This article introduces the Comparative Conspiracy Research Survey (CCRS) dataset, an individual-level cross-sectional dataset on conspiracy beliefs in eight countries: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Lebanon, Morocco, South Africa, and the USA. The dataset contains general conspiracy belief scales, as well as country specific data on dominant conspiracy theories. In addition, the questionnaire contains validated scales of social trust, populist attitudes, authoritarianism, self-esteem as well as items measuring political interest, ideology, and socioeconomic class. In this research note, we present the methodology of the survey and provide an example of how researchers can use the dataset. This example tackles the difference in the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and activism intentions across countries. We highlight that activism is related to conspiracy beliefs in consolidated democracies, but not necessarily in developing democracies or more authoritarian regimes. Lastly, we conclude by laying out several possibilities for research using the CCRS dataset.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, opposition parties found themselves in a dilemma: either to cooperate with the government for the nation’s sake or to take advantage of the situation for political purposes. However, the extant research has not yet fully uncovered the patterns of opposition behaviour during this recent and rather intense crisis. In this article, we examine the case of Portugal, exploring possible differences between opposition parties on this regard and taking into consideration the role of time and focus of COVID-19-related legislation. We do so by investigating the behaviour of opposition parties in parliament, through an analysis of their voting behaviour, enriched by party leader statements, between March 2020 and January 2022. Our results show a different pattern to the right of the incumbent, with the main opposition party being more collaborative (framing its behaviour as responsible and patriotic) than the newer right-wing opposition parties, both populist and not populist. Pandemic gravity and focus of the legislation under vote are also relevant factors of opposition behaviour.

The Covid-19 epidemic came at a sensitive time for Russia’s leadership, which was attempting a political reset and structural reforms, including the removal of President Putin’s presidential term limits. This article examines how issues related to the pandemic provided new opportunities for the systemic opposition, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, who emerged as the main beneficiaries after capitalising on opportunities created by the epidemic. The underappreciated role of systemic opposition parties in electoral authoritarian systems, which balance “voice” and “loyalty” to benefit both themselves and the regime, is examined in the context of the Covid-19 crisis.

During the pandemic, science became one of the most salient issues in European polities. At the same time, relevant sectors of European societies were sceptical about science-driven policy to contain the pandemic (e.g., lockdowns or vaccine mandates). The literature so far has analysed the relevance of trust in experts and trust in science in determining compliance to pandemic-related policies. However, we still do not know what are the drivers that lead to (dis)trust science. In this paper, we contribute to fill this gap, by analysing the association between technocratic and populist attitudes and trust in science. Using a novel survey, fielded in Italy, among a sample of 5.000 respondents, we show that populism and technocracy are strongly related with (dis)trust in science in opposite directions.

This article reflects on the significance of Ukraine’s European choice—a series of pro-European political choices that both Ukraine’s citizens and its political elites gradually committed to, and which crystallized during and after the 2013 Euromaidan protest. Russia refused to accept Ukraine’s European choice, starting the first wave of aggression against Ukraine as soon as the Euromaidan won in early 2014, and ultimately launching the full-scale invasion in February 2022. As Ukrainians defend their European choice, important lessons can be drawn from their resistance to Russia’s aggression. We identify three lessons for Europe and three lessons for political science.

The symposium is motivated by the question of how the war in Ukraine is ‘framed’ and ‘narrated’ in media outside the West. It aims to shed light on the diverse ways in which information is manipulated and disseminated to serve political interests. The emphasis on developing an interdisciplinary conceptual prism is particularly noteworthy. Integrating insights from International Relations, Geopolitics, and Media and Communication studies offers a holistic understanding of the complex dynamics at play. Moreover, by highlighting the influence of foreign propaganda and disinformation campaigns, the symposium underscores the importance of critically analysing media representations in shaping public perceptions and potentially influencing foreign policies. Understanding these dynamics is crucial for mitigating the impact of misinformation and fostering informed public discourse on global conflicts. The symposium promises to contribute significantly to the scholarly understanding of the nexus between conflict and communication, while also offering valuable insights for policymakers and media practitioners alike.

Russia’s unprovoked war on Ukraine has deteriorated the security environment in all neighbouring countries. Some of these countries are terrified of the risk of further Russian invasions while others express less fear of Russian hostile and unlawful actions. The aim of the paper is to outline the Kremlin’s narratives presented in Romanian and Bulgarian media and their impact on the security concerns of both countries. The paper argues that Russia uses media to spread narratives trying to reshape public opinion and to aggravate insecurity and distrust. The arguments are divided into the following parts: First, Romania’s and Bulgaria’s perceptions of Russia are analysed; second and third sections describe the Russian official rhetoric presented in the local media. The conclusion sums up the outcomes of both cases and the impact of the Kremlin’s narratives on Romania and Bulgaria.

The article’s main purpose is to understand the differences in the perceptions of Russian narratives in post-communist European countries by examining the role of the local media after February 2022. The research question is: What factors determine the degree of official Russian narratives’ influence on media discourses about the Russian–Ukrainian war of 2022 in Central and South-Eastern Europe (the cases of Poland and Serbia)? The paper is based on a discourse analysis of articles in major Polish and Serbian quality national broadsheet daily newspapers and online news portals (Rzeczpospolita and Politika) for a six-month period (February 24–August 23, 2022). The article aims to show that the official Russian rhetoric is regularly spread by the local media and that it should be perceived as a tool of the Kremlin's task to change the public opinion in the region.

The war in Ukraine has exposed fundamental Russian narratives and historically based propaganda issues in Turkish internal and foreign policy. Besides, Turkey's own foreign policy visions and goals of its Russian propaganda has also contributed to the anti-Ukrainian and anti-American discourse. This research was conducted to explore how Russia has used its propaganda in media and information campaigns in the Turkish Republic to influence public opinion and pursue its foreign policy goals related to the war in Ukraine. This article argues that widespread pro-Kremlin messages in the Turkish political environment and media are deeply connected to historical, ideological, and media discourses. The arguments are presented in specific subchapters: historical background of the bilateral relations of Russia and Turkey, the domestic political and economic context, ideological views of political forces, media and disinformation.

In a late October 2022 international YouGov public opinion poll, findings indicated that more Indians attributed responsibility for the Russian invasion of Ukraine to ‘the West’ rather than Russia (28% compared to 27%, while 45% indicated both were accountable or expressed uncertainty). This study seeks to elucidate why such perceptions prevail, drawing upon the longstanding strategic partnership between the former Soviet Union and, subsequently, Russia, with India dating back to the 1950s and the portrayal of the Russian invasion within Indian broadcast news media. We argue that the media coverage of the conflict exhibits three main frames: the invasion as an attack by Russia on Ukrainian sovereignty, an anti-West pro-Russia frame, and a perspective aligning with Indian national interests. Both international and domestic proponents of these frames actively seek to shape the narrative presented, with media organizations deciding which frames to prioritize and which political actors to endorse. Consequently, we argue that the news media plays a pivotal role in shaping public perceptions of the conflict, influencing the Indian government's approach toward the war.