Introduction
A complex process of immigrant political engagement in host and homeland politics represents a subject viewed through a binary lens – on one hand stands the emerging transnational perspective which investigates political ties to origin while simultaneously integrating into the host society (Waldinger Reference Waldinger2015); the other focuses on immigrant integration, thus alienating the cross-border perspective from its analysis on political participation. Separate from these research corridors, stands a strand of scholarly literature which examines emigrant political engagement in host or home states (Ahmadov and Sasse Reference Ahmadov and Sasse2016; Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen Reference Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen2020) following traditional political participation theories. Political engagement among emigrants has been linked to both macro and micro-level drivers of participation, including individual resources such as education, socio-economic status, and personal motivation. Alternatively, despite a dearth of academic literature on motivations for political participation of emigrants, Waldinger points to high costs of engagement – i.e. low incentive for activism. And while all these factors inevitably affect political participation of emigrants in important ways, existing works suppress discussions on how origin-country and transnational contexts impact motivations for political engagement in the host-state. Furthermore, there have been studies (Barry Reference Barry2006; Bauböck Reference Bauböck and Anna2017; Caramani and Grotz Reference Caramani and Grotz2015; Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen Reference Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen2020) that explore the effects of distant voting while largely ignoring to examine motivations for emigrant political action. Thus, we know very little about what motivates emigrants to engage in political parties of the receiving state while completely detaching from homeland politics. While this study finds its basis in scholarly literature on immigrant transnational political participation, it adopts a different perspective. Rather than examining variations in the forms or intensity of transnational political activity, it observes a case in which political participation is almost entirely redirected toward the host state. It is exactly by highlighting this near-absence of homeland political engagement that this work contributes to a fuller understanding of diasporic political behaviour, including motivations or rather conditions which weaken or dissolve the transnational political engagement element.
Building on this premise, the article draws from the concept of transnational political action to explain how motivations for political engagement develop in the absence of strong homeland linkages. While the existing literature rarely addresses political motivations for party membership among diasporic groups in the host state, it offers a solid framework for engaging in a discussion which centres on a question of why such groups participate. As part of this broader perspective, Chaudhary and Moss suggest the concept of ‘transnational political action,’ which is cognizant of many forms in which formal participation may take place (including voting and institutionalized – organizational participation). Still, little is known about what triggers immigrant participation in host state politics. In this work, the authors build upon the concept of transnational political action and employ it to identify and explain the motivations for active political engagement of Bosnian and Herzegovinian diasporaFootnote 1 in Austrian political parties. Thus, this article examines their motivations for formal political participation (party membership) in the host-state – ranging from personal to professional interest supported by integrative immigrant policies of the receiving state – to origin-state instability which draws their political interest away from the homeland. Yet, even in instances of high societal and political integration, the potential for transnational political engagement remains important in understanding immigrant political trajectories. As Levitt and Jaworski (2007) argue, lives of immigrants occur across borders; thus political participation also occurs across borders. Such motivators differ, but can be embedded in both the home and the host state. This is why we cannot disregard the literature on transnational political action which recognizes its varying forms across time and space.
Building on earlier works which examine differing forms of formal political participation and more recent works on ethnic mobilisation and representation in ethnic political parties (Buta and Gherghina Reference Buta and Gherghina2023; Chandra Reference Chandra2011; Saggar Reference Saggar2000) this article looks at motivations which instigate the wish of diaspora members to engage in party politics of the host state while simultaneously completely disengaging in homeland politics‥ Considering the fact that different socio-political contexts lie behind every migrant’s journey to a host state the authors identify the gaps that need to be addressed. Firstly, most of the scholarly literature on formal political engagement of migrants focuses on the electoral behavior immigrants (Soare and Gherghina Reference Soare and Gherghina2024; Gherghina and Basarabă Reference Gherghina and Basarabă2024; Gherghina Reference Gherghina2016), but we know very little about political party membership and what motivates them to engage in the receiving state. Such an approach is fundamental not only to move beyond the well-researched topic of electoral behaviour (Gherghina Reference Gherghina2016), but to better understand what drives party participation among diasporic groups that remain geographically and culturally close to the homeland. In this retrospect, the case of BH diaspora in Austria is relevant insomuch as previous works on BH diaspora in Austria are mostly descriptive of their experience as “wartime” diaspora (Halilovich Reference Halilovich2006), yet incognizant of this group’s political engagement in the host land apart from considering ethnic association involvement (Halilovich et al. Reference Halilovich, Hasić, Karabegović, Karamehić-Muratović and Oruč2018). Thus, the article fills the empirical void by recognizing how integrative immigration policies lead to adaptation of new political motives, a process that inspires political party membership of diasporic groups, but one which results in a complete withdrawal of the transnational element – that is, an almost complete withdrawal of interest in homeland political affairs. This is achieved through twenty-five interviews with members of BH diaspora in Austria all of whom are members of different political parties in the host state.
