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Advancing the Humanitarian Imperative of the Arms Trade Treaty: Public and Private Sector Engagement in Responsible Arms Transfers

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 November 2025

Cynthia L. Ebbs Open the ORCID record for Cynthia L. Ebbs [Opens in a new window]
Cynthia L. Ebbs*
Affiliation:
Independent Scholar, International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law and Arms Control
*
Email: cindyebbs.jd@gmail.com
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Abstract

2024 marked ten years since the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) took effect. Firmly rooted in international human rights and humanitarian law, the ATT is the first legally binding instrument to regulate international arms transfers. It is a framework for national action to (i) contribute to peace and security, (ii) reduce human suffering caused by irresponsible arms transfers and (iii) promote transparency in the international arms trade. This piece exploresrecent developments in the ATT process that represent a pivot from building treaty infrastructure toward more expansive stakeholder engagement, increased information exchange centred on state practice and a sharper focus on the ATT’s human impact. Key new features are discussions on actual arms transfer decisions and the examination of the independent human rights responsibilities of industry that operate alongside government risk assessment obligations. Finally, this piece assesses the potential impact of these efforts on the achievement of the ATT’s humanitarian purpose.

Keywords

arms industryArms Trade Treatyexport risk assessmenthumanitarian disarmamenthuman rights due diligence

Information

Type
Developments in the Field
Information
Business and Human Rights Journal , First View , pp. 1 - 7
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press

I. Introduction

The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is the first legally binding treaty that regulates the international trade of conventional arms and their ammunition and parts and components. The stated purpose of creating this international arms control system is three-fold: (i) to contribute to international and regional peace, security and stability; (ii) to reduce human suffering; and (iii) to promote cooperation, transparency and responsible action in the international trade in conventional arms.Footnote 1 Without a codified enforcement mechanism in place, the ATT’s success relies on the continuous transparent exchange of information among States Parties concerning their international arms transfers and, critically, the authorisation decisions behind them.

II. Legal underpinnings of the independent responsibilities of ATT states parties and industry to respect human rights

The ATT requires its states parties to establish effective national control systems to regulate the export, import, transit and transhipment and brokering of conventional arms all along the value chain from exporter to end-user.Footnote 2 It obligates states parties to take measures to prevent diversion of authorised transfers to illicit markets or other unauthorised end users.Footnote 3 Foundational to the ATT’s humanitarian imperative are states parties’ obligations under Articles 6 and 7. Article 6 requires states parties to prohibit all transfers of arms, ammunition and parts and components where the transfers: (1) would violate obligations under measures taken by the United Nations (UN) Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, including arms embargoes; (2) would violate obligations under international agreements to which the state is a party, in particular those relating the transfer or illicit trafficking of conventional arms; or (3) where there is knowledge that the arms or items would be used to commit genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes.Footnote 4

If the transfer is not prohibited under Article 6 of the ATT, prior to export authorisation, Article 7 requires ATT states parties to undertake a comprehensive export risk assessment as to whether the arms or items could be used to commit or facilitate a serious violation of international humanitarian or human rights law or offenses under international conventions or protocols relating to terrorism or international organised crime. States parties must also consider the risk that the exported arms could be used to commit or facilitate serious acts of gender-based violence or violence against women and children. If there is an ‘overriding risk’ of any of the negative consequences enumerated therein, the export must not be authorised.Footnote 5

Alongside the legal requirement for ATT states parties to prohibit certain transfers and conduct a comprehensive risk assessment grounded in international humanitarian and human rights law prior to authorising any arms export, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) create a separate responsibility for the private sector to conduct its own due diligence to ensure respect for human rights relating to its weapons sales. As one of the fundamental obligations set out in the UNGPs, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights ‘exists independently of states’ abilities and/or willingness to fulfil their own human rights obligations’.Footnote 6 In the context of arms transfers, corporate responsibility to respect human rights is adjacent to and separate from states parties’ obligations under the ATT and is not subsumed by state action. Accordingly, companies’ human rights responsibilities remain in place irrespective of their ability to gain government approval for a licence to export.

