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Global Climate Politics after the Return of President Trump

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2025

Jeff Colgan*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science and Watson School of International and Public Affairs, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island, USA
Federica Genovese
Affiliation:
Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, UK
*
*Corresponding author. Email: jeff_colgan@brown.edu

Abstract

The second Trump administration has disrupted global climate politics, turning the United States away from the clean energy and environmental policies of the Biden administration. Consequently, analytical attention is turning, inside and outside of the United States, to a family of concepts referred to as “Climate Realism” (CR), which favors long-run investments in technology and adaptation over near-term climate mitigation efforts. We critically engage with CR and argue that political science identifies four key features of climate politics that shed light on CR’s strengths and weaknesses, and which will persist even in the second Trump era. Despite CR’s flaws, we contend that its emergence in reaction to the second Trump administration highlights some important dimensions of climate politics that deserve greater attention going forward. We highlight three topics for research: the political and practical strategies of the anti-green coalition; the heterogeneity in viable national economic strategies; and the implications for IR of a turn away from meaningful climate mitigation in powerful nations.

Information

Type
Short Essay — Future IR
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The IO Foundation

The second Trump administration has disrupted climate politics, turning the United States away from the clean energy and environmental policies of the Biden administration. Trump’s policy actions, along with a systematic effort to undermine the institutions of climate science, have had significant global ripple effects, including by eliciting responses from China, Europe, and elsewhere. Collectively, these shifts have amplified analysts’ interest in finding ways to reconcile the objective threat of climate change with a new era of international politics.

Largely as a consequence of Trump’s new presidency, attention is turning, inside and outside of the United States, to a family of concepts referred to as “Climate Realism” (CR). Different analysts are using different versions, but at heart, Climate Realism acknowledges the risks that climate change poses while advocating for a pullback from the type of green policies pursued by the Biden administration. Specifically, it: (1) expects the world to miss the 2015 Paris targets for climate mitigation, (2) argues that reducing US greenhouse gas emissions will not make a meaningful difference on a global scale, (3) focuses on different long-term solutions, often involving new technologies and adaptation, (4) proposes US leadership on geoengineering, and (5) contemplates coercive action toward countries with rapidly rising emissions.Footnote 1 In the United Kingdom, the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change,Footnote 2 the Bank of England,Footnote 3 and some influential scholarsFootnote 4 are similarly rethinking the topic based on CR. In Europe, right-leaning actors see CR as gaining ground.Footnote 5 However, this view has not come unchallenged. The American version of CR has already attracted critics who point to the absence of a plausible path to bipartisan support and the pitfalls for US diplomatic credibility of gutting domestic efforts to reduce emissions.Footnote 6 We extend this critique more globally, substantiate it by situating the debates in existing research on climate politics, and evaluate how scholarly perspectives on CR may influence future International Relations research on climate change.

We contend that political science literature—much of it published in International Organization—provides the intellectual scaffolding to understand the advantages and disadvantages of this evident shift toward CR. The literature highlights four enduring features of climate politics that inform how much CR can help navigate it after the return of President Trump. First, there is the perpetual relevance of domestic politics for understanding the “two-level game” of global climate politics. Second, distributional conflicts stay central to climate politics: it is political economy all the way down. Third, ideational frames—involving narratives, worldviews, and perceptions—continue to be important modifications to a strictly materialist understanding of climate politics. And fourth, the problem of global climate change remains characterized by high severity and high uncertainty. These four insights from the latest generation of climate politics research not only endure in the new era of US climate politics, but also collectively point to a tension between the CR framework and the evidence-based mechanics of climate politics that we label the Climate Politics Dilemma.

While we argue that the Climate Politics Dilemma will not be solved by CR and that this family of concepts is therefore deeply flawed, the emergence of CR nonetheless highlights some important dimensions of climate politics that deserve greater attention going forward. Those dimensions are perhaps overlooked by a field of scholars in which pro-climate normative commitments are common. Many researchers predicted that political contestation over climate change would intensify over time as the physical effects manifested more strongly,Footnote 7 but most of the scholarly attention to date has been on the causes, strategies, and effects of the green side of the contestation.Footnote 8 Far less attention has been to three other topics that the new era of climate politics in the United States is illustrating with force: the political and practical strategies of the anti-green coalition; the heterogeneity in viable national economic strategies; and the implications for International Relations (IR) of a turn away from meaningful climate mitigation in powerful nations. The turn to CR can help the literature refocus on these factors, though we caution that uncritically following CR risks falling into analytical traps and potential fallacies.