This analysis adds to the existing literature in two ways. It first explains how immigrant transnational political action is simultaneously reliant and shaped by varying political contexts – that is, motivations for political engagement of diasporic groups depend both on the receiving and the origin state. Second, the article points to a novel political engagement motivation which drifts away from organizational transnational political action (Portes and Fernandez-Kelly Reference Portes and Fernandez-Kelly2015), a concept which brings in the significance of ethnic associations, charities and even religious organizations as elements which drive immigrant political engagement in the receiving state. Our work finds that in the case of diaspora conceived by forced displacement, coupled with home state political instability and weak diasporic policies, organizational transnational political action is weak and a non-representative motive for receiving state political engagement.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. The first section offers a theoretical outlook with a focus on the link between immigrant transnational political action and political participation. It considers three types of immigrant transnational political action – electoral, organizational and non-institutional to reflect a continuum of political activities which help unravel the motivations behind (non) engaging in one or more of them. This is followed by the methodological layout of the study, focusing the discussion on the process of data gathering and analysis. The third section is divided into two parts, both of which rely on a multitude of personal experiences which helped shape political participation motivations of BH diaspora members in Austria. The last segment wraps the discussion with a few concluding remarks and points to further research corridors based on the presented empirical data.
Immigrant Political Participation and Transnational Political Opportunity Structures
Scholarly literature examining the patterns of political participation define it as action that is closely linked with the dominant political culture. Generally speaking, political participation can be divided into two realms – formal and informal, whereby the first one relates to conventional forms of engagements such as political party membership or voting. In considering political participation of migrants, it is known that such groups may be politically active simultaneously in both their host and the homeland. Immigrants may often experience difficulties in participating conventionally in receiving state politics. Yet, immigrants, especially those who are well-integrated and which have already formed diasporas for different reasons, are not just by-standers in the political processes of the host land. Instead, they represent “active immigrants” (Vogel Reference Vogel2007; Zapata-Barrero and Gropas Reference Zapata-Barrero, Gropas, Triandafyllidou, Modood and Meer2012). They are individuals who participate in different forms of political engagement both in the homeland and the host land. In acknowledging the role that immigrants can play in origin and receiving state politics, they must not be considered as simple homo economicus, or in case of forcibly displaced migrants (refugees) a “societal burden” (Halilovich Reference Halilovich2013). Such interpretations only limit the discussion on the political agency of immigrants; hence what the latter approach allows is an understanding that often transcends the borders of traditional theories of political participation, since immigrant political behaviours necessarily transcend the borders of both the host and the homeland.
Here, we turn to the transnational political engagement approach (Koinova Reference Koinova2013; Waldinger Reference Waldinger2015; Ahmadov and Sasse Reference Ahmadov and Sasse2016; Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen Reference Ciornei and Østergaard-Nielsen2020), a growing body of scholarship which discussed transnational political action in relation to diaspora engagement in countries of origin, but also receiving states. More recently, Chaudhary and Moss have modified the concept of political opportunity structures (POS) from the theory of social movements to fit the theory of transnational politics within migration studies. They argue that the research into forms of transnational political activities of migrants has been one-sided, with most studies focusing on the political and social context in host countries, excluding the context of the country of origin. The emerging transnational perspective investigates political ties to their country of origin while integrating into the host society. Scholars who have explored this perspective include Waldinger (Reference Waldinger2015). Chaudhary and Moss state that the factors responsible for generating transnational political activity are more complex and multidimensional than existing research has suggested. They believe that combining distinctive influences and determinants creates transnational political action forms and that this multifaceted perspective should be included in existing research. They further argue that the possibility of transnational connections between various elements should also be considered when studying the transnational political activities of migrants.
Migrants’ capacity to engage politically and achieve representation hinges on a combination of factors such as their educational level, past experiences, inclination to participate in public affairs, networking, and involvement in migrant organizations, alongside the host country’s political framework. This framework encompasses legal and integration policies, available avenues for participation, and the prevailing public discourse on migration, collectively shaping what is known as the political opportunity structure. Initially highlighted by Eisinger (Reference Eisinger1973) the inclusivity of a political system has been recognized as fostering political activism, a notion expanded upon by subsequent authors. While originally applied to citizen activism within nation-states, this concept has evolved to encompass immigrant participation and representation. Examining migrant engagement through the lens of the political opportunity structure model emphasizes the significance of the political system and its key actors, notably political parties.
In this work we focus specifically on the political opportunity structure, which refers to the political environment of both the receiving and the origin state. In doing so, we look at the local (receiving) context. The environment of local context engagement is determined by receiving country’s level of political openness and institutional policies related to immigrant integration (Chaudhary Reference Chaudhary2016; Morales and Giugni Reference Morales and Marco2011; Koopmans Reference Koopmans2005). Chaudhary and Moss offer a conceptual scheme that they refer to as triadic political opportunity structures to reconceptualize migrant transnational politics. Political opportunity structures refer to the host countries’ political context, public policies, and social relations, considering immigration policy and the possibility of quality integration (permanent residence, work visas, citizenship). Indicators of openness of the host country consist of the possibility of participation in local and national political life, and development of initiatives and policies. When immigrants settle in open and multicultural societies, they face fewer restrictions on their participation in public life and politics (Koopmans and Statham Reference Koopmans, Statham, Joppke and Morawska2003). As a result, they find it easier to integrate into their new society, and their political engagement is not limited to their specific ethnic or national group. In such cases, the range of ways immigrants participate in politics becomes broader as they are motivated by various factors beyond their group identity. According to Chaudhary (Reference Chaudhary2016), immigrants residing in inclusive states are less likely to engage in homeland politics.