III. ATT state of play: Ten years on

The momentum for international cooperative action for conventional arms control that peaked in the late 1990s and early 2000s began to wane shortly after the ATT’s entry into force in 2014. The rate at which states joined the treaty began to decline after 2016,Footnote 7 as rumblings of a larger geopolitical movement away from multilateralism grew stronger. A decade later, collective international support for the shared humanitarian purpose of the ATT and for other arms control instruments continues to recede, replaced by increasing isolationism, distrust and self-preservation. We now see a dangerous combination of rising national military expenditures with declining ATT state party engagement,Footnote 8 minimal attention to export risk assessment, downward trends in reporting,Footnote 9 and little concern with ATT compliance.

Before 2024, even with rising numbers of conflicts around the globe, only a few states parties and signatories introduced their positions on the legality of specific arms transfers into the ATT general debate, none of which resulted in any decision taking or further inquiry. These mentions occurred in 2017 (arms used by Venezuela), 2020 (arms used in Yemen), and 2022 (arms used in Gaza and the West Bank and arms used in Ukraine).Footnote 10 Instead, ATT discussions on compliance with its arms transfer prohibitions and export risk assessment remained theoretical, focusing on developing voluntary guidance documents containing interpretation and hypothetical application of the treaty language, rather than applying treaty provisions directly to actual decisions and real-world contexts.Footnote 11

Despite broad access to its Conference of States Parties (CSP), direct engagement by arms industry representatives in the ATT CSP remained sparse before 2023. Of those that did participate, few industry representatives addressed the human rights responsibilities of corporations in the context of the ATT’s government obligations to prohibit or assess the humanitarian and human rights risks of arms transfers.

IV. Reinvigorating the ATT programme of work: An opening for engagement on specific arms transfer decisions and industry involvement in responsible arms transfers

Following an inquiry introduced by the ATT Management Committee on the efficiency of the ATT programme of work, in 2023, states parties developed and agreed to implement a new approach.Footnote 12 This development marked a general shift away from theoretical treaty language discussions and towards centralising practical treaty implementation, with an emphasis on information exchange and actual state practice.Footnote 13 While the revised programme of work reduced the overall working group time by half, it also implemented a more flexible substantive approach by focusing on current and emerging implementation issues and creating space for ATT stakeholders to place issues onto the ATT CSP agenda on an ad-hoc basis.Footnote 14

In the same timeframe, the Republic of Korea, as the President of the Ninth ATT Conference of States Parties (CSP9), introduced the role of industry in the ATT as the thematic focus of CSP9. Early consultations held in 2023 with industry representatives failed to meaningfully include industry’s role in respecting human rights in the President’s draft working paper.Footnote 15 Continued pressure by some states partiesFootnote 16 and civil society organisations resulted in the integration of the UNGPs, human rights due diligence and the arms industry’s corporate responsibility to respect human rights into the President’s Paper and the CSP9 Final Report,Footnote 17 and the specific inclusion of a business and human rights expert in the CSP9 thematic panel discussion.Footnote 18 Further, ATT states parties agreed to include the role of industry in responsible arms transfers into subsequent CSP agendas, with a specific focus on human rights concerns.Footnote 19

ATT states parties put the new programme of work into action during the Tenth ATT Conference of States Parties (CSP10) cycle with uneven outcomes. Substantively, states parties made some progress towards implementing a more practical humanitarian-centred approach with a formal discussion of industry involvement in responsible arms transfers and an open information exchange concerning arms transfer policies specific to the conflict in Gaza.Footnote 20 However, communication concerns and the lack of adequate time hindered states parties’ ability to engage on these topics, indicating that logistics and conference management require more attention. With questions remaining on whether efficiency and effectiveness were achieved through the constraints of four working days,Footnote 21 ATT states parties agreed at CSP10 to continue the shortened programme for an additional year, with a formal assessment to be presented after such extension is complete.Footnote 22

A. Information exchange on actual arms transfer decisions

Utilising the newly flexible agenda at the CSP10 working group sessions in February 2024, the State of Palestine and Control Arms requested an ad hoc session under the auspices of the Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation’s (WGETI) new Sub-working group on Current and Emerging Implementation Issues on the impact of arms transfers on the Israel-Palestine conflict.Footnote 23 For the first time in ATT formal proceedings, participants shared specific information on arms transfers and transfer policies in relation to an active conflict and noted industry due diligence requirements.Footnote 24 Stakeholders also highlighted the intersection between arms transfer decisions and international humanitarian law, the use of force, and state responsibility as they relate to the Israel-Palestine conflict.Footnote 25 Regrettably, the organisation of and time allotted to this working group session proved inadequate to support sustained discussions among states parties on this critical issue of ATT compliance.Footnote 26