The rest of the article is structured as follows. The next section shows why climate change is not going to disappear from IR debates by reviewing the fundamentals of climate politics highlighted in recently published climate politics literature. The third section describes what is changing with the new Trump administration. The fourth engages with Climate Realism more precisely and identifies its pitfalls. The fifth section describes the three key topics for future research, and the final section concludes.

The Unchanged Fundamentals of Climate Politics

Until late in the last decade, prominent political scientists were accusing their own discipline of mostly ignoring the problem of global climate change.Footnote 9 Since then, there has been something like a Cambrian explosion of political science research on climate change.Footnote 10 The literature identifies four fundamental features of climate change politics. We quickly review them to establish why climate change is unlikely to retreat from global politics despite a moment of green backlash.

First, climate change is a direct externality of industrialization that will not leave any section of society unaffected, which means it will remain a domestic politics problem regardless of the extent of international cooperation. The critical relevance of domestic politics is made clear by the “two-level game” literature of international climate politics.Footnote 11 While international negotiations like the United Nation’s COP meetings grab headlines, any (national or international) promises governments make are tightly constrained by the domestic opposition that such promises engender. Constraints are also shaped and generated by domestic institutionsFootnote 12 and social movements.Footnote 13 This is true of mitigation commitments but also adaptation plans, which CR emphasizes and which the literature has so far mostly neglected.Footnote 14

Second, the research suggests an understanding of climate politics as political economy all the way down, in which distributional politics plays a central role.Footnote 15 Actors concerned about climate vulnerabilities—including coastal real estate, farming, and anything that involves outdoor activity—have incentives to push for decarbonization. Some of those actors, like pension funds or homeowners, hold climate-vulnerable assets—which could take many forms, including capital, labor skills, natural resources—but other pro-climate actors see themselves as stewards, like politicians or environmental NGOs. They face opposition from those who hold climate-forcing (polluting) assets, who have strong material incentives to resist policies that support decarbonization and climate mitigation. In as much as the goal of decarbonization requires fewer fossil fuels to be consumed, it implies a historically unprecedented energy transition. Previous energy transitions have only ever increased the consumption of existing fuels; for example, the shift to oil led to more, not less, coal consumption.Footnote 16 In short, the battle between different climate politics coalitions will map onto other political economy battles and continue to intensify.

Third, climate change has now entered the level of mass politics that is hard to repress or, for that matter, push back to purely technocratic spheres. Recent research has shown that ideational politics—involving narratives, worldviews, and perceptions—provide important modifications to a purely materialist understanding of climate politics.Footnote 17 The intermingling of individual material considerations and collective social identity makes for a complex political issue both at homeFootnote 18 and internationally.Footnote 19

Fourth, the problem of unmitigated global climate change is characterized by high severity and high uncertainty. In terms of severity, the probable consequences of failing to decarbonize the global economy include increased social unrest;Footnote 20 amplified civil wars;Footnote 21 internal and cross-border migration;Footnote 22 and food and water systems failures.Footnote 23 Their manifestations are uncertain, though the floor for the overall magnitude of damages grows more certain over time as states and firms offer more evidence about their emissions trajectories. There is also considerable uncertainty about how to support technological change,Footnote 24 how markets should value risks,Footnote 25 how physical harms translate into social consequences,Footnote 26 and a host of other factors related to climate mitigation and adaptation.

We see these four features as enduring aspects of climate politics. They underpin what we call the Climate Politics Dilemma, which consists of two core truths: (1) in the worst scenarios, climate change creates existential risks for our species, and even without the worst scenarios, it is likely to be highly damaging; and yet (2) the international politics of global public good provision are nationally selfish, riddled with distributional challenges down to the most local level, and routinely focused more on the crisis du jour than long-term problems. These four features, and the Climate Politics Dilemma they produce, are analytically essential to explain climate politics since the 1990s and are unlikely to change in the near term. CR fails to resolve these four features or the Dilemma, despite CR’s effort to alter the approach to climate policy and politics. That does not mean, however, that climate politics is entirely unchanging, as we discuss in the next section.

