Introduction
The Religious Organizations Law of 1939 (Shūkyō dantai hō 宗教團體法) was the first comprehensive law in the Japanese archipelago to define state-sanctioned “religious organizations” to be governed by the Ministry of Education and granted benefits, while placing others under strict surveillance (Monbushō 1939, 3–8, 10). The first clause of the law recognized Sect Shintō, Buddhism, and ChristianityFootnote 1 as “religious organizations” (Shūkyō dantai 宗教團體),” but did not explicitly mention Islam (Kaikyō 回教). The decision not to include Islam in the Religious Organizations Law came after extensive debates in the Imperial Diet. In fact, according to the House of Representatives Committee on Religious Organizations Bill’s Chairman, Andō Masazumi 安藤正純, whether or not to name Islam was the “focus of the discussions.”Footnote 2 Another Committee member, Sugiyama Motojirō 杉山元治郎, also stated that the question of Islam “was the most heatedly debated” issue (Shihōsho 1939, 126). While previous literature on the Religious Organizations Law has not adequately addressed the significance of international and non-Euro-American transnational influences, this article argues that lawmakers viewed the power of transnational Islamic and Communist networks as crucial when defining both officially acceptable “religion” and “the Shrine,” Footnote 3 or Shrine Shinto, as the national core to be protected under this law. The debates surrounding Islam offer fertile ground for examining the significance of international and transnational affairs in determining acceptable forms of “religion” in Japan, as well as the broader implications of what Japanese state officials called “religion” and “thought” in wartime Japanese and world politics.
While historians have tended to disregard the significance of “religion” in modern Japanese history, and in history more generally (Sueki et al. 2020, 1; Lofton Reference Lofton2020, 69–70), Japanese state officials considered defining and mobilizing “religion” crucial for determining the survival of the nation in contemporary global affairs. State officials defined that “religion” in terms closely aligned with their understanding of the Japanese nation and its role in global affairs. The Ministry of Education decided to enact the Religious Organizations Law, as they perceived that “religion” and “faith” (shinkō 信仰) provided both the “power to die” and the “power to live,” which “was most needed on the front lines and behind the front lines of Japan, which was in a state of emergency” (Monbushō 1939, 3). State officials involved in the discussion about Islam in the Religious Organizations Law saw “religion” not merely as a tool for mobilizing people but also feared its power as a potential threat to the nation.
Both the arguments for and against mentioning Islam as a religious organization in the law were tied to the concerns about Soviet Communism. Though few Muslims lived in Japan, mostly Turkic refugees from the former Russian Empire, they were of great interest to various branches of the Japanese state. The Japanese Army, for instance, considered mobilizing the network of Muslims across Asia and beyond to fight the Communist Russians and Chinese (Levent 2019, 26–27, 205–208, 222).Footnote 4 Similarly, politicians advocating for the inclusion of Islam in the Religious Organizations Law of 1939 argued that such recognition could potentially secure global Muslim support for Japan’s economic and military policies. After all, Islam had one of the largest numbers of followers in the world, and many territories of Japanese interest contained a significant Muslim population. Yet some politicians hesitated to mention Islam in the law. While they acknowledged Islam as a “religion” and believed that Muslims should receive the same benefits as other religious organizations, they reasoned that Islam was a relatively new “religion” in Japan with a small number of followersFootnote 5 . In particular, the Education Minister Araki Sadao 荒木貞夫 (1877–1966) and the Prime Minister Hiranuma Kiichirō 平沼騏一郎(1867–1952) argued that they needed to wait and see whether Muslims in Japan would follow the Shrine practices and respect the notion of national polity (kokutai 国体), which were the Japanese essence. For these politicians, maintaining a strong Japanese essence was crucial in resisting against the spread of Soviet Communism.
According to Araki and Hiranuma, the Religious Organizations Law was intended to ensure that all “religions” followed the Shrine, which was seen as crucial in combating foreign “thought,” especially Communism.Footnote 6 These two politicians were involved in the demarcation and governance of “religion” as early as the period following the Russian Revolution and the end of the First World War.Footnote 7 In the 1910s and 1920s, the term shisō, or “thought,” began to be used widely, encompassing the ideas embedded in Buddhism, Christianity, and Shinto (Kurozumi 2013, 11, 26), alongside Communism and other ideologies, as seen in the state officials’ discussions below. “Religion,” in other words, contained a form of “thought” that could potentially either support or threaten the Shrine and the national polity. For Araki and Hiranuma, the Shrine and the national polity defined the Japanese nation and ultimately rested on the sacrality of the imperial lineage, which descended from the founding goddess of the nation, Amaterasuōmikami 天照大御神.Footnote 8 Unlike Sect Shintō groups, which were considered religious organizations, the Shrine was positioned as being beyond “religion.” For this reason, Shrine worship was enforceable to everyone in the country, even though religious freedom was guaranteed under the Constitution (Sueki 2006, 180, 184, 199). Araki in particular stated that if Muslims in Japan did not follow Shrine-related practices, practices that constituted the core of what it meant to be Japanese, the Japanese national spirit would weaken and become vulnerable to foreign threats.
