Hostname: page-component-784d4fb959-splj4 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-07-15T03:49:58.583Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Gender and Bureaucratic Overload in the Grassroots State: Work–Life Choices of Female Civil Servants in Rural China

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 June 2025

Qi Song
Affiliation:
School of International Journalism and Communication, Beijing Foreign Studies University, Beijing, China
Ling Han*
Affiliation:
Gender Studies Programme, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Chengpang Lee
Affiliation:
School of Sociology, Central China Normal University, Wuhan, China
*
Corresponding author: Ling Han; Email: linghan@cuhk.edu.hk
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This study explores an emerging yet under-researched group within the Chinese bureaucratic system: grassroots female civil servants. Although there is a growing focus in academia on female officials in China, existing research mainly concentrates on the gender representation and career pathways of high-ranking female officials. This research delves into the work and life choices faced by female civil servants in local governments. Despite official discourse advocating for gender equality, interviews with 21 female public servants from a poverty-stricken county in northern China reveal that the demands of local government work and gender norms impose a double burden on them. Although the civil service is known for its stability, these women often have to put in extra effort into demanding and exhausting jobs, frequently sacrificing promotion opportunities to balance family and caregiving responsibilities. However, they seldom express dissatisfaction with this situation, reflecting the entrenched nature of gender role perceptions. This study provides a new explanation for the underrepresentation of female officials at higher levels from a grassroots perspective and reveals the impact of overloaded bureaucratic work on career mobility.

摘要

摘要

本研究探讨了中国官僚体系中一个新兴却尚未得到充分关注的群体—基层女性公务员。尽管学界对中国女性官员的关注与日俱增, 但现有研究主要集中于高层女性官员的性别代表性和职业流动路径。本研究深入探讨了基层政府中女性公务员面临的工作与生活抉择。虽然官方话语倡导性别平等,但通过对北方某贫困县21 名女性公务员的访谈发现,地方政府的工作要求和性别规范给她们带来了双重负担。尽管公务员职业以稳定性著称,但这些女性却得在漫长而繁重的工作中付出更多努力,常常为兼顾家庭和照料责任而妥协牺牲晋升机会。然而她们鲜少对此表示不满,这一现象折射出性别角色观念的根深蒂固。本研究从基层视角为女性高层官员代表性不足的现象提供了新的解释,并揭示了官僚行政工作超负荷运转对职业流动的影响。

Information

Type
Research Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of SOAS University of London.

The civil service has become one of the most sought-after and competitive careers in China, with the number of female civil servants in central and local government growing rapidly over the past decade.Footnote 1Although official data on female civil servants are limited, a 2019 report indicated that 1.9 million women were working in state and Party agencies, accounting for 26.5 per cent of all bureaucrats.Footnote 2In 2017, female recruits in central government agencies and their directly affiliated institutions accounted for 52.4 per cent, while women represented 44 per cent of newly recruited civil servants at the local government level.Footnote 3These numbers show that women are becoming increasingly prominent within China’s bureaucracy and constitute a significant portion of grassroots civil servants.Footnote 4Yet, despite growing interest in higher-ranking female officials and provincial leaders’ gender representation, female grassroots bureaucrats (jiceng nü gongwuyuan 基层女公务员) remain understudied.Footnote 5This study thus focuses on examining the work–life choices of female grassroots bureaucrats.

The Chinese government, upholding gender equality as a national policy, has actively promoted women’s representation in the public sector through gender quotas.Footnote 6In recent years, the government has introduced policies to boost women’s participation in national and social affairs. The quota mandating at least one female leader in provincial governments and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) committees, established in the 1990s, was expanded to subnational levels with the introduction of the 2006 policy, “Opinions on further enhancing the training and selection of female cadres and development of female Party members.”Footnote 7Leading members of the people’s congresses, Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) committees and governments at all levels must include female representatives, with at least 20 per cent of reserve cadres at the provincial, city and county levels being women.Footnote 8Recent documents such as the “Outline for women’s development in China (2021–2030)” and the “Human rights action plan of China (2021–2025)” emphasize the importance of increasing women’s participation within the civil service at all levels as a clear state policy goal.Footnote 9

The existing literature on China’s grassroots bureaucracy tends to overlook inherent gender dynamics, while recent studies on gender and leadership focus primarily on women in higher bureaucratic positions. A study by Minglu Chen investigates whether male and female provincial leaders are selected using different criteria and finds that female civil servants at higher levels are equally qualified as their male counterparts, particularly in education.Footnote 10This finding challenges the common stereotype that women benefit from a “gender dividend” in promotions, such as being perceived as “innocent young girls” (wuzhi shaonü 无知少女).Footnote 11Zhengxu Wang and Weina Dai’s research on village self-governance found that women were underrepresented on committees in the early 2010s.Footnote 12It is important to note that village committee members are not formally recognized as state bureaucrats. In recent years, there has been a noticeable increase in the number of women holding government positions; however, the all-male composition of the 20th Politburo formed in October 2022 presents a more complex picture.Footnote 13Xinhui Jiang’s research indicates that women working at the subnational level are more likely to be assigned to traditionally feminine posts, and that their career paths differ from those of their male counterparts.Footnote 14Additionally, women’s representation in county-level people’s congresses also varies greatly, reflecting the uneven influence of local politics.Footnote 15

While these studies examining the Chinese bureaucracy through a gender lens are insightful, their focus on higher-ranking cadres may overlook the nuanced experiences and work–life choices that female grassroots bureaucrats encounter in both their careers and personal lives.Footnote 16Furthermore, while studies find that the gender composition has changed at the top level, we still do not know how that change affects the work and lives of female grassroots civil servants. Given the importance of grassroots civil servants and the increasing number of women working in grassroots government, we aim to address the following research questions: what are the working conditions and life choices of female grassroots bureaucrats as they attempt to balance work and life? How do female grassroots bureaucrats navigate work and life amid overtime demands? This study examines these questions based on in-depth interviews with grassroots female civil servants, their spouses and male colleagues in a poor county in northern China.

The article proceeds as follows. First, we review the literature on civil servants, grassroots bureaucracy and women’s role in the grassroots state in China. Then, we discuss our research methodology and interviewee profiles. We move on to analyse the experiences of these female grassroots bureaucrats in managing their work and personal lives. We find that bureaucratic overload is so prevalent that overtime has become the norm. Consequently, female civil servants need to adjust their strategies at different life stages to balance high work pressures with caregiving responsibilities or personal pursuits. Nevertheless, balancing party-state requirements with family responsibilities remains extremely challenging, leading many to prioritize their families over advancing their careers, often opting out of promotion competitions. Our findings on the double burden imposed by the local state’s demands and gender norms offer an alternative explanation for women’s lower promotion rates, which often stem from inevitability or personal choices. We conclude that these women’s work–life choices, shaped by uneven patriarchal structures, offer a bottom-up explanation for the ongoing lack of higher-ranking female officials, despite government promotion efforts.

