Introduction
Background
In Sweden, Salmonella infection is a notifiable disease according to the Communicable Diseases Act (2004:168) and the Infection Control Regulation (2004:255) [1, 2]. Laboratories and physicians are obligated to report Salmonella cases to the County Medical Officers (CMO) and the Public Health Agency of Sweden (PHAS). Domestically acquired Salmonella infections have averaged 653 reported cases per year from 2014 to 2023 [3]. In 2024, PHAS observed 890 domestic Salmonella cases, the highest number since 2007.
Salmonella Typhimurium is a non-typhoidal serovar belonging to the O-antigen serogroup O:4 (B) [Reference Grimont and Weill4], and is relatively common in the European Union (EU), representing 13% and 9% of human Salmonella infections in 2022 and 2023, respectively [5, 6]. It is also one of the most common Salmonella serovars in Sweden, accounting for 10%–30% of domestically acquired infections per year in 2014–2023 and for 26% in 2024 [3]. Since the introduction of routine whole genome sequencing (WGS) for domestically acquired Salmonella in Sweden in 2019, detections of S. Typhimurium sequence type (ST) 36 have been infrequent. By the end of 2023, 35 ST36 cases had been identified, ranging from three to 12 cases per year, representing <10% of S. Typhimurium cases. In 2024, PHAS observed a notable increase, with 115 ST36 cases, of which 108 were reported between August and December.
Edible sprouts are often linked to foodborne bacterial outbreaks due to contamination risks during seed production, storage, and distribution [Reference Miyahira and Antunes7]. Bacteria can internalize within seeds and thrive in the warm, humid conditions present during germination and sprouting [Reference Machado-Moreira8–11]. Additionally, sprouts are typically consumed raw, increasing the risk of infection. Salmonella is the most frequent bacterial pathogen associated with foodborne outbreaks stemming from contaminated sprouted seeds [6, Reference Machado-Moreira8, 11]. In 2023, Salmonella was found in 0.25% of sampled ‘ready-to-eat’ units (n = 86,115) reported by 24 EU Member States (MS), with the highest levels of contamination found in sprouts (1.4%; n = 644) [6]. Alfalfa sprout consumption linked to contaminated seeds sourced within Europe has been implicated in past Salmonella outbreaks in the Nordic countries [Reference Emberland12–Reference Rimhanen-Finne14].
Outbreak detection
In mid-August 2024, PHAS observed an increase in domestically acquired Salmonella serogroup O:4 (B) cases. By 28 August 2024, microbiological analysis had identified two clusters of S. Typhimurium ST36, each clustering within 0–5 single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), comprising two and four cases, respectively. The clusters were distinct, differing by 38 SNPs. The cluster initially comprising two cases was rapidly expanding, reaching 17 cases by 9 September 2024, when an outbreak investigation was initiated. The cases were reported in eight of Sweden’s 21 regions, indicating a widely distributed source of infection. Initial communications with other European countries indicated that the cluster was limited to Sweden. Information from the regional CMOs, who contacted the cases, suggested a high proportion of vegetable consumption among those affected. By 2 October 2024, the cluster included 35 confirmed S. Typhimurium ST36 cases, although the number of newly identified cases had declined in the second half of September. The investigation did not identify a hypothesis regarding the specific source of infection, and the outbreak investigation was subsequently closed.
However, elevated reporting of Salmonella serogroup O:4 (B) cases continued in October, and WGS identified additional cases of S. Typhimurium ST36. By 25 October, five genetically related clusters (related within 48 SNPs) comprising 68 S. Typhimurium ST36 cases had been identified. Although the clusters were genetically distinct and displayed differences in the time of reporting, the large number of S. Typhimurium ST36 isolates detected since August 2024 was striking. Furthermore, for S. Typhimurium ST36 isolates sequenced prior to August 2024, all but two isolates were distantly related (>390 SNPs). Given the relative genetic and temporal similarities of the clusters and strains, PHAS decided to investigate whether they shared a common origin linked to a single source. PHAS re-opened the outbreak investigation on 28 October 2024.
Here, we report a multi-cluster outbreak investigation of S. Typhimurium ST36. The national outbreak investigation was coordinated by PHAS and included the Swedish Food Agency (SFA), the regional CMOs, and the County Administrative Board (CAB).