Historians of Japanese religion have debated the relationships between the state and religion, particularly in terms of Shinto’s connection with the Japanese government (Shimazono 2010; Yamaguchi 2023).Footnote 9 Yet, there has been little discussion on how Islam relates to these themes, or how international affairs and transnational movements have affected the conceptions of the “Shrine” and “religion” as well as their relationship to the state. While historians of Japanese religion have traced how state officials and others defined “religion” under the influences of international affairs, their focus has largely remained on Japan’s relationship with Euro-America (Krämer Reference Krämer2011, Reference Krämer2015; Josephson Reference Josephson2012; Maxey Reference Maxey2014; Thomas Reference Thomas2019; Ogawara 2023).Footnote 10 With regard to the Religious Organizations Law of 1939, scholars of Japanese religion and history have focused their inquiries on the extent of religious freedom the law provided within Japan, rather than on its international implications (Krämer Reference Krämer2011, 182–184; Ogawara 2023, 175–176, 194–195, 200–202; Thomas Reference Thomas2019, 105–107; Uemura 2021, 58). Historians and area studies scholars of the Middle East, Islam, and China, on the other hand, have addressed the international significance of the law, though they have tended not to explore the contemporaneous Japanese politics, particularly the role of the Shrine in the creation of this law (Omoso 2005, 131–44; Fukuda 2012, 156–75; Matsutani 2020, 82–92, 69). While the significant influence of Islam, Turkic Muslim intellectuals, Russian intellectuals, and Soviet Communism on Japanese national consciousness and conceptions of “religion” have been addressed (Aydin Reference Aydin2007, 3; Usuki 2010, 26, 29; Konishi Reference Konishi2013, 96–99; Kanahara Reference Kanahara2019, 93–95; Linkhoeva Reference Linkhoeva2020, 1, 9), further analysis is warranted (Solovieva and Konishi Reference Solovieva, Konishi, Solovieva and Konishi2021, 16; Ono and Unno 2022, 3–5). This article argues that Islam and Communism, both of which possessed global networks and political power, affected Japanese lawmakers’ conceptions of “religion” as well as the Shrine as the national essence. To support this argument, the article will first provide a description of the law, followed by a brief analysis of the arguments in favor of including Islam in the law. It will then examine the backgrounds of Araki and Hiranuma, along with state mobilization and surveillance of Islam and Communism during the same period, in order to contextualize their speeches at the Imperial Diet.
Harnessing “religious organizations” for the war
The Religious Organizations Law was first submitted to the House of Peers on January 18, 1939, where it was revised and passed, and then sent to the House of Representatives plenary session on February 23. In the House of Representatives, the Committee on Religious Organizations Bill met sixteen times until March 22, of the same year, intensely debating the place of Islam in the law.Footnote 11 As the question of Islam was not going anywhere, committee members met several times outside the official meetings, attempting to persuade the Hiranuma government to mention Islam in the law (Shihōshō 1939, 126). The Hiranuma government, however, decided not to include Islam, and the law was promulgated on April 8, 1939. It went into full enforcement the following year on April 1, 1940 (Shihōshō 1939, 125–130; Uemura 2021, 42).
According to the Ministry of Education (Monbushō 文部省), the Religious Organizations Law of 1939 was created to support “religions that walked with the sate” during wartime (Monbushō 1939, 4), while cracking down on others that could potentially undermine these aims (7, 8). Consisting of thirty-seven articles, the law outlined standards for managing “religion” and defined acceptable “religious organizations” that would receive state protection and benefits. Others, identified as “religious associations” (Shūkyō kessha 宗教結社), were not granted such benefits and were subjected to greater state scrutiny (3–4, 7–8). Groups wishing to be recognized as “religious organizations” had to obtain permission from the Minister of Education or regional government secretaries (Monbushō 1939, 5–7; Ogawara 2023, 197). Once recognized by the appropriate state authorities, religious organizations were considered judicial persons (hōjin 法人) exempt from various taxesFootnote 12 and debts. In addition, “buildings and land used for public worship and temples and churches” could not be seized (Monbushō 1939, 5). According to the Ministry of Education, religious organizations “have to have existed for a long enough time, have established the basis of both material and spiritual foundations, and to contribute to the state and society” (4, 5). The standards for becoming a religious organization were rather vague and depended on the judgment of individual administrators (Uemura 2021, 46).
While the law granted privileges and protection to religious organizations, it was essentially a regulatory measure. The Minister of Education reserved the right to revoke an organization’s status or to request that it refrain from conducting specific rituals if they were deemed to violate the bounds of religious freedom guaranteed under the Constitution (Monbushō 1939, 8). Article Sixteen of the law stated that “if proclamation of religious doctrine by a religious organization or a teacher, or conduct of a ritual or religious event, disturbs the peace and order or go against the duties of the imperial subject, the appropriate minister can restrict or prohibit it, [and] suspend the teacher or cancel the permission for the religious organization’s establishment” (Monbushō 1939, 13). What constituted a “disruption to the peace and order or duties of the imperial subject,” however, was left vague (Uemura 2021, 57). As will be shown below, politicians’ concerns over adherence to the Shrine and the national polity played a significant part in determining what qualified as an acceptable “religion.”
