Perceived inequalities

The process of objective inequalities translating into perceived inequalities is complex and dynamic, and remains understudied. Focusing on perceptions, with only a limited framework for research suggested by prior studies, we must rely on secondary literature for guidance in assessing political discourse to confirm the presence of perceived inequalities. Unfortunately, there is not enough survey data available to assess perceptions within the population, as was done in studies by Rustad (Reference Rustad2016), Langer and Smedts (Reference Langer and Smedts2013) and Must (Reference Must2016).

We used a variety of sources to assess perceived grievances, including both existing scholarship and primary sources. First, the public opinion poll by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) (2022) and USAID (2023) revealed people’s perceptions of inequality. However, we were limited by the questions formulated by the NDI and the frequency of its polls. Second, we looked at media coverage, primarily local press and video coverage of speeches and public events, to provide a better understanding of how the issue is framed and presented to the public. Finally, we considered election results as an indicator revealing support for narratives on the unequal treatment of Bosnian Serbs. Official statements by Milorad Dodik provided valuable indicators of perceived grievances.

This approach has been chosen largely due to the significant influence of political leaders in shaping public opinion in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Political elites play a pivotal role in perpetuating ethnic divisions and grievances in this post-conflict society, particularly ethno-nationalist leaders who have retained power since the war and opportunistically exploited ethnic divisions to maintain their hold on office (Kartsonaki Reference Kartsonaki2016; Burianova and Hlousek Reference Burianová and Hloušek2022). Politically controlled media and an education system segmented along ethnic lines present one-sided, ethnonationalist perspectives that shape citizens’ views, with each ethnic group exposed to different versions of history (USAID BiH 2023) and reinforce divisive historical and contemporary narratives. These separate education systems are decentralized — governed by entities or cantons — and highly politicized. This systematic manipulation by political leaders, exacerbated by efforts toward nationalization (Kartsonaki Reference Kartsonaki2016; Touquet Reference Touquet2012), prevents constructive dialogue and deepens the ethnic divide.

The alignment of trusted religious leadersFootnote ² with political figures accentuates religious differences; this and BiH’s low media literacy (Lessenski Reference Lessenski2023) further contribute to the persistence of grievances, leaving society vulnerable to political manipulation. These factors foster reluctance to overcome the ethnic divide, as feelings of insecurity and deeply rooted perceptions of inter-ethnic animosity continue to prevail.

Objective inequalities

Measuring objective inequalities is difficult due to the scarcity of data collected at the group level relevant to HI. Challenges surround not only the systematic collection of data but also the definition of groups. However, in BiH, a data-driven approach to measuring objective HIs is possible due to the wealth of statistical data specific to different ethnic groups in line with the division of the country into two entities. 92.14% of all Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina live in RS, while 88.29% of Bosniaks live in FBiH (Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2013).

Regarding the structure of the entities (see Figure 2), RS is ethnically composed of 81.51% Serbs and FBiH of 70.40% Bosniaks (Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2013).

While the overlap between ethnic and administrative divisions allows for a data-driven approach, it also presents limitations. There is no perfect alignment between ethnicity and administrative entities, so data cannot be solely attributed to Serbs or Bosniaks and Croats. However, we were primarily interested in identifying any potentially disadvantaged position of Serbs, who make up 81.51% of the population in Republika Srpska, where 92.14% of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina reside. Therefore, we proceeded to use data from the Institute of Statistics of Republika Srpska (2021c; 2022b; 2021a; 2021b; 2022a) and the Federal Institute of Statistics of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2020b; 2022a; 2019; 2022b; 2020a) and supplemented them with data from the Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2013) while considering the limitations of the available data. All the data preceded 2021, when tensions reescalated. Data from 2019 and 2020 allows us to scrutinize the milieu in which secessionist rhetoric, predicated on grievances, found a receptive audience among the population.Footnote ³

Dealing with three general dimensions of horizontal inequality — economic, social, and political — we addressed key related concepts and operationalized them with regard to the available data. Where statistics were not sufficient for operationalization, we primarily gathered data by examining the constitutional, electoral, and legal frameworks and other legal documents, procedural rules of the central state-level institutions, secondary literature, and media coverage. The selected variables for this investigation, along with their respective operationalization, are detailed in Tables 1–3 below.

Table 1. Conceptualization and operationalization of economic inequalities

Economic inequalities

In academic research, economic horizontal inequalities have received much more attention than other forms of horizontal inequality among ethnic groups, and several methods of measuring economic disparities have been suggested (Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch Reference Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch2011; Côté Reference Côté2015). In this study, we used numerous statistics directly sourced from statistical offices rather than relying on (or constructing) an economic inequality index with the aim of addressing possible economic disparities.