Civil Servants at the Grassroots State

In this paper, “grassroots civil servants” (jiceng gongwuyuan 基层公务员) refers to state-funded bureaucrats within the national administrative system who work at the county, city (without sub-districts), township and street-level offices. They enter the service through the civil service exam or other channels, such as selected students, external hires, career changes or job transfers. Although terms like “grassroots civil servant” and “grassroots bureaucrat” are widely used, the State Council only formally defined “grassroots government” (jiceng zhengfu 基层政府) in 2020.Footnote 17Since the 2016 bureaucratic reform, comprehensive data on civil servants have not been publicly available.Footnote 18While recent official data are lacking, it was estimated that, in 2016, China had approximately 7.19 million civil servants, with local hires comprising over 85 per cent of the national total.Footnote 19Reports from that year indicate that fewer than 12,000 civil servants, or about 0.2 per cent of the workforce, resigned in 2015, suggesting an overall stability in their numbers.Footnote 20

In China, the grassroots bureaucracy (jiceng 基层) is often vividly described as the single needle that weaves through the thousands of threads dangling from the upper-level governments to the local state. This grassroots level is the primary site for absorbing bureaucratic pressure, as it carries out essential administrative functions crucial to the regime’s stability.Footnote 21Grassroots bureaucrats are often required to work beyond their regular hours and on weekends for special assignments and are frequently in communication with their supervisors and community residents outside of working hours.Footnote 22As the sinew of Chinese state power, they must execute complex directives from higher authorities with care and skill while serving as local moral models; however, rent-seeking behaviour can sometimes occur.Footnote 23Many parents view civil service positions as an “iron rice bowl” (tiefanwan 铁饭碗), a secure and stable career choice for their children, making these positions highly sought after.Footnote 24

In China, the current bureaucratic system is built upon the framework established by the 13th National Congress of the CCP in 1987. This congress set out the national civil servant system, which is guided by the Civil Service Law.Footnote 25In 1994, the Ministry of Personnel introduced the national civil servant examination system through the “Interim provisions on civil servant recruitment.” The Civil Service Law was later enacted in 2006.Footnote 26Chinese civil servants are classified according to their post and grade. According to Article 14, these fall into three main categories: comprehensive administration, professional skills, and administrative law enforcement.Footnote 27The grade system is applied to posts below the bureau level (tingjuji 厅局级). The law mandates that civil servants at level one or below must undergo open examinations, strict reviews and merit-based competition. Consequently, grassroots civil servants are typically recruited through open examinations, which include both examinations open to general applicants and those restricted to certain groups, such as military cadres, soldiers or college student village officials (daxuesheng cunguan 大学生村官).

Grassroots civil servants’ behaviour is shaped by China’s evolving governance model and bureaucratic system.Footnote 28In the past, the grassroots bureaucracy was characterized by a laid-back culture of “a cup of tea, a cigarette, and half a day spent reading the newspaper” (yibeicha yizhiyan yizhang baozhi kanbantian 一杯茶 一支烟 一张报纸看半天).Footnote 29Today, however, an overtime culture is prevalent among grassroots bureaucrats. The popular 2022 TV drama, Bright Future (Xianwei dayuan 县委大院), vividly portrays the lives of grassroots civil servants, depicting their endless meetings, mobilization campaigns (for example, forest fire prevention, rural revitalization, pandemic control) and a 24/7 on-call overtime culture.Footnote 30

The overload facing grassroots bureaucracy has become widespread across China, leading to exhausted civil servants and an “overstretched leviathan.”Footnote 31Grassroots bureaucrats face constant pressure, with little distinction between holidays and regular workdays. The pervasive overtime culture stems from the vast responsibilities imposed on basic government units, as township and county levels bear the full weight of higher-level directives. The slogan of “guarding the ground with responsibility” (shoutu youze 守土有责) signifies that civil servants working at the town or county level are responsible for everything within their jurisdiction. In recent years, the immense pressure from above to achieve diverse and sometimes contradictory goals has intensified, resulting in an increased tendency to work overtime.

Women at the Chinese Grassroots Bureaucracy

While the civil service promises job security and benefits, life in grassroots government often involves compromises, as extended work hours strain the work–family balance, especially for women. As a result, women face additional barriers to career mobility. Even with gender quotas established during hiring, women make up less than 10 per cent of leadership positions.Footnote 32As local governments struggle with bureaucratic overload and extended work hours, the culture of overwork among grassroots civil servants has further blurred the boundaries between work and personal life, making work–family alignment particularly challenging for women

This study investigates the work and family dynamics of female civil servants in grassroots government. Grounded in their social and cultural context, we view these women as active agents who make conscious choices regarding political promotion and their personal lives. The CCP has long been ideologically committed to equal rights for men and women, encouraging women to work outside the home.Footnote 33Exemplified by the well-known slogan, “women hold up half the sky” (funü nengding banbiantian 妇女能顶半边天), CCP propaganda depicts women as essential to the revolution, actively supporting the Party’s political agenda. Like their male counterparts, female civil servants are expected to diligently “serve the people” and the state, often working excessive overtime despite their responsibilities at home. The success of grassroots bureaucrats is typically measured by party-state recognition, but women may miss out on political advancement owing to their household responsibilities.

Meanwhile, work and career mobility are not the only concerns for female civil servants. Women often mention that public sector jobs are more accommodating of parents, as they offer greater flexibility in aligning work–family arrangements. As a result, many highly educated women prioritize job security over jobs with greater recognition.Footnote 34Nevertheless, women still encounter “glass” barriers in the public sector, such as limited promotion opportunities and pressure to conform to gender roles and hierarchy.Footnote 35Studies have indicated that in China, the increase in women’s participation in the workforce has not eroded long-held beliefs about traditional household divisions of labour, and women continue to dedicate more time to household drudgery and caregiving responsibilities as they age.Footnote 36Even when flexible schedules are available, women often adhere to traditional gender roles by prioritizing family in order to ease work–family tensions, while men continue to focus on careers.Footnote 37

Despite the state’s discourse on gender equality, grassroots female civil servants remain constrained by patriarchal Confucian traditions. While they work extended hours to meet local bureaucratic demands just like their male counterparts, they continue to bear the burden of unpaid household labour in the private sphere. This phenomenon extends beyond China, where gendered socialization from a young age often creates a mismatch between women’s roles in society and their participation in political leadership.Footnote 38This perpetuation of traditional gender roles means they are left largely unchallenged or even perceived as fair.Footnote 39Harriet Evans describes this persistent, gendered association of women with the domestic sphere in contemporary society as “patchy patriarchy.”Footnote 40

This study examines how “patchy patriarchy” shapes the work–family dynamics of grassroots female civil servants in S County, Shandong province, particularly as they navigate life stages such as marriage and childbirth. S County is one of the least economically developed counties in the province. At the time of writing, the county Party secretary, promoted from county mayor in 2020, was the only woman on the county’s standing committee (xian changweihui 县常委会). Her leadership demonstrates the potential for women to advance within grassroots bureaucracy.

