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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 April 2025
The proliferation of satellite technology has ushered in an era of opportunity and challenge for the existing international legal framework of space law. International regulatory bodies have looked to existing treaties governing space activities like the Outer Space Treaty, the Liability Convention, and the Registration Convention. In this new era, the challenges that have emerged cannot be enforced by the broad language of the treaties and outdated terms. For example, the deployment of large constellations of smaller satellites poses new challenges, like orbital debris damage and evasive responsibility, which the legal landscape for outer space must address. Space law stresses geopolitical considerations and strategic international legal frameworks that work to reduce the militarization of space and ensure that space is for all. This paper explores current treaties and challenges and proposes legal and policy solutions for the satellite industry’s responsible use of outer space.
1 Jason Rainbow, “ExoAnalytic observes 500 pieces of debris from Intelsat 33e breakup,” SPACENEWS, Oct. 28, 2024, https://perma.cc/TVQ5-3TEU.
2 Joey Roulette, “Russian satellite breaks up in space, forces ISS astronauts to shelter,” Reuters, last modified June 27, 2024, 16:37 (CDT), https://www.reuters.com/technology/space/russian-satellite-blasts-debris-space-forces-iss-astronauts-shelter-2024-06-27/.
3 “China launches first satellites of constellation to rival Starlink, state media says,” Reuters, last modified Aug. 6, 2024, 04:14 (CDT), https://www.reuters.com/technology/space/china-launches-first-satellites-constellation-rival-starlink-state-media-says-2024-08-06/.
4 Larsen, Paul B., “Solving the Space Debris Crisis,” Journal of Air Law and Commerce 83, no. 3 (2018): 475–520 Google Scholar, 482. Tracking is an important tool for satellite operators to avoid collisions. “The U.S. Air Force Space Surveillance Network (SSN) tracks 23,000 debris larger than ten centimeters in LEO and larger than thirty centimeters in GEO.”
5 Adilov, Nodir et al., “An economic indicator of the orbital debris environment,” Journal of Space Safety Engineering 11, no. 3 (Sept. 2024): 539–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 544.
6 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (hereinafter OST), opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, entered into force Oct. 10, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
7 Francis Lyall and Paul B. Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise, 3rd ed. (Routledge, 2024), 2–4.
8 OST, art. VI (n 6).
9 Soumyaditya, Deb and Priyongshu, Paul, “Challenges of Legal Liability in Outer Space Exploration,” International Journal of Law Management & Humanities 6 (2023): 82–89 Google Scholar, 86–87. Today’s space era demands an “international legal system to uphold equality, equity and justice in outer space.” The authors examine the applicability of tort law for both public and private contractors in space exploration. For example, India’s tort of vicarious liability holds private corporations liable for the tortious acts of their employees during the course of their employment.
10 Lyall and Larsen, Space Law, 28 (n 7).
11 For a scholarly work on strengthening existing international space law, see Nelson, Jack Wright, “Is International Space Law Interactional?,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 62, no. 2 (2024): 331–414 Google Scholar, 338. Rather than expanding the legality, he argues that priority should be given to enhancing and sustaining the existing legality within the space regime. Based on Stephen Krasner’s definition, Nelson defines regime as “[a] set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” For an analysis of the need for an international regulatory body to prevent the escalation of conflict, see Houle, Dylan, “Preventing the Next Global Crisis: Addressing the Urgent Need for Space Debris Removal,” California Law Review 111, no. 6 (Dec. 2023): 1955–78Google Scholar.
12 The 2003 Space Shuttle Columbia disaster killed all seven international astronauts on board. The families of the astronauts chose not to sue the private contractors involved, which would have involved private and public entities and individuals of different nationalities. Soumyaditya and Priyongshu, “Challenges of Legal Liability in Outer Space Exploration,” 86 (n 9).
13 Nelson, “Is International Space Law Interactional?,” 378 (n 11).
14 Chris Daehnick, Isabelle Klinghoffer, Ben Maritz, and Bill Wiseman, Large LEO Satellite Constellations: Will It Be Different This Time? (McKinsey & Company, May 4, 2020), https://perma.cc/27W3-WQ4F.
15 See Shields, Rebekah, “Towards a New Orbit: Addressing the Legal Void in Space Mining,” American University International Law Review 40, no. 1 (2024): 229–62Google Scholar, 249. In 2024, only four signatory countries to the OST had passed national legislation aligned with the treaty: the US, Luxembourg, the UAE, and Japan.
