1 Introduction
In 2014, right after the Crimean annexation, Russian President Vladimir Putin famously stated that Kazakhstan did not have a proper nation-statehood until the collapse of the USSR in 1991 (Kalikulov Reference Kalikulov2014). This statement caused public outrage in a post-Soviet republic, and one year later, Kazakhstan commemorated the 550 years of the formation of the Kazakh Khanate, underlining the deep history of nation statehood (Olmos Reference Olmos2019). In 2019, the second Kazakh President, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, announced the wide Commemoration of 750 years of the foundation of the Golden Horde in his State-of-the-Union address (Tokayev Reference Tokayev2019a). The Mausoleum devoted to Jochi, a son of Genghis Khan, was reconstructed in Ulytau, the central region of Kazakhstan, and the Institute for Research of the Golden Horde was launched in Astana. Tokayev stated that the Golden Horde was the first proto-Kazakh state and started to use it in his nation-building strategies (Tokayev Reference Tokayev2019b). In his inauguration speech, Tokayev said that “our ancestors, having rallied together, formed such strong states in the space of Eurasia as the Golden HordeFootnote 1 and the Kazakh Khanate, thereby inscribing glorious pages in our history” (Tokayev Reference Tokayev2022a).
This change in the historical narrative of the Golden Horde in Kazakhstan is perplexing since, in the first 25 years of independent Kazakhstan, the Golden Horde was downplayed mainly by Nazarbayev. In that period, the Golden Horde was not considered a part of Kazakhstani history. For instance, the first academic history textbook of independent Kazakhstan, published in 1997, preserved the ’Soviet paradigm’ narrative, arguing that the Ak Orda, as a vassal and rebellious state within the Golden Horde, laid the foundation for Kazakh statehood. Hence, this article raises two interrelated questions. How has the official historical narrative of the Golden Horde changed in independent Kazakhstan? What role did the Kazakh historians play as memory actors in shaping the historical narrative?
This study operates at the crossroads of history and memory politics, where the formulation of historical narratives becomes entwined with political strategies to shape collective memory. Memory politics, defined as the deliberate efforts of political actors to influence how others remember specific events, forms the backdrop for this research (Kubik and Bernhard Reference Kubik and Bernhard2014). Initially centered on state and elite perspectives in Russia and Central Asia, early memory studies explored how historical interpretation served state legitimacy and nation-building objectives. However, the evolving ”third phase" of memory studies shifts attention to the construction of historical narratives, emphasizing the role of non-state memory actors and the agency of historians in shaping historical policies, engaging in what can be termed “memory games” (Wuestenberg Reference Wuestenberg, Wuesternberg and Sierp2020; Mink and Neumayer Reference Mink, Neumayer, Mink and Neumayer2013; Miller Reference Miller, Miller and Lipman2012). This article specifically examines the construction of the historical narrative surrounding the Golden Horde in Independent Kazakhstan (1991-2022), interpreting the official historical narrative as a meaningful scheme detailing the nation’s genealogy and linking the past to the present and future (Malinova Reference Malinova2018, 274). In the complex landscape of competing historical narratives within a society, this study focuses on the pivotal role of historians as non-state memory actors, shedding light on their agency and activities in shaping the historical narrative of the Golden Horde in independent Kazakhstan.
This work presents a two-fold argument. Firstly, we show how the official historical narrative of the Golden Horde shifted from obscurity under Nazarbayev to full-scale endorsement under Tokayev. Second, this work argues that this shift can be attributed to the agency of a new generation of historians functioning as memory actors. To substantiate this argument, we offer two points. First, our research uncovers an ongoing “memory game” in contemporary Kazakhstan between two schools of historians, particularly in their interpretation of the contested Medieval past. Second, drawing on extensive primary work, including 14 in-depth interviews, we reveal that the new wave of historians utilized historical evidence to advocate for commemorative practices and promote the new historical narrative of the Golden Horde in Kazakhstan.
Applying the framework developed by Mink and Neumayer (Reference Mink, Neumayer, Mink and Neumayer2013), we demonstrate that these historians employed three key practices: 1) “historicizing strategies” to revisit the conflict-generating heritage related to the genealogy of the Kazakh nation, 2) “reactive memory” to convince the state of the “profitability” of incorporating Golden Horde memory material amid external and internal political uncertainty, and 3) a focus on “seams of memory,” such as the Juchi Mausoleum and symbolic heritage of the Kazakh people, establishing connections to the Golden Horde.
