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Global Shifts in Scientific Production: The Decline of Academic Freedom and the Impact on International Collaboration

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 June 2025

Rickard Danell*
Affiliation:
Department of Sociology, Umeå University, Sweden.
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Abstract

This article investigates the evolving dynamics of global scientific production and collaboration from 2000 to 2022, focusing on the impact of geopolitical changes on academic freedom and international research collaboration. Historically dominated by Western liberal democracies, the global scientific landscape has seen a significant shift with the rise of emerging economies, particularly within the BRICS group. This transition reflects broader changes in wealth distribution and scientific output, with China emerging as the largest scientific system. The analysis employs bibliometric indicators and political metrics, including the V-Dem’s Liberal Democracy Index and the Academic Freedom Index, to assess changes in scientific output, academic freedom, and international collaboration. Results reveal a decline in academic freedom and liberal democracy in major science-producing countries, coinciding with increased scientific output from nations with lower academic freedoms. The study also examines international collaboration patterns, highlighting a shift away from traditional Western partners towards increased collaboration within the BRICS group. This shift is particularly evident in the growing partnerships between China, India and Russia. Despite the increased scientific output from these countries, Western countries, particularly the USA and European nations, remain pivotal in global scientific networks. In summary, the findings suggest a move towards a more multipolar scientific world, where the balance of power is shifting away from traditional Western hegemony. However, this shift comes with significant challenges, particularly concerning the erosion of academic freedom in many of the expanding scientific regions.

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Introduction

The global shift in science production encompasses two interrelated dimensions: the geographical diversification of the scientific system and changes in the political context of scientific research. The trend toward broader geographical participation in science, observable across most research fields, is driven not only by the rapid expansion of China in the realm of science but also by other emerging economies. Following the Second World War, scientific advancement was primarily concentrated in ‘Western’ liberal democracies, with the United States serving as the central hub in the international scientific community. However, over the past 20 years, corresponding to changes in the global distribution of wealth, the landscape of scientific activity has been significantly altered (Leydesdorff and Wagner Reference Leydesdorff and Wagner2009; Danell Reference Danell, Danell, Larsson and Wisselgren2013). China has emerged as the largest scientific system in the world, reflecting a broader trend of increasing scientific output from countries outside the traditional liberal democracies. This development signifies that a substantial portion of contemporary scientific research is now conducted within autocratic political systems, raising questions concerning the status of scientific autonomy and academic freedom in such political contexts.

Academic freedom and institutional autonomy in science are legitimized by a belief in the intrinsic value of scientific truth. This belief is not something that science itself can justify; it is a value judgement that arises from the broader cultural milieu (Weber Reference Weber2004). The value of scientific truth should be understood as the value of reason, calculation and systematic observation independent of its practical use. Social trust in academic freedom also relies on the understanding that researchers are governed by a common ethos. The American sociologist Robert K. Merton first developed a coherent argument highlighting the functional necessity of institutionally entrenched values and norms for science (Merton Reference Merton1938, Reference Merton1942). Merton argues that liberal societies, with their greater latitude for self-determination and institutional autonomy, provide more fertile ground for scientific progress compared with autocratic societies.

The concerns Merton raised in the 1930s about the relationship between liberal democracy, academic freedom and scientific advancement are more relevant than ever in today’s changing geopolitical landscape. It can be argued that institutionally guaranteed academic freedom is a precondition for scientific creativity, reliability and credibility (Jančová and Heflich Reference Jančová and Heflich2023). At the level of individual researchers and research teams, scientific activities are often characterized by self-organization and international networks, which are enabled or constrained by national governance structures (Wagner Reference Wagner2008). Whetsell (Reference Whetsell2023) demonstrates positive effects of democratic governance on the formation and strength of international research collaboration ties and homophily across countries with similar levels of democratic governance. Fernandez et al. (Reference Fernandez, Chykina and Chun Lin2024) find a positive relationship between development of research activity in STEM research and the degree of Academic Freedom in countries.