Three New Disruptive Forces for Climate Politics

Three genuinely new shifts due to the 2024 US elections make the road to address climate change much harder and a critical engagement with CR necessary. First, there are the Trump administration’s policy actions, which undermine the United States’ transition to clean energy and related technologies. In its first 100 days the Trump administration rolled back more than 140 environmental rules, started rewriting regulations that limit pollution from cars and power plants, and accelerated environmental reviews of drilling projects to just a few weeks.Footnote 27 Trump also signed executive orders to ease restrictions on fossil fuel extraction and offered the fossil fuel industry an exemption from the tariffs he presented in April 2025. The One Big Beautiful Bill Act passed on 3 July 2025 mostly gutted the Inflation Reduction Act and significantly increases projected US greenhouse gas emissions.Footnote 28 The federal government’s stop-work order in August 2025 on the mostly built Revolution Wind project, among others, indicates that further efforts to cancel or hinder renewable energy projects are likely. The United States has seen fluctuations in climate positions across the past decadesFootnote 29 but never has US climate policy shifted so radically in such a short period of time.

Second, these actions coincided with an attack on the administrative state and the role of science in policymaking. Very early on the administration pushed for sweeping cuts to federal agencies on the forefront of the climate crisis, including the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the Department of Agriculture, and widespread firings of climate scientists and regulation experts. There have been cancellations of climate science grants, censorship of climate-related works from official contracts and documents, and suspension of funding for regional climate centers. The president’s executive orders have been challenged in court but, at a minimum, this administration puts American climate institutions and the environmentally minded civil society to a test. While some theorists have controversially suggested that autocratic institutions might be legitimate in the face of climate change,Footnote 30 empirical research suggests that robust democratic institutions support environmental ambition.Footnote 31

Third, there are the international ripple effects of the second Trump administration. These have been heterogenous, consistent with the mixed evidence in the literature on elections’ effects on climate policymaking.Footnote 32 In some countries, far-right leaders have modeled themselves as local versions of the MAGA movement. Consequently, in places like Germany (with AfD) and the United Kingdom (Reform), far-right parties have embedded climate-skeptic positions in their core electoral agendas, putting pressure on center-right parties to do the same. At the same time, Trump’s actions have reinvigorated some center-left parties elsewhere. The Liberals in Canada and the Labour party in Australia won elections in 2025 partly based on fears of a Trump effect at home. Still, these centrist victories have not necessarily led to climate agenda: Prime Minister Mark Carney removed the consumer carbon tax two weeks before the Canadian national elections, and the Australian Labour cabinet approved a fifty-year extension of one of the largest gas projects in the world just after the elections.

The global political landscape therefore remains patchy and uncertain, and this triggers important questions for future climate politics research. The European Union sees material and soft-power opportunities of the United States retreating from climate action, but also the challenges of conducting a smooth transition as far-right parties exert power domestically.Footnote 33 For example, Hungary has allocated foreign direct investments, including EU resources, to build a powerful EV battery manufacturing hub, but then uses its industry opportunistically, as a geopolitical weapon against Brussels. China, meanwhile, provides a model for clean energy growth, but aligning with China comes with the risks of exposure to the Chinese Communist Party’s monopoly of global supply chains. As the new Trump administration withdraws the United States from being a fulcrum of innovations around renewable energy and a participant in the climate change battle, these countries—and those in the Global South—may have to reposition themselves on climate change, either by further linking their economies to green transition, or downscaling their green energy markets.

The Pitfalls of Climate Realism

Despite the disruptive forces the new Trump administration has unleashed, climate politics is here to stay because climate change itself is unavoidable. The inter- and sub-national tensions over the responsibility for climate change outlined earlier will intensify as the impacts grow in severity and scope. To address this conundrum, CR is an attempt to find a compromise between the reality of climate change and the political opposition to decarbonization. Its three imperatives are preparing for a world that fails its climate targets, investing in market-competitive clean technology and industries, and leading efforts to avert truly catastrophic climate change. Crucially, the CFR manifesto treats as a fallacy the idea that “reducing US domestic greenhouse gas emissions can make a meaningful difference.”Footnote 34

CR is only loosely related to Realism in IR.Footnote 35 CR is not an explanatory theory; it is a partly descriptive, partly normative analysis of contemporary climate politics with powerful indications for policymakers. CR shares with Realism its acceptance of national self-interest as a primary driver of international behavior, its skepticism toward the capacity of international institutions to meaningfully constrain state actions, and its unflinching acknowledgment that climate governance will inevitably produce winners and losers, with some actors facing substantial costs. It appears to be more than mere a pragmatic description of the current moment because CR implicitly rests on a claim that states and other actors define, and will continue to define, their interests quite selfishly and narrowly in the face of a collective challenge like climate change. However, CR departs fundamentally from Realism in some critical respects, as we describe next.

