The post-COVID revival of the Ecclesiastical Law Society’s Northern Lectures was magisterially inaugurated by His Honour Peter Collier KC in March 2025. I would also like to express the Society’s gratitude to Lizzie Wilson, its former Chair, for her role in the revival of the Northern Lectures. The lecture delivered by Collier on that occasion forms the basis of the article published in the preceding pages of this Journal.Footnote ¹ The article is, in my view, so significant that I offer comment on it by way of emphasis. Like Collier, I am also concerned that some readers may well be themselves survivors of abuse, and I certainly do not intend to increase the pain of their memories in any way. Nevertheless, the points Collier makes are important ones.

Collier opens with a careful account of the emergence of the language of ‘safeguarding’.Footnote ² He notes that it was only in about 1986 that public awareness of child sexual abuse grew significantly in the UK. This contributed to Parliament passing the Children Act 1989. Concern then was still primarily about children. My first point is that it was not only public awareness of the widespread reality of safeguarding issues, but also ecclesiastical awareness, which developed gradually. Collier’s timescale here is a valuable reminder of the dangers of judgement by hindsight. His chilling citation of the 2020 National Office of Statistics estimate of the number of adults and young people who have experienced abuse as running into millions is a reminder not only of the seriousness of the issue but also how widespread abuse was and is.Footnote ³ Yet, what was known in 2020 was not known generally in the early 1980s.

Collier’s exposition of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law must also be emphasised. The Makin Review sets ecclesiastical law against secular law as if the law of the established Church of England is simply the rules of a private club. Collier demonstrates that this distinction is simply not correct.Footnote ⁴ He helpfully traces the gradual development of safeguarding guidance or recommendations in both Church and State and emphasises that this was initially all in the language of recommendations, expectations and good practice, yet without the force of hard law. Hard law was first introduced into the Clergy Discipline Measure in 2016Footnote ⁵ with a duty to ‘have due regard’ to episcopal guidance issued by the House of Bishops on matters relating to the safeguarding of children and vulnerable adults. I would want to emphasise that, in clergy discipline cases of a historic nature, this date is significant. Adjudication in terms of the law (that is the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003 (CDM) and its successor the Clergy Conduct Measure 2025 (CCM)) should be based on what the law said at the time of the alleged event, not what it has (rightly) become since.

Collier, rightly in my view, also emphasises the complexity when an allegation is made against beneficed clergy. This includes their legal protection against removal from office other than by legal process through the CDM or a capability procedure.Footnote ⁶ He notes, laconically, that the latter is very rarely used by reason of its complexity. I would want to emphasise this. At the time of its introduction some of us doubted whether the capability procedure would ‘work’. It has not.

Collier also draws attention to the position with unlicensed or unbeneficed clergy given Permission to Officiate (PTO).Footnote ⁷ This permission can be revoked summarily.Footnote ⁸ Whilst bishops are encouraged to give reasons for withdrawal, they do not have to, and sometimes do not. Is there an issue of equity here in comparison with licensed clergy? PTOs increasingly, especially in rural areas, provide an essential ministry for the Church of England without which multi-parish benefices simply could not survive. There is no right of appeal against withdrawal of a PTO, although the cleric should be able to put their case.Footnote ⁹ I would suggest that summary withdrawal should not be effected on grounds of the expressed opinions of a clergyperson, with the exception of those covered by the CDM (soon to be replaced by the CCM) in terms of political extremism.Footnote ¹⁰

Collier moves on to examine the relationship created by the new Clergy Conduct Measure between safeguarding and disciplinary procedures.Footnote ¹¹ Such knowledge in the future will be essential at both diocesan and national level. Collier argues, rightly in my view, that safeguarding cases should be put into the new disciplinary procedures of the CCM quickly; not least because at the end of a procedure, which should be quicker than the old CDM, there will be a report or judgment which will have ‘found facts’. He criticises the earlier risk assessment procedure precisely because it did not include a fact-finding process. I strongly agree with him. Justice must be due to complainant and respondent in all cases, and this is hardly possible if there is no investigation and eventual decision on disputed facts. The provision of ‘case assessors’ under the new CCM will provide a factual basis on which to decide between misconduct (for example, failing to follow guidance which falls short of covering up abuse) and serious misconduct (for example, actual abuse or covering up such abuse). One of my own criticisms about current practice is that clergy who have not followed guidance sometimes seem to be treated, or it at least feels as if they are being treated, as though they are also abusers.