Ignatieff (Reference Ignatieff2024) makes the argument that academic freedom has become a defining issue in the geostrategic competition between liberal democracies and their authoritarian challengers, and that the strategic rivalry between the United States and China disrupts academic interchange between liberal and authoritarian societies. In addition, the advances of neo-nationalism in the West are a threat to academic freedom. Populist right-wing leaders in Western democracies are attacking university autonomy, as part of a strategy of authoritarian consolidation. One striking example of this trend is Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. He has set an example for other Neo-Nationalists in Europe with his authoritarian takeover of Hungary’s higher-education system while seeking new partnerships with Chinese institutions (Kim Reference Kim2023).

Given the evolving geographical and political landscape of science, coupled with increasing geopolitical tensions, this study aims to investigate the long-term development of academic freedom and international collaboration within the global science system, especially whether the varying political conditions for scientific activities disrupt international collaboration.

The research questions are:

  • What is the relationship between liberal democracy and academic freedom in major science-producing countries?

  • How much has the average degree of liberal democracy and academic freedom in the global science system declined the last two decades?

  • How have the increased geopolitical tensions, especially between western countries and the BRICS countries, affected scientific collaboration?

Materials and Methods

The results presented in this article are based on bibliometric indicators, including publication volumes and levels of international collaboration across countries, as well as on the Liberal Democracy Index calculated by Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) and the Academic Freedom Index. The study covers the period from 2000 to 2022, with bibliometric indicators calculated using publications indexed in Scopus.

Both the Academic Freedom Index and the Liberal Democracy Index are derived from indicators coded by country experts. The Academic Freedom Index, as detailed by Spannagel and Kinzelbach (Reference Spannagel and Kinzelbach2023), is based on five specific indicators:

  • Freedom to Research and Teach: Assesses the extent to which scholars can independently pursue research and teaching without external interference;

  • Freedom of Academic Exchange and Dissemination: Measures how freely scholars can exchange ideas and communicate research findings;

  • Institutional Autonomy of Universities: Evaluates the practical degree of autonomy exercised by universities;

  • Campus Integrity: Examines the level of freedom from politically motivated surveillance or security infringements on campuses;

  • Freedom of Academic and Cultural Expression: Gauges the freedom scholars have to express themselves on political issues.

These indicators are coded by over 2050 country experts, with each indicator rated on a scale from 0 to 4 for each country-year (0 being completely restricted, 4 being completely free). The Academic Freedom Index for each country-year is an aggregate score of the five indicators, calculated using a Bayesian measurement model that incorporates inter-coder reliability tests to produce an overall score ranging from 0 to 1 (Pemstein Reference Pemstein2019). The goal of the Academic Freedom Index is to measure the de facto realization of academic freedom.

The more complex Liberal Democracy Index is produced using a similar procedure. The Liberal Democracy Index, as calculated by the V-Dem project, comprises two main components:

  • Electoral Democracy Index: This component forms the foundation of the Liberal Democracy Index and measures the core aspects of electoral democracy;

  • Liberal Principles: This component modifies the Electoral Democracy Index by incorporating additional safeguards and institutions necessary to protect individual rights and limit governmental power, recognizing that, while elections are fundamental to democracy, true liberal democracy requires more comprehensive protections.

In the analysis presented, countries have been grouped according to their respective continents, with exceptions made for BRICS countries. The BRICS category includes only the original BRICS countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Consequently, countries that are part of BRICS are excluded from the continent-based groupings for Asia, Africa, and Europe.

Results

This section presents the findings from an analysis of global scientific production, academic freedom and political systems from 2000 to 2022. We begin by examining the changes in the relative scientific size of different regions over this period, highlighting the shifting dynamics in global research output. We then explore the relationship between Liberal Democracy and Academic Freedom as of 2022, offering insights into how political structures influence academic environments across countries.

