I. Introduction
Christopher Arthur’s Reference Arthur2022 book The Spectre of Capital presents a systematic-dialectical exposition of the capitalist economy, focussing on the forms of capital. The book is a specific synthesis of much of Arthur’s earlier writings (the relevant works are listed in Arthur Reference Arthur2022: 441–42). Inherently the book goes beyond those earlier writings, because ‘synthesis’ and the associated interconnectedness of ‘moments’ is the true art of the book.
With Arthur I share an academic life-long interest in the systematic dialectics of Hegel and Marx, and therefore I gladly comment on his book. I have been in the favourable position to discuss with Arthur many drafts of his earlier writings at the annual conferences of the ‘International Symposium of Marxian Theory’ during the period 1991–2012 (Arthur refers to these symposia on p. xi). I learnt a lot from Arthur’s earlier writings. (In my 2024 Essays on Marx’s Capital Arthur is the most frequently cited contemporary author.)
As the reader will see, my appreciation of the book includes praise as well as some critical remarks. I wish that the author and the reader consider this in face of the view that progress in philosophy and the sciences is served by debate on their outcomes.
The remainder of this introduction pertains to the article’s set-up.
Generally I think that ‘contrast’ (ranging from, e.g., perception to arguments) is clarifying. Therefore, I will often contrast Arthur’s views with those of other authors, as including those of my own two systematic-dialectical outlines of the capitalist system (namely Reuten and Williams Reference Reuten and Williams1989 and Reuten Reference Reuten2019a). For details of an argument I will regularly also refer to some of my other publications.
References to Arthur Reference Arthur2022. For references to specific chapters I often adopt a chapter-page shorthand. E.g. (18:377) stands for chapter 18, p. 377. Similarly for sections of a chapter, e.g., §3:150. Any underlining in citations is my emphasis.
Abbreviations. I adopt the following abbreviations.
• SD for systematic dialectics or for systematic-dialectical.
• SDE for systematic-dialectical exposition. (Instead of ‘exposition’ Arthur often adopts the term ‘presentation’.)
The outline of this article is as follows. I begin with five sections (II–VI) on the book in general and its specific SD (together about one-third of the main text). Next, I discuss four selected chapters of Arthur’s SDE itself (VII–X). I close with some concluding remarks.
II. The structure of Arthur’s 2022 book
Apart from the Preface, Introduction and Appendices, Arthur’s book is composed of two parts. Part 1 introduces his method and general approach (49 pages), and Part 2 presents his systematic-dialectical exposition proper (334 pages).
Part 1 is a very useful prolegomena to the book’s systematic exposition proper. It is so for the readers less acquainted with Systematic Dialectics (SD) generally (that presumably does not apply for most readers of this journal). It is also important in that it sets out Arthur’s specific take on SD.
Part 2 presents a systematic-dialectical exposition of the forms of capital as ‘Idea’, rising from the abstract to concrete categorial forms of it. (The structure of this Part, listing all its ten sections and their sub-sections, is set out on pp. 61–66.) In Appendix I:395 Arthur remarks: ‘my entire system is articulated around Hegel’s Logic’. Yet, whilst its Division I is homologous to the three spheres of Hegel’s Logic, Divisions II and III regard ‘formal analogies with Hegel’s Realphilosophie’ (70), that is, roughly with elements of parts two and three of the Enzyklopädie (408–9). On 9:201 Arthur remarks that the latter two divisions are an ‘application of the logic of capital, outlined in Division I’ (cf. A-I:407).
III. Arthur’s Hegel-inspired reconstruction of Marx’s Capital: the ‘homology thesis’
In the Introduction (p. 1), Arthur remarks that his book ‘aims to reconstruct Marx’s work in the spirit of a systematic-dialectical logic’ and that the book ‘exemplifies the “homology thesis”, namely that the logic of capital may be exhibited by reference to Hegel’s logic’ (from the table at the end of the Introduction it is clear that he means all three of the Logic’s spheres).
On p. 2 it becomes clear that by ‘Marx’s work’ Arthur means Marx’s Capital.
Arthur highlights the dominance of capital within the system, and sets out that he considers Hegel’s Subjective Logic (the third part of the Logic) as providing an adequate framework for presenting that dominance.
In brief, conceptually Arthur embarks on a ‘homology’ between the ‘full’ structure of Hegel’s Logic and the structure of his reconstruction. (As mentioned, for Divisions II and III of the SDE Arthur remotely draws on analogies with Hegel’s ‘Realphilosophie’.) The point that some will find controversial is that it extends beyond Hegel’s Essence logic (the second part of the Logic). On this point see briefly Reuten and Williams (Reference Reuten and Williams1989: 26–30) and Reuten (Reference Reuten2019a: 614). Smith (Reference Smith1990 and e.g. Reference Smith2003, Reference Smith, Moseley and Smith2014, Reference Smith2016) as well as Abazari (Reference Abazari2020) have made the point in a far more sophisticated fashion. On the other side, Bellofiore (Reference Bellofiore, Moseley and Smith2014) posits (without explicitly endorsing Hegel’s Subjective Logic) that fetishism empowers capital in a way that is similar to it being a Subject in the Hegelian sense.
