“Privately, even adherents of the doctrine of guerre révolutionnaire would admit that the maltreatment of prisoners and the use of torture to gain information was normal in some commands.”Footnote 1
Introduction
“[The terrorist] must know that if he is caught, he will not be treated like an ordinary criminal, nor like a prisoner captured on the battlefield. … If he gives the requested information without difficulty, the interrogation will be over quickly; if not, the specialists will have to use all possible means to extract the secret from him. Then … he will have to face the suffering and perhaps the death he has so far managed to avoid. … Science can easily provide the army with the means to obtain what it seeks.”Footnote 2
In his seminal 1962 book La guerre moderne, French Colonel Roger Trinquier euphemistically recommended scientific torture methods to extract information from captured Algerian “terrorists.” Although controversial, the interrogation techniques refined during the battle of Algiers soon became part of a systemic worldview. This Foucauldian dispositif, an ensemble of discourses, practices and institutions through which power operates, is usually associated with the French wars in Indochina and Algeria.Footnote 3 This study shows that it existed much earlier. A proto-scientific expertise in torture had previously been developed in French counterinsurgency doctrine. In fact, the link between the French conception of guerre contre-révolutionnaire and the (re-)legitimization of torture can be traced back to the nineteenth century as part of a “colonial habitus.”Footnote 4 Even if the concept did not exist at that time, its colonial genealogy is fundamental to its development and global appeal. This article argues that the practices of torture during the Cold War did not emerge ex nihilo but were shaped by earlier discursive formations and practices. Drawing on Michel Foucault’s concepts of the dispositif and the power/knowledge nexus, this study traces how a regime linking knowledge production to the disciplined body made torture—defined as the instrumentalization of pain and suffering—both thinkable and technically operable. This configuration enabled the convergence of military-intellectual theory with scientific practices.
Trinquier defined guerre révolutionnaire as “the overthrow of the established power in a country and its replacement by another regime.”Footnote 5 Another influential French theorist, David Galula, described it as a “protracted struggle,” which he characterized as “the pursuit of the policy of a party, inside a country, by every means.”Footnote 6 Although the terminology is not always clearly defined, Trinquier, Galula and other officers developed their theory of counterrevolutionary warfare based on their insights into their enemies’ ways of war. It focused on using modern methods in combatting opponents who fought asymmetrically as guerillas, hidden amongst the population.Footnote 7 From this insight they derived guerre contre-révolutionnaire, which was thus considerably different from the major “wars of the past in the sense that victory [was] not expected solely from the clash of two armies on a battlefield.”Footnote 8 As Dennis Leroux describes, the French saw that “the enemy’s objective was no longer to conquer territory, as in conventional wars, but to control the population.”Footnote 9 Thus, guerre contre-révolutionnaire served as an intellectual and holistic construct that facilitated the export of organized violence with a global reach. This theory would soon be disseminated across time and space.
Since the nineteenth century, torture as a form of violence has not been abolished but rather transformed in form and content to fit the modern era. As in Trinquier’s book, in this article, modern refers not simply to contemporary practices, but to those that emerged in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These were shaped by the global circulation of technologies and an ideology that emphasized efficiency, coordination, and the professionalization of coercive techniques within covert frameworks.
Unlike most academic studies of torture, which focus on a single historical theatre, its perpetrators, or the implications for its victims, this study offers a broader intellectual history of modern torture, based on a long-term perspective. This article’s analytical contribution lies in establishing a link between the French theory of counterrevolutionary warfare and the transnational spread of torture. Although guerre contre-révolutionnaire and torture are not synonymous, this article demonstrates and illustrates the nexus between the intellectual concept and its violent practices.
In this study, three geographically and temporally diverse case studies illustrate how guerre contre-révolutionnaire, originating in colonial Indochina, adapted in Algeria and honed under the Argentine military dictatorship, was closely linked to torture. Remnants of this “torturology” can even be traced to the global war on terror unleashed by the United States after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Although the guerre contre-révolutionnaire is frowned upon today, some of its elements remain attractive to interrogation experts.
Different research perspectives understand torture not only as a physical and psychological act, but also as a psychosocial routine, and thus increasingly as a form of what Michel Foucault called disciplinary power for biopolitical control. Footnote 10 Accordingly, torture has always been a form of disciplining, of punishing, but also of interrogation. Although it was categorically banned by the international community in the 1984 UN Convention against torture, “this did not mean that torture no longer took place.”Footnote 11 Recent scholarship, however, has highlighted the difference with earlier eras: whereas torture was institutionally permitted and administered for a long time, it was banned more consistently in the twentieth century and moved from the public sphere to a secret one, where it flourished clandestinely.Footnote 12 American literary scholar Elaine Scarry compared torture and war: both hurt and kill people and symbolize the power relationship between two or more parties. In both contexts, an alien will is imposed on the victim.Footnote 13
Recent research has highlighted the link between the wars of decolonization and torture. According to Christian de Goustine, almost all the national-liberation fronts of the Cold War era used torture, as did their respective opponents.Footnote 14 There is a burgeoning but patchy and widely dispersed body of literature that analyzes the significance of torture knowledge both translocally and diachronically. As early as 1972, Mohamed Lebjaoui discovered that French torture knowledge, developed in Indochina, was later used in Algeria.Footnote 15 Recent studies have pointed to a global history of modern French repressive knowledge and practices. While in the late 1990s, Lawrence Weschler opined that the Cold War concept of counterinsurgency was “made in the USA,”Footnote 16 Marie-Monique Robin has documented the export of French ideas and teachings on counterinsurgency.Footnote 17 Marina Lazreg and Neil Macmaster have highlighted the similarities between torture in Algeria and Iraq and Mike Jempson has examined modern torture comparatively.Footnote 18 Anne Kwaschik has pointed out that the legal (self-) legitimization of France and the United States in Algeria and in the war on terror has led to the emergence of “lawless spaces.”Footnote 19 Raphaëlle Branche has pioneered the analysis of French torture techniques in Algeria, drawing on a wide range of sources.Footnote 20 In her “criminological investigation,” Melanie Collard examined Franco‑Argentinean cooperation in terms of the concept of state crimes, providing an important basis for this work.Footnote 21 This article continues to pursue this interconnected, transnational study of modern torture based on hitherto unknown historical sources in multiple languages on three continents as well as selected musealia.