At the request of Control Arms, during the Eleventh ATT Conference of States Parties (CSP11) cycle, the WGETI Sub-working Group on Current and Emerging Issues held an ad hoc discussion on the role of rulings of the International Court of Justice and findings of the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council in the application of ATT Articles 6 and 7. While delegations highlighted the importance of compliance with international law and mechanisms during the discussion, states parties took no further action steps on this issue.Footnote 27 With the expansive use of force resulting in humanitarian and human rights law violations in multiple contexts, the failure of states parties to pursue discussions on the effects of actual arms transfers is disappointing. To have measurable impact on the ATT’s purpose to reduce human suffering, ATT stakeholders must make better use of the ad-hoc discussion tool to actively monitor treaty compliance.

B. Industry involvement in responsible arms transfers

Following the CSP9 Presidency’s thematic focus on the role of industry in the ATT, the newly reorganised WGETI took up for the first time the specific issue of corporate humanitarian and human rights responsibilities of industry actors in arms transfers. Discussions at the CSP10 working group sessions emphasised the complementarity of the UNGPs and other human rights instruments with the ATT and provided detailed information on human rights due diligence.Footnote 28 Moderately strong levels of engagement from stakeholders underscored the interest of ATT states parties in continuing the discussion, including on the integration of compliance with arms transfer control regulations into existing industry guidance.Footnote 29

The CSP11 working group sessions held in February 2025 continued coverage of the role of industry in responsible arms transfers. These discussions delved deeper into the issue of human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL) due diligence in the context of ATT implementation and national arms transfer control systems, and included two industry actors who shared their companies’ current human rights due diligence practices.Footnote 30 Delegations also acknowledged industry’s independent responsibility to conduct due diligence in all business activities, with government holding the primary responsibility to regulate arms transfers and implement the ATT.Footnote 31 Many delegations also expressed interest in outreach and training programs for industry actors and the utility of written guidance concerning human rights due diligence.Footnote 32 Planned discussions concerning the inclusion of compliance with arms transfer control regulations into existing corporate guidance were deferred due to challenges with securing speakers.Footnote 33 Looking ahead, ATT states parties agreed at CSP11 to continue discussions on the role of industry, including on a list of reference materials for industry actors and on possible draft elements for a voluntary guide linking industry human rights and IHL due diligence requirements with the primary responsibilities of governments to regulate arms transfers and their obligations under the ATT.Footnote 34

Given the historical lack of engagement between ATT states parties and industry, it is helpful to see an ATT agenda that supports ongoing productive and practical exchange on the interplay between the roles and responsibilities of the private sector and the state in arms transfers, including sustained focus on the UNGPs, human rights due diligence and continued engagement of industry stakeholders in the discussions.Footnote 35 Because the corporate responsibility to conduct human rights due diligence exists independently of arms export controls, ATT states parties and industry actors can mutually benefit from exchanging information and good practice with regard to their respective risk and human rights due diligence assessments. This is particularly relevant to export risk assessments conducted by ATT states parties, given that companies may often be able to collect crucial and exclusive information on weapon use through their engagement in long-term maintenance and other post-sales services. Following the extensive guidance from academics, NGOs and international organisations on the implementation of corporate obligations with regard to arms exports,Footnote 36 continuing consideration is needed on how these government and corporate responsibilities can be leveraged to enhance efforts to prevent the transfer of lethal goods used for the commission of serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law.

V. Conclusion

The ATT is at a pivotal moment. Political and financial resources underpinning the ATT by its early champions have faded, new funding opportunities are limited, and now more than ever, governments often choose secrecy over transparency in their arms transfer decisions. Some of the recent steps taken by ATT states parties to improve the structure and substance of its working group meetings mark forward progress towards strengthening the ATT for the future. These include broadening engagement with industry on human rights responsibilities, focusing on information exchange and introducing ad hoc opportunities for all ATT stakeholders to initiate and contribute to conversations on the legality of actual arms transfers. By shifting focus to encourage more practical engagement concerning ATT implementation and, most critically, including defined pathways to place humanitarian and human rights concerns on the agenda, there is now an opening in ATT process for states to support broader compliance conversations and build, however incrementally, a framework of state practice that would embrace accountability and further the ATT’s humanitarian purpose.

