 2,107 lbs to the Franklin expedition (ADM 114/17).
The implications for the Franklin expedition
From the evidence above, the Committee concluded that the expedition had been adequately provisioned by Goldner in 1845 when production standards were satisfactory. Moreover, it is to The Times’ credit that, despite its initial excoriating report, it published letters with first-hand confirmation of the quality of the meat. John Barrow Jnr. of the Admiralty had been informed from Greenland by James Fitzjames of his satisfaction with the preserved meats, which were also sampled by Edward Griffiths of the transport ship that delivered the expedition’s final supplies. Surgeon Peter Sutherland examined the expedition’s empty cans at Beechey Island while serving with Austin’s search and found no evidence that the contents had been unsound (Times, 1852c,d,e).
There has been a consensus that the expedition was supplied with good meat so that Goldner, whatever his later failings, was not implicated in the loss (for example Cyriax, Reference Cyriax1939; Farrer, Reference Farrer2001; Lloyd and Coulter; Reference Lloyd and Coulter1963). Equally, however, whilst the meats may not have caused the “pestilence or famine” that The Times suggested might have doomed the expedition, the evidence does not permit the conclusion that all the meat supplied was edible. As shown above, some 5% of cans from all contractors, including Goldner, were condemned on board due to manufacturing failures or damage, so there is no reason to suppose that the expedition would have been an exception. It is then relevant to estimate how many cans may have been condemned, and the implications for the serviceable quantity available to the expedition.
Estimating the Franklin expedition’s condemned meats
The calculation requires the date when the meats were first issued and the quantity and schedule of each issue but, until recently, neither was known, and Cyriax (Reference Cyriax1939, p.110) had assumed that canned provisions were not issued until the expedition’s arrival at Greenland. Now, however, publication of letters from the expedition crews confirms that, whilst en route from Stromness to Greenland, issue of the “very good” meats began on 2 July 1845 with each man receiving 0.75 lb on alternate days (Potter et al., Reference Potter, Koellner, Carney and Williamson2022, p.234, 259, 320). The issue and schedule were therefore identical to those on HMS Investigator during the first year of its 1850 Arctic search (Armstrong, Reference Armstrong1858, p.14). It is assumed that on the other days each man received 0.75 lb of salted beef, as on that ship.
The number of cans opened to provide the meat depends on the size of cans selected from the 7,961 supplied. The order in which different-sized cans were consumed is unknown, so a schedule proposed by Cyriax (Reference Cyriax1939, p.115) is adopted where the largest eight-lb cans were consumed until exhausted, then six-lb, and so on. There might have been a strategic advantage to reserve the lightest cans for sledging parties who would have to man-haul their provisions.
The calculation also requires the number of men consuming the meats at any given time and is known with certainty only from their first issue in July 1845 until departure from Beechey Island. The ships’ complement was 133 men when the issue began, and reduced to 129 when four were sent home on departure from Greenland on 12 July 1845. At Beechey Island, two men died on 1 and 3 January, and a third on 4 April 1846, reducing the complement to 127 and then 126 men, respectively. It is not known when the expedition left the island in 1846, so 30 June 1846 is set as a somewhat arbitrary sampling cut-off but which provides a substantial, year-long period to a time when officers would anticipate continuing the mission and where the quantity and quality of the remaining meats would be a consideration.
Factors affecting the estimation
The present estimate must be indicative rather than definitive because the adopted schedule of issuing the meats, and therefore the number of cans opened within the one-year sampling period, would be influenced by the following factors, which cannot be quantified.
Salted provisions had long service in the Navy and were preferred by some crews to preserved meats, which some men even refused to eat, describing days when they were issued as “a pinch-gut day.” Fewer cans would then be opened to avoid wastage [1739, 1815-1817, 1871-1875]. Meats became generally unpopular with crews after putrid cans were found [1671-1676], and a similar rejection occurred during Scott’s “Discovery” expedition to Antarctica when confidence in the meats was lost because they were thought, wrongly, to be implicated in an outbreak of scurvy (Scott, Reference Scott1905, p.408). If similar prejudices arose amongst Franklin’s crews, it is a variable that would have reduced the number of cans opened.