Control of “religion” and “thought”
The Religious Organizations Law of 1939 was issued as the first comprehensive law governing “religion,” following four failed attempts (1899, 1927, 1929, 1935) (Osawa 2013, 40–41). State officials sought to enact the law primarily to control the “religions” entering Japan from abroad, and groups that they classified as pseudo-religions (ruiji Shūkyō 類似宗教). The idea of issuing the law emerged in response to the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Great Britain and Japan, which was signed in 1894 (Ogawara 2023, 177). Because the treaty allowed foreigners to practice their “faith and worship free[ly]” (Chief Secretary of the Minister of Home Affairs Saigō Tsugumichi 西郷従道 quoted in ibid., 179), the Ministry of Home Affairs felt the need to create a law to regulate the activities of “all kinds of religion other than Shinto and Buddhism” (ibid., 179). However, Buddhist groups opposed being equated with Christians under the proposed law, and as a result, the bill did not pass (ibid., 179). Instead of a religion law, the government issued the Police Security Law in 1900 to control “religious conflicts” (Chief Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs Arimatsu Hideyohsi 有松英義 quoted in ibid., 180). Then, in the 1920s, officials at the Ministry of Education attempted once again to create the law, citing the concern that “religions from outside Imperial Japan would enter our nation…and continuously confuse the national thought” (Chief of Religion Bureau of the Ministry of Education Shimomura Juichi 下村寿一 quoted in ibid., 185). This was the period when Turkic Muslim refugees entered Japan, along with other refugees from the former Russian Empire (Matsunaga 2009, 6), which may have contributed to the fears about “religions” from outside entering the country. In addition to addressing the threat from abroad, officials sought to create the law to control the activities of “pseudo-religion” groups, which were gaining increasing popularity. In 1921, members of Ōmotokyō 大本教 – founded in 1892 by Deguchi Nao 出口ナオ (1837–1918), who claimed to be possessed by a deity, and later led by the charismatic Deguchi Onisaburō 出口王仁三郎 (1871–1948) – were arrested (Hagihara 2021, 105). The arrest, endorsed by Hiranuma in his role as the Prosecutor General (ibid., 105–106), along with fears of similar groups, prompted renewed attempts to issue this law. However, due to opposition from Buddhists, Christians, and academics, and other political factors, the law was not enacted (Ogawara 2023, 186–191).
In the 1920s and 1930s, state officials from the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Education sought to control both “religion” and “thought” to combat the spread of Communism and to unify the nation for the Second Sino-Japanese War.Footnote 13 Although scholarship tends to overlook this connection, control of “religion” and “thought” should be considered together, especially in reference to Soviet Communism. Following the First World War, various thoughts entered Japan from abroad. The Ministry of Home Affairs was particularly concerned about the Communist Party, which officially joined the Comintern in 1922, receiving financial support and sharing intelligence (Nakazawa 2012, 26, 38). To counter the threat of Communism and the influence of the Comintern, state officials from various ministries sought to control both “thought” and “’religion.” While in the late nineteenth century, state officials understood “religion” in relation to Christianity (Yamaguchi 2018, 202–204), by the time of the Religious Organizations Law in the late 1930s, they increasingly associated “religion” with Soviet Communism and Islam, both of which operated transnationally. Officials attempted to resist Communism by solidifying national unity around the Shrine and the national polity, at the heart of which was the imperial lineage and in which sovereignty resided (ibid., 167–168, 277–285). In 1925, they issued the Peace Preservation Law “to punish associations that aimed to transform the national polity or go against the private property system” (Nakazawa 2012, i). While officials initially applied the Peace Preservation Law to target the Communist Party, which declared the abolishment of the monarchy as well as capitalism (Yamaguchi 2018, 278–280), they eventually extended its application to groups labeled as “pseudo religion” groups (Okudaira 2006, 235–239; Nakazawa 2012, 155–157; Ward Reference Ward2019, 137). By the late 1930s, the term “pseudo-religion” generally referred to groups that disrupted the social order, regardless of whether they were officially recognized as “religions” (Endo 2006, 97). Any groups deemed by state officials to oppose the national polity were subject to arrest, just like the Communists. The Religious Organizations Law, on the other hand, was more of a preventive measure, aimed at preventing the “blooming of evil flowers” by shaping “religion” into forms acceptable to the state (Monbushō 1939, 8). The law operated in tandem with the Peace Preservation Law (Okudaira 2006, 239), and “new religions, especially those regarded as heresies, were cautioned against in the same way as the inflow of Socialist and Communist ideologies” (Ogawara 2023, 202).Footnote 14 Thus, state officials viewed the control of “religion” and “thought” as part of the same strategy to protect the national polity to withstand foreign threats, particularly Communism.
Various groups identified by state officials as “religious” made political statements and gained popularity through activities the state considered disruptive, prompting officials to bring them under control. The Ministry of Education introduced the Religious Organizations Law of 1939 to better manage the rising popularity of “pseudo religions” by categorizing them as “religious associations” (Monbushō 1939, 7: Endo 2006, 79, 81, 97–98). These groups attracted followers by helping them cope with social and economic instability during Japan’s involvement in the Second Sino-Japanese War (Okudaira 2006, 235). Prior to the Religious Organizations Law, the government recognized Buddhism and Sect Shintō (comprising of thirteen Shinto sects) as “religions,” and Christians were permitted to conduct activities in Japan if they received authorization from the provincial governors (Shioya 1985, 715). Other groups were governed and monitored by the Ministry of Home Affairs’ Bureau of Police and Public Security (Naimushō Keihokyoku 内務省警保局), classified as “religion and thought associations” or “pseudo religions” (Shioya 1985, 175; Monbushō 1939, 7). For example, in 1935, the members of Ōmotokyō were arrested under the Peace Preservation Law. Ōmotokyō led statist (kokkashugi 国家主義) movements that called for social transformation, attracting members of the military and those who supported the emperor and the national polity in opposition to foreign ideological and military forces (Nakazawa 2012, 128, 135–137, 188). Since the group had grown to approximately 400,000 members (ibid., 135, 155–157) and publicly opposed the parliamentary system and capitalist economy (Kojima 2008, 77), the police arrested Ōmotokyō members, despite the fact that they promoted the national polity (Yamaguchi 2018, 294–295).Footnote 15 Thus, state officials restricted “religion” in much the same way they restricted “thought,” since some of the “pseudo religion” groups engaged in activities of “thought” that challenged the existing regime.
