8.1 Introduction
The United Nations held a Summit of the Future on 22 September 2024 and adopted a Pact for the Future, including a non-binding Declaration on Future Generations. The Declaration in para 32 noted the proposal by the UN Secretary General to appoint a Special Envoy for Future Generations but did not agree to create one (UNGA 2022a: para 3).Footnote 1 However, in October 2024 it was reported that a senior UN official had announced at a major international conference that the Secretary-General was intending to proceed to create such an envoy (Day Reference Day2024).
This chapter makes a preliminary assessment of the proposed UN Special Envoy for Future Generations (hereafter, UN Special Envoy) by examining it through the lens of three frameworks. These frameworks provide both the rationale or normative basis for such a proposal and a basis for evaluating or critiquing such an institution (Section 8.2). The three frameworks involve the principles of intergenerational justice, solidarity, and vulnerability (set out in Section 3.2). The UN Special Envoy proposal is then evaluated (Section 8.3) in terms of its legitimacy and effectiveness using the criteria elaborated in Chapter 4. Legitimacy is crucial here, given that previous attempts to establish bodies of this nature – including a proposed UN Commissioner for Future Generations made at the 2014 Rio +20 summit – failed due to lack of support from developing countries (Lawrence Reference Lawrence2014: 17). Garnering such support will be essential for any such mechanism to succeed. Thus, likely effectiveness is inexorably connected to legitimacy. This chapter then examines the UN Special Envoy proposal by considering lessons that can be learned from the establishment of UN mechanisms to further the interests of other vulnerable groups (Section 8.4.1), and institutions purporting to represent future generations at the national level, such as ombudsperson or commissioners for future generations (Section 8.4.2). In Section 8.5 the possible functions of a UN Special Envoy are examined and recommendations made as to what mandate the Envoy should have applying the matrix of proxy functions elaborated earlier in this book (Chapter 2, Section 2.5). Finally, an overarching framework for measuring the potential effectiveness of the UN Special Envoy which incorporates both frameworks – proxy representation functions and democratic legitimacy – is proposed (Section 8.6).
8.2 Justifying a UN Special Envoy for Future Generations
A starting point for this book is that current institutions, policy, and law-making at both national and international levels are biased against the interests of future generations. Evidence for this bias is ubiquitous, including the inadequate response to climate change and biodiversity, just to mention two areas. The best response to this crisis is to incorporate the interests of future generations and nature in decision-making, a process called ‘mainstreaming’ (Dryzek). A second-best – but still worthwhile – parallel strategy involves proxy-style representation of both nature and future generations to increase the weight given to these interests in law-making processes (Lawrence Reference Lawrence2022). A third approach involves the use of so-called commitment devices which bind decision-makers to a particular course of action (see Section 8.4.2). Such devices come in a range of forms: they can be legal, institutional, soft, or hard. They also require policy-makers to consider long-term interests – including the interests of their future selves – as an integral part of the decision-making. A UN Special Envoy would constitute both a commitment device and an advocate for other – more effective – commitment devices.Footnote 2
A further justification for a UN Special Envoy rests in the democratic ideal. We saw earlier (Chapter 3) that a common thread running through theories of democracy is the ‘all affected principle’, whereby those affected by a decision should have a say in the making of that decision. A UN Special Envoy or similar type of institution is justifiable as a mechanism by which future generations can be given a voice. Currently, no UN mechanisms are assigned this task.
Further normative justification is grounded in the three key normative principles elaborated in Chapter 3, namely, the concepts of intergenerational justice, solidarity, and vulnerability. The three normative pillars set out in Chapter 3 provide a strong rationale for proxy representation of future generations in the form of a UN Special Envoy or similar type of institution. The strands of the argument are interconnected. For example, future generations are, in many ways, akin to other vulnerable groups which are disproportionately impacted by climate change because of their vulnerability. These include the young, elderly, people with disabilities, people living in poverty, and women (more so than men). Proxy representation can help address these vulnerabilities by putting pressure on decision-makers to factor in the interests of future generations in law and policy-making aimed at ensuring that their human rights are protected. Given human dependency on functioning ecosystems, these rights include the right to a healthy environment. This, in turn, is an expression of solidarity. Solidarity is important: without some notion of being connected to future generations, there is no basis for action benefiting them.