Alternatively, for Chaudhary and Moss political opportunity structures in the countries of origin are significant and refer to the form of government (autocratic, totalitarian regimes, or democratic system), political and security stability (conflict or post-conflict societies, political crises, or other types of crises such as natural and health). Also, they refer to the question of relations and communication towards the diaspora through institutional policies such as the possibility of dual citizenship and absentee voting. The authors consider the third form of transnational political opportunity structures as important as the first two. Opportunities for transnational political activity lay down in supranational institutions such as the UN, the international legal order (respect for the human rights regime), bilateral agreements and relations based on the foreign policy of a particular state, geopolitical relations.Footnote 2 Bearing in mind the offered POS scheme, the results of our research fit predominantly into the first type (political-social context, i.e., openness or closedness of the host country) and partially into the second type of the given situation in the country of origin. The third type, which refers to transnational structures of political possibilities, was not relevant to our research.
In the context of the typology of transnational political action (transnational political activity), the authors offer three forms of transnational political activity, namely: “Electoral (e.g., voting, campaigning, campaign fundraising); Organizational (e.g., advocacy groups, ethnic associations, charities, hometown associations, ruling party opposition organizations); non-institutional (e.g. protests, demonstrations, boycotts, petitions, covert actions, armed conflict, revolution)”. Chaudhary and Moss criticize the exclusive differentiation between two theoretical approaches to studying transnational political action. The first theoretical line focuses exclusively on POS in the host countries. The second focuses on the conditions and determinants in the countries of origin that shape the actions of migrants and the type of their political participation. Both approaches ignore supranational frameworks, institutions, and networks in the context of generating migrants’ transnational political action. For our research, organizational-institutional activity proved to be the dominant form: membership in political parties (and only in the host countries). Within that activity, membership in local interest/professional associations and associations based on origin is partially relevant to us.
An essential understanding of POS of the host countries which proved relevant for Bosnian diaspora in Austria was also found in works by Koopmans and Statham (Reference Koopmans, Statham, Joppke and Morawska2003) and Waldinger and Duquette-Rury (Reference Waldinger and Duquette-Rury2016). The conclusions of Koopmans and Statham (Reference Koopmans, Statham, Joppke and Morawska2003) on the political activity of migrants in three European countries (Netherlands, Great Britain, and Germany) provided a framework for the theoretical assumptions of our research. The authors proved that migrants are more interested in participating in transnational political action in host countries when they are open and implement quality integration through their immigration policies. In this first case, we are dealing with the examples of Great Britain and the Netherlands. The third case study is Germany, which has more restrictive immigration policies and a more closed attitude towards migrants as foreigners. According to the authors’ findings, migrants in that country showed a much greater interest in transnational political activism in their countries of origin.
The political engagement of emigrants in their countries of origin or receiving states is influenced by various factors. These may include individual-level factors like education, socio-economic status, and motivations. However, there is a lack of academic literature on motivations for emigrants’ political participation, and high engagement costs often deter activism. Some scholars suggest that participation occurs due to selective symbolic incentives, such as a desire to maintain personal self-esteem or as a response to the loss of societal status after migration. While these factors undoubtedly affect emigrants’ political participation, exploring how origin-country and transnational contexts impact their motivations for political engagement in the host state is necessary.
Methodology and data
The case of BH diaspora in Austria is a crucial case for the analysis of conventional participation (in the form of political party membership) and receiving-country political opportunity structures. This diasporic group has a long migration tradition in Austria, while geographic proximity in theory allows for great transnational political engagement. Such contexts allow for a multidimensional understanding of motivations which lie behind the wish to engage in the receiving-state party politics. Alternatively, previous scholarship has mostly relied on examining the electoral behaviour which is not enough to understand the motivations behind political engagement. Consequently, little is known about whether multiple political opportunity structures (home and host) motivate individuals to engage transnationally, locally or just in the home state. In order to help postulate this, we employed in-depth interviews which allowed us to understand the reasons behind party membership decisions of Bosnian diaspora in Austria.
Hence, the data presented in this work draw from multi-sited research conducted from March until November 2023Footnote 3 in AustriaFootnote 4 and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Embedded within a multi-generational focus, the interviews were conducted with twenty-five members of Bosnian and Herzegovinian diaspora members in Austria. The participants belong to 1st and 1.5 generation of adult migrantsFootnote 5 (11 females and 14 males). We employed purposive sampling according to two main criteria of participant selection: (i) 3rd wave migrant (i.e. forcibly displaced/refugee of 1st generation) and (ii) membership in an Austrian political party (regardless of ideology). The rationale for the selection criteria is rooted in literature of transnational political action, more specifically the political opportunity structure concept which points to the receiving-country political opportunity structure (POS) which essentially depends on the political openness and the institutional policies related to immigrant integration (Chaudhary Reference Chaudhary2016; Morales and Giugni Reference Morales and Marco2011; Koopmans Reference Koopmans2005).