CR offers no easy way around the four features of climate politics we identified in the second section of this essay, especially the high severity and complicated uncertainty of unmitigated climate change. The Faustian bargain CR proposes is the negative consequences of failing to meet decarbonization goals in the short- and medium-term in exchange for the potential benefit of a stronger or larger political coalition for long-term climate mitigation and adaptation. CR advocates only hint at this tradeoff without ever really engaging with its full costs, benefits, or probabilities.Footnote 36 This bargain proposed by CR implies a slower mitigation trajectory that simultaneously creates (1) higher certainty about the (large) magnitude of future climate damages given current technology, but also (2) less certainty about exactly what damages would occur, what effects future technology might have, and how actors will respond to the hotter, more volatile climate of the future.

A key example of the hidden assumptions and tradeoffs imbedded in CR is the idea that some horrific consequences of climate change would be acceptable so long as it happens to unspecified Other People. CR is curiously content with the unexamined vagueness about the word catastrophe, and who exactly it affects. Worse still is CR’s assumption that the privileged “Us”—whether that is the United States, the West, or the Global North—would be able to isolate ourselves from spillover of problems and instability in the rest of the world. Given the unprecedentedness of the expected climate impacts, scholars are struggling to estimate how civil wars, human migration, and humanitarian disasters will affect the world, but the best estimates suggest high magnitude costs.Footnote 37 In short, it is much easier to use the term Realism to signal tough-minded thinking than it is to come to grips with the attendant inequality, racialized harm, and high likelihood of spillover effects to wealthy countries that come with this framework.

Another weakness in CR is the unexamined uncertainty about future technologies and future political coalitions. CR places a big bet that climate “catastrophe” can be averted by developing and deploying new technologies like carbon capture and storage (CCS) or solar geoengineering, but that outcome is far from certain. Indeed, some prominent scientists are now warning that CCS is unlikely to play a major role in mitigating climate change,Footnote 38 which means that it might act primarily as an expensive subsidy to the fossil fuel industry. Similarly, CR recognizes the two-level game of climate politics and is explicitly designed to “rise above” partisan disagreement but it does not examine the probability of success of building a future bipartisan political coalition in the United States or elsewhere. This view does not offer any detailed political strategy to appeal to a Republican Party or other right-wing parties that are hostile to clean energy and view climate science as exaggerated or a hoax.Footnote 39

Varieties of Climate Contestation and Strategies

While CR is deeply flawed, its emergence highlights the three key topics we noted in the introduction to this essay: the political strategies of the anti-green coalition, the heterogeneity in national economic strategies, and the implications for IR.

The first of these topics is essentially about domestic politics, ripe for comparative analyses of anti-green coalitions.Footnote 40 Scholars observe that pro- and anti-carbon coalitions now form a major cleavage in US politicsFootnote 41 and that one side pursues recarbonization rather than decarbonization.Footnote 42 Under what conditions, how much, and how effectively are those opposed to decarbonization prosecuting their campaign against clean energy and other green technologies? These questions deserve significantly more focus.Footnote 43 Since the Biden administration’s clean energy policy efforts, the United States has experienced an upsurge in local community resistance to solar and wind energy projects. One report indicates that now roughly 20 percent of all US counties have some form of ban or restrictive ordinance against solar and/or wind energy.Footnote 44 Moreover, anti-green politics is hardly unique to the United States. For instance, protests against energy infrastructure projects are common around the world. Scholarly work in progress suggests, for instance, that about one in eight wind projects in the Global South face opposition involving collective action like protests,Footnote 45 but at present we still know little about the causes and consequences of such opposition.