But proxy-style institutions, such as a UN Special Envoy, need to meet criteria of democratic legitimacy, which (as argued in Chapter 4) is inexorably intertwined with their effectiveness.
8.3 Democratic Legitimacy of a UN Special Envoy
In Chapter 4 (Section 4.2.1), we set out criteria for the democratic legitimacy of international institutions based on an amalgam of criteria from Klaus Dingwerth (Reference Dingwerth2007, Reference Dingwerth2014), Sylvia Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and Antto Vihma (Reference Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and Vihma2009), and Daniel Bodansky (Reference Bodansky1999), adapted to the context of institutions for future generations. We also introduced the concept of future legitimacy (Section 4.2.1).Footnote 3
These criteria can be summarised as follows.
(A) Procedural (input legitimacy): inclusive/fair representation, accountability, transparency, and deliberation.
(B) Source based (input legitimacy): expertise, legal legitimacy, tradition, and discourse.
(C) Substantive (output legitimacy): effectiveness, and equity.
We now turn to examine each criterion separately.
Procedural or input legitimacy involves inclusive and fair representation and, in particular, the idea that, for a decision to be democratically legitimate, those affected by the decision should have a say in the making of the decision – the ‘all affected principle’ (Goodin Reference Goodin2007). Future generations cannot directly have a say in decisions taken now but can indirectly have a say through proxy representatives. Importantly, ‘representation’ does not just include acting on behalf of somebody as an agent. Rather, as Hannah Pitkin points out, it also includes ‘substantive acting for others’ interests’ (Pitkin Reference Pitkin1967: 209). This opens the possibility of a proxy representative of future generations on the basis that future generations possess interests (Goodin Reference Goodin1996: 835; Ball Reference Ball, Dobson and Eckersely2006: 137). The proxy can make reasonable assumptions as to the interests of future generations, including the need for a stable climate and functioning ecosystems upon which their welfare will depend (Vanderheiden Reference Vanderheiden2008: 129).
In the context of proxy representation of future generations, youth representation of future generations can enhance legitimacy. While empirical research suggests that young people do not necessarily accord more weight to future generations than do older people,Footnote 4 the interests of young people overlap significantly more with the interests of persons not yet born than those of older people in the sense that climate change will threaten the interests of younger people over a longer span of their lives. Reflecting both this truth and altruism, young people have initiated school strikes around the world, as well as launching climate litigation where they have not only purported to speak for their own interests, but also on behalf of future generations (Donger Reference Donger2022). Thus, as argued in Section 4.2.1, appointing a young person as a UN Special Envoy would increase the legitimacy of this office as it performs the important function of acting as an advocate for the welfare of future generations. Interestingly, the Mary Robinson Foundation’s 2018 proposal for Global Guardians for Future Generations – which no doubt helped lay the groundwork for the recent push for a UN Special Envoy – proposed appointing three individuals as Global Guardians for Future Generations, one of whom would be under 30 years of age (Mary Robinson Foundation 2018: 10).
Accountability and Transparency are potentially problematic in the context we are discussing because it would seem impossible to make a proxy for future generations accountable to persons not yet born. Nevertheless, accountability can be achieved, at least indirectly, by ensuring that the proxy operates consistently with a mandate which reflects the interests of future generations. Moreover, the proxy could be held to account by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) having a role in monitoring the proxy’s performance. Transparency of the proxy’s activities is an important precondition for this monitoring to take place (Hale Reference Hale2008).
Deliberation is a vital element in many theories of democracy and is often seen as the vehicle by which citizen’s views are conveyed to representative institutions (Saward Reference Saward2008). As argued in Chapter 3, deliberative democracy provides a strong justification for a proxy to represent the interests of future generations in the deliberative process.Footnote 5 Thus, if we consider the role of proxies for future generations as articulating the interests of persons not yet born (rather than representing them), this would open the possibility of a UN Special Envoy meeting this criterion.