In 18:373–74 Arthur defends his position vis-à-vis Smith (Reference Smith, Moseley and Smith2014). Here I disagree with Arthur, and I agree with Smith. Thus I hold, with Smith, that the Hegelian ‘Essence-logic’ categories can adequately shed light on the above mentioned dominance of capital—a dominance, though, that is not unlimited.
That said, in the remainder of this article, for this issue I will treat Arthur’s exposition on its own terms.
IV. Other implementations of a Hegel-inspired marxian systematic-dialectical exposition
(I) Preliminary remarks
In this section I refer to Marx’s and to other Hegel-inspired marxian systematic-dialectical expositions of the political economy prior to Arthur (Reference Arthur2022).
As is well known to most readers of this journal, Hegel’s Logic (e.g. its 1817 encyclopaedia version) is not a philosophy of social science or of political economy in particular. It is propaedeutic to that philosophy, which can be developed on the basis of that logic. There are several ways to do this, and the choice is connected to an author’s view of the object realm of a natural or social science. However, the object realm is inseparable from the content of a science. It follows that the philosophy and methodology of a science cannot be developed in separation from the content of the science. For the political economy, each of the following authors did this in their own specific way.
(II) Marx’s Capital
The paradigmatic marxian SDE is of course Marx’s Capital (three volumes 1867–1894). In Capital, Marx was implicit on his method. Nonetheless, Marx repeatedly stressed his indebtedness to Hegel’s dialectical logic. (See, e.g., Arthur Reference Arthur1986; Echeverria Reference Echeverria1978; Murray Reference Murray1988; Smith Reference Smith1990; and the contributions in the collections by Schmidt Reference Schmidt1969 and by Moseley and Smith Reference Smith, Moseley and Smith2014.)
Marx’s Grundrisse (1857 [Reference Marx1973]) is an early draft of Capital in which the SD-design is much more explicit. Its Introduction provides a statement of a number of the characteristics of systematic dialectics (see, e.g., Ninos Reference Ninos2024a). In earlier works, however, Marx often seems to distance himself from this approach.
(III) The SDE of Reuten (2019a)
As in the remainder of this article I shall frequently contrast my own SDE with Arthur’s SDE, I will briefly outline here the SD method of the former (cf., in more detail, Reuten Reference Reuten2019a: 601–24: https://brill.com/display/book/9789004392809/BP000016.xml).
Its domain is the capitalist economy and state. Its SD method springs from a development of, first, Hegel’s SDE in his Logic—though merely its first two conceptual stages—and second, Marx’s appropriation of that method for his critique of the political economy of capitalism as set out in his Capital. Whence throughout the 2019 book the capitalist value-forms are highlighted.
Details are set out on the basis of the pyramid in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Systematic exposition by chapter in Reuten Reference Reuten2019a.
Inside the pyramid are the book’s chapter numbers; outside are the (abbreviated) chapter titles. The starting point is an all-encompassing concept of the object totality’s essence: in brief ‘dissociation’ (in full: ‘dissociated outward bifurcation into households and privately owned enterprises’); it is the same for the economy ch.1 and the state ch.6 (i.e., their first sections 1§1 and 6§1). This abstract starting point is successively grounded in its concretizing necessary conditions of existence (chs. 1–3 and 6–8). Next their contingent manifestations are outlined—though in a systematic order (chs. 4–5 and 9–10 and 11). Although the book can be read in the order of its chapters (1–11), the rigorous SD order would be a zigzag pattern, that is, the chapter order [1;6], [2;7], and so on. The result is a synthetic exposition of the interconnected totality of the capitalist system, through which the capitalist system can be fully comprehended, i.e., its essential working as appearing in empirical reality.
The SDE of the social totality is an immanent one. That is, it sets out the system from the perspective of the object totality’s principles, norms and standards. This is a principle adopted from Marx. Even if the system is presented from within itself, this does not imply the absence of any evaluation or assessment. When the norms and standards are taken to their logical conclusions, we may detect possible inconsistencies, which an immanent critique makes explicit.
This SD is not the same as Hegel’s in his Logic. I rather build on Hegel in a way that often deviates from him. I especially mention that in my exposition I have no analogue for his ‘subjective logic’. Instead I move to ‘concrete manifestations’, which in Hegel’s terminology would be a further development of his ‘actuality’ (i.e. the last part (C) of the Doctrine of Essence). Cf. §III above.
(IV) Earlier SD works
As far as I know, there are only three earlier comprehensive SD outlines of the capitalist system originally written in English—the domain of the first two is the capitalist economy and state.
