Participatory budgeting (PB) was first implemented in Porto Alegre (Brazil) in 1989 as a measure to reduce poverty and decrease child mortality. Since then, it has spread all over the world. It empowers citizens in political action, increases their awareness of the social and political shortcomings of their communities, and allows them to decide how a part of the local budget should be spent. Despite these benefits, people generally rarely engage with PB when it is offered. With the exception of a few studies (Gherghina, Tap, and Traistaru Reference Gherghina, Tap and Traistaru2023), we do not yet know what makes individuals abstain from participating in this process.
In this article, we argue that low engagement in PB is sometimes linked to political parties’ lack of support for it.
Parties’ apathy is because they do not receive credit for its outcomes. The present analysis uses primary data from semistructured interviews with 16 participants from Kibra Constituency in the Nairobi County (Kenya) in July and August 2024. For the 2023–2024 PB, Kibra was allocated 5,070,333 dollars. Apart from the budget for office operations, bursary funds for educational support, and allowances for officers, the study focused on projects that required public participation and approval, all of which centered on infrastructure development for primary and secondary schools. The data were analyzed using inductive thematic analysis.
The next section reviews the literature about the attitudes of citizens and politicians toward PB and establishes the state of the art of this process in Kenya. The second section presents the research design, and the third section describes the analysis. The last section is dedicated to the conclusions.
Participatory Budgeting: Citizens, Political Parties, and Kenya
The literature about the relationship between citizens and PB underlines three major positions. First, citizens support PB because they perceive it as a means of collective empowerment characterized by the idea that the citizens of a specific community can work together to achieve a common goal (Baiocchi and Ganuza Reference Baiocchi and Ganuza2014; Holdo Reference Holdo2020). Second, PB helps citizens to learn about their rights, allows them to express views on policy making (Gherghina, Tap, and Soare Reference Gherghina, Tap and Soare2023), and increases their awareness of politics in general. Third, citizens could be reluctant to engage with PB because they might perceive it as another opportunity for political actors to achieve their goals. If this is the case, they may just decide not to engage in PB at all (Baiocchi and Ganuza Reference Baiocchi and Ganuza2014; Peck and Theodore Reference Peck and Theodore2015). Political parties often support PB because they believe that it increases overall public trust in democracy (Oross and Kiss Reference Oross and Kiss2023). They see PB as important for two reasons. First, PB provides important channels for data collection about citizens’ desires (Hendriks and Lees-marshment Reference Hendriks and Lees-marshment2019). Second, PB enhances the connections between political parties and the electorate because PB processes involve interactions between citizens and politicians (Kempa and Kozlowski Reference Kempa and Kozlowski2020; Mckenna Reference Mckenna2012). In addition, politicians might use PB as a means to attract electoral support because it can provide numerous benefits to citizens (Oross and Kiss Reference Oross and Kiss2023).
In Kenya, PB was driven through the World Bank’s efforts through pilot programs initiated in 2016. Kenya had already experienced some level of citizen participation in budgeting through its Local Authority Transfer Fund, launched in 1998, and its Constituency Development Fund, introduced in 2003 (Hall et al. Reference Hall, Omolo, Peixoto, Wanjiru and Ruth2018). Through these funds, the central government allocated resources for community projects following a selection process that involved community meetings where citizens identified their priorities. The 2010 constitution provides a framework for participatory governance in which PB is anchored.
The literature about PB in Kenya highlights differences between theory and practice. In theory, political actors support PB because it promotes political participation, political decentralization, and the formation of partnerships between government and civil society (Hussein Reference Hussein2023; Rwigi, Manga, and Michuki Reference Rwigi, Manga and Michuki2020; Touchton Reference Touchton2020). In practice, however, the legislative matters and information dissemination are not transparent enough. The projects do not reflect the will of the people, as they are preestablished and instead reflect the government’s priorities (Kipyego and Wanjare Reference Kipyego and Wanjare2017; Muthomi and Thurmaier Reference Muthomi and Thurmaier2021; Nganda and Gatobu Reference Nganda and Gatobu2024). Accordingly, PB represents an instrument used by politicians to consolidate their power, which means that citizens are reluctant to participate because of the “limited” participation they are granted (Hussein Reference Hussein2023; Rwigi, Manga, and Michuki Reference Rwigi, Manga and Michuki2020).
Research Design
The analysis covers Kibra, one of the 17 electoral constituencies in Nairobi County. It has five administrative wards (Woodley/Kenyatta Golf Course, Makina, Sarang’ombe, and Lindi and Laini-Saba), each represented by a member in the Nairobi County Assembly under the new devolved government structure in Kenya. There are three reasons why Kibra is suitable for analysis. First, it is one of the poorest constituencies in Kenya; almost 80% of its citizens live on an income of under one dollar a day. Among the main concerns of the constituency are water, housing, education, health care, and poverty reduction. Second, Kibra constituency is one of the most multiethnic urban constituencies in Kenya. The issue of ethnicity is critical because representative democracy in Kenya is heavily shaped by ethnic affiliations. Third, Kibra constituency is one of the most politically agitated constituencies. It also hosts some of the most assertive and politically aware citizens in the country.
