I Introduction
Various cities worldwide are engaged in smart city projects, seeking effective solutions to urban issues (e.g., traffic congestion, waste management, and housing) and global ones (e.g., climate change, energy consumption, and population growth). With the onset of the 2019 coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, smart city projects began to receive increasing attention. While smart city policies are linked to specific urban policies (e.g., smart mobility and smart grids), smart cities are currently understood as a more “holistic” solution to various urban issues. Moreover, smart cities cannot be discussed without mentioning big data or artificial intelligence (AI) technologies.
This chapter is inspired by the “smart city” debate that started in the 2000s, led by scholars in the fields of geography and sociology engaged in urban research. On the one hand, a vast body of literature exists on smart cities against the backdrop of the proliferation of “corporate-oriented smart cities.”Footnote 1 The scholarship criticizes “technology-driven, market-led, and top-down” smart city projects led by big information and communications technology (ICT) corporationsFootnote 2 because they usually propose “one-size-fits-all” solutions for urban development.Footnote 3 On the other hand, instead of such an ICT-centric approach, the smart city scholarship suggests “inclusive,” “participatory,” and “citizen-centric/people-centric” approaches.Footnote 4
However, such debates have largely occurred in the context of European and North American smart city projects. It has been argued: “there are no clear answers as to what a smart city is – anywhere in the world… Most smart city definitions and, thereby its scope, are all western.”Footnote 5 This chapter builds on this core observation and asks whether Asian smart cities provide an alternative to those of the West and, related, what patterns and relationships are observable between Asian approaches?Footnote 6 While the purpose of this chapter is not to provide a comprehensive comparison between Western and Asian smart cities, it suggests that there may be important differences and that these are most fruitfully explored in inter-Asian contexts.
In this regard, the literature on Asian smart cities is growing; scholarly work includes not only case studies (e.g., Singapore, India, China, and South Korea) but also wider comparative studies among Asian countries.Footnote 7 Following this emerging literature, this chapter provides a basis for Asian models by analyzing how Japan, and competitors including South Korea and China, engage with member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on smart city projects. In particular, it highlights the role of Japan in shaping the ideas and norms of smart cities by exporting smart solutions. Exporting the ideas of smart cities can eventually affect urban governance, including legal infrastructures that local governments adopt. With this analysis, this chapter contributes to the study of Inter-Asian Law (IAL).
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. It begins by explaining the complexities embedded in smart city research, including the hard and soft law dimensions in smart cities. Next, it provides an overview of Asian smart cities and explains some of their features. Then, this chapter examines smart city cooperation between Japan and ASEAN countries. Discussion section considers the potential diffusion of the smart city concept and urban governance through Japan–ASEAN smart city cooperation, while simultaneously examining possible regulatory competition among Japan, South Korea, and China to export smart city projects into ASEAN countries.
II Complexities of Smart Cities
In the smart city literature, there has been a long scholarly debate on the definition and concept of smart cities. Since this chapter’s purpose is not a full analysis of the scholarly debate, the chapter provides the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s concept of smart cities as a baseline definition: “initiatives or approaches that effectively leverage digitalization to boost citizen well-being and deliver more efficient, sustainable and inclusive urban services and environments as part of a collaborative, multi-stakeholder process.”Footnote 8 While this definition includes several elements of smart cities which are helpful for understanding developments in Asia, this chapter underscores that defining the contours of smart cities remains contested in the region.
Apart from the debate on the concept and definition, smart cities are complex and dynamic infrastructures in light of the following two dimensions.
A. The Smart City as a Layered System
The first complexity pertains to the fact that a smart city is not itself a technology but rather a system. Smart cities generally have a three-layered structure. First, the bottom level consists of city infrastructure and utilities (e.g., energy management systems, water and waste management systems, and public transportation controls), which are linked to digital equipment (e.g., cameras, GPS, sensors). Second, the middle level consists of data gathered from citizens and public administration bodies that are connected and analyzed using software and applications on a data platform. Finally, at the top level, data-based urban services can be offered in a comprehensive manner, covering multiple sectors such as energy, transportation, waste, education, health, and safety.