Early Emergence and Adoption of a “White” Torture Paradigm in the French and British Empires
In the late nineteenth and throughout the twentieth century, there was an intellectual tendency toward the cleansing of torture. As Darius Rejali has impressively illustrated, classical, brutal and mostly physical forms of torture were modified and adapted in various regions and replaced by a “modern,” psychological and scientific paradigm of “white” or “clean” torture.Footnote 22 These new forms of coercive violence primarily aimed at increasing efficiency. At the same time, by increasingly minimizing visible physical marks, torture was shifted towards psychological methods—many of which were pioneered by the French and the British. This is why contemporary witnesses perceived this “white torture” as modern and scientific. In reality, “white torture” was anything but “clean.” The physical suffering of the victims was merely replaced by the carefully devised regulation and instrumentalization of psychological and emotional pain, which was increasingly amplified with technical devices. This process was uneven and benefited from the multidirectional interaction with conflicts in non-European areas. This dichotomy between archaic “classical” and subtle “modern” methods of torture was, for example, already described by the French journalist Andrée Viollis with regard to the French colonial administration in Indochina in the mid‑1930s: “There are tortures that can be called classic. … But besides these tortures of a rather archaic kind, there are more refined, more modern ones: all invented and practiced, in particular by the Sûreté de Cholon.”Footnote 23
The French colonial state in Indochina was not alone in inventing these sophisticated, mostly non-invasive torture techniques. Regarding the British Empire, the Anglo-Irish officer Charles Edward Callwell, a veteran of the Second Anglo-Afghan War and the Boer Wars, published one of the first authoritative manuals on colonial warfare at the beginning of the twentieth century, in which he described how trustworthy information was “unavoidably defective” in colonial wars.Footnote 24 As Calwell’s manual illustrates, the search for information played a central role in locating and exposing the enemy and thus formed what Katherine Judith Anderson calls an evolving “system of knowledge.”Footnote 25 Within this system, imperial troops were able to plan and prepare for confrontations with nationalist and colonial opponents.
Since the genesis of torture is closely linked to so-called “small-scale wars” in seemingly remote areas, strategists, military planners and intelligence officials often drew on colonial experiences. For the British Empire, the writings of Callwell,Footnote 26 T. Miller Maguire,Footnote 27 Ernest Swinton,Footnote 28 William HenekerFootnote 29 and Charles Gwynn became influential.Footnote 30 They formulated methods for quickly and effectively suppressing uprisings in the colonies.
For France, however, asymmetric warfare was much more of a historical constant than it was for the British Empire or other imperialist powers. Despite the structural use of force, until the 1940s, French counterinsurgency operations had a successful track record in the eyes of many military officers and politicians.Footnote 31 To them, the colonization of Algeria and Madagascar served as cases in point. French military and police officers thus gained far more experience in highly asymmetrical wars than their counterparts in other European empires. Consequently, from the theatres of war in Algeria (1830–1848), Mexico (1862–1866), Indochina (1858–1900), Madagascar (1883–1897) and Morocco (1900–1934), the French approach to counterinsurgency and interrogation was gradually refined.Footnote 32 However, there was often a lack of clear political leadership or a coherent strategy from the French Third Republic. This left many French generals, officers and colonial bureaucrats with the burden of implementing political decisions themselves at the local level.Footnote 33 Unlike Callwell, French officers did not want to provoke major decisive battles that would physically destroy the enemy. Instead, leading French thinkers began to interpret the enemy as an overall system that was to be fought in its safe heavens. This was accompanied by the expansion of colonial sovereignty, village by village. This process was known as pacification, and was intended to result in the decisive and permanent suppression of any uprising.Footnote 34
French Marshal Thomas Bugeaud was notorious in the nineteenth century for striking fear into France’s enemies during the conquest of Algeria. General Joseph Gallieni rose to fame through France’s colonial wars, particularly through his victory in the Tonkin campaign (1883–1886) and his tough policy in Madagascar, which expanded on Bugeaud’s ideas of pacification.Footnote 35 Together with his novice Louis-Hubert Lyautey—who, to his credit had spoken out against torture and mistreatment while quelling the Moroccan rising in 1925—Gallieni developed the tache d’huile theory of colonial state building in which secure localized zones were spread through raids (ratissage) and resettlement (regroupment), like an inkpot spilling out over a map.Footnote 36 Historians Jacques Frémeaux and Bruno C. Reis have summarized the extremely brutal tradition of this French approach to counterinsurgency: “The French strategic aim was to force the populations into total submission.”Footnote 37 Pacification was used during the French colonization in Morocco and Algeria in particular. This view would resurface during the Cold War as well as in the early 2000s, becoming an official term in U.S. interrogation policies during the global war on terror.Footnote 38
Like the Americans in the war on terror, French General Théophile Pennequin—who like Gallieni and Lyautey was a veteran of Indochina—linked military operations to socio-economic pacification operations.Footnote 39 French officers prioritized interrogations, intelligence and the targeted use of force: torture was used during the French suppression of the Malagasy Uprising 1947–1949 and the subsequent recolonization of Madagascar by Generals Marcel Pellet and Pierre Garbay. This experience from Madagascar later informed practices by the French from the Ivory Coast to Cameroon, Indochina, Morocco and Tunisia.Footnote 40
However, the intellectual legacy from Indochina became most significant for the global reception of torture. In Indochina, extreme violence was the order of the day, not only in prisons, but also in the everyday handling of the local population.Footnote 41 In French Indochina, various actors tortured their opponents. Early torture practices by leading actors of the grande nation developed since the initial colonization and were derived from military punishment techniques. Many of these persisted even after disciplinary penalties were suspended due to their brutality.Footnote 42
The diplomatic correspondence contains sporadic evidence of torture, but more frequently, an intellectual distance is taken from aggressive interrogation techniques. A confidential letter from the Résident Supérieur au Tonkin in November 1897 reported on the “question by water [and] fire.”Footnote 43 Torture in French prisons and interrogation centers in Indochina was intense and formed part of a distinct prison culture.Footnote 44 Historian Patrice Morlat and journalist Andrée Viollis, for example, reported on specially made forceps that were used to extract eyeballs.Footnote 45 More importantly, French interrogators experimented with psychological techniques like stress positions relatively early on.Footnote 46 Many French officials were interested in their enemies’ use of torture during interrogations as part of the constant uprisings that challenged French rule. From these observations, the French derived their own insights and frequently copied proven methods.Footnote 47 The ingenuity of French torture expertise was emphasized by contemporary witnesses: “They [the tortures] are of various kinds and show an astonishing wealth of sadistic imagination.”Footnote 48
Depictions circulated by the Vietnamese Communist Party today illustrate the use of various French and Vietnamese torture devices, particularly to combat the Cần Vương movement from 1885 to 1896. Forced confinement in stress positions for days on end was combined with instruments of physical torture: the wooden cangue of Chinese provenance and other tools restricted the prisoners’ ability to move. Prisoners whose feet were clamped into wooden beams fared even worse (see figure 1).Footnote 49 Other shackles and handcuffs were used to force prisoners into stress positions. In addition, fetters, handcuffs, truncheons, hammers and knives were used to beat and stab the victims (see figure 2).Footnote 50

Figure 1. The prisoners’ lower legs were clamped in the holes of this wooden beam, creating rudimentary stress positions. Source: Vietnam National Museum of History (Bảo Tàng Lịch Sử Việt Nam), Hà Nội, Vietnam, Cùm chân, author’s photo, 12 April 2023.