First, Eldred (19841; Reference Eldred20102)—460 pages.Footnote 1 Its SD method is outlined on pp. xiv–xxiii (pp. xxxiv–xliii of the 2010 edition). (Eldred remarks about his exposition: ‘The contradiction between universality and particularity is […] the inner motor of the presentation […] driven by the necessity of the concept’ (p. xxxiv of the 2010 edn.). The work highlights the capitalist value-forms.
Second, Reuten and Williams (Reference Reuten and Williams1989)—340 pages. Its SD method is outlined on pp.11–36. In this work, a main focus is on systemic necessity versus contingency of moments, as well as negation and particularisation. It abstains from contingency until the last stage of the SDE. Further, the capitalist value-forms are highlighted.Footnote 2
Third, Smith (Reference Smith1990)—270 pages—excellently sets out Marx’s SDE in Capital, creatively outlined in terms of the first two stages of Hegel’s Logic, focussing on triadic development. The structure of the work is briefly set out on pp. ix–xii.
Finally, I refer to two into English translations of Japanese works by Sekine, namely Sekine (1984 and 1986 [Reference Sekine1997]) and Sekine (1984 and 1986 [Reference Sekine2020]). Each of these is certainly systematic. The first one (a condensed version of the second) does not refer to Hegel. However, the second one sets out correspondence between the author’s theory and Hegel’s Logic.
V. The entry point of the SDE
For any systematic-dialectical exposition (SDE) the entry point into it is crucial. Indeed, the received SD view, stemming from Hegel, is that an object realm can be exhibited as a totality only when a unifying all-encompassing conceptual starting point can capture the abstract essence of the totality, such that this, at the end, can successfully lead to the comprehension of the totality in its full concreteness. (Cf. Hegel 1833 [Reference Hegel, Hoffmeister, Knox and Miller1985]: 83; cf. Reuten Reference Reuten2019a: 606).
As is well known, Marx’s starting point in Capital-I, ch.1, is the commodity and the double character of the commodity (value and use-value). In Reuten (Reference Reuten and Moseley1993, §3.1) I doubted that this is an adequate all-embracing starting point for the systematic exposition. See also Banaji (Reference Banaji and Elson1979: 36–40) and Taylor (Reference Taylor2000: 19–24 and 64–65).
Arthur’s starting point (§1:71) is the ‘commodity’, though in absence of use-value. Thus, in a rather aborted version, Arthur’s seems similar to Marx’s. In Athur’s §1 is not made clear whether (or not) his starting point is meant to be a reference to the totality; or whether (or not) the starting point should (or should not) be a reference to the totality’s essence. However, in the last main section of the SDE (§101: 360) Arthur states: ‘The experiential starting point of the theory of capital is that wealth today takes the shape of a heap of commodities …’ As for Marx, I doubt that Arthur’s is an all-embracing starting point.
For a contrast: as mentioned, the starting point in each of Reuten and Williams (Reference Reuten and Williams1989) and Reuten (Reference Reuten2019a) is the deliberately more encompassing concept of ‘dissociation’—the commodity being merely one moment of it. (Remarkably, in ch.1:9 Arthur suggests that he draws on Reuten and Williams’s ‘dissociation’.)
Quite apart from the commodity being the starting point of Arthur’s exposition, his layered exposition of the commodity (§1:69–90)—here in absence of use-value—is novel and most interesting (it would still have been interesting if it were presented at a later stage).
VI. Sequential development in the SDE
Arthur’s SDE is set out in a strict triadic development, marked by the sub-sections of his ten main sections. In the book’s review chapter (18:377), Arthur states:
Broadly speaking, transitions between categorial forms have the shape of the diagnosis of a problem followed by a putative solution, which then itself is problematised. […] this sequential development of the presentation is not merely a matter of a theoretical device, such that theory ‘zeroes in’ on truth, so to speak, discarding along the way all the false starts. Rather, the presentation should be seen as identifying problems immanent to capital’s own presuppositions, and it is capital that has always already solved them through a sequence of new forms that preserve the inadequate shapes of the truth, now as sublated interior moments.
For Artur’s levels of abstraction/concretion see his ‘Systematic-dialectical presentation table’ (418); and the ‘Tables of Absence and Presence’ (428–29).
A specific characteristic of Arthur’s SDE is that within a dialectical stage and its moments he does not (always) seek out their necessary conditions of existence but rather for merely sufficient conditions (so he writes on, e.g., 3:29 and 18:379). In my view, this amounts to contingent conditions, because a sufficient condition leaves open several possible conditions. Arthur’s major sufficient condition will be noted in my §VII (in a citation Arthur admits the contingency).
I note that ‘necessity’ is central to (at least) Hegel’s Essence logic, and that there is no room for contingency in his systematic exposition. In his lectures, not published by him, Hegel is quoted as saying, ‘The sole aim of philosophical inquiry is to eliminate the contingent. Contingency is the same as external necessity, that is, a necessity which originates in causes which are themselves no more than external circumstances’ (Hegel 1837 [Reference Hegel, Hoffmeister and H. B. Nisbet1975]: 28; cf. Hegel 1817 [1991], §§143–45). On ‘contingency’ and ‘necessity’/‘necessary’ in Hegel’s Logic, see also Ninos (Reference Ninos2024a: 4–6, 10).