Thus, a smart city is a system. However, “smart technologies” play an important role within the system. Smart technologies refer to three elements of technology to deliver urban services: a collection of data, data processing, and automation of decision-making.Footnote 9 On this point, AI technologies are core smart technologies. Accordingly, there are both promises and challenges associated with smart city projects: AI and big data can bring improvements in efficiency and decision-making when providing services while there are increased privacy and security risks.Footnote 10
B. Hard and Soft Laws of Smart Cities
The second complexity relates to soft and hard laws of smart cities with the former mostly preceding the latter.Footnote 11 State action on smart cities typically begins with “soft” instruments – the adoption of national policies and strategies. Smart city policies should be included in the wider policy and planning measures for science and technology of the country. At this initial stage, there will be considerable discussion on the vision, concepts, and ideas of smart cities in the context of each country.
While soft law prevails initially in the design of the foregoing, after the adoption of national policies, legislation related to smart cities (i.e., “hard law”) may come into effect. Various existing laws are relevant to smart city projects such as the laws of the environment, transportation, energy, and education. Apart from these existing laws, new legislation for smart cities may concern “special economic zones” (SEZs). The law for SEZs creates experimental sites for new policies and strategies, including a “regulatory sandbox,”Footnote 12 a concept that invites experimentation in regulatory design, including deregulation for the purpose of demonstrating new technologies. Deregulation aims, fundamentally, to promote new activities rather than to regulate them. Thus, smart city projects are often subject to the laws of SEZs.
For instance, in 2020, Japan amended the law of national strategic special zones to promote smart cities, known as the “law of super cities.”Footnote 13 The amended law has undergone two main revisions.Footnote 14 First, as a “data platform”Footnote 15 is necessary for smart cities, the revision promotes activities such as setting up the data platform and collecting and providing data to relevant business actors. Second, the revision requires responding to the views and concerns expressed by citizens and relevant stakeholders.
Additionally, one of the important existing laws relevant to many regions and cities around the world is the law of data protection and privacy, as smart city projects involve data collection and processing. A core issue is whether the existing laws can function appropriately in the context of data collection and processing in smart cities. In other words, it is important to assure whether existing privacy frameworks can address unique privacy challenges of data collection and processing in the context of smart cities where multiple public and private actors may have access to and share datasets.Footnote 16
III Features of Asian Smart Cities
Building on the foregoing discussion on the complex system and role of law in smart cities, I argue that Asian smart cities demonstrate both similarities to and divergences from Western smart cities. In this section, I suggest that there are three features of Asian smart cities that are unique. While contested within the region, these features distinguish Asian smart cities from Western equivalents.
A. “Problem-Oriented” Projects
A notable feature of Asian smart cities is “problem-oriented” smart projects. In other words, smart cities are tools used to solve specific urban problems in Asia. On this point, the expression “green experimentation” has grown out of low-carbon urban experiences around the world.Footnote 17 Smart city projects are often referred to as “experiments”; therefore, experimental aspects are not a particularly distinctive feature in Asian smart cities.Footnote 18 However, Asian smart cities’ experimentation tends to focus more on environmental protection compared to Western smart cities.