This paper addresses several research gaps. First, it examines the underexplored lives of grassroots female bureaucrats, a crucial yet overlooked aspect of China’s local politics. Second, it analyses the strategies deployed by female civil servants to balance work and life amid bureaucratic overload. Third, the study explores how gender influences individual choices on political promotion, based on the experiences of grassroots female civil servants. Shifting from an institutional to an individual perspective, it examines how female grassroots bureaucrats navigate the double burden, even in this “stable” career, providing a person-centred view of local governance in China. This study contributes to research on women’s political participation and grassroots bureaucracy by exploring how a culture of overtime, gender norms and family obligations intersect to shape women’s political careers through their work–life choices.Footnote 41

Method and Data

This study is based on in-depth interviews with 21 female grassroots civil servants, four male spouses of female civil servants and one male cadre from a local Party organization department in S County in Shandong province (see Table 1). S county is located near Qufu 曲阜市, the hometown of Confucius. The local community takes great pride in its Confucian cultural traditions, and the local government promotes the county as the birthplace of Confucianism. In October 2008, the S County government established an academy (shuyuan 书院) to revive Confucian traditions, which has recently become a key destination for academic forums, training programmes and study tours.

Table 1. Summary of Interviewees

Note: The categories under “Civil servants” include one male bureaucrat but exclude the spouses.

Although influenced by local culture, with some interviewees referencing the Confucian idea of “men work outside, women manage the household,” our case is neither uncommon nor deviant.Footnote 42While the cultural milieu in S County may place extra expectations on female grassroots bureaucrats to shoulder family responsibilities, the revival of Confucian traditions across China – especially in rural areas – has made younger female bureaucrats more aware of gender inequalities. As the chairperson of the Women’s Federation jokingly noted in an informal setting, “The young women here are all a bit feminist.”Footnote 43

We followed ethical guidelines for interviews and field observations, obtaining informed consent from all participants. The interviews were conducted between July and September 2022. Owing to COVID restrictions, some interviews were conducted online. Leveraging local connections, the first author took two week-long field trips to S County to conduct some offline interviews. In August 2024 and January 2025, the authors revisited some informants. Each interview lasted between one and two hours. The fieldwork included participant observations in two female-led local government units: the Women’s Federation and a township government.

All of the female civil servants we interviewed had at least a college education. The average age was 35 (see Table 1), the oldest being 50 and the youngest 24. Unlike the typical image of female civil servants in women-focused roles (for example, the Women’s Federation), the 21 female grassroots bureaucrats and the male cadre worked across various government sectors, including township governments, county bureaus, mass organizations and Party organization departments. Their positions ranged from clerks (keyuan 科员) to deputy-section heads or section chiefs (zheng fu keji 正(副)科级) at the township level. Below, we present an analysis of their work–life conditions within the grassroots bureaucracy and the choices women make.

Entwined Family and Gender Expectations

While both men and women value the stability and proximity of civil service jobs, our interviews suggest that women prioritize these factors more owing to the social expectations surrounding gender roles and family responsibilities. Although the female interviewees expressed that they had intended to return home and support their communities, their decision to work within the grassroots bureaucracy was also influenced by gender discrimination in the private sector, housing affordability and childbirth considerations. An unmarried respondent noted that in private sector interviews in big cities, “about half the time, they directly ask about your childbirth plans.”Footnote 44In comparison, civil service interviews follow a structured format with predefined questions that avoid personal inquiries. This aligns with previous studies showing that civil service jobs are viewed as less discriminatory and more supportive of women’s work–life balance.Footnote 45A married respondent in the development and reform bureau explained that, “Being a civil servant … means you do not need to worry about income, and having a stable job within the system (bianzhi 编制) provides security.”Footnote 46

Although the grassroots civil service is seen as more female-friendly, most respondents noted that traditional gender role expectations persist, with family care still considered a woman’s duty. The chairperson of the Women’s Federation observed, “Women tend to take on more housework and family responsibilities, partly due to traditional beliefs and partly because we are more detail oriented. Husbands often think less about these responsibilities and, as a result, do less.”Footnote 47This dynamic places a greater caregiving burden on women. Married civil servants with children often rely on their parents or in-laws for childcare, while women juggle their roles as wives, mothers and grassroots bureaucrats. As one interviewee put it, “Balancing personal life, family, kids and work feels pretty exhausting.”Footnote 48Family expectations, shaped by gender role attitudes, lead to different work–life choices for women and men in the grassroots bureaucracy.

The overtime culture within the grassroots bureaucracy further influences how women navigate job stability and career mobility amid family and gender expectations. While our female informants acknowledged support from partners and parents, they admitted they were the ones making trade-offs between work and family. With overtime being the norm and a mindset of “whoever has time and energy will do the housework,” women inevitably bear the weight of family and gender role expectations.Footnote 49

The Gendered Consequences of Overtime Culture

The overtime culture within the grassroots bureaucracy is driven by increasingly complex tasks such as mediating demolitions, attracting out-of-province investment and meeting the demands from higher authorities to revive the local economy. Overtime frequently extends into weekends and evenings. Our 2024 fieldwork shows that overwork remains ingrained in the institutional structure despite central efforts to reduce formalism and local budget constraints that lead to project cancellations. Some interviewees believed that men manage these challenges more easily, while women must exert more effort and make greater sacrifices to achieve the same results.Footnote 50A female township Party secretary shared her daily schedule:

I start work at 8:30am, leave at 6pm [for dinner], then work again after 8pm. If I get home by 10pm, that’s considered early – sometimes it’s midnight. Just a few days ago, I got home at 10pm, and my mother remarked how early I was. Honestly, compared to others, our unit is better. If there are no evening commitments, I can leave around 9:30pm or 10pm two or three times a week.Footnote 51

All of our interviewees were familiar with this schedule and added that, in addition to the overtime, the lack of holidays posed an even bigger challenge for women with young children. A section-level chief (zhengkeji 正科级) at the township’s Communist Youth League said, “Having one day off a month, either Saturday or Sunday, would be great.”Footnote 52A deputy-section level head (fukeji 副科级) from the education bureau added, “We don’t get weekends, not even a single day off per week (danxiu 单休).”Footnote 53Families must make additional arrangements for childcare on weekends owing to the lack of public daycare services.

The overtime culture in S County did not originate during the COVID-19 pandemic; several interviewees recalled that this trend began in 2013, when the Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee (Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu 中共中央组织部) issued its “Notice on improving the performance evaluation of local party-state leadership units and leadership cadres.”Footnote 54The notice prohibited GDP rankings for local leaders and introduced a “comprehensive achievement” assessment. This change has burdened grassroots governments with responsibilities such as maintaining social stability, fostering economic growth, protecting the environment and preventing drowning accidents among children during summer vacations. As tasks became more tedious, paperwork increased significantly.Footnote 55During our 2023 and 2024 field trips, Party study sessions were held on Sundays, and township bureaucrats took 24-hour shifts during summer rainfalls.

