2. Terrorism, authoritarianism, and democratic resilience

Citizen support is the cornerstone of democracy, sustaining its legitimacy and guiding its consolidation (Claassen, Reference Claassen2020). This is particularly vital in fragile states like Burkina Faso, where terrorism threatens both collective bonds and individual safety. In such environments, nurturing public belief in the value of democracy becomes crucial, as citizens who view it as the best form of governance are more likely to defend it (Bratton and Mattes, Reference Bratton and Mattes2001).

Terrorism, a deliberate tactic designed to spread fear and destabilize societies (Baldwin et al., Reference Baldwin, Ramaprasad and Samsa2008), poses a significant challenge to democratic governance. It often prompts individuals to embrace authoritarian attitudes, favoring measures like media censorship, centralized power, and autocratic leadership (Merolla and Zechmeister, Reference Merolla and Zechmeister2009; Hetherington and Suhay, Reference Hetherington and Suhay2011). When people feel threatened, they tend to gravitate toward “strongman” leaders, who are perceived as capable of offering swift and decisive solutions (Laustsen and Petersen, Reference Laustsen and Petersen2017; Laustsen, Reference Laustsen2021). Authoritarian regimes frequently exploit this fear, using terrorism as a justification to tighten their grip on power and curtail civil liberties (Applebaum, Reference Applebaum2024).

Although some argue that authoritarian governments manage better terrorism, the evidence paints a more nuanced picture (Wade and Reiter, Reference Wade and Reiter2007; Chenoweth, Reference Chenoweth2013; Gaibulloev et al., Reference Gaibulloev, Piazza and Sandler2017). Democracies outperform authoritarian regimes by employing inclusive strategies that address security threats while respecting individual rights (Magen, Reference Magen2018). These approaches foster long-term peace, stability, and social cohesion, in contrast to the repressive methods typical of autocracies. This paradox—where public preference for authoritarianism persists despite its practical shortcomings—highlights the urgency of countering autocratic narratives, particularly in fragile states with a high probability of terrorist attacks.

Terrorism activates deep-seated psychological responses, as outlined in terror management theory, by amplifying people’s desire for safety, order, and predictability (Pyszczynski et al., Reference Pyszczynski, Greenberg and Solomon1999; Pyszczynski, Reference Pyszczynski2004; Phillips, Reference Phillips2010). This presents a crucial opportunity to reframe democratic governance not only as capable of safeguarding lives but also of protecting civil liberties. This opportunity arises because chronic terrorist attacks expose governments’ inability to protect citizens, undermining public confidence and demoralizing populations (Spilerman and Stecklov, Reference Spilerman and Stecklov2009). This erosion of autocratic legitimacy creates an opening to position democracy as the most effective regime for conflict resolution and peace-building.

We argue that building public support for democracy in the face of terrorism requires educating individuals to critically assess the claims of authoritarian regimes while emphasizing democracy’s capacity to ensure both security and freedom. By directly addressing the failures of autocratic responses and presenting democracy as a viable alternative, we postulate:

3. Framing democracy promotion

Promoting democracy in contexts marked by persistent terrorist attacks presents unique challenges, particularly in positioning democracy as a viable response to the pressing needs of the population. According to Neundorf et al. (Reference Neundorf, öztürk, Finkel and Ramírez2025), the impact of democratic promotion is most pronounced during the democratic developmental stages, where the demand for civic education is highest, and the potential for political change is most realistic. The challenges of democratic promotion are further compounded in autocracies, where foreign actors often lack sufficient leverage or political will, and domestic conditions may not be conducive to change (Hyde et al., Reference Hyde, Lamb and Samet2023; Donno, Reference Donno and Wolf2024).