Expertise can feed into legitimacy if, for example, a proxy can provide expert advice to government on best practices in representing future generations’ interests in policy-making.
Legal legitimacy involves authority based on being in accordance with law. At the international level, this involves institutions acting in a manner consistent with the treaty that established them; the treaty, in turn, derives its legitimacy from states’ consent (Bodansky Reference Bodansky1999: 604–605).
Tradition as a source of legitimacy can include, for example, the legitimacy of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) (UNFCCC)/Paris Agreement (2015) regime as the legitimate form of intergovernmental governance to address climate change (Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma Reference Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and Vihma2009: 410). A UN Special Envoy may derive legitimacy from the status of similar types of UN Special Envoy created in the past.
Discourse refers to legitimacy, which can be derived from an institution being linked to a dominant ideology; for example, sustainable development. This issue is taken up (Section 8.5) in terms of the appropriate mandate for a UN Special Envoy.
Output legitimacy includes the effectiveness and equity of outcomes. Given this book’s focus on climate change, we define effectiveness (see Section 4.4) in terms of the extent to which an international mechanism promotes: (i) intergenerational justice and the values of inclusiveness, solidarity, and addressing vulnerability; and (ii) the Paris Agreement objectives, including both the 1.5/2°C overarching target and the ability to ensure adaptation for future generations, as well as climate resilience, low greenhouse gas emission development, and adequate financing. A further important criterion is the extent to which the institution addresses the cause of wrongful short-termism.
Effectiveness is strongly linked to the concept of future legitimacy (see Section 4.2.3), which involves an institution looking at the present from the perspective of future generations. Examining a UN Special Envoy from this perspective would lead us to favour an institutional mechanism with strong powers and the capacity to exert maximum pressure on law and policy-makers in the direction of redressing the bias against the interests of future generations. We argue (see Section 4.2.1) that, to avoid the concept of ‘future legitimacy’ pushing too far in the direction of emphasising intergenerational justice at the expense of intragenerational justice and the needs of a person alive now, legitimacy would comprise the overlap between current and future legitimacy.
In the context of a UN Special Envoy, the concept of ‘future legitimacy’ provides an additional dimension to accountability in the sense that we must consider accountability from the perspective of future generations. Accountability through adherence to a mandate involving intergenerational equity (as discussed earlier) and accountability to persons alive in the future would push in the same direction. Given that a UN Special Envoy is likely to be limited to making non-binding recommendations – and unlikely to be given any powers to override states – the risk of such a mechanism pushing too far in the direction of the interests of future generations would seem negligible.
Equity reflects the idea that substantive legitimacy involves both contributing to solving a particular problem and furthering justice. Given the context of extreme global inequality, mechanisms need to not only just change behaviour or solve a particular problem but also enhance justice. The link to effectiveness is that norms or mechanisms perceived to be both legitimate and fair are more likely to be complied with (see literature referred to in Section 4.2.1).
Table 8.1 summarises the application of the legitimacy criteria to the proposed UN Special Envoy outlined in the earlier discussion. The left-hand column sets out the legitimacy criteria. The middle column includes the design features which would maximise achieving the criterion. And the far right-hand column sets out the features which would minimise achieving the criterion.
| Legitimacy criteria | Design features which maximise achievement of the particular criterion | Design features which would minimise achievement of the particular criterion |
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8.4 Lessons from Existing International Institutions to Protect Other Vulnerable Groups and National Institutions for Future Generations
8.4.1 Existing International Institutions for the Vulnerable
A further strand of the argument for a UN Special Envoy is to examine existing UN mechanisms which protect and give some representation to vulnerable groups. This will help us to assess which normative arguments have gained political traction in campaigns to establish such mechanisms. In Chapter 5, we made such an assessment, when we looked at the history of the UN mechanisms relating to children, people with disabilities, people living in poverty, and women. To use the proxy representation functions language outlined in Chapter 5 (and discussed at Section 8.5), these mechanisms involve a combination of compliance and representation functions, with the particular mechanism aiming to enhance compliance with the obligations in the particular treaty involved, while also indirectly providing a form of representation for the particular vulnerable group. Understanding which normative arguments have gained traction in these areas will provide insights into which types of normative arguments are also likely to gain traction in efforts to justify establishing a UN Special Envoy and other related mechanisms.