Methods
Outbreak case definition and case finding
We defined a confirmed case as a person with laboratory-confirmed S. Typhimurium, ST36 notified after 1 August 2024 with domestically acquired infection or unknown travel history, with an isolate genetically similar to the initial clusters detected in the outbreak investigation. A suspected case was defined as a person with non-sequenced laboratory-confirmed Salmonella serogroup O:4 (B) infection, while a possible case was a person with non-sequenced laboratory-confirmed Salmonella, not yet classified into serogroup.
Using these definitions, we gathered cases from Sminet, the Swedish notification system for notifiable communicable diseases. Reported case data included age, sex, region, date of symptom onset, sampling and reporting, and suspected country of infection. If the date of symptom onset was missing, the date of sampling was used instead.
Epidemiological investigation
Descriptive analysis
We described the age, sex, region, and date of symptom onset distribution for all confirmed cases.
Trawling questionnaire
A web-based standardized trawling questionnaire is routinely used in the investigation of Salmonella cases and outbreaks in Sweden. It includes questions regarding food consumption and travel during the 7 days prior to symptom onset and is administered upon diagnosis. Parents or guardians fill out the questionnaire on behalf of their children. PHAS used data from the trawling questionnaire to generating hypotheses about potential sources of the outbreak. We assessed the proportion of cases reporting each food item and conducted a case–case analysis using sporadic Salmonella cases reported between 1 August 2024 and 6 November 2024 as a comparison. Sporadic cases were defined as those not belonging to a WGS cluster of >5 cases, and not to the Salmonella Enteritidis serovar, regardless of WGS cluster size, due to an extensive and simultaneous outbreak involving multiple S. Enteritidis strains (EpiPulse 2024-FWD-00119). We calculated odds ratios (OR) along with p-values and 95% confidence intervals (95% CI) for each food item. We selected food exposures from the trawling questionnaire for further investigation using the following criteria:
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(i) >50% of confirmed cases reporting exposure, or
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(ii) >30% of confirmed cases reporting exposure, and the odds of exposure to the food item among confirmed cases were higher (p < 0.05) than other sporadic Salmonella cases, in the case–case analysis.
Case–control study
We performed a matched case–control study to assess whether one or more of the selected food exposures from the trawling questionnaire was associated with the ST36 outbreak. We limited inclusion to confirmed cases reported after 1 September 2024, in addition to suspected and possible cases after 15 October 2024, since they had the potential of becoming confirmed once WGS was performed. The study was conducted while the outbreak was ongoing in November 2024 and thus included retrospective cases as well as prospective cases notified up until 21 November 2024, when PHAS publicly communicated preliminary findings.
We aimed to select 10 controls per case from a national random pool of controls available from a web panel run by PHAS, matched on sex, region, and age group (ages 2–5, 6–10, 11–15, 16–29, 30–59, and 60+) to control for potential confounding [3, 15]. We created a web-based questionnaire for the cases and controls pertaining to consumption of the selected food exposures, during the 7 days preceding the onset of illness for the cases, and during the 7 days prior to completing the questionnaire for the controls. Respondents could answer ‘Yes’, ‘Probably’, ‘Probably not’, or ‘No’ for each item. For each item, we inquired about more specific details such as the type of product or place of purchase, when relevant. For children under 16 years old, the questionnaire was sent to the parent or guardian. Data collection was ongoing 8–21 November 2024.
We included only confirmed cases in the analysis and only controls who had not reported recent travel abroad or gastrointestinal symptoms in the preceding 7 days. The category ‘Probably’ was re-categorized as ‘Yes’ and ‘Probably not’ was re-categorized as ‘No’. To preserve statistical power, if the respondent did not answer the question, the response was coded as ‘No’, provided that not all questions were left blank.
We used conditional logistic regression to estimate adjusted odds ratios (aOR), p-values, and 95% CI by each exposure item, matched for age group, sex, and region. Exposures with a p-value <0.2 in univariable analyses were included in multivariable analyses. We applied stepwise backwards selection, where exposures were removed sequentially using the likelihood ratio test with a 5% significance level. Since parents expressed uncertainty in the questionnaire about their child’s food intake at daycare or school, the analysis was repeated, including adults only. We conducted data analysis using R software version 4.1.1 [16].