Figure 2. Colonial instruments of torture in French Indochina: Fetter, handcuff, truncheon, hammer and knife. Source: Vietnam National Museum of History (Bảo Tàng Lịch Sử Việt Nam), Hà Nội, Vietnam, Roi bằng xương cá và roi da, Xích khóa tay, Xích chân, author’s photo, 12 April 2023.
Many of these tools were not used exclusively for torture, but also to punish and to intimidate. Due to the ubiquity of these practices, criticism of French colonial torture grew. Efforts to abolish torture throughout Indochina had already been made before the turn of the century.Footnote 51 For instance, torture was abolished in Cochinchina after the French penal code was introduced in 1877. In Annam it remained officially in use until it was outlawed in 1913.Footnote 52 A letter from the Gouverneur Générale de l’Indochine in 1911 commented on the apparently pervasive use of torture in courts throughout Southeast Asia: “These judicial procedures are not confined to Annam. A recent trial also revealed their existence in Cambodia. These practices are absolutely intolerable. They must end at all costs. … The civilizing tradition of the nation [of France] forbids us to put up with them [these methods]. Inaction or silence becomes complicity.”Footnote 53
However, by inaction and silence, the elites indeed became complicit in the period that followed. Hence, progress on the abolition of torture and punishment techniques was slow. Journalist Viollis, for example, described countless acts of torture by the French in the 1930s. Viollis mentioned foot whippings imported from China, as well as the breaking of ribs and bones, impalement, water and fire torture, the insertion of wooden dowels into the orifices of the body, and the flogging of prisoners.Footnote 54 At the same time, others also reported beatings, stress positions, the extraction of finger- and toenails, torture by cutting and by burning, deprivation of food and drink, and the feeding of salted rice or pungent liquids.Footnote 55
Little is known about the exact extent and prevalence of these techniques. According to Viollis, such torture was carried out “daily” at the Cholon police station in 1931—often ordered by the French but carried out by local Vietnamese torturers.Footnote 56 According to the communist newspaper La Lutte, the torture applied in Saigon was “terrible.”Footnote 57 Years earlier, the Résident Supérieur du Tonkin felt compelled to condemn the rampant torture in Southeast Asia. He referred to the bans on shackling and the use of the cangue and pleaded for a clearer separation between the accused and the convicted.Footnote 58
Given the long tradition of Vietnamese resistance, information about hiding places, weapons, supporters and resistance fighters was of paramount importance. Torture techniques followed the warring parties and thus migrated from the cities to the provinces. The Chinese falaka, in which the soles of the victims’ feet were severely beaten, was exported from Saigon to the more remote provinces of Indochina: “In Saigon, the tortures are skillfully applied. They have at least one aim: to extract confessions without leaving any trace. … Beatings on the soles of the feet were imported from Saigon to the provinces.”Footnote 59
The French Sûreté, partly a colonial intelligence service, together with the colonial police, had penetrated Indochina down to the provincial level and established new and “cleaner” torture techniques—even more intensely than military forces.Footnote 60 Victim reports from the late 1920s and 1930s testify to particularly subtle torture interrogations by the Sûreté in various provinces of Indochina.Footnote 61
However, in contrast to the Cold War, this early knowledge of torture was only seldom passed on in institutions or schools, and more often spread through informal personal communication.Footnote 62 One such practice was the undressing of victims, which was used from an early date.Footnote 63 Undressing was combined by the Sûreté with other techniques, such as beatings, stress positions, scalding, intimidation through fatigue exercises, and a method called stomach twisting: Lan mé ga, Vietnamese for “twisting the gizzard,” also euphemistically called “the toad” (la crapaudine). This was often a preferred method: “It [lan mé ga] is particularly popular with interrogators because it leaves no visible traces.”Footnote 64
Electric torture soon became even more important than lan mé ga. Footnote 65 In fact, according to Rejali, torture using electricity was first developed and tested in Indochina—long before the Argentinian police began experimenting with the electric picana, before the widespread use of the electric chair, and even before the use of electric torture by the Vichy and Nazi regimes.Footnote 66 Journalist Viollis was one of the first to describe French electric torture after the suppression of the Yên Bái Mutiny in 1931.Footnote 67
A forerunner of the infamous gégène electric torture machine was developed in Indochina in the 1930s.Footnote 68 This involved an instrument for portable electric torture, which could be used directly in the field thanks to mobile generators, sometimes combined with water to maximize the pain. This meant that the French police were equipped to torture suspects in places far away from interrogation centers. The innovation of the gégène prevailed firstly because it left almost no traces and secondly because it led to fewer deaths compared to other variations of electric torture.Footnote 69
From lan mé ga to the gégène, Indochina had an extensive and sophisticated history of torture. Colonial officials witnessed French soldiers studying and copying Vietnamese torture techniques.Footnote 70 This created an experimental atmosphere in which new techniques were tried out, reproduced and adapted by both sides. The Vietnamese intelligence expert Trần Đăng Ninh experienced this process firsthand. He himself managed to escape twice from the notorious Hỏa Lò torture prison, which is why he wanted to halt the Communists’ own use of torture, leading to its ban in 1948 in some cases for political reasons.Footnote 71 Similar abolitionist endeavors during the beginning of the Indochina War can only be observed intermittently. Rather, French torture intensified. One example of this is the rampant use of electric torture, soon spreading to Europe. The electric technique perfected in Indochina migrated overseas and reappeared in the French Gestapo during the Vichy regime. From there, electric torture was most likely passed on to Hungary via the German Gestapo during the Second World War.Footnote 72
Thus, the French experience in Indochina became an important source not only for interrogation techniques during the Second World War, but also for the subsequent global Cold War. The process of refining torture that can be traced to Indochina was fostered by new biological findings, technological inventions, and objects of modernization. Water and electricity allowed for the controlled dosing of pain. From a history of knowledge view, the development of the gégène stands out, making it possible to mobilize traceless torture across geographical space. The advent of electricity in general and the gégène in particular brought the disciplinary power of the colonial empire to the countryside. Indochina had thus become the intellectual incubator of an originally colonial but soon pan-regional pattern of torture.