A preliminary finding in relation to these case studies is that vulnerability linked to human rights and human dignity is a strong theme, but the concept of development has also been crucial in terms of developing countries coming on board. For example, in the campaign to establish the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC 1989), protecting children to become good citizens of the future and contribute to nation-building was a key discourse (Holzscheiter Reference Holzscheiter2010: 166). The upshot of these case studies is that arguments for justifying the establishment of institutions for future generations need to be linked to concepts of development to gain global political traction. A further critical point is that recognition of the development aspirations of developing countries, their need to address poverty, and intragenerational justice issues should be reflected in both the normative arguments justifying institutions for future generations and whatever mandate is agreed for a UN Special Envoy (see the following).
An additional crucial point is that the process of appointing a UN Special Envoy, and the functions of such an envoy (including accountability mechanisms), must involve the participation and support of all countries, particularly developing countries. As mentioned earlier, lack of support from developing countries was a key reason for the failure of the 2014 push to establish a commissioner for future generations.
To maximise the likelihood of developing countries’ support, the Mary Robinson Foundation has made several helpful proposals. These include a proposal that the UN establish a Commission for Future Generations involving two persons – one from a developing and one from a developed country (Mary Robinson Foundation 2015: 3). The Foundation’s proposal for Global Guardians for Future Generations involves appointing three individuals on a basis that would ensure ‘representation for developed and developing countries, gender balance and diversity of age’ (Mary Robinson Foundation 2018). Certainly, a larger, Commission-type structure would allow for a wider range of interests, spanning geopolitics, age, gender, and so on, to be represented – a theme we return to later.
8.4.2 Lessons from National Institutions for Future Generations
So-called ‘commitment devices … seek to bind a person, organisation, or government to an agreed course of action or norms or rules’ (Boston Reference Boston, Linehan and Lawrence2021a: 87; Reference Boston2017; Boston, Bagnall & Barry Reference Boston, Bagnall and Barry2019). The idea is – through such devices – to rebalance the scales in the direction of protecting long-term interests (Boston Reference Boston, Linehan and Lawrence2021a: 87). National institutions representing future generations in the form of Commissioners or Ombudspersons constitute just some of the possible ‘commitment devices’ open to governments to foster long-term policy-making (Boston Reference Boston, Linehan and Lawrence2021a: 89–95).
An important lesson from experience at the national level is Jonathan Boston’s observation that, to be effective, such institutions ‘depend on certain ethical norms being widely shared and actively supported’ and on developing a political culture that ‘values the future and exercises prudence and foresight’ (Boston Reference Boston, Linehan and Lawrence2021a: 107). A threshold level of support within a society that current generations have minimal core responsibilities towards future generations – that is, a conviction that intergenerational justice is required – is thus imperative. The same is true at the international level. The UN Secretary-General, in both the 2013 report (UN SG 2013) and the 2021 report, Our Common Agenda (UN SG 2021), points to support for intergenerational solidarity as being reflected in all the world religions and belief systems (UN SG 2021: 18).
Interestingly, the concept of intergenerational equity has been used in the vast majority of climate litigation cases initiated by youth plaintiffs in recent years (Donger Reference Donger2022: 272). While most of these cases have been heard in developed states (for example, United States, Canada, Western Europe, and Australia), a substantial number have also occurred in developing countries, such as in South America and Asia (Donger Reference Donger2022: 272). While it is possible to point to some strong formal endorsement of intergenerational equity and human rights applying into the future, the acute pressure on governments caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the energy and food supply crises created by the ongoing war in Ukraine are pushing long-term thinking into the background.