For a contrast: The sufficiency rather than the necessity of a SD condition of existence (or ground), is in sharp contrast with the SDE of Reuten and Williams (Reference Reuten and Williams1989) and Reuten (Reference Reuten2019a) which focus on gradually concretizing necessary grounding moments, that is, until a stage of contingent outcomes is reached.
However, I agree with Arthur’s statement in his review chapter (18:378) that the exposition’s architectonic should be, first, ‘an ordering of the categories in a series of levels of logical complexity that allows them to be perspicuously structured’, and second, that the exposition’s order of levels of abstraction/concretion follows the order of ‘the retrogressive grounding of the more abstract by the more concrete’. Nonetheless, I remark, a succeeding level also should make explicit what was implicit at an earlier level, as including the very starting point. (Cf. Reuten Reference Reuten, Moseley and Smith2014: 11,Footnote 3 and Ninos Reference Ninos2024b.)
––––
Rather than reviewing all of Arthur’s Part 2 SDE (which would be impossible given the word limit set by the editor of this journal), the four sections below comment on a selection of its chapters in some detail. These are: §VII. Money and commodity money [on ch.2]; §VIII. Labour and the source of value [on ch.10]; §IX. Absolute capital [on ch.15]; §X. Capital and its others: labour and land [on ch.16].
VII. Money and commodity money
This section pertains to Arthur’s Division I chapter 7 on Money, i.e. (§2:92–149). This §2 is sub-numbered in §21 to §23 (rather than §2.1 to §2.3)—such a sub-numbering applies similarly to all main sub-sections to come.
In his presentation of money, Arthur surprisingly introduces commodity money (gold) as a main moment, grounding his ch.1 exposition. Below I proceed by four series of citations commented on (a to d), sometimes with an interpolated comment in square brackets. Any underlining is mine.
(I) Commodity money; ‘contingency’ alongside ‘necessity’?
Arthur posits:
Once the category of ‘money’ is granted then value is better grounded than it is in simple commodity relations […]. [A commodity is] calling on another commodity to be its equivalent as value. In this simple relation we see the germ of money which as a special commodity excluded from all others […]. How is this uniqueness achieved? By means of the becoming necessary of gold (…). ‘Necessity’ means value is actual if the universal equivalent necessarily exists, that is, produces itself as that object. In a systematic presentation, the form of necessity may well contain alongside it that of contingency. For the actual bearer of the universal equivalent may be contingent on the suitability of available commodities such as gold […]. (§23.1:116–17)
Comment: Evidently commodity money is not necessary in capitalism. The introduction in the cited passage of ‘contingency’ alongside ‘necessity’ seems odd, and as far as I know such a move cannot be found in Hegel’s Logic (see also §VI above). In my view too, contingency should be eliminated from the main systematic of a dialectical exposition.
(II) Money is price?
Arthur posits:
Gold is the universal commodity, not just an instance of the type. It has absolute singularity. […] Remark: […] money has no price itself, it is price […]. But money does express value in its own body […] money is the measure of value, so therefore cannot have a measure [end of Remark]. […] I take money to be value as substance as opposed to searching for the substance of value. (§23.2:123–25)
Comment: In my view money is a measure of price, rather than it being price.
(III) Counterfactual views
Arthur posits:
The presentation of money as ‘the value substance’ is a very different use of the term ‘substance’ from that view which considers labour as ‘the substance of value’. The latter use of the term equates with ‘stuff’ or ‘material’, with what value is ‘made of’, so to speak. […] Remark: Substance here is an ideal social substance, thus immaterial. [end of Remark]Footnote 4 […] finite value ‘bodies’ […] may be incarnated phenomenally in coins and notes […]. Notional differences between such bodies are secured by an extended realm inhabited by pieces of gold, and so forth. Value is real as the ideal substance of such bodies. […] One thing which distinguishes the money form from the purely general form is the requirement that the commodity excluded from the rest has to embody adequately the conceptual character of value. […] the money commodity is the actuality of value. (§23.3:125–30)
Comment: This last phrase is counterfactual (not least when ‘actuality’ is taken in a Hegelian sense). See further the comments under (d) below.
Arthur continues:
[…] value has not an atom of matter to it [I agree], it is a purely social substance. It follows that value in autonomous form, namely money, has not an atom of matter [I agree with the last phrase], and it is itself a purely social substance. Confusion arises if this socially imputed substance is conflated with its contingent bearer, especially if the latter is gold, a commodity. However, it is necessary that money inhabit a material medium, whether the latter is gold, paper, or simply money of account. (§23.3:132)
Comment: The confusion and the conflation are due to Arthur’s positing the issue in terms of a contingency. I disagree with the underlined phrase—see under (e) below.