Scheduling may also have been affected by attempts to provide dietary variety. Seventy-one per cent of the preserved meats consisted of beef in various preparations (roasted, boiled, seasoned, etc.) with the remainder being equal proportions of mutton and veal (ADM 114/17, 11 March 1845). It is not known how those meats were distributed across the different-sized cans, but if an attempt to introduce variety involved selection of meats which had been packed in smaller cans, then more would have to be opened to serve the victualling requirement and would disrupt the schedule adopted here.
It was explained above that damp storage conditions would cause gradual corrosion to spoil cans so that condemnations would not occur at a uniform rate across a mission but become more probable over time. Given the present schedule where cans were opened from largest to smallest, it would imply that condemnations might become more likely when smaller cans began to be sampled, and would therefore require more of those cans to be opened to maintain the victualling requirement. If there were an increased rate of condemnations over time, it cannot, however, be quantified and factored into the estimate.
Finally, the estimate will inevitably overestimate consumption of the meats because it cannot account for periods when hunting or fishing made fresh provisions available instead.
Calculating the consumption, condemnation, and nutrition of the expedition’s meats
Table 2.a shows the number of cans of eight, six and four lbs weight that were opened, and the associated weight of meat, if full rations were maintained as the ships’ complement reduced over four periods from 2 July 1845 to 30 June 1846.
Table 2. Estimate of Goldner’s preserved meats consumed from 2 July 1845 to 30 June 1846, and the serviceable balance remaining from 1 July 1846 onwards

Panel a: Cumulative consumption of preserved meats expressed as number of cans opened/remaining, and weight issued, as a function of crew numbers until 30 June 1846 (ameat issued at 0.75 lbs/crewman on alternate days). Panel b: Balance of cans at 1 July 1846. bNumber of four-lb cans after deducting 180 from the 3,149 remaining on 30 June 1846 (see text). cBalance of serviceable meat from 1 July 1846 onwards after adjustment for 5% condemnations (see text).
Stromness to Greenland. Between commencing the meats on 2 July and departing Greenland on 12 July 1845, row 1 of Table 2.a shows that 133 men each received 0.75 lb. of meat on alternate days, the total of 599 lbs being from 75 eight-pound cans. Departure marked the point when condemnations could be reported in final mail to the Admiralty and, as none were recorded or mentioned in the crews’ private correspondence, it appears that none were found, but the sample size was small.
Beechey Island. After leaving Greenland on 12 July until 31 December 1845 at Beechey Island, 129 men consumed 8,321 lbs from 237 eight-lb cans, 936 six-lb cans (which exhausted both stocks) and 203 four-lb cans (row 2). From 1 January to 31 March 1846, 127 men consumed 4,286 lbs, and from then until 30 June 1846, 126 men consumed 4,253 lbs, all from 2,136 four-lb cans, leaving a balance of 3,149 four-lb cans to be carried forward (rows 3 and 4).
Table 2.a shows that a total of 3,587 cans were opened but must be adjusted because some 5% would probably have been condemned [198]. Condemnations form a discrete rather than continuous variable and are estimated by calculating the binomial distribution of condemnations where the probability of condemning any given can is 0.05. The distribution is shown in Figure 1 and is best interpreted by considering the mid-point and tails, which show, respectively, that condemnations most probably numbered around 180 cans, and were unlikely to have been fewer than 150 or more than 210. The important implication is that if 180 cans were condemned, a similar number would have had to be opened to maintain the weight of meat required by the victualling schedule and would further reduce the remaining stock.

Figure 1. Binomial distribution of the estimated number of cans condemned from 3,587 cans opened from 2 July 1845 to 30 June 1846.
Those 180 extra cans are therefore subtracted from the 3,149 four-lb cans shown remaining on 30 June 1846. Following this subtraction, Table 2.b shows the balance of four-, two- and one-lb cans carried forward from 1 July 1846 (row 1), and the number likely to remain serviceable if 5% condemnations continued to affect the stock (row 2). The associated total serviceable weight of meat is 13,179 lbs (row 3).