A further lesson from national institutions for future generations is that, to be successful, they require bipartisan or multi-party support. Comparing this to the international system, bipartisan support is equivalent to develop/developing country support – which, of course, glosses over significant differences between groups of countries. The most effective of all such national institutions of this nature, the New Zealand Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, has enjoyed bipartisan support since its establishment; this has clearly been significant in its success, albeit without delivering transformative change (Boston Reference Boston, Cordonier Segger, Szabó and Harrington2021b: 455). In addition, the New Zealand Commissioner has been well resourced (Boston Reference Boston, Cordonier Segger, Szabó and Harrington2021b: 444). Any UN Special Envoy would clearly require adequate resources to be effective. A poorly resourced Special Envoy would be worse than no Special Envoy at all, as it would result in tokenism.
8.5 Proxy Functions of a UN Special Envoy
A UN Special Envoy did not emerge from the 2024 Futures Summit, but the Secretary-General could nevertheless proceed to appoint a Special Envoy. The Secretary-General’s Our Common Agenda report suggests that a function of the UN Special Envoy would be to make recommendations on the best institutional form a mechanism to represent future generations might take (with options including regional guardians of future generations or a UN Commissioner) (UN SG 2021: 45).Footnote 6 Combining a 2013 report of the previous Secretary-General (UN SG 2013: 17) with the UN Secretary-General’s 2023 report gives some indication of what functions a UN Special Envoy could have (UN SG 2023: 13). These functions might include a mandate to:
1. act as a ‘global independent advocate for intergenerational solidarity, with a particular concern for the welfare of future generations’;
2. ‘promote … best practices in policy-making at all levels’;
3. ‘promote … engagement and full participation of all stakeholders in United Nations processes related to intergenerational solidarity’;
4. ‘conduct public advocacy to raise awareness of the measures needed at the global level’;
5. facilitate long-term thinking and better use of foresight mechanisms;
6. report annually to the General Assembly and upon request to the high-level political forum; and
7. act pursuant to a mandate that would extend beyond today’s youth to include the ‘needs of future generations’.
As set out in Section 2.5, proxy representation can be broken down in accordance with the functions it performs, as follows:
‘Proxy representative function’ occurs when the proxy purports to speak or act on behalf of future generations (‘direct representation’), with ‘indirect representation’ occurring where the proxy highlights the interests of future generations without purporting to speak on their behalf.
Proxy compliance function occurs where the proxy operates to help ensure compliance with existing international rules that factor in future generations’ interests. This in turn leads to:
Proxy law reform function, where the proxy advocates for reform of international law rules and institutions, including other types of commitment devices. Such a function is likely to be included in the mandate of the new UN Special Envoy for Future Generations (see further).
Proxy norm-entrepreneurial function occurs where the proxy plays a leadership role in persuading others to adopt a particular norm; for example, a UN Special Envoy could advocate for the norm of intergenerational equity (entailing an assessment of the impacts of current policies on future generations) to be incorporated across all UN programmes. The concept of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ is linked to constructivist concepts of international relations (see, for example, Wendt Reference Wendt2001). Intuitively, it would seem likely that there is a strong relationship between the legitimacy of the norm being advocated and the legitimacy of the leadership of the particular proxy representative. In other words, if the norm being advocated is not seen as being in the interests of all countries, then a proxy representative advocating for this norm will have an uphill battle. Conversely, if the norm is perceived as being in the interest of all states, this may facilitate the norm-entrepreneurial function.
A proxy representative of future generations may perform some or all these functions, to varying degrees. A central argument of this chapter is that the most effective proxy representative will maximise the performance of all these functions. By breaking down proxy representation into these elements, a more nuanced analysis can be made as to exactly what a proxy representative is and should be doing. As we shall see, this breakdown also allows a more nuanced analysis of the democratic legitimacy of proxy representatives – to which we now turn.
To ensure the legitimacy and effectiveness of a UN Special Envoy, its mandate should be linked to principles or discourses that already enjoy strong support in the international system. Such principles could include:
Human rights necessary to lead a decent life (Caney Reference Caney and Humphreys2010) and including a healthy environment extending into the futureFootnote 7 aimed at protecting human beings’ underlying core needs and interests.