Asian smart cities’ “green” experimentation has been promoted with particular consideration given to Asia’s urban demographic features, that is, its large urban populations, and associated environmental concerns. Scholars have noted that features of urbanization in Asia are distinct from those in other regions.Footnote 19 According to UN-Habitat, “Asia has the highest number of urban dwellers worldwide.”Footnote 20 Furthermore, as of early 2023, “[t]here were a total of 28 megacities with a population of over 10 million inhabitants in the Asia-Pacific region.”Footnote 21 This feature of urban density raises concerns; “High population densities in megacities can often lead to environmental problems. A dense population, and thus heavier reliance on road network infrastructures, causes increased traffic. This in turn can create significant burdens on the environment.”Footnote 22 This explains why Asian smart cities have had a “green” experimentation factor compared to Western smart cities. Related to this point, experts have noted that the initial policy demand for Chinese smart cities was based on the need to combat air pollution.Footnote 23
B. The Role of State-Led Initiatives
In Western smart city projects, the role of local city governments in building and designing smart cities has been pronounced; as for the famous cases of Amsterdam, Barcelona, Helsinki, and Vienna, experts have noted that city governments play a similarly important role, setting up “a strategic framework” and “a collaborative environment” to promote smart cities.Footnote 24 By contrast, Asian smart city projects are more based on national government-driven strategies. Whereas Western smart city projects are also supported by national-level policies in terms of funding and coordination (e.g., the Smart City ChallengeFootnote 25 of the United States (US) or the European Union (EU) Horizon 2020 program),Footnote 26 there is a greater degree of central government engagement in Asia. This suggests that “the state’s central role in smart city development is undeniable and has been highlighted for countries with strong state planning centrality.”Footnote 27 The “developmentalist smart city concept” in Asia is, “hardware-driven projects developed by governments and big businesses who are keen to apply the most cutting-edge technologies.”Footnote 28
Asian smart cities thus demonstrate tighter linkages between entrepreneurs, big tech, and central governments. Ayona Datta, a smart city researcher focused on India, observed that smart cities in Asia have been promoted through “state-centric entrepreneurial intervention.”Footnote 29 Datta argues that the framing of “development,” “modernity,” and “economic growth” in smart cities supports state-driven urban development. For instance, since 2015, India has been making plans to transform 100 cities into smart cities.Footnote 30
Similarly, in 2017, Indonesia launched the “Toward 100 Smart Cities” movement.Footnote 31 After the engagement of national governments, the role of ICT corporations became more prominent. Asian smart cities have been described as “techno-centric”Footnote 32 and “high-tech.”Footnote 33 Datta has pointed out the high degree of “technocratic nationalism” through which smart cities are promoted by a group of people “[believing] in the power of technology.”Footnote 34
At the same time, as Yu-Min Joo argues, there are several variations of Asian state-led smart city projects.Footnote 35 For instance, even China and Singapore, which have been seen as typical developmentalist smart city cases in Asia, have very different pathways when we look at their development and progress. Chinese smart cities, led by a powerful party-state regime, are a distinctive case.Footnote 36 Chinese domestic smart cities are related to “green experimentation” but are primarily concerned with “green growth” and “green development,” thus seeking an alternative development pathway from the conventional economic growth-centric approach.Footnote 37 This is particularly seen in China’s “eco-city”Footnote 38 projects.Footnote 39 These eco-cities were developed against the background of the Chinese government’s announcement of the nation’s 11th and 12th five-year plans (in the 11th plan [2006–2010], there was a shift from “growth first” to “sustainable development,” and in the 12th plan [2011–2016], to “green development and climate change”).Footnote 40 The first eco-city, in Dongtan near Shanghai (launched in 2006), is a well-known example, although the project did not proceed as planned due to several problems such as the land quota allocation and corruption.Footnote 41 Another well-researched Chinese eco-city case is the Tianjin project, which began under the 2007 China–Singapore framework agreementFootnote 42 and is generally regarded as a greener and sustainable case.Footnote 43