While overtime is common among grassroots bureaucrats, the burden varies across government units, impacting female bureaucrats differently. Core Party organs demand longer hours and exert greater pressure on civil servants. In the Party organization department, attendance is tracked in three distinct time periods – morning, afternoon and evening – making evening work (typically from 7:00pm to 10:00pm) a routine, even institutionalized, practice. In townships, civil servants must remain at the government building for days or even weeks during specific periods, such as summer floods, National Day, Spring Festival or the “two sessions” (lianghui 两会). One deputy Party secretary shared her experience:

I usually arrive at the office around 8:30am, and if all is calm, I can leave by 6pm. But if it rains in the afternoon, I have to stay to monitor the flood (fangxun 防汛). When rain is forecast, we stay in the village and take turns on duty. During key stability periods (anbao weiwen shiqi 安保维稳时期), the secretary, township mayor and I take turns staying overnight. During such times, none of us can go home. Recently, I stayed in the office for three or four days straight for flood control.Footnote 56

In contrast, the county bureau’s shorter hours, which typically end at 6:00pm and allow for daily home returns, make it more appealing to married women. A respondent from the education bureau noted that they handle administrative tasks on weekdays and address Party-related matters, such as meetings and political studies (zhengzhi xuexi 政治学习), on weekends.Footnote 57With the growing number of Party activities, weekends are increasingly occupied. The respondent added, “When the last director was here, we had meetings almost every weekend.”Footnote 58

The overtime culture in grassroots bureaucracy has gendered consequences. After years of balancing work and family, some female civil servants have lost their ambition, with many saying, “I’ll do my best in my current job and let promotion happen naturally.” By stepping back from career advancement, some female grassroots bureaucrats have shifted their focus to prioritizing family and their children’s success. A 36-year-old deputy head of a county education bureau shared, “I don’t want to progress further. Any position is fine as long as I fulfil my responsibilities. That’s enough – I don’t need to strive for more.”Footnote 59

Some female civil servants manage to balance a thriving political career with a fulfilling family life despite bureaucratic overload, but our interviewees often viewed such women as exceptionally capable “geniuses” (tiancai 天才). However, even these success cases struggle with balancing family pressures and work demands. Below, we explore how career paths and promotions are closely tied to female civil servants’ personal choices and compromises.

Gender Norms on Marriage and Motherhood in Grassroots Bureaucracy

Marriage and motherhood often mark significant shifts in the careers of female grassroots bureaucrats. For many interviewees, the ambition to advance diminishes after marriage and childbirth. This reflects the ongoing tension between professional aspirations and gender norms, despite the state’s institutionalization of gender quotas. Our interviewees noted the paradox within the grassroots bureaucracy – childbirth is viewed as a pivotal event in a woman’s career yet is also perceived as reducing productivity: “Many units prefer hiring men because, after having a child, women are expected to spend more time and energy on childcare.”Footnote 60This impression arises not only from male bureaucrats but also from female grassroots bureaucrats. The deputy head of the education bureau observed that female civil servants perform equally to or outperform their male counterparts before becoming parents, but “many request transfers to less demanding roles as family responsibilities grow, to avoid family conflicts and find balance.”Footnote 61The double standards in work expectations and unchallenged gender norms, along with the compromises women make in their careers, reflect the enduring influence of traditional gender role attitudes in the domestic sphere.Footnote 62

Many respondents acknowledged that maternity leave can slow career advancement, yet they maintained that civil service promotion policies are not gender discriminatory. As one interviewee pointed out, “Having a baby will undoubtedly impact promotion because, after all, you have to go through pregnancy, childbirth and childcare. This can impact you for at least three years.”Footnote 63Female grassroots civil servants see maternity leave as both an entitlement and a burden, carrying paradoxical consequences: “Men and women have the same hours and qualifications, but promotion quotas are limited. Then, you take maternity leave and care for children while others keep working hard. If you were the leader, who would you choose to promote?”Footnote 64

Our interviewees viewed marriage and maternity as less important than career promotion, yet still essential for women, reflecting the ongoing tension between ambition and traditional gender roles. Complete devotion to work is more common among unmarried or childless grassroots female civil servants. However, these work-oriented women are often pitied rather than admired, often seen as unlucky for not having found a partner or for not having children. Although none of our interviewees identified with this situation, they all knew someone who had chosen or been forced into it. One respondent shared a poignant story:

There’s a female leader I know, born in 1993, who has always been dedicated to her work. Last year, she was pregnant, but sadly, due to constant overtime and late nights, she lost the baby. It’s hard for her to have another child, so she’s fully focused on her career. Recently, she was promoted to a senior position, becoming the youngest chief at that level in our county.Footnote 65

Our findings reveal that internalized childcare responsibilities and unchallenged gender norms within the grassroots bureaucracy often push female bureaucrats to prioritize their families. After having children, female civil servants quickly assume the role of primary caregiver, particularly focusing on their children’s education. As one respondent sarcastically remarked: “In our traditional Chinese mindset, a mother is expected to be there when a child is in trouble, not the father. Female grassroots cadres often feel more exhausted than their male counterparts.”Footnote 66Despite the demands of motherhood, female grassroots bureaucrats still strive to balance work and family. One respondent with two children noted that having children does not make female civil servants less hardworking; however, it is the nature of the job that matters: “When leaders consider someone for a role, like in the village office, they expect someone who can work day and night.”Footnote 67Women often feel guilty for being absent from their children’s lives: “I feel bad when I miss parent meetings or can’t cook for my child because of overtime. When their grades drop, I wonder, am I even a good mother?”Footnote 68

Our participant observation confirmed the assumed link between motherhood and childcare within the grassroots bureaucracy. Female bureaucrats frequently sought advice on how to improve their children’s learning, college life and pursuit of postgraduate degrees, while male bureaucrats rarely did. In the two units we observed, the female civil servants closely followed their colleagues’ children’s school performance, and those with well-behaved children were admired. In grassroots bureaucracy, motherhood and family care demands constrain married women’s promotion opportunities amid bureaucratic overload, pushing them to make work–life choices based on their life stage and circumstances.

Gendered Work–Life Choices

Below, we explore how female grassroots bureaucrats navigate the double burden of local state demands and gender role expectations, particularly within a culture of overtime that disadvantages women with children. Our interviewees employed three strategies: 1) making ambivalent gender compromises, 2) outsourcing childcare and domestic tasks, and 3) effectively condensing their time and energies, also known as “time squeeze.”

Making ambivalent gender compromises

The female civil servants we interviewed were ambivalent about the gendered division of labour at home, yet they were the ones making concessions. Although they complained about the imbalance, many women still accepted their caregiving role, whether out of expectation or belief. When discussing maternity leave and its impact on promotion, our interviewees spoke in a distant, detached manner, and none raised the issue of whether men should take paternity leave. During our 2024 fieldwork, we found that although parents are entitled to ten days of parental leave annually before their child turns three, none of the interviewees with children had used the benefit. Some even described themselves as “traditional,” suggesting they have internalized gender roles to justify the double burden of work and family care.

To compete with men and balance home responsibilities, some female grassroots bureaucrats increase their work efficiency to compensate for the time spent on childcare. Most female grassroots civil servants in the study said they had to increase their productivity and complete tasks quickly in order to leave work early for childcare. This increased their focus, allowing them to free up “overtime” for family care. Male counterparts rarely voiced similar concerns. In dual civil servant households, male bureaucrats are often perceived as having busier schedules and heavier workloads, leaving the women to manage the household duties. Despite the contradictions, women shoulder these responsibilities while men, even in higher positions, often take them for granted. As one respondent noted, “My husband doesn’t think about household chores. He comes home late, and by then, everything is already done.”Footnote 69The persistent gendered division of labour at home forces some women to make reluctant gender compromises to avoid family tension.

Outsourcing childcare and domestic tasks

Without public daycare services, female civil servants rely primarily on their parents, especially their mothers or mothers-in-law, for childcare and household chores during work hours. Our interviewees informed us that the support of both sets of grandparents was crucial for managing work and home life. These grandparents took on many duties, from childcare to meal preparation and housework, and female grassroots bureaucrats conserved a significant amount of energy for work by relying on parents and relatives for family support, knowing that their children were well cared for. However, those interviewees without parents living nearby were unable to benefit from this arrangement; some entrusted their children to close relatives.