But which arguments promoting democracy are best for maximizing its impact on citizens’ democratic attitudes? To explore which framing resonates most strongly with individuals living in chronic terrorism contexts, we developed three democratic promotion interventions, each targeting different levels of abstraction and psychological engagement. The first intervention is an abstract video highlighting core democratic values such as civic rights (1) and liberties while also emphasizing the risks of non-democratic systems. This video aims to promote general democratic ideals and contrast them with the potential dangers of authoritarianism without any specific reference to terrorism. The second intervention builds upon the first by focusing more directly on the “needs” and motivational congruence of respondents (Higgins, Reference Higgins1998), considering their lived experience of chronic terrorist attacks. However, this video presents a general argument about democracy’s effectiveness against terrorism, using brief examples from unrelated countries at the end to support the idea of democracy as a universal solution to terrorism in general (2). The third intervention is a context-specific video that directly engages with the realities respondents face in the context of chronic terrorism. It includes information derived from their daily exposure to terrorism in Burkina Faso (3) and examines the current regime’s counterterrorism measures. This framing aims to resonate more strongly with respondents by addressing their specific concerns and the pressing need for stability, peace and security, and a return to normalcy (Vázquez et al., Reference Vázquez, Pérez-Sales and Matt2006; Mannetti et al., Reference Mannetti, Brizi, Giacomantonio and Higgins2013). These three videos vary in abstraction and emotional distance, ranging from the more general and abstract (first video) to the more emotionally engaging and contextually grounded (third video).

4. Message framing and instrumental logic of democracy

Citizens in fragile and conflict-affected settings are often less responsive to appeals grounded in abstract democratic ideals, showing greater concern for practical solutions to the insecurity they face (Higgins, Reference Higgins1998; Mannetti et al., Reference Mannetti, Brizi, Giacomantonio and Higgins2013). As Higgins (Reference Higgins1998) explains, individuals are more likely to be persuaded when messages are aligned with their underlying motivational orientation. In high-threat contexts, this often means prioritizing safety, stability, and immediate relief over aspirational or normative content. Framing democratic systems as effective mechanisms for countering terrorism and restoring order may therefore challenge the perceived “autocratic advantage” in managing crisis (Merolla and Zechmeister, Reference Merolla and Zechmeister2019). This instrumental framing resonates with citizens’ need for protection and peace, particularly in societies where terrorism constitutes a dominant and persistent public concern. Accordingly:

5. Democracy promotion intervention and local relevance

Beyond instrumental framing, the perceived relevance and motivational tone of a message influence its persuasiveness. Regulatory fit theory posits that people are more likely to respond to messages that align with their current motivational state: Promotion-focused people seek ideals and gains, while prevention-focused people prioritize safety, and avoidance of losses (Higgins, Reference Higgins1998; Mannetti et al., Reference Mannetti, Brizi, Giacomantonio and Higgins2013). In terrorism-affected contexts, where prevention-oriented mindsets are likely to dominate, messages acknowledging local threats and offering context-specific solutions should be more effective. This suggests that democratic interventions explicitly referencing Burkina Faso’s own experience with terrorism, rather than speaking in generalities, may better resonate with citizens’ immediate concerns.

6. Chronic threat and the limits of localized framing

However, the advantages of context-specific messages can be offset by the emotional and psychological consequences of chronic terrorism. As Spilerman and Stecklov (Reference Spilerman and Stecklov2009) show, prolonged exposure to violence does not simply intensify political receptiveness. In contrast, it can produce dissociative coping mechanisms, emotional disengagement, denial of the reality, or projection of blame on other people or distrust of others, which help people adapt to abnormal conditions but simultaneously reduce their openness to political communication. In such environments, even well-intentioned democratic appeals may be perceived as intrusive, emotionally taxing, or manipulative, especially if they resemble official state rhetoric or evoke familiar traumas.

This insight challenges the assumption that more tailored messages are necessarily more persuasive. Instead, general or abstract framings may achieve greater regulatory fit by offering symbolic distance and emotional protection. Such framings allow citizens to engage with democratic ideals without reliving the daily reality of threat, distrust, or disappointment.