Politicians in the Imperial Diet argued that “pseudo religion” groups needed to be controlled through the Religious Organizations Law because such groups would “confuse the minds of the people” and thereby weaken the nation.Footnote 16 Such confusion was seen as especially dangerous during a war in which “thought” and “religion” played key roles. Referring to the case of Ōmotokyō’s case, Minister of Education Araki stated,
One can see what happens when] leaving religion as is and where it would go, looking at the recent case of the arrest of Ōmotokyō, which confuse the minds of the people to that extent, to the point where it had to be prevented through the police force. When thinking about what existed in the hearts of the people who followed this faith, there is something fearful (ibid., 6).
Thus, Araki considered it critical to control the “fearful” influence of what he referred to as “evil heresies” (inshi jakyō 淫祠邪教) through the creation of the Religious Organizations Law (ibid., 6). In times of war, he claimed, people “rely on god[s] when they face difficulties,” and without the proper “governance of religion” (Shūkyō gyōsei 宗教行政), there could even be “conflicts among the people within the nation” (kokumin no sōkoku 國民ノ相剋) (ibid., 6). A writer from the Ministry of Justice who closely followed debates surrounding Islam’s place in the Religious Organizations Law also warned, “seeing the various circumstances of the actions of our religious world that are against the national polity, and also religion’s mass psychology, and ability to sneak into the subtle movements of the hearts of people, [we] should not stop paying attention to the future of the Islam problem” (Shihōshō 1939, 7). Most likely referring to the popularity of “pseudo-religions” in Japan, along with Islam, the writer expressed concern about the power of “religion” in general, viewing its ability to attract large numbers of followers as a potential source of social instability. For state officials, controlling the power of “religion” was crucial, as the confusion caused by religious influence could lead to the spread of foreign ideologies, particularly Communism that might destabilize the nation.
At the global level, various governments were also concerned about the spread of Soviet Communist influence in their countries, especially after the First World War (Nakazawa 2012, 19, 50; Yamaguchi 2018, 277–283; Hagihara 2022, 26, 32–33). In the late 1930s, Japan, Germany, and Italy issued the Anti-Comintern Pacts (1936, 1937). These governments deployed Muslim soldiers in regions of strategic interests to fight against their enemies, including Communists and the Soviet Union (Motadel Reference Motadel2014, 7, 11, 34–35; Levent 2019, 26–27, 207–219; Hammond Reference Hammond2020, 3, 16). Although the Communist Party in Japan had weakened by the mid-1930s, state officials remained vigilant, as the Comintern had declared in its 1932 Theses that it would target Japan’s emperor system (Yamaguchi 2018, 279, 285). Communism was spreading throughout East Asia, and as will be discussed below, the two main figures who opposed the inclusion of Islam in the Religious Organizations Law, Education Minister Araki, and Prime Minister Hiranuma, viewed the ongoing war as fundamentally a struggle against Soviet Communism, which they believed stood behind China (Araki 1938, 40, 45; Hiranuma 1939, 4–5). Araki (1938) stated that “even while the Incident [the Second Sino-Japanese War] is going on, we should carefully observe the Comintern and the Soviet Union that are active behind the Incident [the War]” (43). To fight Soviet Communism, Araki and Hiranuma believed it necessary to preserve a strong national core rooted in the Shrine and the national polity, free from any foreign influences, including Islam, and saw the Religious Organizations Law as a means to enhance this goal.
History behind Japanese interests in Islam and Muslims
From the period following the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) through the Siberian Intervention (1918–1922), the Japanese Army considered waging battles against Russia by mobilizing Muslims in mainland China and Central Asia (Levent 2019, 26–27, 205–208, 222). Similarly, Turkic Muslims from regions of the former Russian Empire sought support from Japan in their struggle against the Bolsheviks (ibid., 46–60, 222). Following the Russian Revolution in 1921, up to 2,000 Turkic-language-speaking Muslims who fled the internal conflicts in the Volga Ural region sought refuge in Japan, where they became stateless (mukokuseki 無国籍) refugees (hinanmin 避難民) (Matsunaga 2009, 6). Especially after the Manchurian Incident in 1931, the Japanese Army began attempting to mobilize Turkic Muslim leaders to promote a positive image of Japan among the Muslims in North China and the Soviet Union (Levent 2019, 26–27; Fukuda 2012, 158). The Army, along with other officials, learned from these Turkic leaders that Muslims were united transnationally through their faith. They believed that if Japan could gain Muslim support, they might join the fight against the Russians and the Chinese along the Japanese-ruled Manchukuo border (Fukuda 2012, 158; Levent 2019, 206, 224–225).
After the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Japanese Army, as well as other state officials from the Navy and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, became increasingly interested in incorporating Muslims in China and beyond into their wartime policy (Levent 2019,179–181; Hammond Reference Hammond2020, 13–17, 28). To gain support from the Muslims in Japan, politicians and those seeking to benefit from businesses with Muslims abroad supported the construction of the Tokyo Mosque in 1938, an initiative led by the prominent Bashkir leader Muhammed Abdulhay Kurbanali (1889–1972) (Fukuda 2012, 160). Later that same year, the Army, Navy, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs jointly supported the establishment of the Great Japan Islamic Association (Dainihon kaikyō kyōkai 大日本回教協會) (Levent 2019, 179–180). This initiative encouraged the Imperial Diet politicians to include Islam in the Religious Organizations Law (Shihōshō 1939, 51–60). The Association distributed pamphlets stating that “Japan acknowledging Islam in the law would be the best way to make Muslims [throughout Asia] trust Japan,” thereby enabling Japan to position itself as a leader in Asia (Dainihon kaikyō kyōkai 1939a, 4). As discussions on the law progressed, military tensions between Japan and the Soviet Union escalated, culminating in the Battle of Nomonhan in May 1939 (Levent 2019, 206–208). Politicians who advocated for including Islam in the law recognized the military and political advantages of gaining Muslim support in China and beyond, particularly in the context of the fight against the Soviet Union and Communism.