We analyzed PB at the level of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) because it is the oldest level of citizen engagement and would therefore enable us to track its performance. Interviewees were purposively sampled from the level of political representation, CDF Committee members (3), MCA members (3), and local citizenry (10), to give us a total of 16 participants (appendix 1). In-depth interviews of between five and ten minutes were conducted via phone calls. Six questions were asked to solicit data for the three corresponding thematic areas of focus. The interviews were analyzed using inductive thematic analysis (Nowell et al. Reference Nowell, Norris, White and Moules2017). When the interviews were finished, we followed three steps to generate the final themes: interview transcription, independent reading and outlining and comparison of initial themes, and deciding on their final versions and interpretation. The final themes are (1) citizen apathy toward PB, (2) PB in the context of material and political power consolidation for reelection, and (3) campaign culture and financing.
Analysis
Kenyan politics is characterized by dictatorial tendencies. Elections conducted between 1964 and 2007 required a presidential candidate to win a simple majority to form a government. Since 2013, the constitution requires a candidate to win at least a majority of 51% of the votes cast at the national level along with at least 25% of votes in 24 counties out of the national total of 47 counties. Equally, smaller parties tend to be absorbed by the dominant ones, thus lowering the representation of other interests (Nyadera, Agwanda, and Maulani Reference Nyadera, Agwanda, Maulani and Farazmand2020). Local politics is highly patronized by the dominant political party(s) in power. Political parties in Kenya lack strong ideological identities and instead use ethnic matters rather than political ones as the greatest instruments for mobilization (Murunga and Nasong’o Reference Murunga and Nasong’o2007). Kenya’s political landscape is further characterized by preelection political coalitions driven by that ethnic mobilization, and the main focus is on how to gain power rather than how to transform and manage the national resources in a transparent and accountable manner. Despite the prevalence of fragile political parties that are formed toward and during election cycles, KANU and the Orange Democratic Party (ODM) have remained the most stable parties.
For this study, the two levels of governance that actively involve politicians were reviewed. These comprise constituency level governance and ward (local) level representation. At the constituency level, a Member of Parliament (MP) guides the process and a Member of the County Assembly (MCA) runs the ward. A participatory approach is adopted in the process of national budgeting; however, it is highly patronized by the party in power, which by extension has majority representation in the national assembly. At the local level, the MP has an allocation for development under the National Government Constituencies Development Fund (NGCDF) initiated through the NG-CDF Act of 2015 (amended in 2023). The MP relies on the Constituency Development Committee to initiate and implement development projects after a rigorous process of public participation. However, the MCA receives an allocation from the county government to initiate projects presumed to have emerged from the people within the represented area.
Accordingly, the 10 citizens interviewed (those without political functions) expressed concern that their voices were being subsumed at the level of project implementation (I7 to I16). They strongly believed that PB exercises were processes used to sanitize and rubber-stamp decisions already made by the political class. One interviewee (I9) from Sarang’ombe ward said, “Citizens have no voice. We give our views, but politicians do what they want. When we question, all they say is they have allocated funds, but nothing happens. Many projects are never initiated and when initiated, the majority stall” (I9). Another interviewee asserted that “politicians take us for granted and do not fulfil the wishes of the citizens” (I14). The general feeling was that PB processes are not grassroots-oriented yet, which is their main intention. This results from patronage by politicians. One interviewee (I7) claimed that “CDF and the money MCA receive from the governor is supposed to drive local development by implementing projects that are proposed by us as citizens. Instead, the politicians, through their cronies who sit on the committee, do what they want.” These attitudes have created apathy among citizens, who feel powerless in influencing development through PB.
Most proposed projects ended up stalling due to corruption that benefits politicians and their cronies but which also acts as an instrument of patronizing the populace. When this question was escalated to the political party leaders, specifically the members of the MCA, they explained that political parties have manifestos and make promises to the electorate during campaigns. After being elected, they are bound to implement and initiate projects from their campaign trails to improve their chances of reelection. Responding anonymously, one of the MCA claimed that “during campaigns, I promised my voters development based on certain projects. They voted on that promise, and I must fulfill it. I therefore must initiate my own projects … after five years I will be either reelected or not based on what I have achieved” (I5). Political parties and their leaders are preoccupied with consolidating their financial resources and the requisite political power for reelection. PB thus becomes a policy issue that does not enjoy the goodwill of the political parties and leaders alike. As was earlier noted by residents, it becomes an instrument of control by politicians, where citizen engagement is a requirement rather than a necessity. One of the MCA (I4) indicated that “elections in Kenya are expensive, and during campaigns we spend a lot of money. Sometimes we even have to bribe voters to be elected. Once elected, I must control the budget so as to recoup my money, especially since I may not be sure of being re-elected.” Such thinking renders PB a process that politicians use to be seen to be doing the right thing but not as an accountability tool to promote equity in development and governance.