Arthur continues:
This is because value as an immanent magnitude requires phenomenal expression in numerical shape to gain a metric. Gold is a material substance, but as money it seems transubstantiated, posited as merely the golden shell of an ideal substance. […] In capitalism [!] value as an ideal substance posits the transubstantiation of gold, which appears as if the golden shell merely veils the presence of the ideal substance […]. (§23.3:132 and 138)
Comment: I disagree with the underlined phrases. (See also my comment under (d) below.) Arthur continues:
The substantive form of value establishes that gold is valuable in itself if it is money […]. Logically money incarnates the homogenous value substance; yet commodities are the shell of differentiated values, each substantively value. A unified concept of value requires this difference to be a self-difference. The transition to the Doctrine of the Concept employed here is similar to that used to vindicate the transition to the Doctrine of Essence. […] I next move to consider how such a presupposed Concept posits itself. (§23.3:144–45)
(IV) Arthur’s addendum on commodity money
At the end of the chapter’s formal exposition, Arthur adds an ‘Addendum on Commodity Money’ (146–48). Here he states, among other things:
This chapter may appear odd to some, because it commits itself to commodity money, namely gold. […] The prevalence of gold money historically is entirely irrelevant to it. […] I proceed to a money commodity when seeking to actualise the universal equivalent form. […] The methodological reason for it is that each stage of a systematic dialectic supersedes the previous one with a minimum of new material. In stabilising the previous determinations, the new form requires only the minimum sufficient conditions for this, not necessary conditions. (Ch.7—Addendum:146)
Comment: The last two sentences seem an ad hoc argument. As far as I can see, in all of Arthur’s SDE the focus on sufficient rather than necessary moments and grounds (see my §VI) is ‘applied’ in chapter 7 only. Thus, the generally merely sufficient conditions (as declared on, e.g., 3:29 and 18:379) seem merely directed at the above founding of the ch.7 commodity money (gold) moments. Moreover, in other passages of the book, necessity is rightly emphasized. (I later comment on the first three sentences.)
Arthur continues: ‘The monetary medium allows money really to confront commodities; this is what makes commodity money seem the obvious bearer of such reality.’ (Addendum:146)
Comments: (1) Reality? What reality? It may have been a reality more than 100 years ago, but in the cited text above Arthur explicitly states that the historical prevalence of gold is irrelevant to his presentation (Addendum: 146). If this is indeed irrelevant, why is commodity money presented at all? Today commodity money is no reality at all. And I have assumed all along that Arthur’s exposition also applies to current capitalism. In the third indented citation under (c) Arthur refers to ‘capitalism’ tout court. (2) Arthur is aware that gold is no longer money, and that today bank credit money prevails. He writes that at this point of the SDE (ch.7) he cannot introduce banks (Addendum:146–47). If that is so, then he might have anticipated banks, instead of telling a fairy tale. A key question is if, with such an anticipation he might (roughly) have presented a similar exposition as in the current ch.7 (I doubt this).
(V) Final remarks
As a contrast I note that for the exposition prior to manifestations (see §IV under c) Reuten Reference Reuten2019a presents only necessary grounding moments (as mentioned); moreover there is a (initially abstract) truth claim for each level of abstraction (and all its moments), one that is not withdrawn at a later level (or moment). (Reference Reuten2019a: 616).
For money particularly, both Reuten and Williams (Reference Reuten and Williams1989: 65) and Reuten (Reference Reuten2019a: 44) posit that:
unlike the entities that money measures, money has no inherent content—neither bullion, nor paper, nor electronic pulses; even if some particular shape of money may be more adequate than another […]. Consequently, money has no inherent value. Money is inherently merely a quantifier of one-dimensional value. (Quoted from Reuten.)
For these views in relation to Marx’s conceptualisation of money, see Williams Reference Williams2000; cf. Campbell Reference Campbell, Blackwell, Chatha and Nell1993, Reference Campbell, Moseley and Campbell1997, Reference Campbell, Arthur and Reuten1998, Reference Campbell, Campbell and Reuten2002 and Bellofiore Reference Bellofiore, Bellofiore and Taylor2004, Reference Bellofiore2018.
VIII. Labour and the source of value
This section pertains to Arthur’s Division II, chapter 10, on Production (§5:217–55). It is sub-divided in §51 to §53. This is a great chapter, and I have only minor disagreements with it. Below I mainly focus on its §52:223–45, and I briefly comment on §53.
(I) The entry point of ‘labour’
An interesting aspect of Arthur’s SDE is that—in comparison with Marx’s Capital—‘labour’ enters relatively late in the presentation. This is in the section on ‘The Capital Relation Proper’ (§52)—which is nearly halfway through the systematic exposition.
As a contrast: in his Capital-I Marx introduces labour right on from its chapter 1 onwards—although it might be argued that he systematically presents labour in his chapter 7 and the it following Parts Three to Five (chs. 8–18): the exposition of the production of Absolute and Relative surplus-value. As another contrast: in the opening chapter of Reuten Reference Reuten2019a, ‘labour’ is introduced in its ch.1, §2, and the capitalist production process in its ch.1, §12 and onwards.