Following this, we assess the overall changes in academic freedom and liberal democracy from 2000 to 2022, using a weighted average to capture global trends. A comparison of the Academic Freedom Index between 2000 and 2022 for individual countries provides a closer look at the trajectories of specific nations. Finally, we conduct a comparative analysis of international collaboration, focusing on the BRICS countries relative to major Western countries, to understand how geopolitical factors have influenced global scientific partnerships.

The Changing Landscape of Scientific Research

Figure 1 illustrates the trends in the relative contributions to global scientific output by different regions, with a particular focus on the BRICS countries. The most significant change observed is the relative decline of North America, coupled with the rapid rise of the BRICS countries. There is also a noticeable decline for Europe, although this decline is not as steep as that of North America. In addition to India and China, whose scientific contributions are included under BRICS, non-BRICS Asian countries are also increasing their relative contributions to science. It is important to note that rapidly growing countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, which are now members of BRICS, are still counted under Asia in this analysis. Africa, without South Africa, has also seen an increase in its relative contribution to science. Overall, Figure 1 clearly demonstrates that the global geography of science has undergone significant changes from 2000 to 2022.

Figure 1. Changes in relative scientific size 2000−2022.

Liberal Democracies as a Pre-condition for Academic Freedom

The first research question concerns the relationship between liberal democracy and academic freedom in major science-producing countries. Since liberal democracies are associated with values such as freedom of speech, open inquiry, and institutional autonomy – principles foundational to academic freedom – we expect a strong positive relationship between liberal democracy and academic freedom.

Figure 2 illustrates the interplay between the Liberal Democracy Index (x-axis) and the Academic Freedom Index (y-axis) for the year 2022. The figure includes 103 countries, each with at least 1000 publications indexed in Scopus in 2022. Each country is represented by a circle, with the size of the circle reflecting its scientific output for that year. Countries are colour-coded by region, except BRICS members, which are coded in grey.

Figure 2. Liberal democracy and academic freedom 2022.

The figure clearly demonstrates a strong and positive relationship between a country’s level of liberal democracy and its score on the Academic Freedom Index. The correlation between liberal democracy and academic freedom, as presented in Figure 2, is 0.89. However, the relationship between liberal democracy, academic freedom and scientific output is less straightforward. As indicated by the varying sizes of the circles representing each country, Figure 2 reveals that many leading scientific producers, such as China, India and Russia, exhibit low levels of liberal democracy and limited academic freedom.

Furthermore, the figure highlights cases where countries have high liberal democracy scores but relatively low academic freedom scores and vice versa. The range of these variables is broad: at one end, Nigeria produces 15,908 scientific publications with a liberal democracy index of 0.32 and an academic freedom index of 0.931. At the other end, Japan records 130,095 publications with a liberal democracy index of 0.736 and an academic freedom index of 0.582.

The Changing Geography of Science and the Decline in Academic Freedom

The second research question is: how much has the average degree of liberal democracy and academic freedom in the global science system declined over the last two decades? In this section, we will also investigate to what extent the changes in academic freedom are related to a general decline in liberal democracy or whether they result from the shifting geography of science.

To analyse changes in the institutional context in which science is produced, the Liberal Democracy Index and Academic Freedom Index are calculated as weighted averages. This means that each country’s contribution to the yearly level of the indices is proportional to its share of publications in that year. A simple cross-country average is not suitable for answering the research question, as it would give the same weight to small countries such as Andorra, Luxembourg and Iceland as it does to major scientific producers such as the United States, China and India. Given that scientific output is highly skewed, with a relatively small number of countries producing most of the global science, assessing changes in the institutional context requires calculating a weighted average. This approach better reflects each country’s contribution to global scientific production and provides a more accurate representation of the global science system. The results are presented in Figure 3, which illustrates the fluctuations in the Academic Freedom Index (blue line) alongside the Liberal Democracy Index.

Figure 3. Change in academic freedom and liberal democracy for 2000−2022 (weighted average).