Microbiological investigation
In Sweden, initial Salmonella diagnostics, sometimes including serogrouping, occur at clinical microbiological laboratories, after which isolates of domestic infections are sent to PHAS for further typing as part of the microbiological surveillance programme. Isolates were whole-genome sequenced by an Ion S5 XL System or an Ion GeneStudio S5 Prime System (Thermo Fisher Scientific), and subsequent sequence type and serovar prediction was performed using Achtman 7-gene multilocus sequence typing (MLST) and SeqSero [Reference Zhang17, Reference Alikhan18]. The SNP analysis was calculated by MSTgold and visualized by a minimum spanning tree [Reference Salipante and Hall19]. A representative sequence from the outbreak was used as a reference, and a cluster was defined as two or more isolates clustering within five SNPs. Recombinations were defined as point mutations identified within a distance of 500 nucleotides.
Traceback and environmental investigation
The traceback investigation was conducted by the SFA, regional CMOs, CAB, and municipal food inspectors. When available, the regional CMOs collected grocery receipts from confirmed cases in order to trace the producer(s) of purchased items. Information from case interviews and the trawling questionnaires on visits to food establishments was used to identify commonalities between cases and track purchase orders. Purchase information from receipts and orders collected by regional CMOs and municipal food inspectors was sent to SFA for identification of sprout producers.
The CAB carried out an inspection at one major Swedish sprout producer on 21 November 2024 after the epidemiological investigations had led to a suspected source, that is, alfalfa sprouts. The CAB collected 10 samples of remaining seeds, each at least 50 g, which were sent to the SFA for sprouting and analysis. From each sample of sprouted seed, 25 g of sprouts and 25 ml rinse water were analyzed for Salmonella and Shiga toxin-producing E. coli (STEC) with polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and by cultivation (ISO 6579-1:2017).
International investigation
Information on outbreak clusters and associated sequence data was published by PHAS in the European surveillance portal for infectious diseases (EpiPulse) on 9 September 2024-FWD-00079, 30 September 2024-FWD-00088, 23 October 2024-FWD-00104, 6 November 2024-FWD-00108, and 6 December 2024 2024-FWD-00108. Information about the outbreak and measures taken was notified in the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) on 27 November 2024.
Results
Descriptive epidemiology
The total number of confirmed cases reached 100 and was distributed throughout 18 of Sweden’s 21 regions. The largest peak in disease onset of cases was during week 34 in August. Subsequently, smaller peaks followed in weeks 37 and 40 (Figure 1). The age and sex distribution indicated that a higher proportion of confirmed cases were female (65%), and that the highest proportion of cases was observed among individuals aged 0–10 years (17%) and 41–50 years (20%) (Figure 2).

Figure 1. Confirmed cases of Salmonella Typhimurium sequence type 36 in an outbreak linked to alfalfa sprouts, by week of symptom onset and cluster, and timeline of outbreak events, Sweden, August–November 2024.

Figure 2. Confirmed cases of Salmonella Typhimurium sequence type 36 in an outbreak linked to alfalfa sprouts, by age group and sex, August–November 2024.
Matched case–control study
In total, 11 food items were included in the matched case–control study. Seven of the items were reported by >50% of confirmed cases in the trawling questionnaire (tomatoes, cucumber, carrots, apples, minced beef, yellow onions, peppers) and four items were reported by >30% of confirmed cases and had a significantly higher odds ratio in the case–case comparison (sprouts and shoots, salami, goat cheese, iceberg lettuce) (Supplementary Table S1).
A total of 32 confirmed cases and 466 controls responded to the case–control questionnaire, giving a response rate of 48% and 62%, respectively. A total of 421 controls were included after excluding controls reporting travel abroad or gastrointestinal symptoms. Characteristics of the study population and results prior to re-categorization can be found in Supplementary Tables S2 and S3, respectively. Results from conditional logistic regression models by each exposure item, where the confirmed cases and controls were matched on age, sex, and region, showed that alfalfa sprouts and pea shoots had higher odds of consumption in cases compared to matched controls (aOR = 7.66, 95% CI = 2.75–21.3 and aOR = 10, 95% CI 2.96–34.1, respectively) (Table 1). We performed multivariable analysis including alfalfa sprouts, pea shoots, cress, alfalfa seeds, bean sprouts, apples, and carrots. One case and 174 controls were excluded from the regression analyses due to the absence of a matching case or control. After backwards stepwise regression, only alfalfa sprouts and carrots remained in the conditional regression model, with alfalfa sprouts having an adjusted OR >1, both in the main analysis (aOR = 8.94, 95% CI = 2.96–27.1), and the sub-analysis excluding children (aOR = 11.3, 95% CI = 3.28–39.2).