The first five participants were recruited through professional networks in Austria, including contacts established through prior academic collaboration and diaspora-related research forums. These initial interviews formed the basis for a snowball sampling approach, through which additional participants were identified. As a result of applying the snowballing technique, the research spread from urban to rural-urban areas. Since personal life trajectories and political motivations were discussed, the snowballing method allowed for maintaining the level with the participants, since they were difficult to recruit. Out of twenty-five interviews, ten were carried out in Austria during spring of 2023 and fifteen were carried out in Bosnia and Herzegovina during participants’ visit to their home country. Interviews were conducted with Austrian political party members of Bosnian and Herzegovinian origin who arrived to Austria mostly during the 3rd wave of migration, except two participants who were born in Austria in early 2000s, but who later moved back and forth between the two countries, only to finally settle in Austria. Interviews were conducted with participants from six urban areas (Vienna, Salzburg, Gratz, Linz and Innsbruck) and eight rural-urban areas (Hallstatt, Wels, Villach, Tulln, Spittal an der Draü, Klagenfurt am Wörthersee and Steyr). Twenty-five interviews with participants aged 21 (youngest) to 52 (oldest) were conducted. Interviews were held in different locations of participant’s choice, including cafes and restaurants, their workplaces and home, as well as public areas such as libraries. All interviews were held in Bosnian/Serbian/Croatian languageFootnote 6, the preferred language of all participants. While the term “Bosnian diaspora” is used throughout this article for consistency, participants in the study self-identified in national terms – as Bosnians – rather than through specific ethnic or religious affiliationsFootnote 7.The pseudonyms were ascribed to each participant with names that are commonly associated with particular ethnic groups, but that are common in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In certain cases, participants did refer to mixed family backgrounds or rejected ethnic labels all together. A consent form, which provided information about data confidentially and voluntary participation, was signed by all participants. The consent form also offered the opportunity to withdraw from the research at any point, but no such instances occurred. The study employs pseudonyms chosen by each participant him/herself. The profiles are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Profiles of Interview Participants
i Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (eng. Social Democratic Party of Austria)
ii Das Neue Österreich und Liberales Forum (eng. The New Austria and Liberal Forum)
iii Die Grünen – Die Grüne Alternative (eng. The Greens – The Green Alternative)
Table 2. Analytical Clusters of Motivations for Political Party Participation
All interviews were recorded and transcribed immediately after their completion and recordings were destroyed. After the completion of each interview, all answers were reread in order to identify the main motivators for political engagement in the receiving country. NVivo was used for the content analysis. We employed inductive thematic analysis, which relies on themes that emerge during the interviews. Open and axial coding (Babbie, Reference Babbie1998) were employed following three main steps: (i) identification of key concepts through open coding; (ii) verifying pattern between codes through axial coding; and lastly (iii) employing selective coding with the aim of confirming the links emerging from the previous steps. Hence, three main themes emerged, shedding light on the motivations for political engagement in a form of party membership of 3rd wave Bosnian immigrants in Austria.
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(a) Political party membership in the receiving state in order to improve the life of Austrian citizens (in general, including immigrant groups);
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(b) Poor diaspora engagement policies of the homeland;
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(c) Issues pertaining to origin country political stability (post-conflict).
“All Austrians Matter!” – How Integrative Receiving POS Shape Motivations for Party Membership of BH Diaspora in Austria?
Of some 3.2 million citizens, Bosnia and HerzegovinaFootnote 8 currently registers an estimated 2.2 million people residing outside its borders. To its homeland population, this number epitomises a large and a significant diaspora. Yet, in the case of BiH, the term diaspora emerged only during the third wave of migrationsFootnote 9 caused by violent wartime events. Today, BiH’s diaspora still largely comprises former refugees who forcibly left the country in the period from 1992-1995. A significant portion of these first generation, third-wave refugee migrants settled in nearby Austria, where, according to the latest data from 2022 (Statistics Austria 2022), some 97.000 people of Bosnian origin still resideFootnote 10. Naturally, considering their initial refugee status and pertinent protection regulations, Bosnians who remained in Austria obtained permanent residence and work permits, eventually going through the naturalization process as years went by. It is essential to emphasize that there exists no agreement on dual citizenship between the two states, a fact contributing to the majority renouncing the Bosnian Herzegovinian citizenship.
Alternatively, considering Austria’s openness towards migrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina, it comes as no surprise that Bosnians underwent qualitative integration, resulting in successful socialization and a positive socioeconomic status (Emirhafizović Reference Emirhafizović, Emirhafizović, Ćosić, Osmić and Repovac2013, 16-19). Today, Bosnian and Herzegovinian diaspora is flourishing (Halilovich Reference Halilovich2013), which is also mirrored in the fact that there are fifty registered diasporic associations currently active in Austria (Halilovich et al. Reference Halilovich, Hasić, Karabegović, Karamehić-Muratović and Oruč2018, 95). Yet, according to Halilovich et al. (Reference Halilovich, Hasić, Karabegović, Karamehić-Muratović and Oruč2018), BiH diaspora in Austria remains “forgotten”. The critique always remains the same – a complete lack of interest from official institutions and policies in establishing systematic connections with its people outside of the homeland. Despite significant financial remittances (primarily in the form of private aid sent to family and friends) and individual investment efforts, the economic cooperation between BiH and its diaspora is not officially defined. Only in the last decade did the BiH institutions initiate certain efforts aiming at organizing voter registration from the diaspora, which targeted a more active electoral participation. Nonetheless, this measure pertains only to active voting rights and does not envisage other forms of formal political participation.
Such homeland politics only describe the weak relationship that exists between the country of origin and its diaspora. As the study illustrates, this lack of interest by the homeland, has caused an irreversible process of diasporic groups turning towards political participation in the receiving country, in this case, Austria. The work will elucidate the motivations embedded in origin-country factors, including absence of diaspora engagement policies and distrustful governing authorities, to illustrate motivators for political party membership of Bosnian diaspora in Austria. Belma (47), a member of NEOS from Vienna begins her story:
On one hand, I am a member of the party, I have a mandate in Vienna, I hold a high position in the party…I do have the possibility to create policies which target Bosnians in Austria, but it is really not my goal or job to do so. I do not take Bosnians living here out of the Austrian political context.