If the full victualling schedule of 0.75 lbs of meat per man on alternate days was maintained for a complement of 126 men, it is a simple calculation to show that the serviceable weight of 13,179 lbs would be exhausted within some 279 days, being approximately late-March–early April 1847. Rations would have to be reduced to serve the planned three-year mission, as occurred on the Investigator where preserved and salted meats were reduced to 0.5 lbs per man (Armstrong, Reference Armstrong1858, p.14). The expedition’s over-supply of 1,231 lbs of meat, noted in Table 1, would have provided little more than a month’s extra victualling, although mortality that reduced the crews from 126 to 105 men, between June 1847 and April 1848, would have extended the provisions available to survivors. Woodman (Reference Woodman1991, p.117,251,252) has described how separate searches of King William Island by Hall (Nourse, Reference Nourse1879) and Schwatka (Gilder, Reference Gilder1881) reportedly learned that Inuit found unopened meat cans on the wreck of what is now known to be HMS Erebus, although they were very few in number when compared to the many opened cans also found. Those discoveries, and cans found along the crews’ line of retreat, might suggest that they did not lack food in early 1848 (Woodman, Reference Woodman1991, p.113).
Nutritional status
While there may have been no shortage of food, and although the preserved and salted meats would provide important proteins, fats and minerals, they would have become deficient in the essential vitamins C (ascorbic acid) and B1 (thiamine) because those heat-labile vitamins would be depleted by heat during manufacture (ca. 130 oC: Farrer, Reference Farrer2001) and prior to serving, and by the passage of time (Lešková et al., Reference Lesková, Kubiková, Kováčiková, Košická, Porubská and Holčíková2006; Park & Stenton, Reference Park and Stenton2019). The risk of scurvy and cardiomyopathy-associated cardiac failure would be increased by deficiencies in vitamins C and B1, respectively, and Park and Stenton (Reference Park and Stenton2019) have described how the expedition’s lengthy besetment far from land from September 1846 to April 1848 would have made it difficult to restore the deficiencies by hunting, and might explain mortality over the third winter of 1847. The deficiencies would be increased when short rations were introduced, and it is relevant that increasing debility amongst Arctic crews during a third winter was well recognised (Lancet, 1858) but was not understood because vitamins were unknown at that time.
A daily intake of 1.0 mg thiamine is recommended for adult males in the UK today, and as the total body content is only some 30 mg, symptoms of deficiency will occur within 25 to 30 days (National Health Service, 2020; Truswell, Reference Truswell, Mann and Truswell2012). The thiamine contents of present-day cooked and cured meats are 0.05 mg/100 g and 0.58 mg/100 g, respectively (Public Health England, 2015) and have been applied as proxies for the expedition’s preserved and salted supplies to estimate the daily intake of the vitamin if rations were reduced by one third as occurred on HMS Investigator (Millar, Reference Millar2023). By this estimate, the daily intake would have been approximately 0.63 mg, which is well below present-day requirements, and it is notable that disabling signs and symptoms of cardiac failure, including syncope and gross oedema, became prevalent amongst the crew of the Investigator when on reduced rations (Armstrong, Reference Armstrong1857).
Here, the same calculation shows that when on full rations the expedition’s daily thiamine intake would be approximately 0.94 mg and would need only minor supplementation from provisions such as unrefined bread flour or even limited success in hunting where liver would have provided a rich source of the vitamin (Guly, Reference Guly2012). Fitzjames described the expedition’s circumstances as “All Well” in April 1847, after almost two years on mission, although he need not have been referring specifically to health. It is not known when rations were reduced, but significant mortality over the winter of 1847 might seem a plausible consequence of a dietary reduction in essential vitamins and minerals, and would be consistent with the scenario described by Park and Stenton (Reference Park and Stenton2019). It, then, did not matter that Goldner had supplied good quality preserved meats; the expedition would be vulnerable over time to nutritional deficiencies, which could not be adequately supplemented from other sources and would progressively reduce the crews’ health.
The meats supplied by other contractors
It was fortunate that Baring ensured that other contractors’ meats were also investigated because they were equally prone to serious lapses in quality. It was again to The Times’ credit that it published a letter from a London businessman who had condemned 44,800 lbs of preserved meat supplied by an unnamed “first-rate” British manufacturer, and concluded that “all bad meat does not come from Galatz” (Times, 1852f, 12 January, p.8). Two days later, one of Goldner’s competitors, John Henry Gamble, wrote to the newspaper to inform readers of the excellence of his products and regret that he had not been chosen to supply Franklin (Times, 1852g). Gamble may have regretted this self-promotion when the Committee reported the following data.
James Ross’s Antarctic expedition, 1839–43
Cooper and Gamble delivered 33,484 lbs of preserved meats, of which 15,422 lbs were condemned as unfit [156]. It was noted above that Ross complained that the cans would “rust through” and should be made stronger to survive Naval service (Ross, Reference Ross1847, pp.XIX–XX).