The second topic that CR shines a new light upon is the heterogeneity in national economic strategies. The striking contrast between the United States’ and China’s national economic strategies vividly illustrates the wide range of possibilities. Remarkably, Chinese electric vehicle companies’ outward foreign direct investment surpassed domestic manufacturing investment levels ($15 billion) for the first time in 2024.Footnote 46 Then, after Trump took office, China’s Belt and Road Initiative experienced an unprecedented surge in the first half of 2025 after years of post-COVID decline, reaching $124 billion in total engagement—the highest level ever recorded for a six-month period and exceeding the entire 2024 total.Footnote 47 This revival encompasses record-breaking energy engagement of $42 billion, including green energy initiatives totaling $9.7 billion in wind, solar, and waste-to-energy projects. Some analysts now refer to China as an “electrostate” based on its dominance in clean energy technologies, manufacturing, and infrastructure deployment.Footnote 48 Political scientists have mapped the ways in which oil dependence has allowed petrostates to weaponize the international order in their favor.Footnote 49 It remains to be seen whether the electrostate strategy will allow China to exert geopolitical influence in ways that mirror, yet invert, the petroleum-based power structures of the twentieth century. Note, however, that both the United States and Chinese strategies appear to be compatible with the “Realist” label in the sense that they match each country’s national interest as perceived in a given moment—which creates indeterminacy that further undermines CR’s utility for analysis.

Any given state’s choice of national economic strategy in the face of climate change is uncertain and depends on the state’s circumstances. Scholars have usefully called attention to the variety of “strategies of green industrial policy”Footnote 50 but paid less attention to the full range of national economic strategies that a country might adopt, including those that intensify the production or consumption of fossil fuels.Footnote 51 Multiple country-level explanatory variables are worthy of investigation, including: its natural resources; its sources of international comparative advantage; the domestic political coalition that supports its incumbent government; the state’s long-term growth model, if a coherent one exists; its political culture, ideology, and cleavages; time horizons; and its domestic political institutions.Footnote 52 Possibly there are multiple strategies that could maximize a state’s economic prosperity, even if they do different amounts of damage to the global climate.

The third topic is the host of IR implications of the United States’ turn away from meaningful climate mitigation and the global spread of CR. One implication is that global energy markets, and adjacent ones such as the automobile markets, which have been dominated by the OECD for roughly a century, are now being contested by China and others. In a telling May 2025 episode, China delayed approval of BYD’s Mexico EV manufacturing plant amid fears that its technology could leak to the United States—a reversal of the OECD’s concerns in the early 2000s about China stealing its industrial technology. India, Indonesia, and Turkey accounted for 75 percent of China’s exports of silicon cells in 2025, which they are then using as inputs for solar panels built by their own rapidly accelerating domestic manufacturing industries. And even the European Union is beginning to demand technology transfers from Chinese companies that seek to invest and manufacture clean technology in Europe like batteries.

Finally, a second implication of the policy emphasis on CR is the impact it would have on the liberal international order.Footnote 53 In a world in which the United States retreats into a petrol-fueled economy and China pursues green tech for national goals while minimizing its international climate commitments, the European Union remains the only international pole nominally advocating for global public goods in the fashion of climate protection. Whether Europe will decide to retreat from its own climate pledges or perhaps instead forge a green partnership with China depends largely on the internal domestic coalitions with power in European institutions such as the Parliament and the Commission.Footnote 54 It will also depend on how the rest of the world positions itself toward China and the United States. While the scenario of alignment with China seems unlikely for some Global North countries such as Japan and the United Kingdom, some US-exposed countries such as South Africa, Indonesia, Brazil, and even Canada and Australia could update their priors about which transactional partners to choose on the matters of natural resource trade and green energy markets.Footnote 55 Further, in a feedback effect, the repositioning of middle- and small-powers countries could even create competition between China and the United States for relationships with these middle-power countries in separate spheres of interest, just as we have seen during the Cold War and European imperial periods.Footnote 56

Conclusion

The current moment in international politics presents many unknowns for climate politics, but one certainty is that climate change is not decelerating, and societies around the globe will face the geopolitical and institutional challenges that a warming planet presents. The most realistic thing about the Climate Realism framework is the acknowledgment that the world is very unlikely to achieve the Paris target of global warming “well below 2 degrees Celsius.” That acknowledgment is necessary, but wildly insufficient, as a guide to either climate policy or foreign policy. Political science research identifies four features of climate politics that collectively point to serious flaws in CR. We synthesized those four features into what we called the Climate Politics Dilemma: the serious risks of climate change versus the very challenging politics of climate mitigation. Far from grappling with the hard tradeoffs, CR reifies and hardens the two sides of the Dilemma, which are, in reality, co-produced by risk perception and political constraint. As the research literature suggests, political systems shape how risks are seen and prioritized; meanwhile, evolving climate damages reshape the boundaries of what is politically possible.