Social inequalities

The literature identifies horizontal social inequalities — such as access to education and healthcare — across different ethnic groups (Hillesund et al. Reference Hillesund, Bahgat, Barrett, Dupuy, Gates, Nygård, Rustad, Strand, Urdal and Østby2018). These social inequalities are inherently intertwined with economic factors (Østby Reference Østby2008; Côté Reference Côté2015), which can make analysis difficult. Also, the complex nature of social phenomena difficult to measure. Despite these challenges, we aimed to leverage detailed data from the statistical offices, presenting comprehensive general statistics describing social phenomena, to investigate economic and social disparities separately. While we concentrated on group inequalities across ethnic divisions, we acknowledge that these social dimensions should be evaluated within a broader economic framework.

Political inequalities

In HI theory, the political dimension concerns how certain social groups, usually culturally or ethnically defined, occupy an unequal position within the political system compared to others (Siroky et al. Reference Siroky, Warner, Filip-Crawford, Berlin and Neuberg2020). Given the unique political system of BiH, assessing political inequalities between constituent peoples, with a focus on Bosnian Serbs, is crucial. Although the operationalization of political HIs can be challenging, several denominators have been used in previous studies. They include the distribution of political opportunities and power, capabilities for participation and the control of central legislative and executive bodies and regional and local governments (Langer and Smedts Reference Langer and Smedts2013; Langer and Stewart Reference Langer and Stewart2013). Building on these, while considering the specific status of the constituent peoples, we constructed a set of indicators to examine the objective conditions that might create a space for the perception of being disadvantaged within the actual political set-up.

Examining the presence of perceived inequalities

To better comprehend the perceived inequalities among Bosnian Serbs and to explore potential threats they might perceive, it is crucial to briefly outline the historical context of the shaping of their identity as a unified social and political community. Tracing back to the policy of national identity suppression in Tito’s Yugoslavia and the subsequent fall of the one-party system, marginalizing non-ethnic parties, in the 1990s, Bosnian Serbs’ discontent began to surface, together with the emergence of ethnonationalist parties. As political and social identity became salient, it is essential to acknowledge the pivotal role of the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) led by Radovan Karadžić under Slobodan Milošević’s vision of the Greater Serbia (Toal and Maksić Reference Toal and Maksić2014).

The SDS was the first agent to strive to unify Bosnian Serbs into a cohesive and self-aware political community. With slogans of reawakening, renewal, and unity, the party crafted a narrative about the attempt to create disunity among Bosnian Serbs through the territorial organization of municipalities and by highlighting the systematic economic, demographic, and political disadvantages imposed on Serbs within the shared state (Toal Reference Toal2013). Amidst rising ethnonationalism, Bosnian Serbs rallied behind SDS, believing it advocated their interests and gradually aligned their views with those presented by the party’s elites. The SDS not only garnered enough support to win the following democratic elections but also secured the semi-independent territory of Republika Srpska, today characterized by nearly homogenous ethnic composition (Toal and Maksić Reference Toal and Maksić2014).

The current political arrangement of the country dates from the Dayton Peace Agreement, including its Annex IV. The DPA, which ended the civil war in BiH, left all parties dissatisfied, as it appeared to deny each group the full realization of its primary objective — in the case of Serbian representatives, unification with Serbia. However, the agreement did legitimize Republika Srpska to a significant extent by establishing two political entities and allowing it to retain the territories it had gained during the war (Toal Reference Toal2013; Kartsonaki Reference Kartsonaki2016). Despite the significant political gain that secured for Republika Srpska strong control over 49% of the country’s territory through a highly decentralized political system, Bosnian Serb politicians have continued to advocate for the creation of an ethnically homogenous, independent state or the possibility of future reunification with Serbia.

As the reputation of SDS suffered significantly due to its involvement in the war, a decade later, Milorad Dodik, with his SNSD, took on patronage over the Bosnian Serbs, echoing grievances internalized since Karadžić’s era. Given the crucial role of political elites in Bosnia and Herzegovina in shaping public discourse, Milorad Dodik’s long-standing position as a political leader in Republika Srpska, backed by significant public support, makes him a central figure in influencing narratives that shape the identity, priorities, and perceived inequalities of Bosnian Serbs. As noted in the 2023 USAID report, his considerable control over the media further extended this influence over public discourse. Dodik’s rhetoric not only mirrors but actively shapes sentiments within Republika Srpska, underscoring the importance of scrutinizing his statements and their role in increasing ethnic divisions.