Hatidža (48), from Salzburg and a member of SPÖ explains:
I recognized the need for engagement regarding the growing problems of integrating foreigners into Austrian society. I felt that my voice could be crucial in making decisions that would improve living conditions and mutual understanding among citizens. Yes, I feel that as a party member, I have the potential to influence the decisions of the Austrian government regarding diasporic groups, including Bosnians. But my focus is currently on the broader social context, such as refugees.
These participants appear to be aware of the scope of Bosnian diaspora, but their political motivation to join a political party is not at all linked to their roots. And although they do feel as they are in a position to change the “status quo of Bosnian diaspora”, as Belma points out, the primary motivator is instead entrenched in wider societal issues pertaining to status of all groups. Immigrants who settle in more open and multi-cultural societies confront less restrictive POS (Koopmans and Statham Reference Koopmans, Statham, Joppke and Morawska2003). Thus, they integrate more easily, and their political engagement is not solely reliant on their specific group or sternly connected only to their homeland. In such instances, the repertoire of immigrant political participation becomes wider since is motivated by factors which span beyond the group status. Mirsad (40) who also lives in Salzburg and is a member of SPÖ illustrates this:
Austria generally supports an inclusive society. Joining a political party represents my commitment to bringing about positive changes in the community to which I belong. This primarily refers to my community here, Austrians, Bosnians, basically everyone who is part of my close circle here.
The receiving country POS, in this case Austria, offers an open political opportunity structure, as is clear from the claims made by these participants. Clearly, an inclusive political system associated with positive immigrant receiving policy is a main motivator of political engagement in the receiving-country. This sheds light on how political party membership of diasporic groups in the context of a receiving state affects immigrant proclivity to engage in a non-electoral formal political activity.
Alternatively, electoral transnational political action, although not specifically linked to party membership, appears to represent a motivator for Bosnian diaspora members to engage in such activity. According to Chaudhary and Moss, whether a host country allows for dual citizenship is a clear determinant of whether immigrants are eligible to vote. Additionally, dual citizenship permits voting in both states, but as mentioned previously, BiH and Austria do not have such arrangements. Hence, electoral transnational political action is not a significant motivator for political engagement of Bosnians living in Austria. Only two of the participants spoke of homeland-oriented electoral policies as motivators to engage only in Austria. Adela (46), a member of NEOS living in Klagenfurt am Wörthersee states: “I’ve never voted down there; it’s not okay for me since I don’t live there. My parents went back there, I’m here, I have a family, and I go down there, but I don’t live there.”
Although Adela did hold Bosnian citizenship until the age of 22, she never voted. Edis (21) was born in Austria, but he holds both citizenships. Although this is impossible in Austria, he explains that his mother is an Austrian citizen (but of Bosnian origin), and his father has only Bosnian citizenship. This is why he voted in BiH once:
To be honest, when I registered, it was very difficult. It was like it was done on purpose, very complicated procedure, all done online…I had to have the same signature as on my passport and if something didn’t work, they would just tell you that you can’t register.
Edis further explains that his main motivation to engage in NEOS lies in his wish to contribute to the Austrian society and that such homeland policy can only push away its diasporic groups.
I have topics that I consider important…for example liberal market economy, how do I open up a business. No matter where I live, I want to have a good environment, so naturally I want to feel good in Vienna now. I want everybody to feel good in Vienna. That is my biggest motivation…
Just as Chaudhary (Reference Chaudhary2016) points, immigrants living in inclusive states are less likely to participate in homeland politics. Our participants reveal that personal motivations for engagement in political parties of the receiving state prevail, while homeland-oriented electoral policies are insignificant motivators or that they may positively motivate diaspora members to participate in the receiving state.
Turning to organizational transnational political action, albeit there is a high number of ethnic associations of Bosnian diaspora in Austria and a high participation rate of our participants in such organizationsFootnote 11, associational membership is not seen as a driver of political mobilization in Austrian political parties:
I participate in associations, but to the degree which suits me. Not as a politician, not because I feel the need to network…if there are concerts, exchanges, some gatherings that interest me, I go. So, arts, culture – gladly. BUT, not as a member of the political party, but as myself…
states Belma (47, Vienna), a member of NEOS.
Edhem (51), also from NEOS confirms:
I’m quite active in … our associations here…I don’t think associations play a key role in changing the status of our diaspora in Austria. My contribution is focused on connecting young people in these two countries, more like a cultural diplomacy, but I work for all young people, regardless of where they are from.
The motivation to participate in organizational activities of ethnic associations is fully unrelated to any political motives. In fact, motivations for organizational transnational political action are rather sporadic and remain influenced by personal preferences, out of symbolic reasons embedded in cultural elements, such as music or food. Rašida (41) from Tulln, a member of SPÖ further proves this point:
As a member of a party dealing with education, among other things, I work on creating policies that promote equal opportunities for all students. The only time I feel I can influence the decisions of the Austrian government regarding diasporic groups is when I work on improving the education system, but it’s not only about our diaspora. I always participate in association activities, go to our events, but I don’t believe our associations are trying to play a key role in changing the status of our diaspora in Austria.
Koopmans (Reference Koopmans2005) argues that immigrants residing in multicultural European countries tend to engage less with their country of origin. In such instances, ethnic associations do not represent an ally for political engagement. Being in an open receiving state, especially when a diaspora feels well integrated, is not a driver for political participation. Instead, motivators remain outside the internal – diasporic or ethnic – realm.