Table 1. Number and percentage of exposed cases and controls, and odds ratios in univariable and multivariable models in an investigation of an outbreak of Salmonella Typhimurium sequence type 36 linked to alfalfa sprouts, Sweden, September–November 2024

* Conditional regression models are adjusted for age group, region, and sex.
† Adjusted odds ratio.
Microbiological investigation
Isolates from the 100 cases were distributed over 14 genetically related strains of S. Typhimurium ST36, in nine clusters and five individual strains, with an overall maximum SNP difference of 53 SNP (Figure 3). We observed temporal differences in the symptom onset date for cases with isolates belonging to the different microbiological clusters (Figure 1). The 11 cases from the case–control study who reported sprout/shoot consumption were distributed across clusters: 1 (n = 1), 3 (n = 2), 4 (n = 3), 5 (n = 1), 6 (n = 2), 7 (n = 2), and were observed during weeks 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 44, and 45, in seven different regions.

Figure 3. Minimum spanning tree of Salmonella Typhimurium sequence type 36 isolates from outbreak cases, Sweden, August–November 2024 (n = 100). Single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) are shown next to the branches (branch length is not proportional to genetic distance). A representative sequence from the outbreak was used as a reference. Recombinations are marked “R.” Colors demonstrate clusters and individual strains.
Traceback and environmental investigation
The Swedish fresh sprout market is dominated by two cooperating, geographically adjacent companies. Traceback analysis from two restaurants linked to four cases, in addition to a receipt from one case, confirmed that the cases had consumed sprouts produced by both of these major companies. Both producers routinely use the same batches of seeds, which undergo decontamination through hot water treatment (78 °C for 15 s) before sprouting. Inspection of the pasteurization process did not identify any deviations. Cultivation takes 7–8 days, and the resulting sprouts have a shelf life of 8 days. In May 2024, a 10-t batch of alfalfa seeds from an Italian supplier was delivered to one of the two companies. Sprouting of the alfalfa seeds from this batch began in the latter half of July 2024 and occurred continuously throughout the summer and autumn. At the time of sampling, two out of 10 tonnes of alfalfa seeds remained from the original batch that had not yet been sprouted or distributed. Analysis of Salmonella and STEC was performed without detection of either pathogen according to the requirements in Commission Regulation (EC) 2073/2005 on microbiological criteria for foodstuffs.
International investigation
Information sharing in EpiPulse revealed that sporadic, genetically related S. Typhimurium ST36 cases had also been identified in Norway, Denmark, and Finland (2024-FWD-00108). In addition, it emerged that both Finland and Norway had experienced outbreaks linked to alfalfa sprouts in 2023 (2023-FWD-00069) and earlier in 2024 (2024-FWD-00049 and 2024-FWD-00089) with different strains and serovars, with links to seeds from the Italian region also implicated in the Swedish outbreak (personal communication with Ruska Rimhanen-Finne, Finnish institute for Health and Welfare and with Lin Thorstensen Brandal, Norwegian Institute of Public Health). In addition, a RASFF-notification from Spain communicated a finding of Salmonella in alfalfa sprouts, 6 November 2024, grown from seeds originating from Italy.
In late November 2024, Norway informed PHAS that an outbreak possibly related to alfalfa sprouts was underway. During continued contact with Norway in December 2024 to January 2025, it became apparent that the Norwegian outbreak, in addition to including other serovars, also involved a growing number of cases with a variety of strains and clusters of ST36 that were similar to or clustered with Swedish outbreak strains. In addition, traceback investigations in both countries identified seeds from the same Italian region as the source. Considering that our outbreaks jointly included several serovars, there was reason to suspect additional cases infected with other serovars not yet linked to the outbreak. On 8 January, we contacted ECDC together with Norway, notifying our outbreaks in addition to the possibility of connections with previous outbreaks in Finland (2023-FWD-00069) and also Germany (2023-FWD-00071), to ask if it was possible to organize a joint teleconference. On 15 January 2025, a combined event 2025-FWD-00006 was launched in EpiPulse. On 16 January, a teleconference was organized between ECDC, EFSA, the European Commission (EC), and nine involved MS with the aim of coordinating action and promoting information sharing. At the request of the EC, work was initiated on a Joint Rapid Outbreak Assessment (ROA) for the multi-serovar Salmonella outbreaks linked to sprouts on 27 January 2025 and subsequently published on 6 March 2025 [20].