The issue surrounding Islam in relation to the Religious Organizations Law sparked significant national and international reactions from both Muslims around the world and other states interested in mobilizing Muslims against their enemies. Heated debates emerged in the Japanese media, along with gatherings of Japanese nationalists (nihonshugisha 日本主義者) devoted to the topic. One such event, the so-called “Meeting for Those Interested in the Islam Issue” (Kaikyō mondai yūshi taikai 回教問題有志大會), was held in Hibiya Park on March 18, 1939 (Shihōshō 1939, 135-138). Muslims in Japan also organized meetings to petition the Japanese government to include Islam in the law as a religious organization. On March 5, 1939, while the Religious Organizations Bill was under discussion, Tatar journalist and leader Abdürreşid İbrahim (1857–1944) held a prayer gathering of about thirty Muslims and convened a meeting at the Tokyo Mosque. In the following days, Turkic and Indian Muslims in the Japanese archipelago submitted petitions to the chairmen of the House of Peers and Representatives, the Minister of Education, the Committee on Religious Organizations Bill, and the Great Japan Islamic Association (Fukuda 2012, 169; Gaimushō 1939). The petition emphasized that there were 350 million Muslims around the world who were “anxious and hopeful that Japan would take fair actions,” and warned that excluding Islam from the law would disappoint the Muslims globally (Fukuda 2012, 169; Gaimushō 1939). İbrahim also met with the Education Minister Araki to discuss the matter. They spoke about İbrahim’s effort to establish connections with Muslims abroad, reflecting Araki’s apparent interest in securing Muslim support through him (Gaimushō 1939). Although Araki told İbrahim that “I would do my best to include your desire,” he ultimately chose not to mention Islam in the law (Gaimushō 1939). Furthermore, in May 1938, Yemeni Prince Seif-al-Islam al Hussein and his Minister of Religion visited Japan to attend the opening of the Tokyo Mosque. They also expressed concern about the possibility that Islam would not be mentioned in the new law, effectively making the drafting of the law a foreign affairs issue (Omoso 2005, 142). The Prince warned that omitting Islam from the law would have a negative impact on Muslims outside Japan (Dainihion kaikyō kyōkai 1939b, 37, 39–41). In addition, British officials closely monitored the case, and media in Egypt, Iran, India, and Indonesia covered the topic. As the issue became an international concern, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials instructed its embassies to monitor Muslim reactions to the law (Fukuda 2012, 169–170).Footnote 17 These national and international concerns and voices were reflected in the Imperial Diet debates around the place of Islam under this law.
Why include Islam?
The Imperial Diet records show that several politicians in both the House of Peers and the House of Representatives advocated for the inclusion of Islam in the Religious Organizations Law due to its potential global political and economic advantages. In fact, one member of the House of Representatives Committee on Religious Organizations Bill, Hayashi Heima 林平馬, even stated, “Islam [囘教], these two characters, whether to include or not include them [in the law] is a matter not unrelated to the rise and fall of Japan.”Footnote 18 Proponents of including Islam in the law argued that doing so could secure the support of the 370–380 million Muslims around the world for Japan’s political and economic interests.Footnote 19 They believed that Muslims outside Japan were paying close attention to the law, seeing Japan as a non-Western, non-White power that might assist Muslims in resisting both the Western imperialism and Soviet Communism.Footnote 20 Moreover, territories where Japan had strategic interests, such as Manchuria, northern and northwestern China, or the South Sea, were home to significant Muslim populations.Footnote 21 There were already mosques in Tokyo and Kobe (Tsurumi Yūsuke, Shūkyō, March 1, 1939, 2), and Turkic Muslim refugees in Japan had produced pamphlets in Arabic script promoting Japanese culture and expressing gratitude for Japan’s support. Failing to include Islam in the law and thereby disappointing these Turkic Muslims would be “very disappointing.”Footnote 22 If Islam were omitted from the law altogether, Japan risked damaging its relationships with Muslim majority states, such as Yemen, while its enemies could exploit the omission as basis for anti-Japanese propaganda.Footnote 23 As Hayashi noted, the Religious Organizations Law was indeed “a law of great international impact.”Footnote 24 The concerns expressed by Imperial Diet politicians regarding Islam underscore both the national and international significance of how “religion” was demarcated under the Religious Organizations Law.
Why Islam could not be included in the religious organizations law
While some politicians argued that Islam should be in the new law based on its potential international impacts, others contended that Japan’s survival ultimately depended on safeguarding the Shrine and the national polity. According to Minister of Education Araki and Prime Minister Hiranuma, the Religious Organizations Law would “stabilize the minds of the people” (jinshin no antei 人心の安定),Footnote 25 thereby ensuring Japan’s survival against Communism and other foreign influences, including demands from Muslims abroad.Footnote 26 Araki acknowledged the international significance of the law, stating that “with regard to international mobilization of religion…against ‘Soviet,’ or for the policy on the Continent [China] through [mobilization of] Islam,” he “hope[d] this would become active.”Footnote 27 Yet, precisely because of the need to maintain a strong Japanese stance against Soviet Communism, he insisted that interests not grounded in Japan’s domestic situation should not influence the creation of the law (ibid., 314). Even prior to the enactment of this law, Araki and Hiranuma had played significant roles in implementing legal and military education measures to control thought, using the Religious Organizations Law to promote values centered on the Shrine (Sakamoto 2016, 18–20, 33, 37–38). In fact, a leading scholar of Shinto, Sakamoto Koreamaru (2016) called Araki, “the greatest ideologue” of “Shinto ideology” because he linked the Army with the Shrine (18), and Hiranuma as the “parent of the Shinto Affairs Board” (Jingiin 神祇院) (37).”Footnote 28 As head of the Research Committee on the Shrine System (Jinja seidō chōsa kai 神社制度調査会), Hiranuma worked toward the establishment of the Shinto Affairs Board and the promotion of the Shrine. Araki and Hiranuma’s career history sheds light on their stance regarding the Religious Organizations Law.