Figure 3 suggests a concerning trend: both academic freedom and liberal democracy are diminishing within the global science system, indicating a rapidly deteriorating political context for science. This trend may be explained by an increasing prevalence of scientific production occurring within contexts marked by low levels of academic freedom in less democratic societies, a general decrease in liberal democracy and academic freedom in high-producing countries or a combination of both factors.

Concerning the trends presented in Figure 3, several potential explanations arise: (1) nations with restricted academic freedom are experiencing faster growth in scientific output compared with those with greater academic freedom; (2) there is a universal decline in liberal democracy and academic freedom across all countries; (3) the trend could result from a combination of the expansion of scientific output from undemocratic countries and a broader decline in academic freedom worldwide. Figure 4 aims to explain the causes for the decline in academic freedom observed in Figure 3.

Figure 4. Changes in Academic Freedom index 2000 versus 2022.

Further analysis shows that most countries, particularly major science producers, have witnessed a decline in academic freedom. Among these, the BRICS countries − excluding South Africa − stand out for their low and decreasing levels of academic freedom. Brazil, for instance, which had high values on the Academic Freedom Index in 2000, has declined significantly from over 0.95 to about 0.45. Even China, initially with very low levels of academic freedom in 2000, has experienced a significant drop to a level where academic freedom is virtually non-existent, comparable with countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. In the cases of Brazil, India and China, the decline in academic freedom coincides with regime shifts in these countries, while Russia has exhibited a continuous decline since 2000. It is noteworthy that several Western countries, including the USA, United Kingdom, Poland, and Hungary, also show declines in academic freedom. Conversely, positive developments, indicated by countries above the red line, are observed in various African, Asian and some South American countries.

In conclusion, the findings from the previous figure are attributed to both the expansion of countries with low and declining levels of academic freedom and a broader trend of declining academic freedom in many major science-producing nations.

Towards a Multipolar Science World?

We will conclude this section by closely examining changes in international collaboration, with a special focus on the rapidly expanding BRICS countries. The primary question is whether the swift restructuring of the global scientific landscape has also transformed the network of international collaborations. The BRICS countries are of particular interest because their stated goal is to challenge Western global hegemony. Additionally, the BRICS countries have begun to formulate a common research policy. In 2015, they signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Science, Technology, and Innovation, establishing a strategic framework for collaboration between Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.

We will first analyse trends in overall international collaboration for the BRICS countries compared with major Western countries, represented by the four leading scientific producers: the USA, the UK, Germany and France. In contrast to the BRICS countries, which exhibit very low and rapidly declining levels of academic freedom, these Western countries have high and relatively stable levels of academic freedom.

Figure 5. Comparative analysis of the percentage of international collaboration.

Figure 5 illustrates the trend in international collaboration, showing the percentage of internationally co-authored publications for the USA, the United Kingdom, Germany and France (left) compared with the BRICS countries (right).

For the four major Western countries, a consistent upward trend in international collaboration is evident, as indicated by the increasing percentage of internationally co-authored publications. Notably, the European countries outpace the USA in this regard, suggesting a stronger inclination toward collaboration within European scientific networks. However, it is important to note that in a random selection of scientists globally, larger systems would typically exhibit lower levels of international collaboration due to their size.

The trends observed for the BRICS countries are more varied, both in terms of the level of international collaboration and its development over time. Russia initially had a level of international collaboration comparable with that of the United Kingdom, but after 2005, a long-term decline in collaboration became evident. On the other hand, South Africa, which has high levels of academic freedom, closely mirrors that of European countries, both in terms of the level of international collaboration and its development over the observed period. Meanwhile, the fastest-growing BRICS countries, China and India, exhibit substantially lower levels of international collaboration, reflecting a greater reliance on domestic scientific networks.

The next question to be analysed is whether there are any tendencies for the BRICS countries to decouple from Western countries and enhance collaboration within the BRICS group. In this analysis, we will focus on international collaboration from the perspective of the three main science producers among the BRICS countries: China, India and Russia. For each country, we will investigate changes in collaborative preferences, specifically looking at increased international collaboration with other BRICS countries and potential decoupling from Western countries.