16 See Nelson, “Is International Space Law Interactional?,” 371–72 (n 11), explaining that the Legal Principles Declaration, drafted before the OST, was the “first substantive General Assembly resolution regarding international space law.” It was “negotiated privately by the United States and the Soviet Union, building upon a series of bilateral agreements between NASA and the Soviet Academy of Sciences.”
17 OST, art. VI (n 6).
18 Eric Mack, “There Are 10,000 Active Satellites in Orbit. Most Belong to Elon Musk,” Forbes, July 19, 2024, https://perma.cc/N43N-LZYH.
19 OST, art. VI (n 6).
20 For examples of national space laws that regulate private space activities, see Gustavo Boccardo, “Planetary Protection Obligations of States Pursuant to the Space Treaties and with Special Emphasis on National Legislations Provisions,” GlobaLex, New York University School of Law, Jan. 2018, https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Planetary_Protection.html.
21 Soucek, Alexander, “Legal and Practical Questions in Applying Articles II and IV of the Registration Convention,” Zeitschrift fur Luft- und Weltraumrecht – German Journal of Air and Space Law 65, no. 1 (2016): 22–43 Google Scholar, 39. The acceptable time to register an object is after launch, and the reasonable time to provide Article IV notifications cannot be longer than one month after launch. The one-month period is a reasonable time for space objects to arrive in their destined orbit and to submit the related notifications.
22 According to Nelson, “Is International Space Law Interactional?,” 403 (n 11), “the common denominator for most space activities is the ITU—the United Nations specialized agency responsible for coordinating the international management of radio-frequency spectrum and satellite orbits.”
23 See Zannoni, Diego, “The Radio-Spectrum: International Regulation and Current Challenges,” Annals of Air and Space Law 40 (2015): 679–718 Google Scholar, 693. “[T]he use of a frequency band in a manner that intentionally prevents other States from using immediately adjoining frequency bans is unlawful because it violates the positive rule contained in Article 33 of the ITU Constitution establishing that Member States ‘shall endeavor to limit the number of frequencies and the spectrum used to the minimum essential to provide in a satisfactory manner the necessary services.’”
24 See ITU, “ITU Publishes Updated Global Treaty to Optimize Radio Spectrum Management and Advance Technological Innovation,” press release, Aug. 28, 2024, https://perma.cc/8ASF-ATEB.
25 Nelson, “Is International Space Law Interactional?,” 410 (n 11), explains that “the contradiction between ITU practice and the ITU Constitution’s equitable goals is intensified in the age of megaconstellations.” There is a current gap in the international regulation of mega-constellations. Companies like SpaceX have filed information on 30,000 satellites through the relevant US authorities. Private actors are “shap[ing] the ITU regime in ways that will not tend toward equality.”
26 Houle, “Preventing the Next Global Crisis: Addressing the Urgent Need for Space Debris Removal,” 1977 (n 11), explains that “[c]ommitments surrounding the use of weapons and weapons testing in space, […] [is] key to eventually getting Russia and China to support an international regulatory body for space debris. Agreeing to follow the Registration Convention would be one method of achieving both transparency and building confidence. Another step towards getting Russia and China’s participation in regulating space debris could be limiting ASAT testing to altitudes where any debris that is generated is burnt up within a year. This would be an effective incremental step, as it would still allow ASAT testing but would begin the process of regulating the generation of space debris and ensure that any testing does not cause long-term risk.”
27 Christos Kypraios and Elena Carpanelli, “Space Debris” (last updated Sept. 2018) in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, ed. Anne Peters (Oxford University Press).
28 Milowicki, Gen V. and Johnson-Freese, Joan, “Strategic Choices: Examining the United States Military Response to the Chinese Anti-Satellite Test,” Astropolitics 6, no. 1 (2008): 1–21 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 2–3. In 2007, a Chinese anti-satellite missile destroyed one of China’s defunct weather satellites causing a debris cloud in LEO wherein “‘85 percent of that debris cloud will be in orbit in 100 years’” (quoting Dr. T.S. Kelso of the Center for Space Standards and Innovation in Carl Hoffman, “China’s Space Threat: How Missiles Could Target U.S. Satellites,” Popular Mechanics, Dec. 17, 2009, https://www.popularmechanics.com/space/satellites/a1782/4218443/).