However, such a domestic image of smart cities in China has also changed. China exports smart technologies through the “Digital Silk Road” under China’s “Belt and Road Initiative.”Footnote 44 Notably, some Asian smart city projects have been led by Chinese big-tech corporations, such as the Alibaba GroupFootnote 45 and Huawei.Footnote 46 For instance, Huawei has engaged in smart city projects in Malaysia,Footnote 47 Thailand,Footnote 48 and Indonesia.Footnote 49 Such engagements by China in Asian smart cities are also enhanced by the fact that since 2020 “China has accelerated the international promotion of some of its smart city technologies” and “providing ‘anti-epidemic solutions’ has become the new selling point for several Chinese tech companies.”Footnote 50 Indeed, “the COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the deployment of innovation and technology in urban areas.”Footnote 51 Although surveillance and monitoring technologies were widely used even before the COVID-19 pandemic, digitalized surveillance technologies for disease tracking and contact tracing are now proliferating.Footnote 52
In addition to China, Singapore has been a pioneer in designing certain types of smart cities, for example, the top-down Smart Nation project. Scholars describe Singapore’s initiative as “a state-led initiative orchestrated by civic-minded tech-talent.”Footnote 53 To be specific, the Singapore government “insources” tech talent instead of outsourcing to private sectors in developing the smart city: “Insourcing involves attracting tech talent to Singapore, instilling technical knowledge and capabilities amongst those responsible for city governance, and thus upgrading the technical competencies of the public sector [of Singapore] more generally.”Footnote 54 This is a unique state-led approach that avoids outsourcing projects to private firms as “privatization” in smart cities has raised concerns about the increased role of the private sector eroding that of the government, which is viewed as a negative outcome.Footnote 55
Regarding the role of Singapore government, Singapore has another role in the region – leading the smart city movement in ASEAN countries. The next Section III.C turns to this regional aspect of smart cities.
C. “Technocratic Regionalism”: ASEAN and Smart Cities
In ASEAN countries, “Singapore is highly active in trying to forge a smart cities network and regional platforms.”Footnote 56 At the 2018 ASEAN Summit, Singapore proposed the “ASEAN Smart Cities Network” (ASCN),Footnote 57 and to date, twenty-six pilot cities have been launched.Footnote 58
ASEAN has three objectives for smart city development: competitive economy, sustainable environment, and high quality of life.Footnote 59 Under these objectives, six areas are targeted for smart city development: (1) civic and social, (2) health and well-being, (3) safety and security, (4) quality of the environment, (5) built infrastructure, and (6) industry and innovation.Footnote 60 These targeted areas resonate with the problem-oriented features of Asian smart cities discussed above.
Singapore’s leadership has been described as “technocratic regionalism”;Footnote 61 that is, “[promoting] a technocratic form of regional integration and consolidation,” to develop smart city projects across Southeast Asia.Footnote 62 Singapore’s ambition has motivated other countries in Asia to pursue smart city initiatives. Japan is one of ASEAN’s partners supporting smart city development; other partners include South Korea, China, Australia, the US, and the EU.Footnote 63
Hence, whereas China and Singapore have left their strong presence in inter-Asian smart cities, Japan has emerged as an impactful leader as well. Against this backdrop, Section IV focuses on Japan’s engagement in smart city projects in ASEAN. It first looks at the development of Japan’s smart city policies and then explores smart city cooperation between Japan and the ASEAN countries.
IV Smart City Cooperation between Japan and ASEAN
A. Development of Smart City Policies in Japan
The Japanese government has only recently shown a strong interest in smart cities; yet in that short time, Japan has become a major player in the Asian region. However, it has made some efforts in the past. In the context of promoting renewable energy combined with smart grid technologies, the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) took the lead (starting before the 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and Fukushima nuclear crisis).Footnote 64 Such efforts served as a pathway to the current Japan’s smart city national policies, and this section discusses three points that mark the Japanese government’s increasingly strong engagement in the promotion of smart city policies.