Intergenerational equity and solidarity between generations interpreted as ensuring that future generations enjoy – as a minimum – human rights necessary for a decent life and a healthy environment, including a functioning climate system.
Strong sustainability including an obligation to preserve the irreplaceable elements of the global ecological systems upon which human beings depend (Dryzek & Pickering Reference Dryzek and Pickering2018: 89–92).
It is important to note that the concept of intergenerational equity is a component of sustainable development which has received broad international endorsement since the oft-cited formulation in the Brundtland 1987 report, Our Common Future. This report defined sustainable development as ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (UN SG 1987: 43). Strong support for the principle of intergenerational equity and solidarity in securing the interests of future generations was identified in the initial consultations on elements to be included in a Declaration for Future Generations to be adopted at the Summit for the Future by the UN General Assembly in September 2024 (see United Nations 2023; see Issues Paper 2023). In the Declaration on Future Generations ultimately adopted by the Summit (United Nations 2024), while there were references to the promotion of intergenerational solidarity (para 4), and the principles of equity and solidarity (para 5), there were no references to ‘intergenerational equity’ but rather the (weaker reference) to taking into account the ‘needs and interests of present and future generations’ (para 20).
While the Declaration on Future Generations made reference to sustainable development (para 20) this concept has become tarnished in that it has been interpreted as justifying unfettered economic development at the expense of the environment (Dryzek & Pickering Reference Dryzek and Pickering2018: 85–6). When interpreted as ‘weak sustainability’, the concept allows natural capital – including biodiversity, forests, fauna, and flora – to be substituted by artificial capital (Ott Reference Ott, Klauer, Manstetten, Petersen and Schiller2017: 24; Neumayer Reference Neumayer2003). This is problematic, as the multi-functionality of many ecological systems limits their substitutability (Harte Reference Harte1995). The upshot is that weak sustainability can involve not protecting future generations’ human rights as the ecological systems upon which they will depend are degraded. This suggests that a strong version of sustainability should be incorporated in the mandate of the UN Special Envoy, entailing the principle that the irreplaceable elements of global ecological systems should not be degraded. While, undoubtedly, this would be difficult to negotiate, it would clearly strengthen the mandate of the UN Special Envoy. Absent such a clear principle, a UN Special Envoy would necessarily have to fall back on less direct principles, such as arguments about the dependence of human beings on global ecological systems.
Whether the mandate of the UN Special Envoy should seek to incorporate a right to development is a complicated issue, which touches on the tension between the rights of contemporaries and future generations (Spijkers Reference Spijkers2018: 7). In the past, there have been attempts to combine the right to development with intergenerational equity. Thus, the 1972 Stockholm Declaration Principle 3 states that ‘the right to development must be fulfilled to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations’. In the drafting, this principle initially referred only to the ‘right to development’; a reference to ‘future generations’ was added at the insistence of the Nordic countries, ensuring that the final text refers to both current and future generations. Interestingly, however, the provision is now interpreted as referring only to intergenerational rights and not the right to development (Spijkers Reference Spijkers2018: 6–7).
The breadth of the mandate would be a key issue here. A broad mandate allowing the UN Special Envoy to operate guided by the principles set out earlier would allow the Envoy to represent future generations across the UN system. A UN Special Envoy with a broad mandate to represent future generations based on these principles could be given discretion as to how it performs its functions. However, a broad mandate would entail potential risks of overlap with existing UN regimes or agencies, including the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), to name some of them.