(II) The concept of ‘abstract labour’ (§52.1:224–34)
Arthur aptly, and rightly, posits that—in contradistinction to ‘abstract labour’—‘only labour as concrete can be measured’ (§52:226). However, I disagree when he continues on the same page:
While such labours cannot be aggregated concretely in any meaningful way, capital makes this senseless aggregation ideally; and it does so under the aspect of time only, because it needs to get the commodities to market as quickly as possible.
Comment: Statistical bureaus make an aggregation of concrete labour by expressing a country’s labour in full-time equivalents, and then conclude that the labour force of country ‘x’ amounts to ‘y’. Enterprises in their annual statements do so similarly for their labour. This is indeed an aggregation of concrete labourers, and one that has meaning (much as it has meaning to say that there are ‘z’ inhabitants in a country).
I agree when Arthur continues (226–27): ‘Capital cannot “economise” on labour in the abstract. Only labour as concrete can be measured and minimised […] the living labour capital exploits is determined as the carrier of its own predicate: the time it takes.’
Comment: For the record I note that in Marx’s Capital the term ‘abstract labour’ disappears right after his proper introduction of money (i.e., after the third chapter of Capital-I, Part One)—in my view this is so, because in chapter 1 of Part One ‘abstract labour’ foreshadows the ch.3 money measure (cf. Reuten Reference Reuten and Moseley2005:141). In the same article it was also concluded that abstract labour cannot be measured (p. 142), although with a far less thorough argumentation than Arthur.
(III) Arthur’s implicit criticism of labour-embodied notions
Further on Arthur implicitly distances himself from labour-embodied theoretical notions in the following clever turn:
So far from labour embodying itself in commodities and thereby constituting them as values, capital embodies itself in production, subordinates its purposes to value creation, and realises itself in the product, posited as nothing but its own result. When production is formed as production for exchange, the new product is potentially formed as value. (§52:227)
On p. 228 this is qualified in the phrases: ‘value is not “produced” but posited by capital’; and ‘Capital in its material incarnation, e.g., the factory, confronts living labour, and it subordinates it to the aim of generating value, through appropriating the powers of labour.’
(Cf. pp. 231 and 232: ‘Value-in-process is carried by the labour process […]. Because labour serves as carrier of value-positing it seems as if work as such is immediately “productive” of value, and as if then value were a “product” of labour like use-value.’)
Comment: All of the above, are perceptive statements by Arthur.
(IV) The capital-labour relation (§52:234–45)
Here Arthur posits:
[C]apital ‘takes possession’ of labour so as to subordinate it to the purpose of valorisation […] labour is the real condition of value creation […]. If the factory is ‘the body of capital’, its ‘soul’ is the living labour process as it is appropriated by capital as a valorisation process […]. Yet capital presents itself as the prime mover in the economy […]. Capital is productive insofar as it ‘produces’ the compulsion to do surplus labour on the part of the workers. Given this, it seems capital creates capital. (§52:234–35)
The last sentence is indeed the perspective of capital, and less abstractly that of capitalist enterprises. On p. 239 Arthur posits, only partly in line with this: ‘Capital creates value, but it does so only through its appropriation of the labour that creates the bearer of value.’ In the remainder of this section Arthur makes subtle and important distinctions. A problem for the reader (me) is that throughout the section Arthur mixes the standpoint of capital (his main endeavour), and a critical appraisal of that standpoint from labour’s point of view, such as the exploitation of labour by capital.
One such subtle distinction is about ‘production’ versus ‘creation’:
While value is not produced, it is created […]. Clearly in both cases something new results; however, value is created when a new form is acquired by what is produced. Productive activity transforms one configuration of matter to another […]. But, if value is essentially a social form, and contains ‘not an atom of matter’, it is not ‘made out of’ anything at all […]. (§52:141)
Towards the end of this section Arthur remarks:
Capital faces material, means of production, and living labour. It has to realise its Idea through the ‘labour of the negative’ in subsuming these. But only in the case of labour may we properly speak of potential recalcitrance, in the sense of a practical contestation of capitalist exploitation, through strikes, sabotage, and so forth. (§52:145)
See further §X below.
(V) The source of value and surplus-value in labour (§53:245–55)
In the book’s Introduction (p. 2) Arthur states that he presents ‘a “political” theory of the source of value in labour’. However, in ch.10 the term ‘political’ only appears in the following two sentences: ‘It is capital’s toil and trouble in subsuming labour that is the key socio-political dimension of “economics”. Thus I hold a properly political economy’ (§53.2:250).