First, Japan’s engagement can be found in the Sixth Science, Technology, and Innovation Basic Plan (hereinafter, the Sixth Basic Plan) adopted by the Cabinet in March 2021Footnote 65 and covering the period 2021–2025. The Sixth Basic Plan identifies six policies for transforming society in a sustainable and resilient manner, including the development and proliferation of smart cities.Footnote 66 The smart city is framed as an “innovation” and a solution for a sustainable and resilient society. This was the first time in the Science, Technology, and Innovation Basic Plan that smart cities were mentioned – the previous Fifth Basic Plan only mentioned the promotion of a “super smart society.”Footnote 67 Moreover and important for the study of IAL, the Sixth Basic Plan describes the proliferation of smart cities outside Japan, clearly stating that Japan will disseminate the concept of a smart city and export smart-city-related infrastructure and data management systems, particularly with other Asian countries.Footnote 68
The second engagement of the Japanese government relates to the establishment of the concept of smart cities. In April 2021, the Cabinet released the “Smart City Guidebook,”Footnote 69 which explains the need for smart cities and the process of development to support smart city efforts. Notably, the Guidebook specifies “three philosophies” and “five principles” of smart cities.Footnote 70 The three philosophies are: (1) resident-centric, (2) based on visions/challenges, and (3) collaboration among sections/cities.Footnote 71 The first, “resident-centric” framing, actually aligns with the Western smart city debate on a “citizen-centric” or “people-centric” approach. According to the Guidebook, the “resident-centric” concept is aimed at “‘[improving] well-being’ and [taking] a demand side driven approach, in which residents, i.e. primary users, take initiatives, instead of a supply side driven one, in which governments and private companies take initiatives.”Footnote 72 The “five principles” identified by the Guidebook are explained below in the context of the third instance of the Japanese government’s involvement.
Third, the Japanese government has attempted to link smart city policies with data governance concerns, calling for global attention to smart city initiatives from a “data governance” perspective. Smart cities first became an international topic at the G20 Osaka Summit in 2019. Thereafter, the “G20 Global Smart Cities Alliance” was established with the World Economic Forum.Footnote 73 In 2020, the Alliance established five principles for smart cities: (1) equity, inclusivity, and social impact; (2) security and resilience; (3) privacy and transparency; (4) openness and interoperability; and (5) operational and financial sustainability.Footnote 74 The Japanese government has transferred and adopted these five smart city principles into the 2021 Smart City Guidebook,Footnote 75 which illustrates its attempt to align the national smart city policy with global data governance discussions.
B. Exporting Smart Solutions to ASEAN
The Japanese government has provided several routes to support the export of smart city technologies and infrastructure to Asia. Four governmental organizations are involved: the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism (MLIT), METI,Footnote 76 the Ministry of Environment,Footnote 77 and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).Footnote 78 Among these, the most active actors are JICA and MLIT.
JICA is a well-known Japanese institution that offers capacity building and training for foreign local governments via official development assistance (ODA) to support foreign developing countries bilaterally.Footnote 79 JICA has been engaged in Asian smart city projects for several years,Footnote 80 including famous cases in Bangkok and Jakarta. Additionally, JICA assists small cities such as Siem Reap in Cambodia. Siem Reap has an iconic temple, Angkor Wat, that has been identified as a world heritage site, and tourism has been growing as its main industry.Footnote 81 The city needed infrastructure and utilities to cope with an increasing number of tourists from abroad and handle rapid urbanization; therefore, the city sought smart solutions.Footnote 82