For Araki, Communism was Japan’s primary threat. He had been sent to Russia as an officer specializing in Russian military tactics, where he witnessed the Russian Revolution, which, in his words, resulted in an “anarchical state” (quoted in Tomita 2008, 18). To counter Soviet Communism, Araki emphasized the importance of national spiritual unity over modern military force (Kitaoka 2018, 183–184). As the leading figure of the Imperial Way Faction of the Army (Kōdōha 皇道派), which promoted the spiritual elevation of the Japanese nation based on the three values expressed through the imperial regalia, “fairness…benevolence, …[and] courageous decision” (Araki 1932, 18–19), Araki became extremely popular among young officers (Nakazawa 2012, 137). As director of the Inspectorate General of Military Training and the Army and Minister of the Army (1931–1934), Araki influenced the Army’s decision in1932 to take a critical stance against Catholic university students who refused to worship at the Yasukuni Shrine, which enshrined the war dead, as part of their military training (Sakamoto 2016, 10–11, 18–19). Thus, Araki played a significant role in shifting the education and military systems toward valuing the Shrine as the nation’s essence.
Araki’s experience in, and knowledge of, the Soviet Union also influenced how he thought about “religion.” For instance, he stated that “nourishing national thought through religion …is vital,” and that the Religious Organizations Law was intended to prevent “losing the most precious faith [probably referring to the Shrine]Footnote 29 and becoming materialistic.Footnote 30 For Araki (1938), Communism was “materialistic,” “artificial,” and “against all spiritual civilization,” whereas Japan stood at the “opposite” end, upholding a “spiritual civilization” (38). “Communism and our Japanese spirit are incompatible” (ibid., 38), he maintained. His emphasis on the importance of “religion” stemmed from his desire for Japan not to become like the Soviet Union. During a House of Representatives Committee on Religious Organizations Bill meeting, Araki stated that,
religion as such, as anyone can understand, is so important for one’s life, and it is clear from the case of the ‘Soviet’ Union how sad it is to not believe in religion and to value solely materialistic thinking, and how society becomes confused…it is probably an ideal, and not a reality today, that everything in society could be done solely through logic or self consciousness, and for this reason it is necessary to value religion… (Shūkyō, March 7, 1939,14).
Seeing that the Soviet Union’s attempt to eliminate “religion” had failed, Araki concluded that “religion” was crucial for societal stability, perhaps especially in Japan’s fight against Communism. He regarded “religion” as an antidote to Communism.
Like Araki, Hiranuma believed that Japan’s survival required centering Japanese thought on the emperor and the Shrine. As a Prosecutor General (1912), Chief Justice (1921), Minister of Justice (1923), Vice-President and President of the Privy Council (1926, 1936) before becoming the Prime Minister in 1939 (Hagihara 2021, ii–iii, 305–308), Hiranuma worked to counter foreign thoughts that entered Japan in the aftermath of the First World War. He played a significant role in shaping Japan’s prosecutorial system and mechanisms of thought control (ibid., 56, 98–106, 119). For instance, Hiranuma was involved in the High Treason Incident (1911) and the Toranomon Incident (1923), both attempted assassinations of the emperor and the crown prince by Socialists, Anarchists, and Communists (ibid., ii-iii, 52–53, 121, 123). These experiences solidified his resolve to prevent the spread of Communism in Japan. In their aftermath, he supported the Peace Preservation Law of 1925, and its 1928 revision, which sought to protect the national polity against the Communist Party (ibid.,122–123, 147–150). He was also ideologically influential as a founder of the Kokuhonsha (国本社), a statist organization that promoted Japanese traditional values, in which Araki was one of the directors (ibid., 124–126). He was, in fact, a prominent figure in controlling the activities of thought.
Again, like Araki, Hiranuma considered the control of “religion” crucial for uniting the nation under the Shrine. Even before the enactment of the Religious Organizations Law in 1939, Hiranuma had been involved in its development since 1926, serving as the first head of the Research Committee on the Religious Administration System (Shūkyō seido chōsakai 宗教制度調査会) (Osawa 2013, 43). From the mid-1930s onward, as the head of the Research Committee on the Shrine System, Hiranuma prepared for the establishment of the Shinto Affairs Board, supporting Shinto priests who aimed to restore the unity of politics and ritual (saisei icchi 祭政一致), a condition believed to have existed in ancient times (Sakamoto 2016, 22–23). For Hiranuma, the unity of politics and ritual meant conducting governance based on “the divine will of the kami [gods]” (shinryo 神慮) (Hiranuma 1938, 2–4). In his words, “politics emerges from ritual, and ritual is completed with politics. Ritual and politics are one and not two” (ibid., 7). Thus, when Hiranuma became the Prime Minister in 1939, he pressured the Ministry of Home Affairs to establish the Shinto Affairs Board. In 1940, he became its head while serving as Minister of Home Affairs (Sakamoto 2016, 33, 37–38; Yamaguchi 2018, 267). Hiranuma’s work illustrates how state officials considered the control of both “thought” and “religion” together, particularly in opposition to the spread of Communism and Soviet influence in Japan.