International Collaboration from China’s Perspective

First, we will examine China’s preferences regarding international collaboration. Figure 6 shows changes in international collaboration with specific countries as a percentage of the total number of internationally co-authored publications from China. On the left-hand side of Figure 6, China’s level of collaboration with other BRICS countries is displayed for each publication year from 2000 to 2022. On the right-hand side, China’s collaboration with the four Western countries is depicted for each publication year.

Figure 6. International collaboration from China’s perspective (note: the scale on the y-axes differs significantly).

Comparing the two diagrams in Figure 6 clearly demonstrates that China has been much more reliant on research collaboration with Western countries, both at the beginning and at the end of the observation period. From the perspective of Chinese researchers, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States are clearly much more significant as scientific partners than any of the BRICS countries. By the end of the period, the fast-growing China–India collaboration reaches a level comparable with China–France collaboration, which appears to be China’s least significant Western partnership. We can therefore conclude that China’s collaboration with counterparts from the USA and European countries remains paramount, reflecting longstanding partnerships and access to advanced expertise and resources.

Regarding the development of China’s collaboration with its Western partners, several notable trends emerge. First is the sharp decline in collaboration between China and the USA after 2015. This decline may be attributed to various factors, including geopolitical tensions, policy changes, and shifts in research priorities. Despite this decline, the importance of collaboration with the USA cannot be overstated, given its longstanding position as a global leader in scientific research and innovation. This type of drastic change is not observed in collaboration with researchers from the United Kingdom, which shows a steady increase during the period. In contrast, China’s collaboration with German researchers decreases slightly, while the relationship with France remains stable.

Despite China’s modest level of collaboration with its BRICS partners, there has been a noticeable shift toward deeper engagement with other BRICS nations, particularly India and Russia, in recent years. India and Russia are emerging as increasingly significant partners for China in scientific collaboration. Although India represents just under 3.5% of China’s international collaboration in 2022, compared with over 25% with the USA, collaboration with India is on an upward trajectory. Similarly, collaboration with Russia is gaining momentum. In conclusion, while the USA and European countries remain key partners for China in scientific collaboration, there is a discernible trend toward strengthening ties with other BRICS nations, particularly India and Russia. This reflects China’s strategic efforts to diversify its collaboration networks and leverage expertise from emerging scientific powerhouses.

International Collaboration from India’s Perspective

Figure 7 displays India’s preferences regarding international collaboration. As in Figure 6, the figure shows changes in international collaboration with specific countries as a percentage of India’s total internationally co-authored publications. On the left-hand side of Figure 7, India’s level of collaboration with other BRICS countries is displayed for each publication year from 2000 to 2022. On the right-hand side, India’s collaboration with four Western countries is depicted for each publication year.

Figure 7. International collaboration from India’s perspective (note: the scale on the y-axes differs significantly).

A comparison of the two diagrams in Figure 7 demonstrates that India, like China, has been more reliant on research collaboration with Western countries than with its BRICS partners, particularly at the beginning of the observation period. During the first decade, all four Western countries were clearly more significant scientific partners for India than any of the BRICS countries. However, by the end of the period, the rapidly growing China–India collaboration surpassed India’s declining collaboration with Germany and France. Interestingly, India’s most important partner is not one of the original BRICS nations, but rather the newer BRICS member, Saudi Arabia. International research collaboration between India and Saudi Arabia has increased rapidly since 2010, even surpassing India’s collaboration with the United Kingdom by the end of the period. This suggests a significant shift in collaboration patterns, potentially driven by shared research interests, complementary expertise or strategic partnerships between India and Saudi Arabia.

India’s collaboration with Western countries, particularly the USA, is experiencing a decline, with the exception of its stable collaboration with the United Kingdom. The decline in collaboration with Western countries, coupled with the rise in collaboration with China and Saudi Arabia, highlights India’s evolving scientific landscape and its efforts to diversify its collaboration networks beyond traditional partners.