Decolonization and Torture: The Violent Legacy of Indochina
As has become evident, the origin of this French savoir-faire lay in Indochina, where torture flourished. While the Algerian War is often seen as the apex of French torture, its widespread use emerged at least partially from colonial Indochina as well as the First Indochina War. There, the French Armed Forces routinely engaged in coercive methods against the Viet Minh and suspected civilian sympathizers.Footnote 73 Occasionally, the French themselves were also tortured by their enemies.Footnote 74 Though not officially sanctioned at the outset, torture became part of a recurring pattern of military operations, often justified as a tactical necessity in the struggle against guerrilla warfare. Despite this, the torture of soldiers and civilians was described in contemporary French documents as “the most despicable crimes,” part of a “full range of horrors” and “outpouring of hatred.”Footnote 75
By the early 1950s, Indochina veterans such as Charles Lacheroy began to observe and theorize their practices. This article argues that this transition from practice to doctrine marks a critical evolution where the prevailing dispositif of torture moved from an improvised countermeasure to an integral component of guerre contre-révolutionnaire. The Indochina War thus served as both a training ground and a conceptual incubator, bridging colonial military repression in Asia with its later manifestations in North Africa.
With the defeat at Điện Biên Phủ in 1954, the French had to withdraw for good. Some French contemporaries explicitly associated this battle with torture by their Vietnamese enemies: “We were tortured in Indochina, and that led to Dien Bien Phu.”Footnote 76 As the tortured Colonel and later doctoral candidate Robert Bonnafous demonstrated in his thesis, neglect and abuse were ubiquitous in the prison camps of the Viet Minh, sometimes accompanied by torture.Footnote 77 More than half—some authors put the figure as high as two-thirds—of the prisoners who survived the battle of Điện Biên Phủ died in these camps, mostly due to disease. Many were subjected to political re-education and communist brainwashing.Footnote 78 Prisoners who showed little discipline were shackled and exposed to swarms of vermin.Footnote 79 The large number of prisoners of war in Southeast Asia became one of the International Committee of the Red Cross’ biggest concerns.Footnote 80 Of the total 37,000 French prisoners, the Viet Minh are said to have released only 10,700.Footnote 81 As a result, many contemporaries spoke of a “red hell”Footnote 82 or of “deathcamps,”Footnote 83 from which only the emaciated “living dead” returned to France.Footnote 84
The surviving brutalized Indochina veterans self-righteously referred to themselves as the “Centurions of the Far East.”Footnote 85 Many of these French officers had already encountered Nazi torture techniques as part of the résistance—and many had experienced the Gestapo’s brutal torture methods firsthand. Yet, according to contemporary observers and historians, it was their colonial experience that left a deeper imprint.Footnote 86 Many captains of the French expeditionary corps, who later became colonels and generals in Algeria, were shaped by Southeast Asia.Footnote 87 The French historian Yves Courrière observed: “The injection of officers and non-commissioned officers from Indochina [to Algeria], who had been deeply affected by ‘Viet’ techniques, opened new horizons.”Footnote 88
Courrière and Raphaëlle Branche have argued that the prolonged exposure to asymmetrical warfare, guerrilla tactics, and ideological confrontation in Southeast Asia had a sustained and systematic influence on the mindset and moral worldview of these officers.Footnote 89 In contrast to the relatively brief and defensive struggles against Nazi occupation, the Indochina War exposed officers to years of attritional conflict, captivity and political re-education under Viet Minh control. As demonstrated by Dennis Leroux, anti-communist propaganda flourished in post-Second World War France. The Indochina War, and specifically the experiences of French officers in Viet Minh captivity, played a pivotal role in their radicalization. Political re-education under communist supervision fostered a deeply personal and emotional anti-communism, which the officers took with them to later campaigns, particularly in Algeria—even though the Algerian partisans were not Communists.Footnote 90 Nevertheless, psychological and political warfare became a “central feature of the Cold War,” particularly for French officers.Footnote 91 Their resistance identity was shaped by the Second World War, but it was their experiences in Indochina that led them to adopt an aggressive counterinsurgency ethos. Hence, descriptions of torture in the Indochina and Algerian wars of decolonization are strikingly similar.Footnote 92 In fact, techniques such as the gégène, naked interrogations, as well as stress positions, were used in both wars and suggest a fil rouge, culminating in the frequent use of water and electricity, causing drowning and electrocution in the most extreme cases.Footnote 93 Most of these methods were learned and passed on as forms of torture. One contemporary proudly claimed, “to conduct an interrogation, you need to know the techniques.”Footnote 94
No one better illustrates this military circulation of violence than Colonel Marcel Bigeard. He was captured and neglected by the Viet Minh in the spring of 1954, after parachuting twice over Điện Biên Phủ.Footnote 95 Bigeard later described his time in a Viet Minh prison camp as “four months … of total horror.”Footnote 96 Along with other Indochina veterans, Bigeard was transferred to Algeria only two years later. Paul Alain Léger, Bigeard’s brother in arms, is another example. He willingly adopted the Southeast Asian torture regime: “In Asia he [Léger] learnt about intelligence, and the most subtle kind of intelligence. … Only the result counted.”Footnote 97 Future General Jacques Massu was influenced by the Southeast Asian torture regime in a similar way. After the Algerian War, the contemporary witness Jules Roy accused him of being “beyond reproach” in his tolerance of violence.Footnote 98
Thus, after a crushing military defeat and the trauma of captivity, a brutalized cohort of officers was sent to North Africa in quest of revanche.Footnote 99 It was precisely because Indochina was a failed French war that leading thinkers were eager to learn lessons in order to survive in the global struggle against communist expansionism: “They believed they have learned their lesson in Indochina.”Footnote 100 Besides all their willingness to learn and adapt, the embarrassing defeat in Indochina had weakened French morale. It was even recommended by critics that frustrated officers should not be sent to Algeria.Footnote 101 However, due to an impending personnel shortage in the top ranks, this request could not be met—a decision that would have serious consequences. Former prisoners of the Viet Minh interpreted the Algerian War not simply as a colonial rebellion but as part of a global communist conspiracy. Thus, anticommunism provided a mobilizing narrative that created cohesion across diverse personal backgrounds and career frustrations.Footnote 102 Heavily influenced by the trauma of Indochina, these military thinkers became important theorists of the guerre conte-révolutionnaire—a military philosophy which adapted torture to new geopolitical realities.
Facing the Specter of Subversion and Revolution: Torture as a Covert Cold War Science
After the Second World War, the theory known as guerre contre-révolutionnaire became a protective cover for the systematic use and circulation of violence. It included practical knowledge, which was rarely codified in public, but soon gained secret validity due to the geopolitical context of the emerging Cold War. Torture techniques from the major regular wars of the twentieth century began to merge with experiences from smaller wars, to form a modern archetype of torture. This torture regime was not free-floating but was always linked to leading circles of experts and institutions. Moreover, this system of knowledge was linked to material practices. In its implementation on the ground, the torture expertise illustrates power relations and contemporary forms of biopolitical control in a particularly powerful way. It is no exaggeration to view it as a Foucauldian dispositif of power—even in democracies.Footnote 103 This dispositif comprised a characteristic set of discourses, institutions and practices through which power and ultimately violence circulated.