The importance of maintaining a Japanese stance
Araki acknowledged the significance of Islam in Japan’s policy toward China and the Soviet Union. He mentioned that he had helped build the Tokyo Mosque himself and emphasized that Muslims were free to practice Islam under the Article Twenty-Eight of the Constitution.Footnote 31 However, he hesitated to include Islam in the Religious Organizations Law because, unlike Buddhism, Shinto, and Christianity, Islam had a relatively short history in Japan, and Muslim population in the country was still quite small. He was unsure whether Muslims would follow Shrine practices and revere the national polity. He noted that:
Islam, among others, has attracted many followers among the Asian peoples in Central Asia…Unfortunately, there have been no religious activities of this kind in our country’s past, and it is still unclear what position this [Islam] would take once it arrives and begins its activities in our country…Regarding this law, as I have just stated, since it is based on the state of religious activities in our country, we do not include Islam or other religions from other parts of the world (Emphasis added, Araki Sadao in Shūkyō, March 1, 1939, 3).
Accordingly, Araki argued that if the Muslim population in Japan were to reach 100,000 or more, he would consider explicitly including Islam in the law on the grounds that “there is, in fact, the occurrence of the activities of a religion” (ibid.,10). Araki insisted that Muslims must follow the Shrine practices because, for him, the purpose of the law was to ensure that “the people of this nation grow their faith in the Shrine and fully understand that [they] are imperial subjects. And while [a religious organization] is protected in this country, [it] must act in accordance with this principle” (ibid., 10). Indeed, the law was intended to “clarify the relationship between the Shrine and religion”Footnote 32 by fostering people’s faith in the Shrine.Footnote 33 He further stated that:
[we] do not hesitate to Japanize thoroughly our nation’s religions [that have existed] from the past. Regarding the Shrine, [these religions] should not hesitate to walk on the path as Japanese. Not only should [they] not hesitate, [they] must understand that [they] are obligated to follow [the path of the Shrine] (Araki Sadao in Shūkyō, March 1, 1939, 2).
For religious organizations to “Japanize,” they were expected to align with the teachings of the Shrine. Araki hoped that Muslims would “Japanize” like Christians had. In 1937, for instance, Anglicans in Japan spoke against the British Archbishop’s anti-Japanese resolution (ibid., 2) and subsequently refused any support from abroad (Oe 2018, 120, 124). Officials at the Education Ministry intended the Religious Organizations Law to eliminate foreign influences, such as from missionaries and parent churches overseas (Hara 2018, 37-39), and in the case of Christianity, this strategy appears to have worked. Through it remained an open question whether Muslims would follow suit, this was how Araki hoped and expected Muslims to act in Japan as well.
For Araki, the administration of “religion” was crucial because it determined the life of the nation. Religious Organizations Law, therefore, should not be influenced by the demands of foreign voices. He stated, “religious administration is the most important issue, that has to be conducted most carefully,” because “once there is a mistake with the religious administration, there would be a great effect on the national polity,” which would endanger the very life of the Japanese nation.Footnote 34 Araki further stated, “with regard to religious administration in our country, and at the core of faith, we need to recognize that we receive our lives from the unique national polity to which we must give serious consideration.”Footnote 35 A key aspect of this national character was the fact that Japan had an emperor with an unbroken lineage descending from the founding goddess of the nation.Footnote 36 Araki hesitated to mention Islam in the law because he wanted to maintain a strong “Japanese stance” (Nihon toiu tachiba 日本ト云フ立場)Footnote 37 and not be swayed by Japan’s interests in mobilizing Muslims for international affairs, or by Muslim demands. He warned that:
there is a slight tendency for this thing called Japan and its foundation to be swayed by matters of interests. What is needed, and is at the core of the idea, is that [we are] our nation at all times. Strike if you want, hit if you want, but we must show that there is something that does not waver.Footnote 38
The “Japanese stance,” and its “foundation” were grounded in the national polity and Shrine worship. To protect the national polity through this law, Araki would not easily yield to the demands rooted in political and economic interests, such as including Islam in the law merely to garner Muslim support for Japan’s policy in Asia.Footnote 39
As with Araki, Prime Minister Hiranuma Kiichirō reasoned that Islam did not need to be named in the law because there were few Muslims in Japan. In his concluding remarks on the issue of Islam, Hiranuma stated that, “this Religious Organizations Bill is based on the religious activities that have taken place in our country up to the present, so Islam is not explicitly mentioned in the Religious Organizations Law.”Footnote 40 However, he noted that Islam would still receive various benefits under this law, just “like other churches” (教會等) mentioned in the law.Footnote 41
In a similar vein to Araki, Hiranuma also placed prime importance on the Shrine. He emphasized its non-religious nature, referred to it as the “way of the kami,” and proposed making it the central criterion for determining which forms of religious organizations were acceptable. Hiranuma stated, “the way of the kami [Kannagara no michi 随神ノ道] is the absolute, and all people of the nation must respect it. What deviates from this teaching and infringes upon it should not be permitted,”Footnote 42 echoing Araki. While the Religious Organizations Bill was being discussed in the Diet, Hiranuma (1939) gave a talk titled, “The Way of the Imperial Subject” (Shinmin no michi 臣民の道),” in which he emphasized the importance of the Japanese people drawing on their special relationship with the emperor to eliminate Communist influence in East Asia. The talk was given at a conference of the Central Committee of the National Spiritual Mobilization Movement (Kokumin seishin sōdōin undō 国民精神総動員運動), a movement initiated by the Konoe Fumimaro 近衛文麿 (1891–1945) government in 1937 to compel citizens to fully comply with the state’s wartime policies, an effort that Hiranuma actively continued to promote (Fuke 2022, 20, Hagihara 2016, 210). In his talk, Hiranuma stated, “today, where Communism permeates the Chinese continent, even trying to dominate the government, [we] must eliminate this, and protect East Asia from the harm of reddening [sekika 赤化]” (Hiranuma 1939, 4–5). To achieve this goal, he emphasized the necessity of both economic power and national defense, but added, “without the spirit, these are just formalities” (ibid., 6). Therefore, it was essential to “elevate the Japanese spirit” (ibid., 6) by recognizing the emperor’s benevolence and sacred lineage, and to support him in return (ibid., 2–3). Likewise, in formulating the Religious Organizations Law, Hiranuma viewed adherence to the teaching of the imperial ancestors as a means of resisting Communism both from abroad and within Japan.