The push to further nationalize the entity to create a nation-state, along with demands for secession, intensified following Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, which is often cited as an example of international injustice and the unequal treatment of the Serbs. Independence became a prominent topic during the SNSD’s 2006 campaign, leading to Milorad Dodik’s victory and providing a clear direction for his upcoming political agenda, with the potential to solidify his hold on power (Touquet Reference Touquet2012; Kartsonaki Reference Kartsonaki2016).

Rhetoric of division

Stepping into the patronage role, Dodik has become a key political figure who publicly expresses concerns about the unequal treatment of Bosnian Serbs in BiH. After 2001, he veered off his moderate, reconciliatory, and pro-Western political course and reshaped himself as a prominent nationalist protagonist and secessionist, who is seen as a major threat to BiH’s political system, contributing to an overall tense atmosphere (Hasic and Savic-Bojanovic Reference Hasic and Savic-Bojanovic2022). Paradoxically, while he has been taking over the defence of the Dayton constitutional system in its original form, he is the one constantly challenging this system, attempting to subvert it (Toal Reference Toal2013).

Dodik openly advocates for RS interests and independence and frequently employs discursive constructions, such as “we/us,” to distinguish himself and the Serbs from “them,” typically referring to the Bosniaks or the international community. The linguistic strategy extends to possessive pronouns such as “our” and “their.” These linguistic tools are central to identity politics, emphasizing and creating divisions, thereby contributing to ethnic polarization. Beglerović (Reference Beglerović2020) and Barton Hronešová (Reference Barton Hronešová2022) claim that Dodik extensively employs elements of divisive identity politics, including historical revisionism and collective memory, to portray Serbs as victims who are often silenced and disrespected (Dodik 2023). By accentuating divisive stereotypes (Dodik 2023; VoA 2023; FACE TV 2022; RTRS 2024), he radicalizes the political arena and society as a whole.Footnote ⁴

By establishing close ties with external actors such as Russia, Serbia, and, more recently, Hungary, based on their mutual interests, Dodik has successfully legitimized the secessionist discourse on the international stage. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić advocates a moderate stance towards Dodik’s ultranationalist and secessionist claims to an extent that allows for pursuing his political goals in BiH while upholding amicable relations with the West. Conversely, Russia fully backs RS’s discourse and secessionist agenda, endorsing any controversial action by Dodik that could disturb the status quo, threaten stability and territorial integrity, or challenge the role of the international community in BiH (Zweers, Drost and Henry Reference Zweers, Drost and Henry2023; Vulović Reference Vulović2023b).

This enables Dodik to enhance the prominence and visibility of narratives concerning alleged discrimination against Bosnian Serbs in the common state. In return, these external actors find in Republika Srpska a reliable ally for advocating and pursuing their interests. Through this alliance, allegedly built mainly upon historical, cultural, and religious ties, all efficiently legitimize the authoritarian tendencies of their leaders, fuel polarization, and amplify their mutually recognized revisionist, nationalist, and anti-Western narratives. Together, they portray themselves as victims of unjust treatment by the international community, which they claim persistently threatens their sovereignty and the traditional values they strive to protect (Vulović Reference Vulović2023b; Bakrač, Dokić and Radeljić Reference Bakrač, Dokić and Radeljić2023). This rhetoric further resonates within society, as evidenced by the consistently low and declining support for EU integration among Bosnian Serbs. In 2023, only about 37% expressed approval, compared with over 80% support among both Bosniaks and Croats (USAID BiH 2023).

Similarly, Serbian representatives, led by Milorad Dodik, ignore the rulings of the Constitutional Court, criticizing the inclusion of foreign judges in its structure. However, it is worth noting that the Constitutional Court is the only institution capable of issuing decisions without the participation of Serbian judges. Whenever these institutions oppose SNSD’s or Dodik’s governance, he frequently leverages their actions as a narrative tool to portray Serbs as victims of unjust treatment (Radio Slobodna Europa 2023).

Dodik positions himself as a patron of all Serbs, often framing actions taken against him, such as US sanctions, as politically motivated attacks aimed at undermining the autonomy of Republika Srpska (RS) and punishing the Serb community as a whole (Jutarnji 2024). He holds extensive celebrations on 9 January each year to mark Republika Srpska Day, including a military parade. This event has been declared unconstitutional, as it is deemed discriminatory against other constituent peoples, given the historical context of RS’s formation in 1992, which effectively marked the beginning of the armed conflict.

Shaping public opinion

While Dodik tends to speak on behalf of all Bosnian Serbs, data from polls do not demonstrate an unambiguous alignment of public opinion with his rhetoric. According to NDI (2022), the vast majority of respondents from RS prioritized maintaining peace and the economy over Serb unity, with 52% perceiving Serb unity as a political phrase used to distract the public’s attention, and only 9% strongly supporting RS declaring independence, with 26% somewhat supporting it. Notably, a significant share of respondents remained undecided on both questions.