When family support is unavailable, grassroots female civil servants often turn to private daycare or boarding schools. Those without nearby relatives face greater challenges, especially if their partners do not share in the childcare responsibilities. One respondent sent her child to a boarding school that provided meals and supervised night study:

In my case, neither side of the family can help with childcare, so it’s mostly on me. We send our child to a boarding school that offers classes and evening study sessions, which gives me more flexibility, especially when I have to work overtime. The school provides meals, and my child started daycare at two. Since then, they’ve gradually become more independent in their learning.Footnote 70

Outsourcing childcare allows women to focus more on their work and to spend their free time helping their children’s education, but this option is only available for those who can afford it.

Time squeeze

Female grassroots bureaucrats feel the dual pressures of the party-state and local gender norms, which are further compounded by family obligations. They often voluntarily condense their time and energies to manage family and work responsibilities. For instance, one young grassroots female civil servant mentioned that she had to forgo the entertainment and leisure activities she had enjoyed before marriage. This sentiment was echoed by others, who felt compelled to sacrifice their personal interests because of the dual pressures of family and work. One respondent humorously remarked, “We have no time for entertainment. The only thing I can count on is getting some sleep.”Footnote 71When asked if their husbands made similar sacrifices, most acknowledged that men were generally not held to the same expectations.

Another example of “time squeeze” is the compensatory mindset many grassroots female civil servants adopt to make up for missed work during maternity leave. Since maternity leave is exclusive to women, they often feel obligated or guilty, believing they must compensate the government for their absence. This compensatory mindset is seen in some female civil servants returning to work before their maternity leave ends. Maternity leave for civil servants is capped at six months, but most return to the office within four to five months and start working from home after just one to two months of postpartum rest. Younger female civil servants may exert additional effort, such as voluntarily working overtime, to compensate for their time away. One respondent even said, “Having a child only disrupts work for a month or two but doesn’t cause major delays.”Footnote 72Our findings reveal a vicious cycle: because overtime is common in grassroots bureaucracy, married women with young children must constantly juggle work and family, leading some to compromise their career mobility.

Gendered Barriers to Promotion

Grassroots female civil servants, like their male counterparts, can advance their careers through civil service examinations or promotions within the county; however, the women’s paths are greatly affected by marriage and motherhood.Footnote 73Life stages have a significant impact on women’s career ambitions. One unmarried interviewee planned to take further examinations to pursue higher-level government roles outside the county. The selection examination serves as a “springboard” for female civil servants seeking better career prospects in more desirable units. Those who fail remain within the county, facing limited leisure breaks, high pressure and the likelihood of never achieving “official” (guanyuan 官员) status in their careers.Footnote 74

Despite the ongoing work–life challenges, our fieldwork shows a growing trend of young women advancing in their careers, with many remaining hopeful. In S County’s recent personnel adjustments, most promoted female township secretaries were born after the 1980s, signalling a generational shift. Respondents viewed central policies promoting women in civil service and local administration positively, seeing gender quotas as a step towards affirmative action. A male respondent observed that, beyond the quotas, “younger female colleagues outperform their male counterparts.”Footnote 75Nevertheless, a female respondent from the Party organization department noted ambivalently that with too few women in top positions, “regulations should be introduced to eliminate prejudice against female colleagues in the civil service.”Footnote 76

Interviewees across various units agreed that women’s participation in grassroots bureaucracy had steadily increased. However, they observed that female leadership still lags behind that of their male counterparts, despite near-equal entry rates in S County. A younger respondent working in the township government pointed out that, “among new civil servants, the [gender] ratio is six women to four men. However, across all cohorts, men still outnumber women in the overall civil service.”Footnote 77It is also not surprising that the Women’s Federation was predominantly staffed by females: “Of our 12 members, only two are men, and the chairperson must be a woman.”Footnote 78An interviewee from the Party organization department noted: “Right now, our department has more women, and the gender ratio in the inspection commission (jiwei 纪委) is about equal. But in areas like emergency management (yingji guanli 应急管理) and law enforcement (zonghe zhifa 综合执法), which involve more safety risks, you rarely see women.”Footnote 79

Beyond job stability and fulfilling family and gender expectations as dutiful daughters or wives, our interviewees still felt that women were disadvantaged in grassroots bureaucracy, despite ongoing government initiatives and the presence of some female leaders. Although the top leader in S County was a woman, her leadership had not significantly altered the gender structure; she was the only female on the standing committee (out of 13 members). According to county government data, among the 100 heads of bureaus and townships, only 18 were female. Only four of the 26 township heads were female (15.4 per cent), and only 14 of the 74 bureau chiefs were female (18.9 per cent). This gender imbalance shows that despite the rise in female grassroots bureaucrats, women remain marginalized in leadership roles.Footnote 80

None of our interviewees questioned the gendered nature of meritocratic promotion; however they agreed that those who invest more time or handle complex tasks have better chances of advancement.Footnote 81Owing to the fierce competition, few female civil servants manage to pass the examination to advance beyond the county, making in-county promotion the more viable path. As a result, those in townships and key Party organs, such as the organization department and Party office, tend to advance faster than those in county bureaus or mass organizations such as the Women’s Federation. A senior male leader in the organization department stated that the promotion system is gender-neutral but remarked, “Women generally have better writing skills and work attitudes, making them more likely to be promoted. With the heavy workload, anyone delivering exceptional performance has a better chance.”Footnote 82

Despite the general consensus on meritocracy, male bureaucrats often benefit from a “fatherhood bonus” in promotion competitions. Male leaders are praised for being good husbands and fathers, while the family care provided by female leaders is taken for granted and may even harm their political careers if they appear to prioritize family duties. One young female bureaucrat remarked ambivalently, “[the unrecognized women’s labour at home] unintentionally pushes women to shift their focus from work to family, eventually leading them to give up on promotion.”Footnote 83

Unmarried women in the grassroots bureaucracy tend to be highly ambitious, working harder to prepare for the examinations that can transfer them to the township or core Party organs. One young interviewee shared, “I take the initiative to work overtime because I want to do better.”Footnote 84This ambition is closely linked to life stages; several older interviewees recalled that “in my first five or six years, I worked like a maniac, never feeling tired.” We found that married civil servants are often less enthusiastic about promotion. Some interviewees attributed their limited career mobility to personal traits, such as being perceived as “less visionary,” “less confrontational” or “struggling with communication and coordination.”Footnote 85Even if they were interested in chasing promotion, they lacked the time and energy to prepare for exams.