Given Arthur’s jargon, for a reader acquainted with Marx’s Capital there is nothing controversial in §53. I merely cite two apt formulations of Arthur: ‘On the one hand, capital is self-grounded in form; on the other, it feeds, vampire like, on labour. […] in its original constitution, capital is formed out of the exploitation of labour.’ (§53:250 and 251)
(VI) Addendum on ‘the’ labour theory of value
Arthur regularly adopts the term ‘labour theory of value’, e.g., in his introduction to ch.10’s three §§52 on p. 224, and in the same chapter’s pp. 229, 232, 239, 246, 248 and 255.
I don’t know when and how the term ‘labour theory of value’ entered the marxian paradigm (this is still on my research agenda). Anyway it was not via Marx. In his Capital (and contrary to what many people, including marxian authors, believe) he never uses the term ‘labour theory of value’ as a denotation for his own work, and with two exceptions even not the term ‘theory of value’; nor does he adopt the term ‘labour values’ (Reuten Reference Reuten, Vidal, Rotta and Prew2019b: 38 and 48).
IX. Absolute capital
This section pertains to ch.15 of Arthur’s book, i.e. §9:338–51, which is subdivided into §91, §92 and §93.
(I) ‘Pure’ capitalist money (§91:338–42)
In §91:339 Arthur correctly posits that ‘money must be as immaterial as value itself’. Remarkably, however, he also writes that this does not mean that earlier presentation ‘was in error’. (In my view it was in error; cf. my §VII above.)
Arthur correctly posits that ‘banks create credit money ex nihilo’ (339).
Comments: (1) Pure capitalist money is indeed created ex nihilo. However, this does not imply, as Arthur suggests, that this money ‘enters circulation without being the counterpart of previously produced commodities’ (339). In fact, for their issue of credit money, banks mostly (but not always) require a commodity security (pledge)—perhaps a building of the enterprise. (2) A minor critical point regards Arthur’s remark that a ‘standard [of money] … is now meaningless (339). This is not correct, as generalized market trade requires a standard (or convertible standards) of money, e.g., yuan, dollar, or euro (Reuten Reference Reuten2019a:44).
Apart from these comments §91 is fine.
(II) The three particularisations of capital (§92:342–44)
These three particularisations are Finance, Commerce and Industrial production. Under the heading ‘Finance’, Arthur posits: ‘Capital here exists as universal capital, under the control of the bankers as representatives of social capital.’ And: ‘The “personification” of capital in the shape of “the industrialist” is complemented by that of “the banker”’ (§92:342–43). Here he also introduces the concepts of ‘ante-validation’ (Bellofiore) or ‘pre-validation’ (Reuten and Williams/Reuten). I add that this refers to the banks’ anticipation of production and its realisation via their money-creation, which is socially validated when the anticipated production is sold—the bank’s initial money creating loan can then be redeemed.
I do not understand what Arthur means when he writes on page 343: ‘Thus the form “money as money”, here a fund, remains as a distinct moment in the reproduction of capital. If this refers to the banks’ money-creation, there is no fund involved at all.
The four-line section on Commerce, and the brief section on Industrial production require no emphasis or comment.
(III) The capital system, or ‘The absolute idea of capital’ (§93:344–51)
The opening sentences of the introduction to this section are: ‘The spheres of finance, commerce, and industry are systematically unified to form the capital system. The Absolute Idea of Capital unites these differences in a whole of intermediation.’ After a connecting sentence there follows a typical Arthur one: ‘Together they constitute capital as Individual’.
The latter is explained in subsection §91.1:345–46, where Arthur posits: ‘the whole must be centred such that a moment of decision is located, which determines the particulars to which the universal is to determine itself.’ And next:
The system is centred: the financial system is not only as such the universal moment distinct from the characteristic particularity of industrial capitals, but it is also the centre of the system, where bankers assess the viability of specific applications for loans, albeit it is displaced from the real source of growth. When ‘Capital’ as such takes shape as such a unitary system, it is Individual.
Comment: The content of the issue makes sense to me, given the important caveat ‘displaced from the real source of growth’.
Arthur expands on the latter in the following pages (347–48), where he (correctly) posits a ‘double-centredness’ between Finance capital and Industrial capital:
The point of production is the ultimate origin of economic growth; but the self-reference of capital is displaced to the sphere of finance […]. The material interface is at the point of production […] materially, the source of all surplus ultimately derives from exploited labour. So the claim of industry is surely vindicated. But in truth these two centres struggle for dominance.
The last subsection (§93.3:349–50) of ch.15 is headed ‘Capital as Absolute Idea’. Here Arthur posits among other things:
While the Idea of capital seems Absolute, in the sense of grounded on itself in form, as such it is merely an abstract Absolute, because it forms itself separately from its material substrate. However, while it is not the form of that matter, the Idea forms it into an adequate basis. This process of formal determination of the economic metabolism constitutes the concretisation of capital. The all-embracing moment is that of form. Even if the system is materially dependent on surplus labour, it is the formal determinations that subsume and regulate living labour.
Finally, I cite the section’s concluding sentence: ‘The Idea of Capital is not a collation of […] many capitals; it is a concrete unity, a totality, that persists in and through its effectivity upon them.’