After the Second World War, attempts were made on both sides of the Iron Curtain to disguise torture as a legitimate interrogation technique to avoid modern, evidence-based criminal prosecution. Even more strongly than before, leading theorists argued for the abandonment of direct techniques in favor of methods and techniques that left no or only temporary physical damage. In contrast to the old, classical torture, the systematic manipulation of the psyche was supposed to produce quicker and better results. However, these interventions often led to psychological and emotional trauma. One example that illustrates the fluid transition between “physical” and “psychological” torture is stress positions, in which victims had to remain in the same position for hours on end, provoking muscle spasms.
This “science of pain” continued to flourish during the Cold War. The psychological part of this “torturology” was linked to real and sometimes hallucinatory threat scenarios. The phantasm of communist subversion by an enemy hidden deep within one’s own society legitimized contemporary forms of torture.Footnote 104 It was therefore thanks to the onset of the Cold War, decolonization and the rise of strategic research that torture did not simply disappear after the World Wars, but adapted like a chameleon to a new context. In the West, communist subversion seemed to threaten the free world as a fifth column, while in the East, capitalist influence and democratic reform were dreaded. Indirect proxy conflicts extended the Cold War and facilitated transatlantic solidarity. Claude Delmas, an influential French defense intellectual, argued in 1959 that Russian and Chinese stooges were at work in diverse countries such as Greece, Iran, Tunisia and, of course, Vietnam and Algeria.Footnote 105 It was precisely these areas that became experimental zones for sophisticated forms of torture.
French torture in Indochina and Algeria was developed in cooperation with secret services.Footnote 106 After the French withdrew from Indochina, Syria and Lebanon, they were determined to hold on to their remaining colonies, especially in geographically close North Africa. The French General Lionel “Max” Chassin and Colonel Charles Lacheroy were among the first veterans to analyze the military defeat in Southeast Asia and derive insights from it. From his rich, practical experiences, Lacheroy deduced the lesson that communist “revolutionary war” called for a new and all-encompassing counter-doctrine.Footnote 107 In a 1957 internal study, Lacheroy wrote of a “new form of warfare” that threatened the free world.Footnote 108 With regard to this new global war, the French Army had a pioneering role to play—indeed, “all possible means should be utilised.”Footnote 109 For Lacheroy, the origins of guerre contre-révolutionnaire lay in Indochina, because “no period in our military career was so formative.”Footnote 110 According to Lacheroy, communist subversion was focused in the French and British colonial territories.Footnote 111 A “total war” was now to be fought there, in which entire societies had to be militarized.Footnote 112
As a model, Lacheroy cited the findings of modern psychology and the biological insights of Sergei Chakhotin, a Russian microbiologist and ideologist of the Iron Front. Chakhotin became famous for developing pioneering propaganda techniques.Footnote 113 According to the historians Paul and Marie-Catherine Villatoux, Lacheroy’s contribution to French military thinking in the 1950s was considerable.Footnote 114 But his influence also stands out in terms of the reception he achieved. He became “the principal promoter of the French doctrine of ‘revolutionary war.’”Footnote 115 Lacheroy not only analyzed the modus operandi of the Viet Minh but also derived from it a generally applicable model of war. For him, the key to success lay with the civilian population, which had to be won over through psychological warfare. A charismatic teacher and officer who was recognized by many of his contemporaries as a gifted didactician, Lacheroy went so far as to suggest that the French neglect of the civilian population was the reason for their defeat in Southeast Asia. For Lacheroy, it was clear after Indochina that the communist enemy could no longer be dealt with by the “Code Napoléon.”Footnote 116
Like other French officers, Lacheroy was convinced that the Vietnamese guerrillas had co-opted the role of the civilian population, drawing them into their struggle, appropriating their position and functions for the guerrillas’ own political and military purposes.Footnote 117 He studied other sources, such as Mao Zedong, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, the British strategist Basil H. Liddell Hart and T. E. Lawrence.Footnote 118 From their conceptions, Lacheroy derived his own messianic doctrine. Guerre contre-révolutionnaire was conceptualized not only for application in colonial wars, but explicitly for all the wars of the twentieth century.Footnote 119
When Lacheroy was recalled from Indochina to Paris in the summer of 1953, he was put in charge of the Centre d’études Asiatiques et Africaines in the French capital. He was given the task of training French troops, which allowed him to share his understanding of the Vietnamese revolutionary war through various means, including conferences, lectures and articles.Footnote 120 A conference he co-organized at the Sorbonne in 1957 on guerre révolutionnaire et arme psychologique was open specifically to officers. There were 52,000 copies printed of Lacheroy’s own publication on guerre révolutionnaire. Footnote 121 His readers, whom he referred to as “apostles” were taught the art of this science.Footnote 122 Lacheroy and later epigones such as Colonel Roger Trinquier skillfully built on previous French thinkers on pacification such as Lucien Poirier, Maurice Prestat, Jacques Hogard and Pierre Saint-Macary.Footnote 123 According to the historian François Géré, torture was “systematised” and “banalised” in the units they commanded.Footnote 124 Moreover, the use of torture might have been a sign of bad morale. As part of guerre contre-révolutionnaire, soldiers were to undergo a specific new type of training, in small elite units and in close contact with the enemy.Footnote 125 This novel training was intended to circumvent the problem that many existing regulations contradicted Lacheroy’s vision. Instead, Lacheroy called for tolerance from above and flexibility from below as the only way to put the enemy in its place.Footnote 126 For Lacheroy, as later for the French Indochina expert Bernard B. Fall as well as Claude Delmas, the enemy was active at different levels of society and thus had to be engaged in multiple spheres.Footnote 127
Lacheroy drew his lessons from his experience as well as from historical case studies. He studied the uprisings in Madagascar, Indochina, Cambodia, Morocco and Tunisia.Footnote 128 This approach was in line with the curriculum of the École Superieure de Guerre at the time, which taught small-scale warfare from Tacfarinas in Roman Africa (17–24 AD), through the Vendéen (1789–1769), Soviet (1917), German (1918–1922), Spanish (1931–1936), Greek (1946–1949) and contemporary Moroccan and Tunisian case studies.Footnote 129 A pioneering study in this field was co-authored by the Israeli Lieutenant Colonel Mattityahu Peled, who would later serve in the notorious cinquième bureau responsible for psychological operations in Algeria.Footnote 130
Lacheroy never wrote much, commenting: “I decided on my own to train my officers in revolutionary warfare by explaining to them everything they had to do.”Footnote 131 Like Lacheroy, Bigeard, Chassin and Trinquier, many French officers learned an idealized lesson from Indochina that the French Army must never again suffer an ignominious defeat due to a lack of national will. Indeed, their colleagues later displayed a deep distrust of politicians. The abstraction of guerre contre-révolutionnaire capitalized on this resentment. It called for the ideological determination of the soldier, in the field as well as on the home front.Footnote 132 As a result, the leading role of the political was soon called into question. Lacheroy and his allies prioritized the implementation of military orders, creating a centralized command that increasingly marginalized political guidelines.