References

1 The Arms Trade Treaty, 3013 UNTS 269 (adopted on 2 April 2013, entered into force on 24 December 2014), art 1.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid, art 11.

4 Ibid, art 6.

5 Ibid, art 7.

6 Human Rights Council, ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’, A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011).

7 Control Arms Secretariat, ‘ATT Monitor Report 2022’ (2022), https://attmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/ATT_Monitor-Report-2022.pdf (accessed 14 July 2025), 21.

8 Control Arms Secretariat, ‘ATT Monitor Report 2023’ (2023), https://attmonitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/ATT-Monitor-Report-2023_Online.pdf (accessed 14 July 2025), 35.

9 ATT Secretariat, ‘Working Group on Transparency and Reporting: Chair’s Report to CSP10’ (16 April 2024), https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP10_WGTR_Chair_Draft%20report%20to%20CSP10_EN/ATT_CSP10_WGTR_Chair_Draft%20report%20to%20CSP10_EN.pdf (accessed 14 July 2025), para 3.

10 Control Arms, ‘Conference of States Parties to the ATT (CSP 2017) Geneva, 11 September 2017 Daily Summary: Day 1’ (2017), https://controlarms.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Daily-Summary-Day-1-CSP-2017.pdf (accessed 14 July 2025); Kingdom of the Netherlands, ‘Statement of the Netherlands to the Sixth Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty’ (14 August 2020), https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/att/csp6/statements/Netherlands.pdf (accessed 14 July 2025); State of Palestine, ‘General Statement by Ambassador Dr. Omar Awadallah Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates’ (2022), https://tinyurl.com/yc8pcv4u (accessed 14 July 2025); Control Arms, ‘Daily Summary Analysis Report of the Eighth Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty Geneva, Switzerland, Monday 22 August 2022’ (2022), https://controlarms.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/CSP8-Summary-Analysis-Day-1.pdf (accessed 14 July 2025).

11 See ATT Secretariat, ‘Voluntary Guide to Implementing Articles 6 & 7 of the Arms Trade Treaty’ (August 2024), https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP10_WGETI_Voluntary%20Guide%20to%20Implementing%20Articles%206%20&%207%20of%20the%20ATT_EN_2024_11_26/ATT_CSP10_WGETI_Voluntary%20Guide%20to%20Implementing%20Articles%206%20&%207%20of%20the%20ATT_EN_2024_11_26.pdf (accessed 14 July 2025).

12 ATT Management Committee, ‘Review of the Arms Trade Treaty Programme of Work: Management Committee Draft Proposal’ (21 July 2023), https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP9_MC_Draft%20proposal_Review%20of%20the%20ATT%20Programme%20of%20Work_EN/ATT_CSP9_MC_Draft%20proposal_Review%20of%20the%20ATT%20Programme%20of%20Work_EN.pdf (accessed 14 July 2025).

13 Ibid, para 18, 19(a).

14 ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation, ‘Chair Letter and Sub-Working Group Documents’ (22 January 2024), https://www.thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_WGETI_CSP10_Chair%20Letter%20and%20Sub-WG%20Documents%20for%2020-21%20February%202024_EN/ATT_WGETI_CSP10_Chair%20Letter%20and%20Sub-WG%20Documents%20for%2020-21%20February%202024_EN.pdf (accessed 14 July 2025), Annex C-1, C-2.

15 ATT CSP9 President, ‘Draft Working Paper Presented by the President of the Ninth Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)’ (21 April 2023), https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP9_%20Second%20CSP9%20Informal%20Prep%20Meeting%2012%20May%202023_President%20Working%20Paper%20_EN/ATT_CSP9_%20Second%20CSP9%20Informal%20Prep%20Meeting%2012%20May%202023_President%20Working%20Paper%20_EN.pdf (accessed 14 July 2025), fn 2.

16 See Austria, Ireland, Mexico, ‘Joint Working Paper: Responsible Business Conduct and the Arms Trade Treaty’ (10 August 2023), https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP9_Austria,%20Ireland,%20Mexico_Joint%20Working%20Paper_Responsible%20Business%20Conduct%20and%20the%20Arms%20Trade%20Treaty/ATT_CSP9_Austria,%20Ireland,%20Mexico_Joint%20Working%20Paper_Responsible%20Business%20Conduct%20and%20the%20Arms%20Trade%20Treaty.pdf (accessed 14 July 2025), 3.