Horatio Austin’s search for Franklin, 1850–51
Cooper and Gamble supplied 86,543 lbs of preserved meat, of which 51,463 lbs were condemned. A further delivery by Powell was rejected as underweight and of inferior quality [1121,1125; Parliamentary Papers, 1852, p.429].
Meats for general stores, 1851
Powell, Gamble and Hogarth were each contracted to supply 60,000 lbs of preserved meats. Powell delayed signing the contract and then admitted that he could not supply the meats. Gamble did nothing until threatened with legal action and then supplied meats which were “very inferior, pulpy and bad,” and the replacements were no better [224,225; Parliamentary Papers, 1852, p.427]. Hogarth’s meats were satisfactory. From the above evidence, the Franklin expedition may have been fortunate that Gamble did not supply their preserved meats.
Edward Belcher’s search for Franklin, 1852–54
Cans from Cooper, Hogarth and Moir were found leaking and stinking on delivery, so that all were condemned [1201, 1204, 1206, 1217, 1220, 1221]. Moir also supplied preserved salmon; its description as “preserved” being a “calumny” according to George McDougall, master of HMS Resolute, who cited headaches suffered by those who had eaten it (McDougall, Reference McDougall1857, p.355). The symptom would be one of scombroid poisoning associated with poorly preserved fish and where there may be no unpleasant odour to deter consumption. The Committee did not hear of illness associated with preserved meats for the fortunate reason that, when decomposed cans were opened, the stench was so nauseating and pervasive around a ship that they were immediately hurled overboard [1444, 1453, 1556, 2836].
1926: The last inspection of Goldner’s canned meats
In 1926, the Liverpool Post and Mercury (1926a, 21 April, p.5) reported that an audience watched Professor J.M. Beattie of Liverpool University’s Department of Bacteriology open a can of Goldner’s meat which had been recovered from Beechey Island in 1852 during Belcher’s search (Savours, Reference Savours1999, p.329). Figure 2 shows a sample of that meat which is held in the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, UK, and reveals a moderate quantity of fat which commonly reduced the meat content of canned provisions (Armstrong, Reference Armstrong1858, p.14) and would, in turn, reduce the content of essential vitamins discussed above. Beattie showed the meat to be “moist and fresh” but, perhaps predictably, no-one volunteered to taste it so it was fed to unsuspecting laboratory rats. Next day, the headline “The rats doing well” confirmed that they had not only survived but were “in the best of health” after their “hearty meal” (Liverpool Post and Mercury, 1926b, 22 April, p.5). Evidently, when properly prepared, Goldner’s preserved meat had the potential to remain safely edible for many decades, and palatable, at least to rodents.

Figure 2. Sample of Goldner’s preserved meat supplied to the Franklin expedition (© National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London).
Conclusions
The enquiry showed that Goldner’s preserved meats provided reliable service to the Royal Navy until their quality declined in 1850, caused by his poor management of inexperienced and aggrieved staff, which led to inadequate preparation of the meats and deliberate contamination with highly offensive materials. It was important that whilst the enquiry failed to quantify precisely the proportion of meats that were truly inedible, Baring did establish that meat condemned for traces of offal was good food which, according to witnesses, might be enhanced by the presence of offal and it was certainly no risk to health. It was also important that Baring ensured that the meats of other contractors were investigated because they were shown equally prone to failure, although this evidence received scant attention from the press.
The enquiry’s conclusion that Goldner supplied good-quality meats to the Franklin expedition remains accepted today, and the present study estimated that a relatively small proportion of cans would have been condemned up until the time when officers had to decide whether to proceed from Beechey Island or return home for re-supply. Evidently, the decision was to proceed, but the estimated rate of meat consumption could not have been maintained if stocks were to last for a three-year mission so that rations would have been reduced at some point. No matter how good the quality of the meats, their nutritional contribution to the diet would have decreased over time and been exacerbated when rations were reduced. Other Arctic crews were similarly vulnerable but were able to mitigate the effects to some extent by hunting and, ultimately, by returning home. The Franklin expedition was faced with unique physical circumstances which denied them those options.
Acknowledgments
The author gratefully acknowledges two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and advice, and his colleague Professor Adrian W. Bowman for advice concerning the binomial distribution and provision of Figure 1. The National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, gave permission to reproduce the image of Goldner’s preserved meat in Figure 2.
Financial support
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
Competing interests
The author declares none