29 Andreas Witte, “A Tragedy of the Night Sky? International Law as a Regulator for Satellite Megaconstellations,” Annals of Air & Space Law 45 (2020): 307–40, 316. The Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), has called for mega-constellations to be disposed of within twenty-five years to manage risk.
30 Li, Lawrence, “Space Debris Mitigation as an International Law Obligation: A Critical Analysis with Reference to States Practice and Treaty Obligation,” International Community Law Review 17, no. 3 (July 2015): 297–335 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
31 See Dey, Anish and Jagadanandan, Jithin, “Study on Space Debris Mitigation under the National Space Law,” University of Bologna Law Review 9, no. 1 (2024): 45–72 Google Scholar, 57. In 2022, the IADC updated its space debris guidelines because it was “concerned about space debris and its effects on future space exploration. It also agreed that international intergovernmental organisations and Member States with permanent observer status should continue to provide details on research about space debris; the safety of spacecraft with nuclear power sources; and its collisions with space debris […].”
32 Nelson, “Is International Space Law Interactional?,” 340 (n 11), explains, “Article VI means that ‘states are responsible for national activities and the activities of nationals in outer space […] [and] are under a duty to authorize and a continuing duty to supervise such activities’” (citing Francis Lyall and Paul B. Larsen, Space Law: A Treatise, 2nd ed. (2017), at 64).
33 Lyall, Francis, “On the Moon,” Journal of Space Law 26, no. 2 (1998): 129–38Google Scholar. Although the Moon Agreement might fall short in providing adequate duty in a particular instance, or justify an alleged breach by a State, it sets the foundation for a formal structure in parallel to the International Sea-Bed Authority.
34 Houle, “Preventing the Next Global Crisis,” 1968 (n 11): “A similar model [to cap-and-trade programs] could be incorporated to fuel space debris removal technology development and then to eventually encourage space debris removal.”
35 See Hunter, Denton and McKemey, Quinn, “The Time is Now: How the United States Can Lead Active Debris Removal Efforts,” Journal of Space Law 45, no.2 (2021): 437–64Google Scholar, 458. Active debris removal requires international cooperation, and the US should ally with mutually interested parties and enact collaborative efforts. The authors also point to the Artemis Accords, which have “ADR concepts currently in development and would be prime candidates for international cooperation.”
36 Kessler, Donald J. and Cour-Palais, Burton G., “Collision Frequency of Artificial Satellites: The Creation of a Debris Belt,” Journal of Geophysical Research 83, no. A6 (1978): 2637–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The Kessler Effect is the cascade effect of uncontrolled collisions caused by the proliferation of space debris, undermining the use of the Earth’s orbit.
37 Nicholas L. Johnson, Orbital Debris Management & Risk Mitigation, (NASA APPEL, 2018), https://perma.cc/N6R5-3WFW.
38 For reasonable steps to mitigate risk, see 47 C.F.R. § 25.123. (Steps may include, but are not limited to, contacting the operator of any active spacecraft involved in potential collision warning, sharing ephemeris data and other operational information with relevant operators to facilitate coordination, adjusting the space station’s altitude, or modifying its operational parameters to avoid potential collisions.)
39 Goldstein, Nicholas Romici, “Beyond Free Use: Stewardship, Orbital Debris and the Due Regard and the Due Regard Standard in the Outer Space Treaty,” Auckland University Law Review 28 (2022): 137–67Google Scholar, 149 (explaining that the due regard standard from art. IX of the OST can play a strong role in regulating orbital debris).
40 Masson-Zwaan, Tanja et al., “The Need to Improve Registration Practices in the Context of Space Traffic Management,” Acta Astronautica 223 (2024): 242–43CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
41 United Nations, Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (hereinafter RC), Jan. 14, 1976, art. II, https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/registration-convention.html.
42 Kyi, Rinchen and Laishram, Neeraj, “Concerns, Implications and Possible Barriers to Licensing: A Legal and Operational Analysis on Setting up Starlink in India,” Jus Corpus Law Journal 3, no. 3 (Mar. 2023): 575–97Google Scholar, 581. “Starlink was the direct participant in the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict and a legitimate military target, [and] Starlink has been actively involved in directing Ukrainian military drones and missiles against Russian military installations.”