Nadir (42, Steyr), a member of GRUNE agrees:
I mostly decided because I care about policies that promote innovation and technological advancement for a sustainable future. Honestly, I’ve been here for a long time; I don’t feel the need to react regarding the rights of our community. We are well integrated. I go to associations; I used to go more often, now less because of work, but I go when there are holidays, events…there’s no talk about politics there.
These words by Nadir echo the feelings of twenty more participants – their ethnic association engagement is not seen as an ally for political action. Furthermore, not only are ethnic association memberships individual and sporadic, but the political motivation aspect of being a member of an association is completely missing. The reasons for this, according to our participants, lie in the fact that members of first and 1.5 generation of Bosnian diaspora in Austria are well integrated. Not only do these data explain that ethnic association membership is just a symbolic factor in an every-day life of a well-integrated migrant, but explain that such groups opt for host land political party membership for reasons that are not at all related to the status of their group.
All but two of the participants describe their motivations to engage in political parties as being influenced by factors relating to personal interests and general well-being of the community in which they live, regardless of ethnic belonging. They claim that transnational political participations, including electoral engagement, all decrease overtime as immigrants – that is, members of diaspora – become integrated into the host society and feel ready to embrace the political culture of the host land. All the participants find that electoral transnational political action, which refers to homeland electoral practices (including voting and fundraising, campaigning, etc.), is hard to maintain due to complex voting procedures. This is where electoral transnational political action ceases for Bosnian diaspora in Austria. Considering the fact that all participants are indeed members of different political parties in Austria, fundraising and campaigning in their homeland was not discussed at all. Instead, twenty-two participants constantly reiterated their reasons for participating in Austrian politics, evading any discussion on engagement in electoral transnational political action. In terms of organizational transnational political action, the primary focus is on ethnic association membership, as this is the only organizational transnational political action that the participants engage in. Although, organizational transnational political action is an essential form of political action for immigrants, since it allows them to engage with homeland authorities and implement different development or social service projects, members of interviewed Bosnian diaspora in Austria do not see ethnic associations as a political channel. Furthermore, ethnic association membership does not represent a motivator to be engaged in host land politics and does not spur their political party engagement. Hence, in the case of Bosnian diaspora in Austria, organizational transnational political action in form of ethnic associations is not a motivator nor a channel for political participation, but rather an every-day symbolic moment of connection with the homeland. In the section that follows, the attention is diverted to the issue of weak diaspora politics and political instability in the homeland to unravel how such political opportunity structures motivate political participation in form of party engagement in the host land.
Political Opportunity Structure and Immigrant Political Participation
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a post-conflict country which is still undergoing an economic and political transition. A complex political system based on ethnic power-sharing embedded in its Constitution has led to weak central institutions in a country and a state plagued by political corruption, clientelism and erosion of democratic values. Thus, it comes to no surprise that its diaspora perceives it as generally unstable. The existing scholarly literature on political participation of transnational groups (Guarnizo and Chaudhary Reference Guarnizo and Chaudhary2014; Chaudhary Reference Chaudhary2016) recognizes that factors such as homeland’s internal stability, diaspora policies and type of political system may serve as motivators to engage more with the homeland or alternatively participate more in the host land politics. However, what has not been recognized are the conditions under which specific motivations to engage in home or host land politics occur; that is, we do not understand what specific factors which arise out of homeland political opportunity factors may motivate an individual to politically act more strongly in the receiving-society while completely detaching from homeland politics.
Personal motivations to engage in the host land as compared to home-state politics are determined by homeland’s political disinterest towards its diasporic groups. This creates a motive for absence of any sort of transnational political engagement primarily as tailored or dictated and, even more so, motivates solely participation in the host state. What this work reveals is that homeland political disinterest in its diasporic groups is not necessarily only embedded in political instability, corruption or illiberal politics, but that the absence of “politically caring for its own people abroad” in the words of Ismet (38, SPÖ) currently living in Vienna, is a major motivator for engagement in the receiving state. In what follows, the motivations for participating in Austrian politics as embedded in origin country political opportunity structures are investigated. As will be revealed, the lack of diaspora policies in the origin state coupled with country’s instability acts as a demotivator to engage in Austrian politics for reasons related to Bosnian community issues. The findings of this study align with previous research that has shown that the BH Diaspora in Austria perceives their homeland as unstable. They also express discontent with the lack of institutional communication and public policies regarding emigration (Halilovich et al. Reference Halilovich, Hasić, Karabegović, Karamehić-Muratović and Oruč2018).
Leo is a 41-year-old Austrian citizen from Salzburg who is politically active in Austria and a member of the NEOS party. Despite being aware of the complex situation in the BH state and society (origin-state instability, which draws their political interest away from the homeland and further motivates participating in the receiving state), Leo expressed his interest in contributing to long-term solutions and positive changes in his country of origin. Out of twenty-five participants, Leo was the only respondent who stated that he engages in Austrian politics primarily because he wants to help BiH advance its political path.:
My clear focus is on long-term assistance to Bosnia. I understand that the country faces serious challenges, including political divisions, economic difficulties, and social inequalities. My origin from Bosnia makes me particularly sensitive to these issues, and my desire is to contribute to positive changes. Through political engagement in Austria, I want to promote international cooperation and support to address the complex problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina. My vision is focused on long-term solutions that will support economic development, strengthen institutions, and build a society that will provide better living conditions for all citizens of Bosnia. Through political work, I want to be a bridge between Austria and Bosnia, encouraging cooperation that will contribute to stability and progress in my homeland.