Nevertheless, public opinion polls reveal a notable level of grievance, with 18% of respondents from RS completely agreeing and 29% somewhat agreeing that their ethnic group was threatened in Bosnia and Herzegovina (NDI 2022). The report demonstrates that while slightly over half of Serbs in RS opposed Dodik’s statements and actions, a considerable number of individuals at least partially identified with the narratives propagated by him or other political groups in RS regarding secession or the unequal treatment of Serbs within BiH. This cannot be disregarded. Moreover, according to a USAID report, approximately 20% of Bosnian Serbs continue to experience interethnic anxiety (USAID BiH 2023).

Due to the lack of recent independent polls, we have relied on election results to gauge the beliefs and opinions of Serbs in RS to determine the presence of grievances, assuming voters align, at least partly, with their chosen party’s general attitudes. We acknowledge the limitations of using election results as an indicator, considering their unreliability for this purpose and particularly the concerns about the fairness of the 2022 general elections in RS and subsequent fraud allegations (Kurtic Reference Kurtic2022; OSCE BiH 2023).

The SNSD was again the outright election victor in 2022 and, as in the past, gained a significant share of the seats in all the central and entity institutions. An SNSD candidate won the presidency of BiH with 51.65% of the vote. In the House of Representatives, the SNSD gained 41.15% of the vote from RS, which translated into six seats, making SNSD the second strongest party in the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH after the Bosniak Party of Democratic Action (SDA). In RS, the party secured the position of president with 47.06% of the vote and won twenty-nine seats in the National Assembly with 34.64% of the vote (CIK 2022).

However, the presence of a grievance does not have to be reflected solely in support for the SNSD party. The second strongest party in RS, the SDS, presents similar or even more nationalist narratives than its counterparts. It should be noted that SDS has been under US sanctions since 2004 (Bahtanović Reference Bahtanović2023). Considering the election results of these two parties, we concluded that there is a notable preference among voters in Republika Srpska for nationalist parties and the narratives they promote (Maksić Reference Maksić2017).

A recent study (Becker Reference Becker2023) focusing on the link between education and the building of civic identity in BiH has underlined the issue of cleavages among constituent peoples along ethnic lines. The study adds another piece to the puzzle by pointing out that the education system often promotes ethnic viewpoints at the expense of building civic society in BiH. The author found that there is still low interpersonal trust among students in the education system and society, “identity is viewed as a zero-sum game” (Becker Reference Becker2023, 1242).

Segregated educational systems in BiH, with their mono-ethnic curricula, serve as a conduit for conveying ethnonationalist narratives, primarily focusing on unresolved disputes from the 1990s war and earlier historical conflicts. These curricula present a contentious view of events from the Ottoman period to World War II. Divisive issues that emerged after the war include debates on BiH’s state structure, election law, the Bosnian (vs. “Bosniak”) language, national holidays, and mutual accusations of extremism (USAID BiH 2023; Becker Reference Becker2023). The notion of grievance and division along ethnic lines is not only reflected but also perpetuated within the education system, further embedding these notions in Bosnian Serb society.

The overall deterioration of the political situation, accompanied by hate speech and the radicalizing rhetoric of political leaders, has translated into social unrest (ACLED 2023) both in RS and the FBiH (OSCE BiH 2023). This is particularly evident in areas with ethnically mixed populations, manifested in recent attacks on returnees and several hate-motivated incidents reported by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) between 2021 and 2023 (OSCE BiH 2024; 2023).

These dynamics highlight how the political discourse of the elites, combined with the unique features of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political system (for example, divided school curricula and international presence), reinforces existing societal cleavages and deepens grievances among Bosnian Serbs. This interplay of factors not only shapes how inequalities are perceived but also actively influences social attitudes and behaviours, embedding grievances into public consciousness and creating a cyclical reinforcement of disparities that feel both pervasive and enduring. In the following sections, we delve into underlying objective inequalities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a focus on those most relevant to the Bosnian Serb people, to unveil the basis for these perceptions and see how well the two are aligned.

Assessment of objective economic inequalities

In addressing the potential economic disparities between Bosniaks and Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the analysis systematically focused on the variables outlined in Table 1 to assess different dimensions of horizontal inequalities (all data gathered for the outlined variables can be found in the Online Appendix).