X. Capital and its others: labour and land
This section pertains to the final chapter of Arthur’s SDE proper: ch.16, i.e. §10:352–67. It is subdivided in §101, §102 and §103.
I neglect the 17-line §101 which posits the capitalist corporation as legal person. The corporation highlights ‘capital in its pure form’.
(I) Internalisation of capital’s ‘others’ (§102:352–56)
In the first pages of this section Arthur writes:
[T]he capitalist totality primarily consists of relations that are internal in the sense that each side of the relation requires the other in its very definition […]. In the investigation there are problems to be addressed when that which in principle is external to capital, notably labour and land, are necessary to it as conditions of its existence […]. This means they are internalised by capital yet, in themselves, remain alien to it. I term living labour ‘capital’s internal other’, and land ‘capital’s external other’ […]. These are internalised through disbursing two revenues, namely wages of labour and rent of land. (§102:352–53)
Comments: (1) A minor critical point here is that ‘disbursement of revenue’ does not cover the differentia specifica of these two entities. In an extended domain, for example, the mere disbursement of taxation to the state, would not make the latter internal to capital. (2) Another minor critical point is that whereas §101 posited the concretizing ‘corporation’, Arthur keeps on using the (non-corporate) term ‘firm’.
On 16:354 Arthur interestingly posits (contrary to Marx) that ‘labour power has a price but no value’—because labour-power is not ‘a true commodity […] produced by capital’. I think that Arthur is right on this.
(II) General conditions of existence of capital (§103:356–66)
This section encompasses two subsections: §103.1, ‘The immediate condition of existence of value: use-value’ (359–64) and §103.2, ‘The immediate condition of existence of capital: labour’ (365–66).
Apart from its last page 366, §103 these sections posit hardly any new issues. Nonetheless they include apt formulations of what was posited earlier. In this sense §103 concludes and reflects.
On to p. 366. Arthur’s §103 is generally superb. As such it is unfortunate that I feel compelled to end with a critical comments on it. Arthur posits on p. 366:
It seems […] that there are just two great classes of modern society. However, the capitalists […] are unnecessary to the perfected capital system. The joint-stock company, consequent on the increasing scale of the productive forces, certainly puts in question the need for a class of capitalists. It is only necessary to suppose a punitive inheritance tax drove out such individuals to release capital as a social power. The stocks and shares could all be owned by unit trusts, insurance companies, pension funds and the like; and run (ostensibly) for the benefit of ordinary people enrolled in such institutions. Nothing would change in the capital relation. The factories would be managed according to the dictates of capital, not the workers.
Comments: (1) My major criticism is that the mentioned ‘punitive inheritance tax’ is highly speculative, and it assumes away a core aspect of current capitalism. (2) In the prevailing advanced capitalist OECD countries, around 2019, on average the top 10% of households in terms of wealth distribution owned 85% of the total capital-ownership assets; with these assets comes actual or potential economic power in enterprises (Reuten Reference Reuten2023). Thus, it seems that here is at least a capitalist class ‘an sich’. (3) Who would be the owners of the of the ‘unit trusts, insurance companies, pension funds and the like’? If it were the state (which is not obvious), then, if indeed ‘nothing would change in the capital relation’, we would have ‘state capitalism’. Why would that be a ‘perfected capital system’?
∴
Arthur’s perceptive last addendum-like chapter 19, entitled ‘Beyond capital and class’, provides no further information on the above last point specifically. However, he argues that ‘in order to articulate the need for change, … the speculative moment cannot be avoided’. But he also indicates (19:392) that ‘dialectic is not a science of efficient causation allowing prediction’. In the closing paragraph of this chapter (19:393), Arthur finely states:
The principle of an immanent development of sociality is given in estranged shape in capital’s dialectic of negativity. Never content with its sublation of its previous condition, it continually transforms those presuppositions and creates itself anew. Throwing off the estranged form of the development of our powers leaves humanity as the subject of its own ‘absolute process of becoming’. However, epochally the Idea of capital has made itself real. Capital is the totalising Subject of modernity. Whether that which is in excess of its concept remains forever marginal is for the future to determine.
XI. Concluding remarks
This article has voiced both positive and critical comments on Arthur’s book. Of the latter points, the main ones regard the author’s beyond Hegel’s essence logic for a work on the capitalist economy (§III) and the presentation of commodity money for capitalism in general (§VII). That said, my view is that progress in philosophy and the natural and social sciences is served by the blossoming of many (contrasting) flowers, even if one might take issue with some of their leaves.
Someone should have written a Hegelian-Marxian reconstruction of Marx’s Capital fully homologous to Hegel’s Logic categories (with the caveat at the end of §II), and I know of no current philosopher or social scientist who could have done this better than Arthur in his 2022 magnum opus.
Acknowledgements
For their most useful comments on an earlier version of this article, I am very grateful to Giannis Ninos, Tony Smith and Hegel Bulletin editor Christoph Schuringa.
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