7. Experiencing terrorism and the impact of democracy promotion

The literature on affective responses to violence from terrorism shows that affected individuals tend to express stronger emotional reactions, such as anger or anxiety, which can increase their receptiveness to political messages (Vasilopoulos et al., Reference Vasilopoulos, Marcus and Foucault2018; Marcus et al., Reference Marcus, Valentino, Vasilopoulos and Foucault2019). The frame of democracy as a credible and effective response to insecurity may therefore have stronger effects on this subgroup. However, the psychological toll of repeated trauma could also dull emotional sensitivity and reduce the effectiveness of even highly salient messages (Spilerman and Stecklov, Reference Spilerman and Stecklov2009).

This tension reflects a theoretical uncertainty: while conventional models expect heightened responsiveness among victims, the realities of chronic threat may instead lead to political fatigue and emotional numbness. We retain the conventional expectation that direct exposure increases message effectiveness, while remaining attentive to the potential for attenuation in chronic settings.

8. Research design

To test our hypotheses, we implement a randomized controlled trial in Burkina Faso, testing the impact of online democracy promotion programs on key democratic attitudes and behavior. In this section, we outline our case selection and research design.

8.1. Case study Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso offers a critical case for examining democracy promotion amid chronic terrorism and autocratization. Its trajectory raises the challenge of designing interventions that respond to public demands for security (Higgins, Reference Higgins1998; Mannetti et al., Reference Mannetti, Brizi, Giacomantonio and Higgins2013) while accounting for psychological coping mechanisms that may blunt the impact of localized messages (Vázquez et al., Reference Vázquez, Pérez-Sales and Matt2006; Spilerman and Stecklov, Reference Spilerman and Stecklov2009).

Following independence from France in 1960, the country was governed largely by authoritarian regimes until democratic elections in 2015. However, escalating terrorist violence has since fueled political instability, resulting in two military coups and sharp democratic decline. The democratic breakthrough of 2014–2015, when a popular uprising ended Blaise Compaoré’s 27-year rule and opened the way for free elections, marked a brief peak of democratic enthusiasm. The 2014 revolution was the culmination of a long trajectory of prodemocracy mobilization. As Figure 1 illustrates, the liberal democracy index rose modestly during the 1990s but has collapsed since 2016, reaching closed autocracy by 2023 (0.18 on the V-Dem scale) (Coppedge et al., Reference Coppedge, Gerring, Knutsen, Lindberg, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, Cornell, Fish, Gastaldi, Gjerløw, Glynn, Grahn, Hicken, Kinzelbach, Marquardt, McMann, Mechkova, Neundorf, Paxton, Pemstein, Rydén, von Römer, Seim, Sigman, Skaaning, Staton, Sundström, Tzelgov, Uberti, Wang, Wig and Ziblatt2024). This trajectory reflects both the initial optimism of the post-revolution transition and its erosion under growing insecurity and autocratic governance.

Figure 1. Liberal democratic index, 1960–2023 (V-Dem).

Successive governments used security narratives to justify curtailing civil liberties, restricting media outlets, such as the BBC and Voice of America, and detaining activists and political leaders (see BBC and Le Monde).

Before 2015, Burkina Faso remained largely insulated from the wave of terrorism affecting the wider Sahel, with Mali serving as the primary hotspot. Since then, the country has experienced a sharp escalation in violence, with its Global Terrorism Index rising from 3 in 2015 to 8.56 in 2022 (Figure A2, Online Appendix). This index ranges from zero to ten, with higher scores indicating greater impact (see Appendix A.2). The surge reflects mounting attacks by groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda and ISIS. In 2023 alone, more than 1,000 terrorism-related fatalities were recorded, part of a broader regional trend (Institute for Economics & Peace, Reference Institute for Economics & Peace2024). Figure 2 shows the spatial concentration of attacks between 2018 and 2022, particularly along the borders with Mali and Niger.

Figure 2. Spatial distribution of terrorism attacks, 2018–2022 (ACLED).

Terrorism and the rise of authoritarian narratives have eroded public support for democracy in Burkina Faso. Figure 3 shows the decline in support for democracy, as measured by the Afrobarometer survey, from 80% in 2014/15 to 55% in 2021/23 amid political turmoil and terrorism. At the same time, support for non-democratic alternatives surged from 4.4% to 25%. This shift, occurring around 2015–2016, suggests a negative impact of terrorism and autocratic security narratives on democracy.