One way of reducing this risk would be to design the UN Special Envoy to ensure that it had a strong proxy compliance function, with its mandate linked to specific intergovernmental norms, processes, or treaties. One such candidate here would be the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (adopted in 2015): this comprises 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (UNGA 2015), which require a commitment to future generations and long-term policy-making as part and parcel of their implementation (Soltau Reference Soltau, Linehan and Lawrence2021; cf. Spijkers Reference Spijkers2018). The Group of 77 at the United Nations (G77), representing developing countries and China, indicated in the lead up to the Summit for the Future that it would support a focus in the Declaration on Future Generations on implementing existing commitments including the 2030 agenda (G77 and China 2022: para 26). The G77 and China also indicated that eradicating poverty, the ‘development pillar’ (included in the Preamble of the United Nations Charter), and intragenerational justice should be given equal importance to intergenerational justice in the intergovernmental process leading to the Declaration on Future Generations (G77 and China 2022; paras 7, 18, and 25), and that any new mechanisms would need to be established through the intergovernmental process related to the declaration (G77 and China 2022). They ruled out the possibility of any amendment of the UN Charter (G77 and China 2022: para 31), which would be a prerequisite for repurposing the existing Trusteeship Council. It may, however, be possible to repurpose the Trusteeship Council through a UN General assembly resolution without amending the Charter. In any event, the UN Secretary-General has indicated that UN members do not favour this proposal (UNSG 2023: 17). The G77 and China implicitly accepted that ‘intergenerational equity’ and ‘solidarity’ were appropriate principles for inclusion in the Declaration but argued, in addition, that there should be reference to ‘the principles of multilateralism, equity and Common but Differentiated Responsibilities’ (UNSG 2023: para 17).Footnote 8
Indeed, the Declaration on Future Generations adopted at the Summit (United Nations 2024) reflected the G77 and China position with most of its content comprising the repetition of existing commitments already made by countries in, for example, the SDGs.
In terms of functions of a UN Special Envoy, a further possibility that has been discussed over recent years is the idea that it play a role in international judicial processes. In the lead-up to the 2014 Rio +20 conference, some NGOs argued that a UN Commissioner for Future Generations should have standing to bring cases on behalf of future generations in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Ward Reference Ward2012). This idea has never been pursued and is a ‘bridge too far’ for states zealous of their sovereignty. Nevertheless, the normative principles reflected in the proposed mandate for a UN Special Envoy set out earlier – particularly the concept of intergenerational equity – could provide a basis for the ICJ to interpret its rules of procedure flexibly to allow NGOs to represent future generations in amicus curiae briefs, which could operate to bring to the Court’s attention the interests of future generations in particular proceedings (Lawrence & Köhler Reference Lawrence and Köhler2018). Such a function would be enhanced if states explicitly granted a UN Special Envoy this right in the rules of procedure of the ICJ.
Similarly, a UN Special Envoy could exercise compliance functions and law reform functions more effectively, if it were given explicit standing in the UN climate negotiations. This seems unlikely given that the Declaration on Future Generations only contains broad-brush, rather than precise, obligations.Footnote 9 Nevertheless, even the Declaration with its general obligations could provide sufficient leverage for a UN Special Envoy to exert pressure on governments to factor in the interests of future generations in policy and law-making. A declaration could have important political and normative effects, even if it did not create new legal obligations (Hale et al. Reference Hale, Moorhouse, Ord and Slaughter2023: 23–4). It could, for example, serve as a reference point for future more specific rulemaking, as did the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights in relation to the development of the global human rights regime (Hale et al. Reference Hale, Moorhouse, Ord and Slaughter2023: 24).
As mentioned, the UN Secretary-General’s Our Common Agenda report envisages that the UN Special Envoy would develop proposals on the ultimate governance structure adopted by the UN, with possibilities listed including regional guardians for future generations, a global commissioner for future generations, or a revamped Trusteeship Council. Interestingly, a wide spectrum of mechanisms is envisaged, ranging from formal through to softer peer-review type mechanisms. The experience in other areas of international law demonstrates that success can often be achieved by starting with informal mechanisms that require exchanges of views and confidence building, which then provide the basis for moving to more formal mechanisms.
While space precludes discussion here, a longer-term proposal worth pursuing could be establishing a new Optional Protocol to the UN Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that would require parties to establish national institutions to represent future generations and to report on long-term impacts of policy-making.Footnote 10 Such an instrument could be linked to an existing human rights instrument.