17 ATT CSP9 President, ‘Draft Working Paper Presented by the President of the Ninth Conference of States Parties to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)’ (21 July 2023), https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP9_Pres_President%20Working%20Paper_Role%20of%20industry_EN/ATT_CSP9_Pres_President%20Working%20Paper_Role%20of%20industry_EN.pdf (accessed 14 July 2025), para 4, fn 2; para 5; ATT Secretariat, ‘Final Report’ (25 August 2023), https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP9_ATTS_Final%20Report_%20rev2_EN/ATT_CSP9_ATTS_Final%20Report_%20rev2_EN.pdf (accessed 14 July 2025), para 22.

18 ATT Secretariat, note 17, para 19.

19 Ibid, para 22(c), (d), (f), (h).

20 ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation, ‘Chair’s Report to CSP10’ (19 July 2024), https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP10_WGETI_Chair_Report%20to%20CSP10_EN%20(incl.%20annexes)/ATT_CSP10_WGETI_Chair_Report%20to%20CSP10_EN%20(incl.%20annexes).pdf (accessed 14 July 2025), para 43–44.

21 See, e.g., Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Republic of Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States, ‘Food for Thought Joint Paper About the Organization of the Arms Trade Treaty Working Group meetings’ (2024), https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP10%20Informal%20Prep%20Meeting_CA,%20NL,%20NO,%20KR,%20SE,%20US%20and%20UK_Food%20for%20thought%20joint%20paper%20about%20the%20organization%20of%20the%20ATT%20Working%20Group%20meetings/ATT_CSP10%20Informal%20Prep%20Meeting_CA,%20NL,%20NO,%20KR,%20SE,%20US%20and%20UK_Food%20for%20thought%20joint%20paper%20about%20the%20organization%20of%20the%20ATT%20Working%20Group%20meetings.pdf (accessed 14 July 2025).

22 ATT Secretariat, note 17, para 42, 43.

23 ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation, note 13, Annex C-2, para 38–9.

24 ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation, note 20, para 42. See also, ATT Secretariat, ‘Statements: CSP10 Working Group Meetings, Sub-Working Group on Current and Emerging Implementation Issues’ (2024), https://thearmstradetreaty.org/statements-csp10prepmeets (accessed 14 July 2025) (statements from Netherlands, United Kingdom, Brazil, International Committee of the Red Cross, American Friends Service Committee, Australian Center for International Justice, Control Arms, Josh Paul, University of Kent).

25 ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation, note 20, para 42.

26 Ibid, para 50.

27 ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation, ‘Draft Chair’s Report to CSP11’ (2 May 2025), https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP11_Informal%20Prep%20Meeting_WGETI_Chair_Draft%20Report%20to%20CSP11_EN/ATT_CSP11_Informal%20Prep%20Meeting_WGETI_Chair_Draft%20Report%20to%20CSP11_EN.pdf (accessed 14 July 2025), para 30–31.

28 ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation, note 20, para 29–33.

29 Ibid. See also, ATT Secretariat, note 17, para 28(f).

30 ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation, note 27, para 21–2.

31 Ibid, para 23.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid, para 24.

34 ATT Secretariat, ‘Final Report’ (29 August 2025), https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_CSP11_%20ATTS_Final%20Report_EN/ATT_CSP11_%20ATTS_Final%20Report_EN.pdf (accessed 3 October 2025), para 25c.

35 See ibid, para 25c, d.

36 See, e.g., Hiruni Alwishewa, ‘Human Rights Due Diligence for Arms Companies: Lessons from Supply Chain Regulations’ (15 November 2024) European Journal of Risk Regulation, https://doi.org/10.1017/err.2024.83 (accessed 14 July 2025); American Bar Association Center for Human Rights, ‘Defense Industry Human Rights Due Diligence Guidance’ (2022), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/human_rights/justice-defenders/chr-due-diligence-guidance-2022.pdf (accessed 14 July 2025); UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights, ‘Information Note—Responsible Business Conduct in the Arms Sector: Ensuring Business Practice in Line With the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights’ (30 August 2022), https://media.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/BHR-Arms-sector-info-note.pdf (accessed 14 July 2025).