According to our informants, civil servants can request transfers based on their career preferences, such as moving from a township to a county bureau. They do so by expressing an interest to their superior, leveraging personal networks or applying through the organization department (zuzhibu 组织部). When it comes to transferring between counties and townships, married women tend to prefer less demanding departments and are often reluctant to return to towns. This has been attributed to “mutual selection,” as women’s personalities align with family duties, but this perspective may overlook their ambivalence when making these choices.Footnote 86Our findings show that married female grassroots civil servants struggle to juggle career advancement with family responsibilities, and that they are keenly aware that prioritizing family limits their promotion opportunities. This conflicted choice is shaped by workplace norms, caregiving expectations and the belief that certain career paths are more “sustainable” for women juggling multiple roles, even at the cost of career mobility. One respondent noted, “Transferring affects promotion. If you move to a quieter department, you achieve less, and leadership notices fewer results. It’s unavoidable.”Footnote 87

For female grassroots bureaucrats, the demands of marriage and motherhood take precedence, as they prioritize security and stability over career advancement. Gender and family expectations lead many to choose less demanding jobs, which allow them to manage caregiving but also limit their promotion prospects. Ironically, it is the very strategies that women use to balance work and family life – as shaped by the local state, gender norms and family obligations – that restrict their career mobility.

Conclusion

This paper bridges the gap between two key areas: grassroots bureaucracy studies and female representation within the Chinese government. Despite the growing number of women in lower-level civil servant roles, there has been little research on the intertwined effects of their work and family lives. Our article addresses this gap by examining the double burden placed on female grassroots bureaucrats and the paradox they encounter in balancing party-state demands, gender norms and family expectations as they pursue career mobility. Our findings show that while female and male grassroots bureaucrats may have equal professional capacity, the career costs associated with marriage, maternity and child-rearing fall predominantly on women. This situation is exacerbated by a culture of long hours and increased responsibilities. Women are expected to manage these challenges alone while remaining highly productive in grassroots bureaucracy. Our analysis reveals a vicious cycle that limits female grassroots bureaucrats’ career mobility as they attempt to juggle state demands, gender norms and family obligations: 1) marriage hinders their pursuit of higher government roles; 2) motherhood and child-rearing push them towards less demanding positions with limited promotion prospects; 3) even when both spouses are civil servants, women still shoulder most of the household duties. The women in our exploratory study frequently highlighted “widow-style parenting” (sangoushi yuer 丧偶式育儿) as a contributing factor reinforcing the glass ceiling in the workplace.Footnote 88

We further explore how highly capable female grassroots bureaucrats manage the tension between their work responsibilities and expected gender roles. These women typically employ three strategies: they make ambivalent gender compromises by voluntarily assuming primary responsibility for family care as mothers; they outsource childcare and domestic tasks to parents, extended family or external services to ease work–family tensions; and they “squeeze” their time and energy to compensate for “gendered privileges” such as maternity leave, working harder to make up for time spent with both family and the government. These strategies require women to navigate work–life contradictions, forcing them to adjust their expectations and scale back their ambitions – burdens that largely fall on them.

Finally, our analysis demonstrates the paradox female grassroots bureaucrats face in balancing work–life choices, often leading to inevitable stagnant careers after marriage and childbirth. This issue is not unique to grassroots bureaucracy but is seen across sectors with routine overtime. Our study offers a bottom-up perspective on the persistent underrepresentation of women in top leadership, a trend further exacerbated by the national revival of traditional family values that reinforce women’s role as the primary caregiver. Despite gendered challenges, the civil service remains a sought-after career for women, especially during economic downturns. The high social esteem and job security linked to civil service positions demonstrate that the social and cultural foundations at the grassroots bureaucracy remain strong. This context suggests that, despite the obstacles, the prestige and stability of civil service positions continue to attract many applicants, especially young women. To support national policies encouraging young people to return home, our study highlights the need for improved local care infrastructure to ease family responsibilities, promote better work–life balance for women and their families and prevent the double burden from falling solely on the shoulders of women.

Acknowledgements

The authors sincerely thank the grassroots female bureaucrats of S County for sharing their experiences. Qi Song acknowledges support from the Major Project of the National Social Science Foundation of China, “AI and Precise International Communication” (Project No. 22&ZD317). Ling Han acknowledges the support of the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Early Career Scheme, RGC Ref. No. CUHK 24612423) and the research start-up fund from the Chinese University of Hong Kong. The authors gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Yunyun Wu, a postgraduate student at the College of Public Administration, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, and Xinning Gou at the Gender Studies Programme, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.

Competing interests

None.

Qi SONG is a lecturer in the School of International Journalism and Communication, Beijing Foreign Studies University. He earned his PhD from the School of Journalism and Communication at Peking University. His primary research interests encompass political sociology and internet politics, with a particular focus on China. Currently, he is engaged in a project exploring the relationship between the internet, civic engagement and local governance in China.

Ling HAN is an assistant professor in the Gender Studies Programme at The Chinese University of Hong Kong. As a sociologist, her research focuses on gender and work, digital platforms, and nonprofit organizations. She is part of Stanford University’s Civic Life of Cities Lab. Her latest project delves into exploring the meanings of work among young social innovators and female platform workers in greater China. She leads the research cluster of Gender and Digital Wellbeing and is working on a book manuscript about gender philanthropy and digitalization in China.

Chengpang LEE is a professor in the School of Sociology at the Central China Normal University. He investigates the intersection between medicine, organizational structures and technological transformations in the greater Chinese context. His recent research focuses on the impact of digital platforms in mainland China and the transformation of Chinese society. He is the author of The Rise of Tzu Chi: The Making of a Global Buddhist Movement (University of British Columbia Press, 2025).

Footnotes

1 “2024 nian guokao: baoming renshu pansheng xueli menkan tigao” (2024 national civil service examination: surge in registration numbers, increase in educational requirements). Zhongguo qingnian bao, 23 October 2023, http://www.xinhuanet.com/edu/20231023/0b589820df164434a714a017fb74942d/c.html. Accessed 7 January 2024.

2 “Pingdeng fazhan gongxiang: xin Zhongguo 70 nian funü shiyede fazhan yu jinbu” (Equality, development, sharing: the development and progress of the women’s cause in new China over 70 years). State Council Information Office, 19 September 2019, http://www.scio.gov.cn/gxzt/dtzt/2019/pdfzgxxzg70nfnsydfzyjbbps/bps_21562/202209/t20220921_435556.html. Accessed 30 April 2025.

3 Ibid.

4 Owing to limited official data, we have drawn this conclusion from our fieldwork and news media analysis. For example, “Gongwuyuan shibushi nüxing pianduo” (Is there a higher proportion of women in the civil service?). Zhihu, https://www.zhihu.com/question/470064826. Accessed 23 December 2024.

5 See Chen Reference Chen2022; Jiang Reference Jiang2022. This paper uses “female grassroots bureaucrats” and “grassroots female civil servants” interchangeably.

7 Chen Reference Chen2022; “He Guoqiang qiangdiao: zuohao peiyang xuanba nüganbu fazhan nüdangyuan gongzuo” (He Guoqiang emphasized: effectively carry out the cultivation and selection of female cadres and the development of female Party members). www.gov.cn, 24 August 2006, https://www.gov.cn/govweb/jrzg/2006-08/24/content_369484.htm. Accessed 28 December 2023.

8 State Council 2009.

9 NBS 2023.

11 Ibid. The phrase “innocent young girls” (wuzhi shaonü) reflects a common misconception that the CCP selects female political leaders as symbolic tokens, often favouring women without Party membership but who are educated and from ethnic minority backgrounds.

17 State Council 2020.

18 Before 2018, the National Civil Service Administration (guojia gongwuyuanju) operated under the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, which published an annual report. However, following the reform, the administration was placed under the Central Organization Department of the CCP (Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang zuzhibu), which subsequently ceased the publication of annual statistics on civil servants.