43 von der Dunk, Frans and Tronchetti, Fabio, Handbook of Space Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2015), 425 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
44 RC, art. IV (n 41).
45 Von der Dunk and Tronchetti, Handbook of Space Law, 82 (n 43).
46 RC, art. I (n 41).
47 RC, art. II (n 41).
48 Houle, “Preventing the Next Global Crisis,” 1959 (n 11).
49 See Martinez, Katherine Latimer, “Lost in Space: An Exploration of the Current Gaps in Space Law,” Seattle Journal of Technology, Environmental & Innovation Law 11, no. 2 (2021): 322–49Google Scholar, 344. Besides multiple States registering a satellite, licensing regulations are at risk of being inconsistent by individual governments, and there is an “unpredictable recognition of property rights, and lack of a uniform STM and other safety regimes […].”
50 OST, art. 8 (n 6).
51 Von der Dunk and Tronchetti, Handbook of Space Law, 425 (n 43).
52 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (hereinafter LC), Sept. 1, 1972, 961 U.N.T.S. 187, art. II.
53 Ibid., art. III.
54 See Freeland, Steven and Martin, Anne-Sophie, “A Sky Full of Stars, Constellations, Satellites and More! Legal Issues for a ‘Dark’ Sky,” Oslo Law Review 10, no. 3 (Apr. 2024): 1–22 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 2,12. Mega-constellations are tied to the “miniaturisation” of technology, which includes the large number of small satellites in LEO. The authors state that art. IX of the OST deals “with mechanisms of consultation with regard to the avoidance of potentially harmful interference […] to the activities of […] other States in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.”
55 See Wood, Danielle and Weigel, Annelisa, “Charting the Evolution of Satellite Programs in Developing Countries – The Space Technology Ladder,” Space Policy 28 (2012): 15–22 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Eight countries from Africa, Asia, and Latin America were analyzed as they pursued the technological capability of space technology. The introduced framework of the “Space Technology Ladder” was the descriptive tool that defined the path to national space technology capability.
56 Goldstein, “Beyond Free Use,” 142 (n 39). Art. IX of the OST provides environmental protection but is short on providing language on how to regulate orbital debris.
57 Goehring, John S., “Can We Address Orbital Debris with the International Law We Already Have? An Examination of Treaty Interpretation and the Due Regard Principle,” Journal of Air Law and Commerce 85, no. 2 (2020): 309 Google Scholar, 317.
58 United Nations, Status and Application of the Five United Nations Treaties on Outer Space, A/AC.105/C.2/2021/CRP.10, Apr. 21, 2021, https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/ltd/v21/041/53/pdf/v2104153.pdf.
59 Sundahl, Mark J. and Salmeri, Antonino, “The Registration of Lunar Activities: Recommendations from the Registration Project,” Proceedings of the International Institute of Space Law 64 (2021): 93–112 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 95–96. Critical shortcomings include the following: no registration for space activities; current registration provides insufficient information for operators to avoid interference; existing mechanisms do not encourage updates regarding changes in the location or function of an object/activity; no mechanisms for sharing information; registration can be delayed under the RC due to the “as soon as practicable” language; and States are deterred from undertaking registration due to the correlation with liability.
60 Ibid., 94. The sharing of information on planned and existing space activity is critical for compliance with the duty to act with “due regard” and to avoid potential harmful interference that requires further consultation under the OST.
61 Ibid., 98.
62 See, e.g., Runnels, Michael B., “Protecting Earth and Space Industries from Orbital Debris: Implementing the Outer Space Treaty to Fill the Regulatory Vacuum in the FCC’s Orbital Debris Guidelines,” American Business Law Journal 60 (2023): 175–229 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Space situational awareness requires applicants to share data that follows the guidelines of the 2020 FCC guidelines for commercial satellite applicants; Winter, Michael, “Orbital Debris: A Common Concern of Humanity?,” Annals of Air and Space Law 43 (2018): 323–64Google Scholar, 331 (explaining that the ability to track debris is essential). “[N]ot disclosing to a space-active State, either intentionally or inadvertently, may result in a collision.”
63 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, Outer Space Index (2025), https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/osoindex/search-ng.jspx?lf_id=.
64 United Nations, Secretariat, Information Furnished in Conformity with Article IV of the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (June 29, 2022), ST/SG/SER.E/1043, https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/221/014/6e/pdf/2210146e.pdf.
65 Lyall and Larsen, Space Law, 33 (n 7).