Outbreak control measures
PHAS first published information about the outbreak on its website on 12 September 2024. It was not observed that the outbreak was continuing throughout the autumn until late October, when additional genetically-related clusters were detected. On 8 November 2024, PHAS communicated that the outbreak was ongoing. Findings indicating that alfalfa sprouts were the likely source of the outbreak were communicated to the SFA, who then contacted the competent authority, the CAB, for the two major seed-producing companies in Sweden. After the inspection performed by the CAB on 21 November 2024, the two companies recalled the remaining alfalfa sprout products from the implicated batch on 26 November 2024. After testing of Salmonella and STEC with negative results, the two companies began distributing alfalfa sprouts again, using a new batch of seeds from a different supplier on 18 December 2024. Since the recall, no additional cases from this ST36 cluster have been reported, and the outbreak was officially declared over in Sweden on 23 December 2024.
Discussion
We describe an outbreak involving multiple distinct but genetically related clusters of S. Typhimurium ST36 that occurred August–November 2024 in Sweden and involved 100 confirmed cases. Epidemiological, microbiological, and traceback investigations support that contaminated sprouted alfalfa seeds were the source of the outbreak, despite the absence of detection of Salmonella from sprouted seed samples in Sweden. The outbreak ceased after the recall of sprouts produced from the implicated seed batch and the switch to a different seed supplier. Our findings are further corroborated by a Norwegian multi-serovar outbreak investigation identifying the same source [Reference Rakover21]. Further, multiple outbreaks and findings of Salmonella of additional serovars and strains in Finland, Spain, Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy have been linked to the same Italian region, according to reviewed EpiPulse and RASFF notifications, and the ROA published by ECDC and EFSA [20]. The multinational scope of these findings, combined with the involvement of multiple Salmonella serovars and strains, suggests widespread and persistent contamination during seed production. Communication and sharing of independent findings with Norwegian colleagues and others were essential for strengthening our conclusion as to the source of the outbreak and for identifying the wide scope of this contamination and accompanying outbreaks.
We observed temporal trends both in terms of the timing of the outbreak in relation to the delivery of the implicated batch, as the Swedish outbreak began shortly after cultivation started, and in terms of the sequential pattern of separate ST36 clusters detected over time. We hypothesize that this pattern may be due to seed production and widespread contamination at the seed supplier. The implicated batch was delivered to Sweden in May 2024 in multiple bags, from which the seeds were sprouted sequentially, beginning at the end of July and continuing throughout the following months. The separate bags in which the seeds were stored may have contained different strains of ST36, and their usage may align with the temporal trends in cluster detection. However, the majority of the seeds and bags did not remain at the time of the study, so this hypothesis cannot be confirmed. The lack of findings of Salmonella from sprouted seed samples may be explained simply due to the large size of the batch and a potentially uneven or sporadic distribution of bacteria.
The involvement of alfalfa sprouts in particular created limitations for the epidemiological investigation. Sprouts are typically used as a garnish, likely leading to poor recall among cases, or in some instances, cases may have been unaware that they consumed sprouts at all. Recall may have been especially difficult for parents and/or guardians reporting consumption on behalf of their child, as they may not be aware of what their child ate while not at home, and garnishes and/or side salads are often not written on printed school menus. Exposures may have been misclassified as a result. As such, approximately one-third of cases reported sprout or shoot consumption in the trawling questionnaire. The low recall observed is somewhat expected and aligns with past sprout-associated outbreaks [Reference Werner13, Reference Rimhanen-Finne14, Reference Harfield22]. Nevertheless, the regional CMOs reported that sprout consumption among cases was unusually high. This was further corroborated by PHAS in a case–case comparison with other sporadic Salmonella cases observed in the same time period. Recall bias due to the timing of the study is also a limitation that may have led to underestimated odds ratios, as cases were asked, in some instances, to recall food consumption several weeks in the past. To mitigate recall bias, we limited inclusion to cases reported after 1 September 2024. This decision was influenced by the need to compare cases and controls from the same population and season, ensuring that dietary and other relevant exposures were comparable. However, we acknowledge that this exclusion criterion may have introduced selection bias among the cases due to seasonal differences. In the case–control study, reported sprout consumption was distributed across time and did not indicate any clear cluster-specific pattern. Additionally, results indicate an association with carrot consumption. While it is possible that carrot consumption may be linked to an unmeasured variable that could explain this, we suspect that this may be a spurious association, as there is no clear mechanism or prior evidence suggesting why carrots would have a protective effect in this context. Furthermore, the use of a web panel for control data selection may have induced selection bias, as respondents may be more prone to participating in surveys than the population that gave rise to the cases, and re-coding of ambiguous and missing responses may have introduced misclassification bias. Together, these limitations may affect both the internal and external validity of the study.