19 MOHRSS 2018.

20 “Renshebu: xianchuji fuzhi yishang zhiwu de gongwuyuan zhan zhengge gongwuyuan duiwu 10%” (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security: deputy county and department-level positions and above account for 10% of the entire civil service workforce). Xinhua, 27 June 2016, https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2016-06/27/content_5086004.htm. Accessed 30 April 2025.

23 Wang Reference Wang2017; Deng, O’Brien and Zhang Reference Zhang2020.

26 Burns and Wang Reference Burns and Wang2010.

27 An English-language version of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Public Servants is available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384101.htm. Accessed 26 January 2024.

29 “Renmin ribao renmin luntan: dang ganbu yao xiguan ‘bu shufu’” (People’s Daily People’s Forum: cadres must get used to being “uncomfortable”). Renmin ribao, 6 August 2018, http://opinion.people.com.cn/GB/n1/2018/0806/c1003-30209931.html. Accessed 21 May 2025.

30 “Jiceng ‘buhaoti’ ‘tile ye baiti’: gongwuyuan jiaban gaibugai fa jiabanfei” (“It’s hard to raise questions” at the grassroots level and it is “pointless to raise questions”: should grassroots civil servants get paid extra for overtime work?). Banyuetan, 27 October 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2018-10/27/c_1123620961.htm. Accessed 18 January 2024.

34 Kang, Park and Park Reference Kang, Park and Park2020.

37 Gerstel and Clawson Reference Gerstel and Clawson2014.

42 “2018 Qilu zuimei jiating fabu” (2018 Qilu’s most beautiful families announced). Qilu.com, 27 July 2018, https://www.iqilu.com/html/zt/shandong/2017zmjt/. Accessed 19 October 2024.

43 Interview with a female civil servant at the Women’s Federation, 14 August 2024.

44 Interview with a female civil servant at the Women’s Federation, 1 August 2022.

45 Kang, Park and Park Reference Kang, Park and Park2020.

46 Interview with a female civil servant at the development and reform bureau, 16 August 2022.

47 Interview with a female civil servant at the Women’s Federation, 1 August 2022.

48 Interview with a female civil servant at the Party organization department, 7 August 2022.

49 Interview with a female civil servant at the Women’s Federation, 1 August 2022.

50 Interview with a female civil servant at the Party organization department, 1 August 2022.

51 Interview with a female civil servant at the township government, 2 August 2022.

52 Interview with a female civil servant at the township Communist Youth League, 15 August 2022.

53 Interview with a female civil servant at the education bureau, 1 August 2022.

54 “Guanyu gaijin difang dangzheng lingdao banzi he lingdao ganbu zhengji kaohe gongzuo de tongzhi” (Notice on improving the performance evaluation work of local Party and government leadership teams and leading cadres). Xinhua, 9 December 2013, https://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2013-12/09/content_2545183.htm. Accessed 21 January 2025.

56 Interview with a female civil servant at the township government, 2 August 2022.

57 Interview with a female civil servant at the education bureau, 1 August 2022.

58 Ibid.

59 Interview with a female civil servant at the education bureau, 1 August 2022.

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid.

63 Interview with a female civil servant at the township government, 30 July 2022.

64 Interview with a female civil servant at the township government, 10 August 2022.

65 Interview with a female civil servant at the township government, 9 August 2022.

66 Interview with a female civil servant at the government branch bureau, 7 August 2022.

67 Interview with a female civil servant at the education bureau, 1 August 2022.

68 Ibid.

69 Interview with a female civil servant at the township government, 30 July 2022.

70 Interview with a female civil servant at the technology bureau, 10 August 2022.

71 Interview with a female civil servant at the township government, 2 August 2022.

72 Interview with a female civil servant at the township government, 9 August 2022.

73 DINK (dual income, no kids) couples are rare in this county, as marriage often leads to having children.

74 Several interviewees noted that a deputy county mayor or above is considered an “official” and not a grassroots civil servant.

75 Interview with a male civil servant at the Party organization department, 11 August 2022.

76 Interview with a female civil servant at the Party organization department, 1 August 2022.

77 Interview with a female civil servant at the township government, 30 July 2022.

78 Interview with a female civil servant at the Women’s Federation, 30 July 2022.

79 Interview with a female civil servant at the Party organization department, 30 July 2022.

80 Wang and Dai Reference Wang and Dai2013; Zhou, Yunyun Reference Zhou2019.

82 Interview with a male civil servant at the Party organization department, 11 August 2022.

83 Ibid.

84 Interview with a female civil servant at the Party organization department, 30 July 2022.

85 Interview with a female civil servant at the township government, 30 July 2022; interview with a female civil servant at the technology bureau, 10 August 2022.