Such an ardent desire to help his homeland through engagement in Austria while also contributing to a political party in BiH was also expressed by Edis (21, Vienna) who is a member of NEOS. Yet despite this strong motive, he was soon discouraged to participate in politics of both states.
I once requested to join that young organization Naša stranka (Our party), but nothing has come so far; I don’t know; I forgive them. They are relatively new, so I didn’t know… I had the will to contact anyone in Bosnia, not only them
Mejra (51), a member of SPÖ echoes Edis’s experience. However, she did not try to contact anyone in her homeland because she assumed that there was no interest in environmental protection issues, which is her primary focus of political action in Austria. Mejra explains the ideological motives for her political engagement in Austria and why she did not feel the need to be politically active in her country of origin:
I have a special passion for environmental protection. I am aware of the importance of preserving natural resources and sustainable development for present and future generations. I would love to be able to work more on promoting these values in Bosnia, but I don’t feel there is much motivation for that there.
Twenty-three respondents who took part in the research do not find any motivation to engage in Austria just to improve the situation in their homeland. In fact, the majority of the respondents suggested that they are strongly committed to their host country and, therefore, they did not feel the need to participate in transnational political activities. One respondent completely rejected any possibility of an “active connection” with her country of origin. Nađa (40, SPÖ), Linz, states:
I don’t focus on Bosnia, nor on our community…Politics in Bosnia doesn’t interest me because we as a diaspora don’t interest Bosnian politics… My political focus is on vulnerable groups here, I work a lot with migrants, older people, so I exclude any interest in changing the situation in Bosnia from my domain.
Belma (47, NEOS), Vienna, adds:
My goal was to connect more with our sister parties in political parties to achieve something … I am not a representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Austria, but more like an Austrian politician with Bosnian origins.
Both Nađa and Belma are critical of the lack of interest of Bosnian politicians to improve the relationship with the diasporic groups. Hence, while some participants are motivated to participate in Austria in order to help their home country overcome internal instabilities, others feel detached from Bosnian political issues and are rather motivated to engage in party politics as Austrian politicians due to their anger with a complete absence of solid diaspora policies. Guarnizo and Chaudhary (Reference Guarnizo and Chaudhary2014) clearly point to the importance of this stability dimension (or better its lack), and although their findings help interpret the electoral behavior of diasporic groups, here they also prove relevant for other types of political participation, such as political party membership in the host state.
Fadila (41, SPÖ) from Linz further explains the effects of poor diasporic policies on her political engagement in an Austrian political party:
I am deeply committed to preserving our national identity, values, and culture. While I advocate for policies that prioritize the interests of Austrian citizens, including those of Bosnian origin, I also believe in the importance of integration and assimilation.
While the attachment to “home” exists in forms of a national identity and cultural values, the importance placed on host state integration clearly points to the detachment from the home state. She further unpacks this by explaining that the lack of clear diaspora policy by BH authorities makes her feel unwelcome in Bosnian politics, which fosters her motivation to engage in Austria. This points to the fact that there are certainly variations in origin country political opportunity structures, since for 3rd wave Bosnian diaspora members in Austria, organizational transnational political action does not appear to be a motivator at all. They justify this by weak or even non-existent diaspora policies, which confirms the findings by Halilovich (Reference Halilovich2013).
Agarwala (Reference Agarwala, Portes and Fernandez-Kelly2015) and Naujoks (Reference Naujoks2013) point to origin state symbolic and weak attempts to recognize their diasporic groups. Such efforts tend to focus mainly on financial remittances and investment projects, which diasporic members may find benefit only the political structures in the homeland and do not necessarily reach wider communities. In such instances, diasporic members feel motivated to remain active in host state politics and alienate themselves from homeland politics. Thus, this further explains the limit posed on the transnational element of diasporic engagement or better helps understand why motives to participate are found solely at the level of receiving state political opportunity structures, resulting in, among others, party membership and a feeling of being a “domestic, Austrian politician” (Edin, 48, Innsbruck, GRÜNE).
The outcomes of twenty-five in-depth interviews show that there are different reasons why immigrants join political parties in their host country. And, while these categories often overlap in participants’ narratives, the analysis above clearly points to thematic clusters that reflect their distinct roles in shaping political motivations. More precisely, the motivations which drive political participation can be grouped into three clusters, as presented in the table 2 below:
While many participants expressed a desire to improve integration and inclusion for diasporic groups, their motivations were mostly individual. These findings align with the existing literature that emphasizes individual agency shaped by opportunity structures, and challenge assumptions that diaspora engagement is primarily collective or identity-driven.
This helps us understand the connection between the host and origin states’ policies and their impact on transnational immigrant political action. One of the primary motivators for political party membership is the desire to improve the lives of all citizens, including immigrant groups, within the host society’s multicultural and integrative socio-political context. This finding explains how personal and professional interests are the primary drivers for individuals to join political parties to benefit the receiving society. In the case of Austria’s 3rd wave of the Bosnian diaspora, this motivator goes beyond just electoral engagement. Instead, active involvement through political party membership is a strong driver. On the other hand, although Austria’s 3rd wave Bosnian diaspora is highly involved in ethnic associations, such channels do not represent a solid motivator for engagement in Austrian politics. Participants felt that associational membership, as a form of organizational transnational political action, is not a channel for political participation and not a way to improve the lives of Bosnians in Austria. Such organizational membership was mainly linked to cultural identity and values and was viewed as symbolic. Participants engaged in associations for personal motives, almost out of nostalgia, and attended as individuals, not as “Austrian politicians,” as they identified themselves.