As in the Siem Reap case, JICA’s smart city assistance is not only about providing technology. The city needed smart city policies, institutions, human workforce, and skills. Thus, JICA focused on the “establishment and human resource development of smart city promotion organization” and the “establishment of institutional framework … for smart city” by dispatching Japanese experts to foreign local governments.Footnote 83
MLIT is a central actor in the Japanese government that has actively engaged with ASEAN, particularly, the ASCN.Footnote 84 Since 2019, MLIT has hosted the annual ASEAN–Japan Smart Cities Network High-Level Meeting. The first meeting was held in Yokohama, Japan, and according to the summary of meeting, the “Japan Association for Smart Cities in ASEAN (JASCA) was established as a framework to facilitate cooperation between ASEAN and Japan, and is composed of potential Japanese partners, both public and private, from various fields.”Footnote 85 More specifically, JASCA’s web page explains its role that “[JASCA] will proactively and continuously disseminate information on the technologies and experiences that promote Japan’s smart cities in ASEAN.”Footnote 86
At the second high-level meeting held in December 2020, the MLIT proposed “Smart City Supported by Japan–ASEAN Mutual Partnership” (Smart JAMP), which is an overseas smart city assistance program.Footnote 87 Smart JAMP consists of four measures: (1) assisting new project formations, (2) offering financial support, (3) strengthening the relationship between ASEAN members and Japanese firms, and (4) sharing information.Footnote 88 Among these, MLIT particularly supports the first measure, engaging with ASEAN countries and cities to form new smart city projects. When MLIT requested proposals from ASEAN countries and cities, thirty-two proposals were raised and nineteen were adopted.Footnote 89
Further, MLIT suggested ASEAN develop the “ASEAN Smart City Planning Guidebook,” which was released in March 2022 and aims “to provide practical insights including frameworks and examples, to support stakeholders involved in smart city development in ASEAN.”Footnote 90 This Guidebook is actually based on Japan’s national “2021 Smart City Guidebook” (as explained above).
V Discussion – How to Shape the Concept of Smart Cities in Asia
Japan’s intention seems to be to diffuse smart city ideas and norms into ASEAN. As seen above, MLIT has been supporting project developments in ASEAN; at the same time, it suggested creating the “ASEAN Smart City Planning Guidebook,” which was a “transplant” of Japan’s Guidebook version. As noted, Japan’s Guidebook includes “three philosophies” (including the resident-centric view) and “five principles” (including data governance guidelines) for smart cities.
How has ASEAN responded? It has officially stated that the ASEAN Smart City Planning Guidebook is “[p]repared by [the] Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) in Japan [i]n Consultation with the ASEAN Smart Cities Network (ASCN) and the ASEAN Secretariat.”Footnote 91 Hence, it appears that ASEAN has accepted the Japanese guidebook to some degree but nonetheless retains the Japanese origin for the guidebook. In other words, there seems to be some level of caution in ASEAN’s approach rather than the wholesale incorporation of the Japanese guidebook into its own normative framework.
While the process is not seamless and there are important nation-of-origin distinctions in branding the regulatory and normative bases for Asian smart cities, the diffusion of smart city ideas and norms may eventually lead to the export of Japanese legal infrastructures, which may provoke regulatory competition in Asia. For Japan’s MLIT, there are potential regulatory competitors: South Korea and China.Footnote 92
First, there is South Korea’s Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MOLIT), which has been hosting the “K-City Network Global Cooperation Program,” “a new platform and G2G cooperation program for overseas smart city development and export of K-smart city model.”Footnote 93 Under this program, twelve smart city projects were adopted in 2020 and eleven in 2021,Footnote 94 with nine in ASEAN countries. However, as MOLIT’s program also focuses on global projects beyond Asia, the extent to which Japan and South Korea are in regulatory competition to export their own smart city models to ASEAN may be unclear.