Beginning with the average monthly net and gross wages — a key indicator of the economic situation and well-being — we observed consistent and gradual wage growth in both the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. The peak difference in net monthly wages was minimal, reaching only KM32 (Bosnian convertible marks; code BAM), and this gap narrowed over time. Notably, RS reported higher gross wages in 2020, but residents were not economically disadvantaged because, in the BiH tax allocation system, revenues remain within the entity. Even in Kanton 10 of FBiH, which has a significant Serb population (12.96% of the 84,127 inhabitants were Serbs), wage levels were comparable to the averages in both entities, indicating no substantial disparities in economic well-being.

Despite observing only minor differences, we duly considered these distinctions and undertook a more comprehensive examination of employment patterns across diverse economic sectors to ascertain if the slight wage inequality was not fundamentally entrenched in more substantial forms of inequality in economic opportunity.

The data (see Figure 3) revealed distinct but balanced sectoral preferences: FBiH showed a slight emphasis on the service-oriented tertiary sector, implying a higher degree of economic diversification and possibly more robust growth prospects. RS had a marginally higher concentration in the manufacturing-focused secondary sector, suggesting opportunities for export-driven growth if industries are competitive.

Detailed sectoral analysis (see Figure 4) highlighted minor differences in four areas: agriculture; manufacturing; electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning supply; and administrative and support service activities. Over the period 2018–2020, RS had a higher proportion of its workforce in agriculture and manufacturing, and a lower proportion in administrative and support service activities. This suggests a higher concentration of the workforce in the tertiary sector. However, the lower share of employment in administrative and support service activities in RS may be influenced by varying degrees of administrative decentralization in both entities. FBiH, with its cantonal system, requires a larger administrative workforce to ensure effective management.

While the disparities in manufacturing, administrative, and support service activities in RS and FBiH were not significant, more apparent variances were detected in three other economic sectors. However, given their size, the observed differences, while relevant, do not alone serve as conclusive evidence of the existence of economic inequalities, warranting further examination of the employment structure in terms of occupation types and the nature of employment contracts to reveal potential disparities in the sustainability of the economic situation of entities.

Despite variations in employment structure, the sustainability of the economic situation in both the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska remained comparable. FBiH had a higher proportion of people formally employed, while RS showed a greater ratio of self-employed and unpaid family workers. These differences reflect contrasting economic characteristics rather than significant economic inequalities. The higher proportion of self-employment in RS suggests an environment that fosters entrepreneurship and small business activity, contributing positively to economic sustainability. At the same time, RS showed a higher proportion of unpaid family workers, which may imply limited job opportunities in the formal economy. To shed more light on this potential disparity, we can turn to the structure of employment contracts, where both regions exhibited similar levels of full-time employment. Considering these factors collectively, there is no substantial difference between the two entities in the sustainability of their economic situation. Additionally, RS consistently reports lower youth unemployment rates for both genders, suggesting that future economic prospects and access to opportunities are at least on a par with, if not better than, those in FBiH. This finding further contextualizes the previous results and makes potential economic inequality disadvantaging RS even less evident.

Our findings of minimal disparities were further reinforced when we extended our comparison to include state-level data for Bosnia and Herzegovina and economic data from Serbia. Incorporating state data provides a more complex and comprehensive picture of the economic landscape across BiH, ensuring that regional analyses are contextualized within federal trends. This broader perspective confirms that disparities in economic situation, sustainability, security, and opportunities within the entities are comparable to the federal level. The statistics in the Online Appendix suggest that both entities align closely with federal averages, which also indirectly reinforces the reliability of the statistics.

Comparing RS data with that of Serbia might serve as a meaningful point of reference for the Serb population in RS. Beyond cultural and historical ties, this comparison is particularly relevant because political leaders in RS frequently emphasize that Serbs in BiH are disadvantaged under the common state. However, by including and assessing data from Serbia (see the Online Appendix), we demonstrate that, notwithstanding the narrative presented by political elites of significant inequality based on ethnicity, economic indicators such as wages, employment rates, and job security in RS are comparable to, and in some cases better than, those in Serbia. This finding, consistent with the rest of the comparison results, reinforces the argument that substantial economic disparities between Bosniaks and Serbs in BiH are not evident, and Serbs in Republika Srpska are not worse off in the common state of BiH.

In summary, our analysis shows that both entities exhibit comparable wage growth, entity-specific but overall balanced employment preferences, similar levels of job security and promising prospects for youth employment. Even when extending the comparison to federal-level data and including economic statistics from Serbia, the results remain consistent, showing alignment with national averages. This examination reveals that the perceived economic inequalities between Bosniaks and Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina are not supported by statistical evidence, strongly suggesting that such narratives are not based on true inequalities.

Assessment of the social inequalities

Assessing access to healthcare in RS and FBiH, along with the analysis of social indicators, reveals a parity, further challenging assertions of significant social disparities based on ethnicity or regional divisions. By examining key metrics in healthcare and education — as outlined in our conceptual framework (see Table 2) — we found that both entities provided comparable access to essential social services (all the underlying data can be found in the Online Appendix).