87 Interview with a female civil servant at the education bureau, 1 August 2022.

88 Shen and Jiao Reference Shen and Jiao2024.

References

Barnett, A. Doak, and Ezra, F. Vogel. 1967. Cadres, Bureaucracy, and Political Power in Communist China. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
Benney, Jonathan. 2016. “Weiwen at the grassroots: China’s stability maintenance apparatus as a means of conflict resolution.” Journal of Contemporary China 25(99), 389405.10.1080/10670564.2015.1104876CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bos, Angela L., Greenlee, Jill S., Holman, Mirya R., Oxley, Zoe M. and Lay, J. Celeste. 2022. “This one’s for the boys: how gendered political socialization limits girls’ political ambition and interest.” American Political Science Review 116(2), 484501.10.1017/S0003055421001027CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Burns, John P., and Wang, Xiaoqi. 2010. “Civil service reform in China: impacts on civil servants’ behaviour.” The China Quarterly 201, 5878.10.1017/S030574100999107XCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chan, Hon S. 2004. “Cadre personnel management in China: the nomenklatura system, 1990–1998.” The China Quarterly 179, 703734.10.1017/S0305741004000554CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chen, Minglu. 2022. “‘Innocent young girls’: the search for female provincial leaders in China.” The China Quarterly 251, 751775.10.1017/S030574102200042XCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chen, Minglu. 2024. “Women’s political leadership and the Party agenda: the coverage of female Politburo members in the People’s Daily.” The China Journal 91, 4466.10.1086/729312CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Choi, Eun Kyong. 2012. “Patronage and performance: factors in the political mobility of provincial leaders in post-Deng China.” The China Quarterly 212, 965981.10.1017/S030574101200118XCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yanhua, Deng, O’Brien, Kevin J. and Zhang, Li. 2020. “How grassroots cadres broker land taking in urbanizing China.” The Journal of Peasant Studies 47(6), .Google Scholar
Eaton, Sarah, and Kostka, Genia. 2014. “Authoritarian environmentalism undermined? Local leaders’ time horizons and environmental policy implementation in China.” The China Quarterly 218, 359380.10.1017/S0305741014000356CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Evans, Harriet. 2021. “‘Patchy patriarchy’ and the shifting fortunes of the CCP’s promise of gender equality since 1921.” The China Quarterly 248(S1), 95115.10.1017/S0305741021000709CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gerstel, Naomi, and Clawson, Dan. 2014. “Class advantage and the gender divide: flexibility on the job and at home.” American Journal of Sociology 120(2), 395431.10.1086/678270CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Goldstein, Avery. 1994. “Trends in the study of political elites and institutions in the PRC.” The China Quarterly 139, 714730.10.1017/S0305741000043125CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Heberer, Thomas, and Trappel, René. 2013. “Evaluation processes, local cadres’ behaviour and local development processes.” Journal of Contemporary China 22(84), .10.1080/10670564.2013.795315CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yingchun, Ji, Xiaogang, Wu, Sun, Shengwei and Guangye, He. 2017. “Unequal care, unequal work: toward a more comprehensive understanding of gender inequality in post-reform urban China.” Sex Roles 77(11), 765778.Google Scholar
Jiang, Shuoliang. 2008. “Zhongguo gongwuyuan zhidu yanjiu de huigu yu zhanwang” (Review and prospects of civil service research in China). Zhengzhixue yanjiu 6, 106114.Google Scholar
Jiang, Xinhui. 2022. “Gendered pathways to the county-level people’s congress in China.” The China Quarterly 249, 6890.10.1017/S0305741021001156CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jiang, Xinhui, Eaton, Sarah and Kostka, Genia. 2025. “Women’s work: the gendered nature of appointment politics in subnational China.” Government and Opposition 60(1), 6385.10.1017/gov.2023.34CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jiang, Xinhui, and Zhou, Yunyun. 2022. “Coalition-based gender lobbying: revisiting women’s substantive representation in China’s authoritarian governance.” Politics and Gender 18(4), 9781010.10.1017/S1743923X21000210CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jiang, Xinhui, and Zhou, Yunyun. 2025. “When socialist legacy meets international norms: gender quota adoption and institutional change in China.” Journal of Contemporary China 34(151), 161180.10.1080/10670564.2023.2299964CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Miliann, Kang, Juyeon Park, C.N. Le and Kang-Le, Sangha. 2024. “How glass ceilings and iron rice bowls create ‘glass bowls’: gendered barriers and protections in public sector employment in South Korea.” American Behavioral Scientist. https://doi.org/10.1177/00027642241242750.Google Scholar
Kang, Miliann, Park, Hye Jun and Park, Juyeon. 2020. “Teachers as good mothers, mothers as good teachers: functional and ideological work–family alignment in the South Korean teaching profession.” Gender, Work and Organization 27(3), 395413.10.1111/gwao.12396CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kung, James, Cai, Yongshun and Sun, Xiulin. 2009. “Rural cadres and governance in China: incentive, institution and accountability.” The China Journal 62, 6177.10.1086/tcj.62.20648114CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lee, Ching Kwan, and Zhang, Yonghong. 2013. “The power of instability: unraveling the microfoundations of bargained authoritarianism in China.” American Journal of Sociology 118(6), 14751508.10.1086/670802CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Luo, Meng Sha, and Chui, Ernest Wing Tak. 2018. “Gender division of household labor in China: cohort analysis in life course patterns.” Journal of Family Issues 39(12), .10.1177/0192513X18776457CrossRefGoogle Scholar
MOHRSS (Ministry of Human Resource and Social Security of the People’s Republic of China). 2018. “2016 niandu renli ziyuan he shehui baozhang shiye fazhan tongji gongbao” (The 2016 statistical bulletin on the development of human resources and social security), 21 May, https://www.mohrss.gov.cn/SYrlzyhshbzb/zwgk/szrs/tjgb/201805/t20180521_294286.html. Accessed 20 August 2024.Google Scholar
NBS (National Bureau of Statistics). 2023. “2021 nian Zhongguo funü fazhan gangyao (2021–2030) tongji jiance baogao” (China women’s development outline (2021–2030) statistical monitoring report for 2021), 20 April, https://www.gov.cn/lianbo/2023-04/20/content_5752343.htm. Accessed 30 April 2025.Google Scholar
Pang, Baoqing, Keng, Shu and Zhang, Siyi. 2023. “Does performance competition impact China’s leadership behaviour? Re-examining the promotion tournament hypothesis.” The China Quarterly 255, 716733.10.1017/S0305741022001904CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Perry, Elizabeth J., and Goldman, Merle (eds). 2007. Grassroots Political Reform in Contemporary China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.10.4159/9780674042056CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Qiao, Liang. 2017. Political Mobility of Chinese Regional Leaders: Performance, Preference, Promotion. London: Routledge.10.4324/9781315466651CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Read, Benjamin. 2012. Roots of the State: Neighborhood Organization and Social Networks in Beijing and Taipei. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
Sargeson, Sally, and Jacka, Tamara. 2018. “Improving women’s substantive representation in community government: evidence from Chinese villages.” Development and Change 49(5), .10.1111/dech.12377CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shen, Yang, and Jiao, Lin. 2024. “‘Widow-style parenting’: the discursive formation of gendered parenting roles and popular feminism on social media in China.” Chinese Journal of Communication 17(4), 399415.10.1080/17544750.2024.2329063CrossRefGoogle Scholar
State Council of the PRC. 2009. “Guojia renquan xingdong jihua (2009–2010)” (National Human Rights Action Plan (2009–2010)). www.gov.cn, 13 April, https://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-04/13/content_1283983.htm. Accessed 23 January 2024.Google Scholar
State Council of the PRC. 2020. “Guowuyuan bangongting guanyu quanmian tuijin jiceng zhengwu gongkai biaozhunhua guifanhua gongzuo de zhidao yijian” (The State Council of the PRC’s Guiding opinions on the comprehensive advancement of standardization and formalization of grassroots government). www.gov.cn, 8 January, https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2020-01/08/content_5467526.htm. Accessed 30 April 2025.Google Scholar
Tomba, Luigi. 2014. The Government Next Door: Neighborhood Politics in Urban China. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Wang, Juan. 2017. The Sinews of State Power: The Rise and Demise of the Cohesive Local State in Rural China. New York: Oxford University Press.10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190605735.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wang, Zhengxu, and Dai, Weina. 2013. “Women’s participation in rural China’s self-governance: institutional, socioeconomic, and cultural factors in a Jiangsu county.” Governance 26(1), 91118.10.1111/j.1468-0491.2012.01605.xCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Yang, Hua. 2022. Xianxiang Zhongguo: xianyu zhili xiandaihua (County and Township China: Modernization of County Governance). Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe.Google Scholar
Zeng, Benxiang. 2014. “Women’s political participation in China: improved or not?Journal of International Women’s Studies 15(1), 136150.Google Scholar
Zhang, Yuxi. 2020. “‘Promotion tournament 2.0’: why local cadres expand health‐care provision in China. Governance 33(4), 897914.10.1111/gove.12429CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zhao, Hanyu. 2023. “Overstretched Leviathan: Bureaucratic Overload and Grassroots Governance in China.” PhD diss, Harvard University.Google Scholar
Zhou, Xueguang. 2012. “The road to collective debt in rural China bureaucracies, social institutions, and public goods provision.” Modern China 38(3), 271307.10.1177/0097700411416216CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zhou, Yunyun. 2019. “‘Being a good daughter of the Party’? A neo-institutional analysis of the All-China Women’s Federation organisational reforms in China’s Xi era.” China Perspectives 2019(2), 1728.10.4000/chinaperspectives.9042CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Figure 0

Table 1. Summary of Interviewees