Collier then turns to the question of ‘the balance of probabilities’. I also warmly welcome this exposition as the phrase is widely misunderstood. The point is made that the test is well understood by lawyers, indeed it has been the subject of discussion and development since the first decade of this century, but not always well understood by those who conduct safeguarding reviews. In law it means that, to quote Collier, ‘it must be established that something is more likely than not to be the case’.Footnote ¹² He then asks the crucial question how this is to be established, and the answer is that the evidence on each side has to be weighed and ‘if there is no evidence about something then there is nothing to place on the scale and the exercise cannot be carried out’. He, rightly in my view, criticises the Makin Review here in what is said about Archbishop Justin Welby.Footnote ¹³

Collier then moves to Lessons Learnt Reviews (LLRs) and details their history.Footnote ¹⁴ He emphasises (quoting practice guidance from 2017) that the review should ‘seek to understand practice from the viewpoint of the individuals and organisations at the time rather than using hindsight’. The more recent Code of Practice of 2023 in relation to Safeguarding Practice Reviews (SPRs) is also examined (this replaced the earlier LLR procedure). Collier emphasises that SPRs are ‘not judicial processes designed to establish guilt’. They are not about attributing responsibility or accountability. Collier notes that ‘many victims and survivors do look to (such reviews) with that hope and even expectation’.Footnote ¹⁵ His manifest sympathy for the survivors of abuse makes his emphasis on the importance of understanding what an LLR or SPR is for – and what it is not for – compelling.

Collier then turns to the Makin LLR as an example of the problems arising when there is a lack of understanding of an LLR’s remit. The Makin LLR’s terms of reference (which Collier quotes) are proper and usual to an LLR. While provision was made for additional allegations of abuse uncovered during the review (and alleged failures to respond to such allegations) to be examined, the main objective was supposed to be that of learning for the future. Where additional allegations were uncovered, the Terms of Reference were clear that immediate attention should have been drawn to the appropriate authority. Collier rightly asks why the National Safeguarding Team (NST) waited until the final version of the Makin Review to take action. He notes that much of the discussion following its publication appears to have assumed it was an investigation and appropriation of culpability rather than lessons learned after the completion of an investigatory process. Perhaps the most important aspiration in Collier’s article is as follows:

However, for this to happen, it is imperative that all those involved in safeguarding and clergy conduct and discipline processes become aware of their proper relationship. This article provides the necessary history of the development of, and necessity for, this relationship and documents in detail where we came from and where we ought now to be going.

We next move to the Humphries review and its criticism of Archbishop Sentamu. Again, its terms of refence were clear, not least the consideration of actions against the standards of practice which applied at the relevant time, rather than hindsight. Nevertheless, Collier is right to observe that the reviewer went on to state what the reviewer would have done without reference to either the guidance or actual legal requirements at the time. Nor was there reference to an earlier NST report which said that Archbishop Sentamu had followed relevant practice at that time.Footnote ¹⁷

Collier concludes by repeating that safeguarding is not to be set against either secular or ecclesiastical law. He contrasts the lack of specificity of Professor Jay’s Report in 2024 – The Future of Church Safeguarding – with the detailed evidence of the current safeguarding audits of cathedrals and dioceses conducted by the INEQE safeguarding group.Footnote ¹⁸ There is praise here, rightly, for our Diocesan Safeguarding Teams. His final message is that there has been a very significant advance in the past 30 years and in systems for handling current allegations and historic cases. Even so, the Church must continue to learn, there never being an end point to this important work.

For those who have heard and now read Collier’s paper, most of what I have written is mere emphasis. Nevertheless, as a now retired diocesan bishop, but also a bishop who has continued to deal with a number of CDM cases where other diocesans have been ‘conflicted’, and of course having occasionally to work (happily) with my local diocesan safeguarding team, I hope my precis of Peter Collier’s lecture is a useful underlining. In practical terms I would urge all readers of the Journal to make Collier’s article as widely known as possible, especially to those involved in clergy conduct, discipline and safeguarding cases. In this way his hope of a better correlation between safeguarding and law may be achieved in practice.