Table 2. Conceptualization and operationalization of social inequalities

Table 3. Conceptualization and operationalization of political inequalities

Table 4. Distribution of political power in BiH and participation of entities/constituent peoples in decision-making

In the realm of healthcare, both FBiH and RS allocate very similar percentages of their GDP to health expenditures, demonstrating an equal commitment to the well-being of their populations. Interestingly, per capita health expenditure is slightly higher in RS, which could suggest better access to healthcare services. Both entities predominantly rely on public funding for healthcare, with RS showing only a slight edge. Residents in both regions benefit from similar levels of public support, limiting individual financial burdens for medical care.

While these data highlight the financial resources allocated to healthcare, they do not conclusively demonstrate inequality in healthcare access between FBiH and RS. Data on the impact of unequal access to healthcare, on the other hand, point to lower rates of infant mortality and stillbirths in RS than in FBiH. While this might imply better healthcare access or quality in RS, these differences are influenced by various factors — including population size, genetic factors, and maternal health behaviours — and therefore cannot conclusively indicate significant disparities. Moreover, the average age of mothers at the birth of their first child is slightly higher in RS, potentially reflecting better socioeconomic conditions like access to education and employment opportunities. Both entities have a negligible proportion of births to mothers under the age of fifteen. Taken collectively, these findings indicate no significant disadvantages for RS in healthcare access.

Both entities mandate compulsory primary education and have high enrolment and completion rates,Footnote ⁵ indicating that children across Bosnia and Herzegovina have equitable access to basic education. The student-to-teacher ratios were also comparable, with RS showing a slightly better ratio, suggesting similar educational quality and learning environments. At the secondary level, completion rates and the transition from primary to secondary education were nearly identical, showing only a minor difference, further emphasizing the uniformity in educational opportunities.

Examining the highest level of education attained by the working-age population reveals only slight differences. In RS, a larger proportion of the working-age population attained only primary education or lower. This could demonstrate that access to higher education may be less prevalent in RS, potentially impacting the entity negatively. However, the gap is not substantial, and it is not accompanied by other signs that would indicate significant inequality. The percentage of people with secondary education and higher degrees is comparable between the entities, suggesting that access to advanced education and vocational training is similarly available in both regions.

This examination of social indicators demonstrates that the people of both FBiH and RS are provided with comparable healthcare and educational opportunities, highlighting a general parity in access to social services across entities. When extending the analysis to include Serbia, the comparison reveals that RS performs slightly better in several areas. For example, the rate of stillbirths in Serbia is higher than in RS, suggesting that access to healthcare is better in RS. Additionally, a higher proportion of people in Serbia had reached only the primary school level of education, suggesting that RS provides relatively better, relatively stronger opportunities for educational advancement. These findings suggest that the social conditions for Serbs in RS are not only comparable to those in FBiH and the federal average for Bosnia and Herzegovina, but, according to some social indicators, are superior to the Republic of Serbia.

Collectively, these findings illustrate that social conditions in FBiH and RS are largely equivalent. The minor variations observed in health expenditure, outcomes, and educational attainment reflect regional nuances rather than systemic disparities. This parity aligns with our earlier analysis of economic indicators, reinforcing the overarching conclusion that significant horizontal inequalities between Bosniaks and Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina are not evident.

By highlighting the absence of substantial objective social disparities, we further challenge narratives that suggest deep-rooted inequalities based on ethnicity or regional divisions. Recognizing that these perceived inequalities are not supported by statistical evidence, our analysis underscores the importance of referring to objective data when inequality is used as a basis for discussions about secession.

Assessment of political inequalities

The complex political structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina, defined by a delicate balance of ethnic parity, power-sharing mechanisms, and decentralization principles aimed at preserving equality among constituent nations, embodies the federal nature of BiH’s political system (Kapidžić Reference Kapidžić2019). Bosnia and Herzegovina has five central state institutions: the three-member Presidency, the bicameral Parliamentary Assembly (PA) with chambers of equal standing, the Council of Ministers (CoM), the Constitutional Court, and the Central Bank. However, the exclusive competencies and partial responsibilities of these central bodies are limited compared to those governed by the entities or lower levels of administrationFootnote ⁶ (Ustavni sud 2009).

The distribution of political power and control across the central legislative, executive, and judicial bodies in BiH respects both the multi-ethnic nature of the state and its administrative structure (Siroky et al. Reference Siroky, Warner, Filip-Crawford, Berlin and Neuberg2020). While the constitution envisions equal status, rights, and representation for all three constituent nations at the central level of governance, in practice, disparities and inefficiencies persist within these central institutions. That hinders effective governance and creates conditions that enable certain groups to exert disproportionate influence through procedural mechanisms, such as veto powers and entity-based voting.