The analytical turn to CR might nonetheless be intellectually generative because it points to the need for better explanations of anti-green politics and its consequences. We highlighted three such topics: the political strategies of the anti-green coalition, the heterogeneity in viable national economic strategies, and the implications for IR of a turn away from meaningful climate mitigation by the United States and others. There may be more. What we can say with some certainty is that, in the absence of some shocking technological breakthrough(s), climate politics will continue to shape International Relations.

Acknowledgments

We thank Max Bradley, Sarah Colbourn, Robert Keohane, Tyler Pratt, Hayley Pring, and three anonymous reviewers for helpful feedback.

Footnotes

2 Tony Blair Institute for Global Change 2025.

3 Financial Times, 2 June 2025. Kenza Bryan and Martin Arnold, Bank of England Staff Depart after Downgrade of Climate Risk. Available at <https://www.ft.com/content/c9919c02-8328-4fa0-af4d-a108770a9f73>.

7 Colgan, Green, and Hale Reference Colgan, Green and Hale2021.

10 For recent reviews, see Ross Reference Ross2025; Colgan and Hinthorn Reference Colgan and Hinthorn2023; Gazmararian and Tingley Reference Gazmararian and Tingleyforthcoming.

14 Javeline Reference Javeline2014; Grossman, Sacks, and Xu Reference Grossman, Sacks and Xu2025.

15 Meckling Reference Meckling2011; Aklin and Mildenberger Reference Aklin and Mildenberger2020; Colgan, Green, and Hale Reference Colgan, Green and Hale2021.

16 Colgan and Hinthorn Reference Colgan and Hinthorn2023.

17 Blondeel, Colgan, and Van de Graaf Reference Blondeel, Colgan and Van de Graaf2019; Bechtel, Genovese, and Scheve Reference Bechtel, Genovese and Scheve2019; Guenther Reference Guenther2024.

18 Bayer and Genovese Reference Bayer and Genovese2020; Gaikwad, Genovese, and Tingley Reference Gaikwad, Genovese and Tingley2022.

19 Tingley and Tomz Reference Tingley and Tomz2022; Gaikwad, Genovese, and Tingley Reference Gaikwad, Genovese and Tingley2025.

20 Hendrix and Glaser Reference Hendrix and Glaser2007; Hendrix and Salehyan Reference Hendrix and Salehyan2012.

23 Dabelko and Conca Reference Dabelko and Conca2019.

29 Mildenberger Reference Mildenberger2021.

30 Mittiga Reference Mittiga2022.

33 Voeten Reference Voeten2025; Bayer, Crippa, and Genovese Reference Bayer, Crippa and Genovese2025.

34 Sivaram Reference Sivaram2025.

35 Realist texts include Waltz Reference Waltz1979; Walt Reference Walt1987; Art and Greenhill Reference Art and Greenhill2015; Kirshner Reference Kirshner2022.

36 Sivaram Reference Sivaram2025.

39 Wallace Reference Wallace2025.

40 Though opposition can be transnational, not entirely domestic; see Cory, Lerner, and Osgood Reference Cory, Lerner and Osgood2021

42 Driscoll and Blyth Reference Driscoll and Blyth2025.

44 Meyer and Clynes Reference Meyer and Clynes2025.

48 Tauschinski and Stylianou Reference Tauschinski and Stylianou2025.

50 Allan and Nahm Reference Allan and Nahm2025.

51 Driscoll and Blyth Reference Driscoll and Blyth2025.

53 Lake, Martin, and Risse Reference Lake, Martin and Risse2021.

54 Bayer, Crippa, and Genovese Reference Bayer, Crippa and Genovese2025.

55 Deberdt, Letourneau, and Le Billon Reference Deberdt, Letourneau and Le Billon2025.

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