China is another possible rival. As noted previously, Chinese big-tech corporations such as Huawei have been engaging in Asian smart city projects. Chinese companies’ technologies and systems can spread through overseas smart city projects along the “Digital Silk Road” under China’s “Belt and Road Initiative.”Footnote 95 Moreover, the Chinese government is engaged in the ASCN. In 2019, China and ASEAN released the “ASEAN–China Leaders’ Statement on Smart City Cooperation Initiative.”Footnote 96 According to the Statement, ASEAN and China agreed to “support private sector collaboration,” “encourage the establishment of mutually beneficial city partnerships between ASEAN cities … and Chinese cities,” and “promote … encouraging exchanges among related government departments, research institutions, enterprises, and other relevant stakeholders to promote the sharing of knowledge, technology and innovative solutions.”Footnote 97
Related to the promotion of “sharing of knowledge, technology and innovative solutions” above, one study pointed out that “China is promoting its smart city expertise through a set of training programmes provided to officials and engineers from foreign countries, particularly developing ones.”Footnote 98 Indeed, the same study argues, “China is not only training foreign officials on the technical dimension of smart cities (infrastructure, maintenance, etc.) but also, increasingly, on how the government can use this expertise for specific social, political or security purposes.”Footnote 99
The COVID-19 pandemic increased opportunities for China to export its own smart city model because the pandemic has expanded and added a new function to smart city development: the need for an urgent response to public health emergencies. Smart city technologies can promote “remote work, online or distance learning, digital and contactless payments, telehealth, online shopping and drone or robot delivery” during health emergencies.Footnote 100 Moreover, smart technologies for surveillance and monitoring, which can track people’s location and movement, have been useful for managing public safety during pandemics. As another study highlighted, “[t]he public sector has regained unexpected power and trust”Footnote 101 in using smart surveillance and monitoring technologies during the pandemic, and “[s]mart-city development will be boosted following COVID-19.”Footnote 102 At this point, China may successfully export its own smart city model, which is useful for responding to public health emergencies and thus has great appeal for other governments.Footnote 103
As noted, China has been extensively engaged in training foreign officials in smart city governance. This differs from what Japan’s MLIT and South Korea’s MOLIT have been doing for smart city cooperation, mainly assisting overseas smart city project formation. As noted, for Japan, capacity building and training for foreign local governments are within the scope of JICA, which uses ODA to support foreign developing countries bilaterally. JICA’s engagement with foreign local governments is possible only after JICA receives official requests for support from foreign (local) governments. Generally, just as “traditional donors have diffused principles, political structures, state reform, and economic adjustment programmes to recipient countries via Official Development Aid,”Footnote 104 JICA can also attempt to diffuse Japanese urban development models through smart city cooperation. However, JICA’s smart city support may be insufficient to compete with the extensive capacity building offered by China.Footnote 105
Simultaneously, the Chinese government’s engagement and big-tech company projects will certainly raise security and privacy concerns regarding smart city development. Arranging the regulatory framework for data governance, including security and privacy issues, is a significant challenge, particularly in Asian smart cities.Footnote 106 In terms of concerns over privacy, China’s approach differs from that of Japan – Japan can differentiate its overseas smart city projects from China’s projects in light of privacy and security concerns.
VI Conclusion
This chapter has examined Japan’s shaping of the ideas and norms of smart cities in Asian countries, particularly in relation to ASEAN in the context of inter-regional competition. Several methods exist for exporting smart solutions by Japanese governmental organizations, including development cooperation, diffusion of ideas, and regulatory competition. While interactions do not yet entail the export and adoptions of specific Japanese legal infrastructures, the MLIT and JICA are attempting to diffuse the norms, ideas, and governance models of smart cities through cooperation with ASEAN. Japan attempts to shape the idea of smart cities as it seeks to strengthen cooperation with ASEAN countries and highlight advantages over rival countries (i.e., China). More precisely, Japan wants to take the lead in exporting the smart city model associated with the “citizen-centric” approach and the importance of privacy and data protection.Footnote 107
What are the consequences of these interactions? It takes time to observe the effects and consequences of any interaction; in the case of smart cities, implementation takes a decade.Footnote 108 Each smart city project encompasses various development pathways; there is no smart city in Asia yet that includes a comprehensive smart “system” achieving all three levels (as illustrated in Section II.A).Footnote 109 It remains to be seen how the interactions between Japan and ASEAN will lead to the creation of the Asian smart city model. For future research on IAL of smart cities, it is necessary to look at interactions involving other key actors (i.e., Singapore, South Korea, and China)Footnote 110 and examine how the dynamism of interactions affects cooperation, diffusion, and competition in shaping the idea of smart cities in Asia.
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