For Lacheroy, the Algerian War became an almost holy crusade in which his theory had to prevail. He saw himself as called upon to save the country from communism and to consolidate France’s status as a world power.Footnote 133 His brother in arms, Colonel Marcel Bigeard, a self-styled chivalrous officer, proclaimed:Footnote 134 “As defenders of the freedom of the West, we are here as ambassadors for the Crusaders.”Footnote 135 Many other French officers articulated similar views.Footnote 136 The analysis of guerre révolutionnaire was largely based on the military approach of the Viet Minh and was reverse-engineered to defeat similar opponents.Footnote 137
The wrong lessons of Indochina thus became a “huge machinery put in place by the [French] Army.”Footnote 138 This systemic ideology interpreted the Cold War as an intermediate condition in between war and peace, and as a global confrontation with Bolshevism.Footnote 139 Geopolitics was often associated with very specific, interest-driven interpretations of history. But this was primarily a discourse in semi-official journals and organs. Partly because of the arrogance of the spokesmen, the dissemination of knowledge was slow. Toward the end of the 1950s, however, the first written instructions became available.Footnote 140
One of the excesses of guerre contre-révolutionnaire was the implicit tolerance of torture and, in more than a few cases, its active propagation. This behavior had little to do with a strong and confident military. Desperate for a solution, many apologists expected all available military and psychological means to be made available, including semi-legal and illegal instruments.Footnote 141 After all, many of the principles of guerre contre-révolutionnaire were in open conflict with international humanitarian law and human rights. Alluding to Carl von Clausewitz, Colonel Antoine Argoud, for example, weaponized one of the Prussian war theorist’s most famous quotes to illustrate the effectiveness of torture: “Do certain forms of torture […] contradict the demands of a Christian conscience? … Within the framework we have set ourselves, torture and capital punishment are acts of war. And war is an act of violence designed to force an adversary to carry out our will. Violence is the means. The goal is to impose our will on the enemy. … War is an act of violence and there is no limit to the manifestation of this violence.”Footnote 142
The defeat in Indochina thus became the starting point for a generation of officers with bold ideas and an impulse driven by action. Consequently, there was a call for similar methods and means. By the end of the 1950s, the discourse on torture in France had been radicalized into the following syllogism: “psychological action = revolutionary war = torture.”Footnote 143
The French military had thus developed its concept for winning future wars. This approach was implemented in Algeria and then exported by French advisers to the United States and Latin America, where modern knowledge of torture was to spread even further. Guerre contre-révolutionnaire became the intellectual matrix, “a new set of operational and strategic ‘fixed values’” in which torture could be transmitted.Footnote 144 As a result, the experience of recent years would soon inform the use of torture by allied countries during the Cold War and beyond.Footnote 145 It was less the military or political effectiveness of modern torture that was decisive. Rather, it was the mostly unofficial embedding of subtle techniques in an overall ideological concept, which soon gained global popularity due to an apparent lack of alternatives. A specter haunted the “free world,” and guerre contre-révolutionnaire seemed the viable response to this apparent danger.
Globalizing Knowledge against Subversion: Ideologues, Theorists and Followers
The intellectual scaffolding of guerre contre-révolutionnaire benefited from the practical experiences of most of its advocates. But to what extent was it the intellectual system that transmitted torture? By exploring the circulation of torture knowledge, a previously hidden history of organized violence is uncovered.
The strong anti-communism of guerre contre-révolutionnaire facilitated both the direct and indirect spread of knowledge to more remote areas. Indeed, the transnational campaign against communism favored the export. What was tested in Indochina was further differentiated in France’s second great war of decolonization in Algeria. Though the Algerian insurgents were very different in their fighting style and morale, the French colloquially referred to them as “Viets.”Footnote 146 While France would also lose this war, the matrix of torture tested in the Kasbah of Algiers was soon exported to the United States—and thus indirectly back again to Vietnam—but also to Latin America.Footnote 147
With the arrival of experienced colonial officers and troops from Indochina, the French changed their tactics in Algeria from 1956 onward. The Indochina veterans formed a tight-knit group, with a great deal of firsthand experience.Footnote 148 French author Jean Lartéguy described the importance of Algeria as a testing ground for the spread of the lessons learned: “It was here that a new concept of war was developed, based on several experiences that the instructors had gone through: Indochina, Diên Biên Phu, the Viet Minh camps, fighting in the sands or the jebels, the battle of Algiers. Everything is carefully calculated around a single idea: to make the captain, on whom all the weight of this war rests, a trained athlete, a revolutionary war leader, a believer who can transform himself from a high-tech scout into a political agitator.”Footnote 149
The new French leadership began to informally and unofficially tolerate, and in some cases promote, this violent version of counterinsurgency. The Algerian case illustrates that even former victims of torture, in this case from Indochina or the Second World War, could themselves use torture—that is, that victims of torture can later become torturers.Footnote 150 The focus in Algeria was on the civilian population as the “sine qua non for victory.”Footnote 151 Human intelligence was linked both to strategic intelligence operations in France and to clandestine operations in other countries, particularly Israel. The key to success in guerre contre-révolutionnaire seemed to lie in the rapid dissemination of important information. At the same time, conventional land warfare tactics with heavy weapons and standing troops were perceived as counterproductive.Footnote 152 In the struggle against subversives, water torture in the bathtub or electricity applied by the gégène were more promising because they left no traces and therefore could not be proven even by doctors, according to an internal investigation order.Footnote 153 Even the French poster boy David Galula, a leading theorist who drew on his experiences from Algeria to write influential treatises, admitted to having used “physical deprivation and psychological coercion.”Footnote 154 Euphemistically referred to as “police methods,” one of these techniques “consisted of placing suspects in shallow trenches closed-off with barbed wire, and then denying them food and water until they provided information.”Footnote 155 Galula’s biographer assumed that his protagonist had learned these torture techniques from previous wars. Later, the United States rediscovered the advice of Galula, whose work was recognized in 2008 during the war on terror when it was translated from English into French.Footnote 156
Before Galula could be utilized for the war on terror, the influence of French ideas reached Latin America. Both French and Anglo-American expertise are partly responsible for the excesses of torture there. In Argentina, for example, the ground for torture was prepared in a discursive process initiated in the 1950s, in which Argentine and French officers objectified and popularized the counterrevolutionary war as the war of the future. As the former chief of police of Buenos Aires, General Ramón Camps, explained: “In Argentina, we were influenced first by the French and then by the United States. … [The French] organised centres for teaching counterinsurgency techniques … and sent out instructors, observers, and an enormous amount of literature.”Footnote 157
The Argentinian reception of the French lessons flourished in the following years. The Argentine Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra, published by the Naval War College, reported non-stop on the French “fight against subversion.”Footnote 158 These interpretations culminated in a course on subversive actions organized in 1981.Footnote 159 Not only was French know-how used, but British and American counterinsurgency techniques were also referenced in Argentina.Footnote 160 As in other Latin American countries, the Argentine Armed Forces were ideologically assigned the role of a “civilising force” on the way to a “new and glorious nation.”Footnote 161