Furthermore, as in the case of Araki, one of Hiranuma’s concerns about Islam may have stemmed from his perceptions of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.Footnote 43 In a 1943 interview, he stated, “Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, they all are in opposition [to] each other,” whereas “[Japan’s] spirit of the imperial way [kōdō seishin 皇道精神] is absolute [and does not conflict with anything else]” (Hiranuma Kiichiro kaikoroku hensan iinkai 1955, 134). Although this statement came later, it is likely that Hiranuma held similar views during the drafting of the Religious Organizations Law in 1939. He may have perceived Islam, like Christianity and Judaism, as often in conflict with one another, and potentially at odds with the Japanese spirit as well.
Hiranuma’s concerns are reflected in the Ministry of Justice’s article on the Imperial Diet debate regarding the inclusion of Islam in the Religious Organizations Law of 1939. The Ministry’s 172-page article in its journal Shisō Geppō (思想月報 Thought Monthly Report) stated that the issue “should be carefully examined from the essence of Islam per se as a problem of thought [shisō mondai 思想問題]” (Emphasis added, Shihōshō 1939, 7). The unnamed author warned that “today’s Muslims, who do not have modern weapons, fundamentally rely on transnational psychological ties and moral unity that transcend race and states and extend around the world” (ibid., 6). Due to these transracial, faith-based ties and the “Muslims’ essential character [to] fight against heathens” (ibid., 6), the author expressed concern that Islam could pose a threat to the national polity.
In the end, Islam was not mentioned in the Religious Organizations Law, but it was treated like other religious organizations. Mosques were apparently not taxed, and there were no significant restrictions on their activities. Later, in 1942, the ruling body of Imperial Japan, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, established the Kōa Shūkyō dōmei 興亜宗教同盟, a religious alliance, which included Shinto, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam to unify religious groups across Asia. Yet, Islam was still not formally included as a religious organization in the Religious Organizations Law (Fukuda 2012, 170).
Conclusion
Although the Religious Organizations Law is often analyzed within the domestic context of Japan, with a focus on the degree of religious freedom it provided, examining the Imperial Diet politicians’ discussions on whether to mention Islam as a religious organization reveals that the law was drafted with concerns about its international and transnational consequences. Both politicians who argued for and against including Islam in the law emphasized the control of “religion” as crucial for navigating contemporary global affairs and sustaining the life of the nation. While many politicians viewed Muslims as generally opposed to Communism and therefore likely to support Japan’s wartime policies against the Soviet Union and the spread of Communism in Asia, some state officials, such as the Ministry of Justice author, feared the transnational, faith-based ties of Muslims, which they believed could potentially weaken the Japanese nation centered on the Shrine and the national polity. For those who opposed mentioning Islam in the law, such as Araki and Hiranuma, it was essential to maintain a strong Japanese stance, one that reflected the domestic situation and was grounded in the Shrine and the national polity, as a way to resisting Soviet Communism.Footnote 44 International and transnational affairs, especially concerning Islam and Communism, were thus central to how Japanese state officials conceptualized “religion” and the role of the Shrine, which they saw as foundational to the Japanese nation. Araki and Hiranuma, in particular, considered adherence to the Shrine crucial to the war effort, perhaps even more so than military tactics. The analysis of debates over whether to include Islam as a religious organization in the law sheds light on the significance of “religion” in wartime global politics, as well as on how Japanese state officials understood “religion,” thought, and the Shrine within national, transnational, and international contexts shaped by the transnational migration of Turkic refugees, Islamic and Communist networks, and the ongoing war. It also underscores the need to situate modern Japanese history in a context beyond Japan and its international relations with the Euro-American states.
Acknowledgement
This article was written with funding from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science’s Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity Start-up (JSPS KAKENHI Researcher Number 30883912). The author thanks the participants and organizers – Ulrich Brandenburg, Noriko Unno, and Yasemin Rende – of “The Politicization of Islam in East Asia, 1850–1950,” held at the University of Zurich in August 2022; the panelists of “The Military-Ideological Complex of the Japanese Empire” at the European Association for Japanese Studies Conference in August 2023; Professor Yamaguchi Teruomi for his comments; and Professor Otsuka Osamu for the opportunity to present a talk based on this article at the University of Tokyo’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Sultan Qaboos Chair in Middle Eastern Studies, in October 2024. The author also thanks Professors Tomi Suzuki, Haruo Shirane, Jinno Hidenori, Adam Miller, Bruce Winkelman, Paride Stortini, Clinton Godart, and Abe Naofumi, as well as the anonymous reviewers, for their comments on drafts of the manuscript. All errors remain the author’s own.
Competing Interests
The author declares no competing interests.
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