Meanwhile, the loyalty of the MCA lies with their main supporters, and like MPs, they are guided by reelection and sometimes use their positions to elevate themselves to even higher political positions within either the constituency or the wider political party. Thus, although PB may be a potential avenue for accountable and transparent leadership, it tends to shift power away from the political party and the politicians by placing it into the hands of the citizenry. It attempts to depoliticize development processes and encourages people-centered governance through an expanded democratic and participatory space. Putting people at the center of decision making and budgeting, it emerged, is seen to “weaken” the politicians’ control over the electorate, negating their campaign promises and also breaking the patron–client arrangements when it comes to rewarding cronies, awarding tenders to main financiers within party political ranks, and threatening the “cult-leadership” style embraced by not only the political class in Kibra but also many other Kenyan politicians and political parties. Citizen apathy toward public participation is grounded in despair, years of marginalization, harassment from central government based on lack of land tenure, and disenfranchisement based on ethnicity, urban squalor, and patronage.
Retrospectively, the culture of voter bribery, appeasement of the electorate, and the national political party leadership’s wish to be granted the party ticket establishes a precarious culture of corruption which seeks to recoup the cost of campaigns and amass more wealth for future campaigns in defense of the ticket. Political party leadership therefore minimizes the space for citizen engagement in decision making to have sway in deciding which projects are to be adopted, their cost, and the companies or groups that are to be awarded the tenders. Both the citizenry and political leaders admitted that the culture of kickbacks is an inherent part of contemporary Kenyan politics and development. Therefore, any process or approach, such as PB, that seeks to empower ordinary citizens is bound be sabotaged, either overtly or covertly, by the political class because it disempowers them both politically and economically.
CONCLUSIONS
This article reports that citizens’ lack of desire to engage in PB in a Kenyan constituency is due to the political parties’ skewed interest in supporting this process. The findings of our study bring two contributions to the literature. First, the study indirectly illustrates that when political parties cannot fully control the outcomes of a participatory action, they either do not promote it or organize it in such a way as to pursue their own objectives. This influences citizens’ attitudes towards participatory processes because their trust in the process decreases. As a result, citizens may abstain from participating in such a process because their participation will not reflect their genuine voice but will only align with (and boost) party interests. These findings help us to better understand citizens’ apathetic attitudes toward participatory practices in general as well as how a political process can be hijacked by political parties (Baiocchi and Ganuza Reference Baiocchi and Ganuza2014; Gherghina, Geissel, and Henger Reference Gherghina, Geissel and Henger2024; Gherghina and Mitru Reference Gherghina and Mitru2024).
Specifically, this study contributes to a burgeoning body of research on African politics, and how participatory processes are used in this region of the world (Kipyego and Wanjare Reference Kipyego and Wanjare2017; Muthomi and Thurmaier Reference Muthomi and Thurmaier2021; Nganda and Gatobu Reference Nganda and Gatobu2024). The study confirms what was already indirectly indicated by other studies of the use of PB in Africa, and specifically in Kenya: that the lack of transparency of the PB legislation and the use of this process as a tool to achieve political goals decrease citizens’ desire to participate in PB. This results from both the country’s historical-political culture and the need by its politicians and political parties to patronize the electorate to secure reelection, recoup the expenses they have incurred in competitive campaigns, and reward their loyal supporters, financiers, and the political party cult leaders who determine a candidate’s chances of election. Where projects are initiated, political leaders and parties want to claim community service to grow their popularity and support and thus their (re)electability.
The study further illustrates a dissonance between what citizens want and what political parties (as represented by elected and nominated political leaders) pursue. PB requires the goodwill of those who wield power, along with the readiness of the governed to persist and hold their leaders responsible. This study demonstrates that participation is not equivalent to empowerment and representation. PB and other deliberative processes of governance are disempowering where citizen participation is equated with endorsement, as is the case for majority of the citizens in the Kibra constituency of Nairobi County. The politics of tokenism and patronage that seem part and parcel of Kenya’s political culture tends to stifle the power of PB in bridging the governance gap. However, one of the study’s limitations is that it focuses solely on the Kibra constituency, so its results apply only to this case study. Further research could use the themes that emerged in our study to explore whether similar outcomes occur in other places in Kenya and Africa.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
To view supplementary material for this article, please visit http://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096524001343.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This article is based upon work from the COST Action CA22149 Research Network for Interdisciplinary Studies of Transhistorical Deliberative Democracy (CHANGECODE), supported by COST (European Cooperation in Science and Technology).
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
The authors declare no ethical issues or conflicts of interest in this research.