Figure 3. Individual support for democracy, 2008–2022 (Afrobarometer Data).

Afrobarometer survey rounds: R4: September 2008, R5: October 2012, R6: April 2015, R7: October 2018, R8: October 2021, R9: September 2022.

9. Outcome variables

We use six main outcome measures to assess the impact of democracy promotion interventions on democratic support and behavior. The outcomes are divided into three main groupsFootnote ¹³:

1. 1. Perception of democracy’s efficacy in the context of terrorism: This outcome evaluates whether respondents believe democracy is effective in addressing terrorism, aiming to correct the misconception of an autocratic advantage in managing such threat.

2. 2. General support for democracy and rejection of its alternatives:

   • • Support for democracy: This measure captures the abstract preference for democracy by asking respondents to self-report how important it is for them to live in a democracy.

   • • Rejection of authoritarian alternatives: This is a composite measure that evaluates respondents’ attitudes toward various non-democratic systems, including strongman rule, single-party rule, military rule, and religious law (e.g., Sharia law). Respondents were asked to assess how good or bad they perceived these systems to be.

3. 3. Behavioral intention variables: These measures capture whether the democracy promotion interventions influence pro-democratic behavioral responses. Examples include intentions to donate to a pro-democracy NGO, participate in pro-democracy protests, or vote for a democratic candidate.

All outcomes were measured after respondents watched the videos. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics, where the outcomes have been standardized to range from 0 to 1 to facilitate subsequent comparative analyses. A value of 0 indicates disagreement, while 1 signifies agreement. In our sample—across all treatments and placebo groups—74.8% prefer to live in a democracy, demonstrating the strong demand for democracy. However, we also see that only 46.6% reject authoritarian alternatives, which demonstrates the tension in the political narrative in contexts of terrorism.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics: standardized outcomes

11. Discussion and conclusion

Can democratic promotion interventions foster public support for democracy in terrorism-affected contexts? Our findings suggest they can. A key outcome is that the interventions successfully reshaped public perceptions of democracy as a secure and effective system for combating terrorism. This highlights the potential of concise online videos presenting accurate empirical evidence to counter the perception of an “autocratic advantage” in conflict resolution (Merolla and Zechmeister, Reference Merolla and Zechmeister2019). By challenging the security-based narratives employed by autocratic leaders to consolidate power (Applebaum, Reference Applebaum2024), this approach underscores the instrumental value of democracy. Beyond its intrinsic virtues, democracy’s capacity to address urgent societal challenges and needs is crucial for persuading citizens facing insecurity and adversity (Higgins, Reference Higgins1998).

The study further examines various framings of democratic promotion interventions, from general approaches to context-specific ones. Among the interventions tested, the treatment emphasizing the universal advantages of democratic systems in addressing terrorism had the most significant impact, outperforming the treatment focused on universal rights. In contrast, the context-specific treatment, designed to address the direct experiences of the targeted population, proved ineffective. While this contradicts our initial expectation in hypothesis (H2b), which anticipated stronger effects from interventions tailored to the unique challenges faced by communities affected by terrorism, the result is consistent with hypothesis H2c and the broader literature on coping under chronic threat (Vázquez et al., Reference Vázquez, Pérez-Sales and Matt2006; Spilerman and Stecklov, Reference Spilerman and Stecklov2009).

This finding must be interpreted in light of the broader context in which the study took place. Just one month before data collection, a terrorist attack claimed the lives of more than 600 people,Footnote ²³ the highest single-day death toll in the country’s history. Beyond this acute tragedy, the data reflect a broader pattern of entrenched insecurity: 77% of respondents reported direct or indirect exposure to terrorism, including injury, displacement, or the loss of a close relative. These figures are not isolated; they reflect the cumulative impact of nearly a decade of sustained terrorist violence. The country has transitioned from episodic attacks to a state of chronic insecurity, where exposure to violence, both physical and psychological, has become widespread, personal, and enduring.