The French influence in Argentina can be traced back to Colonel Carlos Jorge “Chivo” Rosas. He was a student at the École Supérieure de Guerre in Paris in the 1950s. On his return, Rosas worked as a professor of strategy and tactics in Buenos Aires, and was a regular contributor to the Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra. Footnote 162 Other Argentine officers who studied in Paris during the Cold War were Pedro Tibiletti, later director of the Escuela Superior de Guerra in Buenos Aires, Cándido Hure, later vice-director of that school, Manrique Miguel Mom, author of various articles on revolutionary war and teacher at the Escuela Superior de Guerra, Alcides López Aufranc and later Edgardo Daneri. They even regularly invited radicalized French members of the terrorist Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS) to Argentina to share their knowledge.Footnote 163 In addition, French diplomats had been working in an official mission in Buenos Aires since the late 1950s. The three French officers stationed in Argentina were pleased that German influence on the Argentine Armed Forces was beginning to fade after the Second World War in favor of French ideas.Footnote 164 The last French military advisers did not leave Argentina until 1981.Footnote 165 However, the heyday of French influence came in the early 1960s. Afterward, the defeat in Algeria and a failed colonels’ putsch in France led to a crisis of the French school in Latin America, before it was revived by Franco-American representatives in the 1970s.Footnote 166 Through years of training, the French prepared the ground for Argentine torture during the military dictatorship.Footnote 167 The close contact with France meant that “most torture methods were developed before 1976.”Footnote 168 Ramón J. Camps compared the very similar French and American concepts and concluded that: “The French pointed to the overall design, whereas the North Americans focused exclusively or nearly exclusively on military aspects.”Footnote 169
Only later did imported influences from the “amigo americano” greatly enrich the characteristic knowledge of torture.Footnote 170 As early as 1957 and 1958, Patrice de Naurois, a French Lieutenant-Colonel and adviser to the Argentinean Escuela Superior de Guerra, described French warfare in the school’s official journal.Footnote 171 Shortly afterward, de Naurois, a close follower of the French doctrine, wrote on the “strategy and tactics of the Viet Minh during the Indochina campaign.” This essay referred to France as a role model for Argentina.Footnote 172 On this basis, the author developed his own theory of subversive war,Footnote 173 the foundation for later debates on the Indochina War, most notably from the pen of Colonel and Professor D. Leopoldo R. Ornstein.Footnote 174 As early as 1959, Colonel Manrique Miguel Mom argued that conventional war theories should be considered obsolete in the face of current threats. Instead, the real danger to Latin America came from the followers of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao. Since this unpredictable adversary sought “absolute power over body and soul,” only the militarization of society could help.Footnote 175 A year earlier, Mom edited an article on “revolutionary war” by French officer Jacques Hogard, which was translated into Spanish.Footnote 176 In the autumn of 1958, the François Pierre Badie saw French psychological warfare as “the order of the day,” which “together with the atomic bomb could change the laws of war.”Footnote 177 According to Badie, “revolutionary war” was aimed at “the human spirit,” referring explicitly to French military officers.Footnote 178 For Badie, this psychological warfare had no limits, either spatial or social. He linked it to a well-known slogan from Carl von Clausewitz:
The psychological struggle has a permanent character. … If war is the continuation of policy by other means, peace is also nothing more than the continuation of war by other means. … Like all warfare, psychological warfare has an objective: military conquest without the use of armed forces. … Like classical warfare, psychological warfare has its terrain and its theatre, which is the world of ideas. It engages in “operations” with well-defined objectives in time and space. Psychological warfare also has its “centre of gravity”: it is man who must be convinced, conquered, by modifying his convictions; and its “axes of effort” which are the moral or intellectual values of the human being, his thoughts, his tendencies, his instincts, his unstable and sometimes contradictory feelings.Footnote 179
Hence psychological warfare was seen as “part of a total war,” which was primarily about information:Footnote 180 “Any operation must be based on the deepest possible prior knowledge of the enemy.”Footnote 181 Later, Badie wrote a lengthy text about the Chinese “revolutionary war,” which he failed to fully comprehend.Footnote 182 Colonel Tomás A. Sánchez de Bustamante did the same, referring to the French interpretation by Lionel Chassin,Footnote 183 and describing the international communism lurking everywhere as “intrinsically perverse.” Again, French military figures such as Chassin as well as French war experiences in Southeast Asia and North Africa were used to support this thesis.Footnote 184 Lieutenant-Colonel Jean Nougues, another French guest writer, introduced Argentinian readers to French operations in Algeria.Footnote 185 French Lieutenant-Colonel Henri Grand d’Esnon, meanwhile, focused on the characteristics of subversive warfare.Footnote 186 Jean Nougues pointed to a communist threat to the entire Latin American subcontinent.Footnote 187 The French General Raoul Salan, who had a sinister past in the use of torture in Algeria, was introduced to the audience by the Argentinean Colonel Jorge Raúl Orfila.Footnote 188 In 1963, a special issue of the Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra devoted almost two hundred pages to the French experience of war in Indochina. According to the authors, this was the only truly “revolutionary war” to date: “Consequently, the experiences and lessons learned from its study are of extraordinary value.”Footnote 189
Hence, Lieutenant Colonel López Aufranc argued that French definitions of “counter-revolution” against organized terrorism should be applied to Argentina.Footnote 190 He saw the infiltration of society by the Communists as the main problem. López Aufranc even visited the Algerian theatre of war, where he served in the French psychological warfare unit. In 1958, more than a hundred Argentine officers followed López Aufranc’s lead and traveled to Algeria, a country they believed was under threat from communism.Footnote 191 It may therefore have been López Aufranc’s experience that allowed French ideas to flourish in Argentina. He later commented as follows:
At the Argentinian General Staff, we heard talk of French doctrine, which was very much in vogue at the time. That is why I was selected to train in counter-revolutionary war. The teachers [at the French Higher School of War] talked about nothing else! And for me, that was something completely new. We did not yet know of this kind of problem in Latin America. There were political struggles, and they were sometimes violent, but they were not subversive in nature, because the Communist Party had not begun its infiltration work. … We were convinced that World War Three was imminent and that the Soviet Union was going to try to open a front on Argentinian territory. … It was thanks to the teaching of the French that I understood that the enemy could be the people and that to win the war, we had to win minds.Footnote 192
Thanks to lessons like these, the shrewd López Aufranc had made himself a sought-after teacher. General Spirito, the chief of staff of the Argentine Army, used his influence to appoint him chairman of the newly formed Committee to Combat Marxist Expansion.Footnote 193 As a result of these intellectual influences, leading Argentine officers began to read Roger Trinquier.Footnote 194 In addition, the Revista de la Escuela Superior de Guerra published reports on French counterinsurgency under “Humberto” Lyautey, French geostrategists, French military regulations, French defense policy and, last but not least, French advice on infiltration tactics.Footnote 195
Thus, when the tricolor was taken down from over Algiers in 1962, sealing the end of France’s colonial empire in North Africa, the French concept of counterinsurgency was given a new lease of life in Latin America. In fact, after a brief hiatus in the second half of the 1970s, Gallic influences regained ground in Argentina when Robert Servent, a veteran of the Second World War, Indochina and Algeria, was sent to Buenos Aires. He moved into his office in the French military mission, which was still set up in the Escuela Superior, and was happy to pass on his experience. Servent was friends with Argentina’s last military dictator, Reynaldo Bignone, as well as with another French torture expert, Paul Aussaresses.