8.6 Synthesis: Strategic Alignment for Future Generations
Table 8.2 combines the democratic legitimacy of Table 8.1 with the proxy representation functions outlined earlier to demonstrate what is likely to be most effective in terms of the design of a UN Special Envoy for Future Generations. The argument is that effectiveness will be optimised where the UN Special Envoy maximises its various legitimacy criteria and proxy functions (left-hand column of Table 8.2) with the features of ‘Strong’ strategic alignment set out in the centre column. When this occurs, this is described as ‘strategic alignment for future generations’, meaning that the UN Special Envoy is most likely to be effective and operate in a way that maximises intergenerational justice; in other words, its functions align with the interests of future generations. When this occurs, the UN Special Envoy is most likely to function in a way which helps transform policy and international law-making to balance intergenerational and intragenerational justice (see Chapter 4). Conversely, where the UN Special Envoy’s functions are aligned with the features of ‘Weak’ strategic alignment (set out in the right-hand column of Table 8.2), it is more likely to be ineffective and poorly aligned with the interests of future generations.
| Legitimacy criteria | Strong | Weak |
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| i. Inclusive/fair representation (procedural – input legitimacy) |
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| ii. Democratic control (accountability and transparency) (input legitimacy) |
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| iii. Deliberation (input legitimacy) |
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| iv. Source-based (input legitimacy) expertise, discourse |
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| v. Substantial (output legitimacy), effectiveness, equity. |
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| Proxy functions | Strong | Weak |
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| Representative |
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| Compliance |
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| Norm-entrepreneurial |
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It is important to note (as discussed in Section 4.2.3) that effectiveness is linked to: (i) how a particular institution promotes intergenerational justice and the values of inclusiveness, solidarity, and addressing vulnerability; (ii) the Paris goals; and (iii) the extent to which a particular mechanism addresses causes of harmful short-termism. As we have seen, one important cause of short-termism is the lack of awareness of long-term policy impacts. A UN Special Envoy could not only help to address this deficiency by authoring high-quality reports on long-term trends and impacts of policy but also through sharing best practices and strengthening national mechanisms for future generations. From a practical point of view, a UN Special Envoy would focus on climate impacts which are short- or medium term, as these are more certain and easier to document. As mentioned in the Conclusion of Chapter 4, there is a lack of research on the structural causes of short-termism in terms of international law-making and international institutions more generally. Appointing a UN Special Envoy could be a trigger for quickly redressing this research deficit.
It is important to recognise an important lesson from the design of such mechanisms at the national level. The stronger the mandate such institutions have had in terms of their powers, the more likely governments are to become nervous and clip the wings of such institutions by reducing their powers.Footnote 11 This demonstrates a difficult dilemma in designing a global UN Special Envoy. A UN Special Envoy with a strong mandate is likely to generate concerns amongst states zealous of their sovereignty – particularly developing countries concerned about interference with their economic development. On the other hand, a UN Special Envoy with a weak mandate may struggle to have an impact, particularly if the UN Special Envoy is poorly resourced. A weak UN Special Envoy may be worse than none at all.
Finally, it should be noted that, since 2020, there has been a significant shift in improving the extent of consultation with young people in UN processes. Evidence for this is the extensive consultation with youth undertaken by the UN Secretary-General in producing the Our Common Agenda report (UN SG 2021: 39). Further examples include the extensive consultations undertaken by the UN Human Rights Committee in the drafting of a General Comment on children, human rights, and the environment (particularly climate change), with consultation taking place in regions across the world with youth groups (UNOHCHR 2021). In addition, the 2024 UN Summit for the Future included youth representatives selected by the President of the General Assembly in consultation with member states (UN GA 2022a: para 4). As mentioned earlier, engagement with youth in these processes is indispensable to their legitimacy. This engagement with young people needs to be across both the age and developing–developed country spectrum. Addressing both these dimensions of legitimacy is likely to be a key factor in building legitimacy and support for a UN Special Envoy and implementing the various elements agreed at the 2024 Summit of the Future.