International Collaboration from Russia’s Perspective

Figure 8 displays Russia’s preferences regarding international collaboration. As in the previous figures, it shows changes in international collaboration with specific countries as a percentage of Russia’s total internationally co-authored publications.

Figure 8. International collaboration from Russia’s perspective (note: the scale on the y-axes differs significantly).

For most of the observed period, Russia’s main research collaboration partners have been Western countries. From 2000 to 2010, Russia’s research collaboration with other BRICS countries was substantially less than with the four Western countries, most notably with Germany and the USA. However, after 2010, Russia’s share of collaboration with Western countries has declined rapidly, indicating a significant shift in Russia’s scientific collaboration landscape. In contrast, there is a notable and rapid increase in Russia’s collaboration with China, which emerged as its most important scientific partner by 2022. This strengthening partnership reflects the growing strategic alignment and shared research interests between Russia and China. Additionally, Russia’s collaboration with India has also been on the rise during this period.

Conclusion

Considering the evolving geographical and political landscape of science, alongside rising geopolitical tensions, this study set out to examine the long-term development of academic freedom and international collaboration within the global science system. The research addressed three questions: What is the relationship between liberal democracy and academic freedom in these countries? How much has the average degree of liberal democracy and academic freedom declined over the past two decades? And how have increased geopolitical tensions, particularly between Western countries and the BRICS nations, impacted scientific collaboration?

The results clearly demonstrate a strong positive relationship between a country’s level of liberal democracy and academic freedom. However, the findings also reveal that scientific growth is faster in countries with low levels of liberal democracy and academic freedom. The significant transformation in the global scientific landscape over the past two decades has coincided with a concerning decline in academic freedom and liberal democracy globally, particularly in major science-producing nations. The BRICS countries, with the exception of South Africa, have experienced especially sharp declines in academic freedom, raising concerns about the broader implications for scientific autonomy and the quality of research produced in these environments.

The final research question addressed whether increased geopolitical tensions, particularly between Western countries and the BRICS nations, have impacted scientific collaboration. The study highlights evolving patterns of international collaboration, with a noticeable shift away from Western partners in favour of increased collaboration within the BRICS group, particularly between China, India, and Russia. This shift reflects broader geopolitical tensions and a strategic realignment among emerging scientific powerhouses. Despite these changes, Western countries, especially the USA and European nations, continue to play a crucial role in global scientific networks, although their dominance is increasingly challenged by the growing influence of BRICS countries.

In summary, the findings suggest a move towards a more multipolar scientific world, with a shift away from traditional Western hegemony. However, this shift comes with significant challenges, particularly regarding the erosion of academic freedom in many of the newly dominant scientific regions. The long-term implications of these trends for global science, innovation, and the preservation of academic integrity remain critical areas for further research and monitoring.

About the Author

Rickard Danell is Professor in Information Studies at the Department of Sociology, Umeå University with an expertise in quantitative studies of scholarly communication. His research has spanned diverse themes, including international communication in social science, the factors contributing to the decline in Swedish science, career development among young scientists, the predictive capacity of bibliometric indicators, and the global evolution of Arctic research. In addition to his academic role, Rickard Danell holds the position of Associate Vice-President Research Analytics at UArctic.

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Figure 0

Figure 1. Changes in relative scientific size 2000−2022.

Figure 1

Figure 2. Liberal democracy and academic freedom 2022.

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Figure 3. Change in academic freedom and liberal democracy for 2000−2022 (weighted average).

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Figure 4. Changes in Academic Freedom index 2000 versus 2022.

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Figure 5. Comparative analysis of the percentage of international collaboration.

Figure 5

Figure 6. International collaboration from China’s perspective (note: the scale on the y-axes differs significantly).

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Figure 7. International collaboration from India’s perspective (note: the scale on the y-axes differs significantly).

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Figure 8. International collaboration from Russia’s perspective (note: the scale on the y-axes differs significantly).