As Table 4 shows, each central institutional body adheres to either territorial or national formulas to promote equality. Institutions that employ ethnic quotas serve as platforms for articulating and safeguarding the national interests of all constituent peoples, represented by an equal number of representatives. This approach favors Bosnian Croats and Serbs, given the disparity in population representation (see Figure 5).

In contrast, institutions based on a territorial formula are intended to represent rather state interests and reflect the priorities of elected political parties, which act on behalf of their electorate regardless of ethnic background. However, these intentions are often not fulfilled in reality. For instance, while the absence of national quotas suggests that the CoM should represent the state’s interests, scholars argue (Banović, Gavrić and Barreiro Mariño Reference Banović, Gavrić and Mariño2021; Koseva Reference Koseva2019) that it remains highly fragmented along national lines and prioritizes national interests, resulting in low productivity and unfavorable outcomes (Koseva Reference Koseva2019).

Although Serb representatives criticize the composition of the Constitutional Court and persistently refuse to recognize or implement its rulings due to the presence of foreign judges, from a legal perspective, the court’s composition, while unusual, is balanced and does not disadvantage any constituent nation or entity.

The capacity to participate in decision-making is shaped by numerous procedural rules and veto mechanisms that allow objectionable decisions to be reversed, preserving the equal involvement of constituent peoples and entities in decision-making processes.

Table 4 shows that veto mechanisms are predominantly embedded in institutional bodies that adhere to ethnic parity. However, in practice, the procedural rules allow potential political obstruction and hinder decision-making through absenteeism. For instance, in the House of Representatives (HoR), the “entity voting” provision requires that the majority include at least one-third of members from each entity, effectively allowing absenteeism to function as a veto against unfavorable decisions. The SNSD frequently employs this tactic to obstruct the functioning of state institutions (Bahtić-Kunrath Reference Bahtić-Kunrath2011; Hasic and Savic-Bojanovic Reference Hasic and Savic-Bojanovic2022; Banović, Gavrić and Barreiro Mariño Reference Banović, Gavrić and Mariño2021). These rules particularly benefit representatives of Republika Srpska due to their mostly homogenous political representation. Paradoxically, while “ethnic vetoes” are rare, territorial vetoes occur frequently (Hasic and Savic-Bojanovic Reference Hasic and Savic-Bojanovic2022).

The prevalence of consociational power-sharing elements leads to frequent obstructions in parliamentary proceedings, often resulting in legislative gridlock (Keil Reference Keil2016; Banović, Gavrić and Barreiro Mariño Reference Banović, Gavrić and Mariño2021; Burianová and Hloušek Reference Burianová and Hloušek2022). Consequently, the bicameral Parliamentary Assembly of BiH reflects the overall weakness of state-level institutions due to its slow and inefficient legislative processes. As argued by Bahtić-Kunrath (Reference Bahtić-Kunrath2011, 918), “the institutional design of the Parliamentary Assembly discourages inter-ethnic cooperation between the veto players.” Therefore, it is often marginalized and does not function as a central hub for discussing important political issues (Hasic and Savic-Bojanovic Reference Hasic and Savic-Bojanovic2022; Banović, Gavrić and Barreiro Mariño Reference Banović, Gavrić and Mariño2021). Critical debates then occur outside the institutional framework, potentially excluding relevant stakeholders and thereby jeopardizing equal representation of all constituent peoples.

While an assessment of the parliamentary processes suggests no disadvantages for Serb representatives regarding participation in decision-making, in fact, the system gives them an upper hand in this matter, privileging them over other constituent peoples, as they can apply entity-voting unconditionally at every legislative stage (Bahtić-Kunrath Reference Bahtić-Kunrath2011).

Similarly, the system provides an advantage to members of the presidency with significant political backing within their respective parliamentary bodies since they can exercise veto rights for harming vital interests. Such a decision is immediately referred to the concerned entity’s parliamentary body for further consideration. If two-thirds of MPs from a parliamentary body agree that a decision harms vital interests, the decision cannot be enacted. Notably, since 2010, this veto power has been exclusively exercised by Milorad Dodik, who, through his association with the dominant coalition party, secured enough votes to prevent the enactment of presidential decisions (Ustavni sud 2009; Banović, Gavrić and Barreiro Mariño Reference Banović, Gavrić and Mariño2021).