The findings from this outbreak have implications for future food safety measures and outbreak investigations. There are multiple possible points of contamination along the sprout production chain, for example, from contaminated water, soil, storage units, or improper handling at the sprouting facility [6]. Our findings suggest widespread contamination at or before the seed supplier’s facility. The diversity of genetically similar yet distinct strains of ST36 suggests that this contamination also had time to evolve. Evolution during seed storage is less likely due to the water-stressed conditions present in dried seeds that may inhibit bacterial growth [Reference Morasi23]. Instead, the number of different serovars identified in other countries suggests that the contamination originates from several sources or, alternatively, a single source with a mixture of contaminations, such as sewage. We recommend that future outbreak investigations consider multiple serovars or pathogens from the same source, particularly in open-environment food production systems, as it could enhance root cause analyses and lead to more effective prevention and control measures. Furthermore, our results point to difficulties in decontaminating seeds as Salmonella repeatedly remained in finished sprouts despite inspection of the pasteurization process not revealing any deficiencies. Previous studies have highlighted this challenge, particularly in regards to Salmonella, as it is resilient and can survive in products with low water activity [Reference Waldner24, Reference Yao, LiBrizzi and Chen25]. This, together with the other sprout-related outbreaks mentioned above, underlines the importance of avoiding contamination at the primary seed producer and highlights the persistence of sprouts as an international food safety concern [Reference Taormina, Beuchat and Slutsker26]. We emphasize the need for primary producers of alfalfa seeds and sprouts to identify and prevent possible contamination points.
Supplementary material
The supplementary material for this article can be found at http://doi.org/10.1017/S0950268825100526.
Data availability statement
Sequence data of Salmonella isolates described in this investigation are available at the European Nucleotide Archive (ENA), study accession number PRJEB76821.
Acknowledgements
The authors thank all the regional County Medical Officers and their teams for their respective investigations and for recruiting participants to the case–control study as well as administering the questionnaires. The authors also acknowledge all regional clinical microbiological laboratories cooperating in the investigation. The authors would also like to express gratitude to Lin Thorstensen Brandal, Arthur Rakover, and Umaer Naseer (Norwegian Institute of Public Health) for kindly sharing sequence data and information on the parallel Salmonella outbreak in alfalfa seeds in Norway. Additionally, authors would like to thank Jonas Fröjd at the County Administrative Board of Skåne for information gathered from the alfalfa sprout producers. Finally, the authors would like to thank Anette Hansen, Maarten Coorens, Anneli Rasmusson, Marie Rapp, and other colleagues at the Public Health Agency of Sweden, for assisting in the outbreak investigation.
Author contribution
Kate Lillepold, Rikard Dryselius, Nadja Karamehmedovic, Moa Rehn, Ioana Bujila, Anna Ohlson, and Ilias Galanis were part of the PHAS outbreak investigation team. Rikard Dryselius coordinated the investigation at the national level. Kate Lillepold, Moa Rehn, Ioana Bujila, Ilias Galanis, and Rikard Dryselius contributed to the design and implementation of the case–control study. Kate Lillepold, Anna Ohlson, and Ioana Bujila analyzed descriptive data, and Kate Lillepold, Ilias Galanis, and Moa Rehn analyzed and interpreted data from the case–control study. Nadja Karamehmedovic performed the microbiological and bioinformatics analyses. Joanna Nederby Öhd, Ingela Hall, and Gunilla Ockborn were responsible for the outbreak investigations in their respective regions. Mats Lindblad led the trace-back investigation at the Swedish Food Authority. Kate Lillepold coordinated, drafted, and finalized the manuscript. All authors contributed to the revision of the draft manuscript and approved the final version.
Disclaimer
The authors are fellows of the ECDC Fellowship Programme, supported financially by the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). The views and opinions expressed herein do not state or reflect those of ECDC. ECDC is not responsible for the data and information collation and analysis, and cannot be held liable for conclusions or opinions drawn.
Competing interests
The authors declare none.
Ethical standard
The data used for the outbreak investigation were collected as part of routine infectious disease surveillance and control, defined by national legislation, and ethical approval was therefore not obtained.