Conclusion
This study aimed to understand what motivates members of Bosnian diaspora in Austria to engage in receiving state politics and how their origin and receiving contexts influence such motivations. The article is posited against the backdrop that political participation of immigrant groups oscillates based on political opportunity structures and contexts provided by both the receiving and origin state. Discussing political party membership in the host state with 3rd wave first and 1.5 generation Bosnian diaspora members living in Austria leads to a conclusion that integrative immigration policies result in the adaptation of new political realities. The results reveal that integrative immigration policies of the host state coupled with weak diasporic policies of the homeland can act as strong motivators for political party membership in the receiving country. What results is a complete withdrawal of interest from homeland political affairs.
The results deriving from twenty-five in-depth interviews point to varying motivations for political party membership in the host state, enabling an understanding of the link between origin and receiving state policies and how they influence immigrant transnational political action. The first motivator mirrored in multiple positions on political party membership for the purposes of improving the lives of all Austrian citizens, including immigrant groups is strongly embedded in the multicultural and integrative socio-political context provided by the host society. This finding explains how personal and professional interests act as main motivators which individuals employ through political party membership for the benefit of the receiving society. In the case of 3rd wave Bosnian diaspora in Austria this is not just a motivator for electoral engagement as presented in the studies of Chaudhary (Reference Chaudhary2016), but a strong driver to engage through political party membership more actively. On the other hand, although 3rd wave Bosnian diaspora in Austria appears to be heavily involved in ethnic associations, such channels do not represent a strong motivator to engage in Austrian politics. Participants largely felt that associational membership, as a form of organizational transnational political action, is not a channel for participation and not an ally through which they could improve the lives of Bosnians in Austria. What is more, such organizational membership was mostly linked to cultural identity and values, thus viewed as symbolic. Participants engaged in ethnic associations for personal motives and almost out of nostalgia, but attended them privately and not in a role of “Austrian politicians” as they referred to themselves. This finding contests previous studies on organizational transnational political action (de Haas Reference De Haas2010) which argue that historical or present commitment to development of immigrant origin countries impact organizational transnational political action in ways which contribute to voluntary return or institutional capacity development in the origin-state.
An important general observation is that an integrative immigrant policy coupled with poor diaspora engagement policies in the homeland represent the main motivator to engage solely in Austrian political parties. The title “Too Far from Home?” reflects the paradox explored in this article: although Bosnia and Herzegovina is geographically close to Austria, this proximity does not translate into sustained political participation in the homeland. Hence, the domain of transnational political action is very weak in the case of this diasporic group. Participants point to complicated external voting procedures, but also to political unwillingness of Bosnian political parties to cooperate on joint initiatives or development projects. Hence, a second general finding is that in cases in which homeland political structures openly dismiss to cooperate with ideologically similar political parties from states with a large diaspora, the motivation to further engage transnationally weakens, while incentive to remain active in receiving state politics is stimulated. This leads to a conclusion that political engagement motivators in the case of Bosnian diaspora in Austria drift from the traditional understanding of organizational transnational political action (Portes and Fernandez-Kelly Reference Portes and Fernandez-Kelly2015) which emphasizes the importance of ethnic associations and charities which may drive political engagement in the host state. The post-conflict context of BiH further complicates this picture for the participants, which point to this factor as a negative motivation to engage with their homeland. In turn, this is an important motivator to stay focused on receiving-state politics and engage with issues that benefit the entire host society.
Going beyond a single case study of Bosnian diaspora in Austria, this work offers several theoretical and empirical propositions. First of all, the study contributes to the existing literature on transnational political participation by highlighting how personal motivations to engage in political parties of the receiving state are dependent on both the origin and the receiving contexts. Yet, the pre-migratory experience of a political crisis at home (war) is not a motivator to drift away from homeland politics – instead, reasons are embedded in current instabilities and contexts. Second, the article points to individual motives for backing away from homeland politics and becoming active in the host state. What is evident is that political participation through party membership evolves from motives that are embedded in local experiences while motives related to origin-state opportunity structures are negative motivators. Third, the study offers an explanatory analysis which aids in understanding of why certain immigrants participate in different forms of transnational political action and why the transnational element in the political action framework can indeed be missing for certain diasporic communities. The existing literature (Soare and Gherghina Reference Soare and Gherghina2024; Bozhinoska Lazarova et al. Reference Lazarova, Monika and Seifert2024; Chaudhary Reference Chaudhary2016) propose that transnational political action varies across groups, places and time. This article reveals that contexts of departure and the receiving-state realities can act as significant motivators to engage solely in the politics of the host land. Despite the symbolic importance of ethnic association belonging through which diasporic communities upkeep their identities, such engagement channels are not sufficient for the establishment of the transnational political link and its maintenance across borders.
Further research may extend these findings by looking into non-institutional transnational political action. It could analyse whether political party membership in the host land and non-institutional political action in the form of social movements, notably protest, are mutually exclusive. This would allow for an understanding of whether home state instability and poor diasporic policies intensify informal transnational political action among diaspora members or are such motivators reserved only for formally engaged members. Such research may rely on a mixed-method approach to understand the motivations for why certain diasporic groups choose a particular transnational political action and why the transnational element can be missing even in a case of an established and large diasporic group.
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