Conversely, the Constitutional Court is the only institution that follows majority-based decisions while not considering the judges’ nationality or territorial origin in its procedural rules. Decisions are made by a quorum, requiring the presence of at least five out of nine judges, and are adopted by a simple majority. Hence, it is the only institution capable of reaching decisions without the need for representation from all the constituent nations, thereby making it widely viewed as the most effective institution capable of mitigating the effects of ethnonationalist governance (Banović, Gavrić and Barreiro Mariño Reference Banović, Gavrić and Mariño2021; Ustavni sud 2023).

Disparities in the decentralization of political power continue to be a contentious topic for the constituent peoples. The constitution only briefly delineates the areas of state-level competence while adhering to the principle of subsidiarity (Woelk Reference Woelk2021). This reflects divergent interests, with each constituent nation seeking to consolidate a different level of political power. Yet, the centralization of the system does not necessarily indicate inequality in access to power. RS strives for more autonomy within the already decentralized Bosnia, while simultaneously strengthening centralization within RS. We argue that a greater degree of centralization in RS facilitates more efficient administration, decision-making, and agenda-setting and, finally, better advocacy for its interests throughout the whole system. Overall, this suggests that Bosnian Serbs benefit more from the current level of decentralization in BiH than do the other constituent peoples.

The central government has only limited fiscal competencies, operating with a considerably smaller budget than the entity governments. This is predominantly to cover the costs of the state institutions and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s international obligations. A budget of KM1.8 billion was approved for 2022 (Bosna i Hercegovina 2022). According to the constitution, the FBiH provides two-thirds of the revenue and Republika Srpska one-third, a level of contribution that benefits RS when considering the population sizes of the entities. Tax authority lies with the entities and lower administrative levels, such as cantons and municipalities. Entities control the most significant share of financial resources; while about KM3.3 billion was approved for 2022 in Republika Srpska (NSRS 2022), the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted a budget of KM4.4 billion (FBiH 2022), approximately corresponding to the demographic structure.

Lastly, none of the constituent peoples holds demographic or electoral dominance. All formally enjoy their group rights throughout the entire territory (meaning all constituent nations have reserved mandates in both entities’ institutions); however, the real impact of this unique political feature is limited. Since the turn of the millennium, the ethnoreligious principle has been extended to lower levels of governance (Stojanović and Hodžić Reference Stojanović and Hodžić2015; Banović, Gavrić and Barreiro Mariño Reference Banović, Gavrić and Mariño2021). However, despite provisions ensuring the participation of less-represented constituent peoples in the respective entity’s institutions, their actual powers are severely limited.

Paradoxically, a ubiquitous ethnic criterion for running for office leads to discrimination against constituent nations, particularly those representing a minority in their respective territories. For instance, the presidential election denies passive electoral rights to citizens who don’t belong to a dominant constituent nation at the entity level, violating the European Convention on Human Rights. Additionally, scholars argue that the current electoral law is unfavorable for numerically disadvantaged constituent peoples in a given entity, as territorial affiliation takes precedence over the ethnic principle (Ustavni sud 2009; Banović, Gavrić and Barreiro Mariño Reference Banović, Gavrić and Mariño2021). Nevertheless, discrimination occurs equally in both entities; considering the fact that 92.14% of Serbs (see Figure 1) live in RS, they are not systematically affected by this, which makes it of little relevance to our analysis.

Figure 1. Population Distribution of Bosniaks and Serbs by Entities: Cenzus of Population 2013.

Figure 2. Population by Ethnicity in Entities: Cenzus of Population 2013.

Figure 3. Shares of employed persons in FBiH and RS by main sectors of economic activity in 2020.

Figure 4. Shares of employed persons in FBiH and RS by detailed sectors of economic activity in 2020.

Figure 5. Population by Ethnicity in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Cenzus of Population 2013.

Drawing from the political dimension of HI theory, we assessed four key potential objective disparities that might cause grievance: distribution of political power, political opportunities, capabilities for participation, and the decentralization of power (see Table 4). Our analysis found no significant objective discrepancies that could disadvantage RS against FBiH or Bosnian Serbs against other constituent peoples. On the contrary, we suggest that Republika Srpska may benefit from the current system due to its mono-national nature and high level of centralization, allowing for a more efficient exercise of power and public affairs management. Despite formal guarantees of equal representation, these rules often lead to inefficiencies and marginalize the central institutions, with roughly 40% of Serbs favouring the status quo (USAID BiH 2023, 27) – likely recognizing the advantage it provides them – while most Bosniaks and Croats are in favour of state-level decision making. The decentralized arrangement — placing significant power in entities and cantons — allows Serb representatives to leverage procedural mechanisms like entity-based voting and vetoes, facilitating political obstruction and enhancing their influence over state institutions.