Despite this backdrop, our results show no evidence that emotional states (anger, anxiety) or proximity to attacks moderated the impact of democratic promotion messages. These null results challenge the assumption that heightened threat salience intensifies political receptiveness. Instead, they align with research in Israel and Northern Ireland suggesting that prolonged exposure produces desensitization and psychological disengagement (Spilerman and Stecklov, Reference Spilerman and Stecklov2009). Although Burkina Faso’s experience with terrorism is more recent, its intensity and frequency since 2015 make desensitization highly relevant.

The concept of dissociative coping, well-documented in Northern Ireland, is particularly relevant (Spilerman and Stecklov, Reference Spilerman and Stecklov2009). In high-threat environments, people may resort to psychological defenses such as denial, detachment, and blame projection to maintain a sense of normalcy. These defenses reduce distress but can also diminish the credibility of political messages. Our manipulation checks reinforce this view: both instrumental democratic interventions—and especially the Burkina Faso-specific video—were less likely to be seen as informative, relatable, or shareable than the placebo. Far from being more persuasive, the contextualized message may have been perceived as inauthentic, politicized, or emotionally taxing.

The absence of a “low point” or an end to the violence means that elevated fear or anxiety becomes a permanent feature, not a transient response (Spilerman and Stecklov, Reference Spilerman and Stecklov2009). In this context, abstract democratic framings may hold more symbolic appeal than locally grounded but discredited narratives tied to politics and broken promises.

These findings suggest that in contexts of chronic insecurity, democracy promotion must move beyond assumptions of emotion-based receptiveness and attend instead to deep-seated trust deficits and narrative fatigue. Interventions that evoke hope, dignity, or international solidarity, rather than reiterating local trauma, may stand a better chance of being heard.

These results offer practical implications for democratic promotion in fragile and authoritarian settings. First, they suggest that context-sensitive messaging must be designed with great caution in high-threat environments. Although intuitive, localized appeals may underperform or even backfire if they intersect with trauma, distrust, or state-controlled narratives. Second, short, low-cost online interventions, such as those deployed in this study, can meaningfully shape public attitudes toward democracy when framed appropriately. They are particularly valuable in contexts where in-person programming is dangerous or infeasible. Social media can spread autocratic narratives, yet research shows that short-video interventions can sustain effects for at least two weeks and hold significant potential for democratization (Neundorf et al., Reference Neundorf, öztürk, Finkel and Ramírez2025).

At the same time, structural challenges remain. Authoritarian regimes often limit access to media and information, and online platforms are increasingly subject to surveillance or censorship (Analytica, Reference Analytica2018). Nevertheless, online advertisements and video content continue to offer outreach opportunities, especially when targeting platforms beyond the reach of domestic authorities. Such tools cannot replace long-term democratic development, but they may help maintain civic engagement in hostile settings.

This study raises important questions for future research. In contexts of chronic terrorism, under what conditions do citizens remain open to democratic appeals? When does the desire for security override habituation to violence? Further work is needed to examine the specific types of narratives that generate trust and engagement, and how these dynamics vary across countries and conflict stages. Understanding how psychological fatigue, institutional context, and narrative design interact will be essential for developing more effective democratic interventions in settings of sustained political violence.

Finally, we hope that future research will also advance the generalizability of our findings. One important limitation of this study is the coverage bias in our sample. Facebook sampling enabled us to reach broader and more diverse populations than would otherwise have been feasible in Burkina Faso. Nevertheless, our sample still over-represents more educated individuals. Weighting and conditional effects analyses across education categories did not reveal significant biases, which alleviate some concerns. Still, it is possible that segments of the population not captured at all, such as those without internet access or formal education, might respond differently. Replicating the study with fully representative samples and using survey designs that trace the long-term effects of repeated exposure to online content would be valuable steps forward. As digital infrastructures and recruitment methods continue to develop, future research will be able to draw on more inclusive and reliable strategies that further reduce these limitations.