It was Servent who resurrected the French doctrine from Algeria and popularized it in Buenos Aires under the guise of gathering information.Footnote 196 All too often he drew on his extensive experience of torture in Algeria.Footnote 197 Other leading French ideologues such as General André Beaufre and Colonel Roger Trinquier, both veterans of Indochina and Algeria, lectured in Buenos Aires and their books and articles were translated into Spanish in the 1970s. Trinquier’s book La Guerre Moderne was already translated into Spanish in 1963. In the Spanish preface, Trinquier did not mince his words, extolling the values of torture. Just as the anti-aircraft gun was used against foreign aircraft and the machine gun was used by the infantryman, the righteous soldier against terrorism had to use torture.Footnote 198 Bernard B. Fall spoke of a “Cartesian rationality” within whose terms Trinquier and other officers saw the use of torture.Footnote 199
The Argentinians would soon exceed the boldest expectations of their much-praised French teachers. Argentine Lieutenant-Colonel Federico later said: “In any case, it was thanks to the teaching we received on the Algerian Revolutionary War that we were able to wage our own war in Argentina. … We can try to live in denial, but to win an anti-subversive war, torture is unavoidable.”Footnote 200
General Acdes Vilas pointed out the practical relevance of his French role models: “I say this with pride. … I have been paying attention to work on this subject published in France … produced by OAS and French army officers who had fought in Indochina and in Algeria. … On the basis of the experience gathered throughout these classics in the field, … I started issuing orders.”Footnote 201
These orders were often imbued with a hypertrophic fear of a Latin American fifth column, which also allowed for the targeted disappearance of victims, usually from helicopters and airplanes. The elimination of torture victims had already been popularized by French exponents in Algeria, before being copied in Guatemala and Argentina. It was later reproduced in Chile, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Peru and Colombia.Footnote 202 In the broadest sense, the long-term detention of captives without clear sentences and outside the established justice system as part of the American war on terror could also be interpreted as a similar form of enforced disappearance.Footnote 203
Conclusion
During the Argentine military dictatorship, French knowledge of regulated pain was brutally perfected. Electricity and water, which had previously proved effective and left no traces, were now used in Latin America. In the second half of the twentieth century, it became increasingly important to avoid leaving physical marks to prevent litigation.
Hence, sophisticated stress positions partly derived from military punishment as well as homegrown torture techniques, sleep deprivation and methods of sensory deprivation were added, all of which had already been developed in rudimentary form in colonial Indochina (see for example figure 1). This cultivated knowledge system spread to the Latin American continent through Operación Cóndor, a network of political repression orchestrated by the right-wing dictatorships in South America’s Cono Sur. With American support, intelligence officers and agents researched modern forms of torture and passed them on. In the twentieth century, this gave rise to a specific culture of torture, characterized by a “strategic syncretism” that found eager customers in the global South.Footnote 204 The Americans soon became interested in the French modus operandi. Roger Trinquier, one of the most prominent representatives of the French school, visited American training centers in Korea and Japan as early as 1950. Jacques Lacheroy taught at Fort Bragg after the Algerian War, and French liaison officers were stationed in the United States from 1952 onward. As an instructor and adviser at the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, the French General Paul Aussaresses lectured on revolutionary war and the use of torture to break insurgents, after having gained teaching experience on this topic in Brazil.Footnote 205
The dirty wars of the Cold War were not about fighting militant communism. Instead, the aim was to expose subversive elements in a seemingly endless crusade of good against evil. The discourse of guerre contre-révolutionnaire produced formations of knowledge that framed Western social and moral order as under threat, authorizing violent practices and embedding them within a broader regime of security and truth production. This knowledge regime thus legitimized the administrative power to torture so long as it did not leave a trace. Techniques evolved away from the traditional violent, cruel and bloody torture toward a supposedly “clean,” clinical and sober variant. The idea of guerre contre-révolutionnaire was characterized by the structural connection between a military‑conservative worldview and the use of increasingly subtle and sophisticated torture techniques. Thanks to this intellectual link, the concept of nuanced or “white” torture enjoyed great popularity in many anti-communist regimes. In some cases, it may even have spilled over to their enemies. Regardless of France’s defeats in Indochina and Algeria, this modern school of thought had successfully cultivated and embedded elaborate techniques into a conceptual framework that would continue to gain traction—particularly in Latin America. Guerre contre-révolutionnaire, developed in Indochina and Algeria, became the intellectual umbrella under which covert torture techniques were validated and applied.
In the global war on terror, many elements of this sinister expertise flared up again in the new millennium and under new ideological premises. It was no longer the global struggle against communism that provided it with its intellectual spine, but a seemingly world-spanning war on Islamic terrorism. Clearly, American counterinsurgency ideas in the war on terror were heavily shaped by French influences from Indochina and Algeria. What had been the reflexive imperial reaction of the mid-twentieth century would again be repeated during the first years of the twenty-first. To many Americans, the covert use of torture was acceptable and not counterproductive.Footnote 206 Thus the U.S. intelligence agencies had at their disposal many years of experience and a broad knowledge of sophisticated torture techniques. The transregional knowledge of modern torture existed—after 9/11 it just had to be brought out of the secret archives and into the dark interrogation dungeons. This dark dispositif of power has influenced a globally appealing science of torture that continues to haunt us.
Acknowledgements
The author gratefully acknowledges the participants of the annual colloquium of the Chair for History of the Modern World at ETH Zurich for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this article. He is particularly indebted to Harald Fischer-Tiné, Anne Kwaschik and Stephan Martin Scheuzger for their insightful and generous feedback. The author also wishes to express his sincere thanks to the editors of Comparative Studies in Society and History, as well as to the journal’s anonymous reviewers, whose constructive suggestions were invaluable in shaping the final version of this study. Additionally, the author wishes to thank Lauren Kapsalakis for her careful copyediting of the article.