This work contributes two strands of literature. First, this work contributes to the growing literature on non-state memory actors in post-communist and post-Soviet autocracies. While numerous studies focus on the role of non-state memory actors resisting the state narratives in democratic or hybrid settings of Eastern Europe (Miller Reference Miller, Miller and Lipman2012; Mink and Neumayer Reference Mink, Neumayer, Mink and Neumayer2013; Kubik and Bernhard Reference Kubik and Bernhard2014) or transnational memories (Wuestenberg Reference Wuestenberg, Wuesternberg and Sierp2020), this article reveals how such actors operate in cooperation with the state in authoritarian settings. Therefore, we add to the growing literature (Kurilla Reference Kurilla2023; Dukeyev Reference Dukeyev2025) on memory actors engaging the historical narratives and memory in non-democratic countries.
Second, this article engages the literature on mnemonic context in Kazakhstan. The previous scholarship emphasized how the Kazakh state utilized the history of Stalinist repressions to forge symbolic capital (Bekus Reference Bekus2021) and achieved legitimization within the civic concept of nation (Kundakbayeva and Kassymova Reference Kundakbayeva and Kassymova2016). Except for a few studies, the previous scholarship has not investigated the role of historians as active mnemonic actors in Kazakhstan. Hence, this research fills this gap. This work showcases how historians as mnemonic actors possess the agency to shape memory building on the recent studies on the role of authors in history writing (Dukeyev Reference Dukeyev2023) and counter-state narratives (Medeuova et al. Reference Medeuova2016) in Kazakhstan.
The next section describes the theoretical framework that underlines our approach. It extensively draws from the “third wave” literature on the agency and practices of memory actors. Then, we situate our study within the literature on Kazakhstan’s mnemonic context, followed by an essential background on formulating the historical narrative in Soviet Kazakhstan and the emergence of the Tatar school of historians of the Golden Horde methodological note. Then, we present the methodological note. Afterward, we present our findings from primary data and analysis of the reinterpretation of the official historical narrative under Nazarbayev and Tokayev, focusing on the interchange between two schools of Kazakh historians. In the end, we present our discussion and concluding remarks.
2 Literature Review
The literature review is based on the analysis of two strands of scholarship. First, we understand and conceptualize the process of politicizing history and memory politics in the post-communist world, proposing a framework to investigate the role of historians as mnemonic actors in shaping the official historical narrative. Second, we provide the essential context of memory politics in Kazakhstan, situating our study in a wider literature.
2.1 “Third Phase” of memory studies and “historicizing strategies” of mnemonic actors
This article examines the evolution of Kazakhstan’s historical narrative of the Golden Horde under Nazarbayev and Tokayev. Brubaker’s (Reference Brubaker1994) concept of a “nationalizing state” and Halbwachs’s (Reference Halbwachs1992) notion of collective memory inform our understanding of how post-Soviet states, including Kazakhstan, use history to construct national identities. This involves the state’s role in creating official historical narratives through symbols like monuments and commemoration practices (Assmann Reference Assmann, Tilmans, van Vree and Winter2012; Malinova Reference Malinova2018). Early memory studies focused on how states use history to shape national identity, with examples like Amir Timur in Uzbekistan (Paskaleva Reference Paskaleva2015) and the Battle of Gokdepe in Turkmenistan (Horak Reference Horák2015). However, criticism of the state-centric approach in memory politics led to a “third phase”, emphasizing the agency of mnemonic actors that have their own agency (Wuestenberg Reference Wuestenberg, Wuesternberg and Sierp2020). This phase explores memory politics as a dynamic interplay of negotiations and interactions among various actors, acknowledging the active role of historians and memory activists in shaping historical narratives in Eastern Europe and beyond (Miller Reference Miller, Miller and Lipman2012; Kubik and Bernhard Reference Kubik and Bernhard2014; Cusco Reference Cusco, Miller and Lipman2012; Feischmidt Reference Feischmidt2020; Behr Reference Behr2022).
The third phase initially posited that non-state mnemonic actors were influential mainly in democratic settings, with Daphi and Zamponi (Reference Daphi and Zamponi2019) discussing the “movement memory nexus” in shaping dominant official narratives. Yet, Kurilla’s (Reference Kurilla2023) work on the Immortal Regiment in Russia challenges this, showing how memory actors retain autonomy even in authoritarian contexts. Hence, this study aims to fill a gap in understanding the role and agency of memory actors in authoritarian regimes.
Although history and memory are distinct concepts, it is crucial to recognize their interrelation. P. Nora (Reference Nora1989, 8) argued that history and memory are in constant opposition, where “memory is a perpetually actual phenomenon, a bond tying us to the eternal present; history is a representation of the past.” History, as a problematic and incomplete reconstruction of the past, seeks to control memory. Scholars have noted that history is constructed based on the personal perspectives of historians, influenced by their background (education and training) and social constructions (Burke Reference Burke1989). Therefore, historians play an essential role in activating the past and engaging in mnemonic manipulations, i.e., the process of memory politics (Kubik and Bernhard Reference Kubik and Bernhard2014; Miller Reference Miller, Miller and Lipman2012). Hence, this study concentrates on historians.
This study employs the framework developed by Mink and Neumayer (Reference Mink, Neumayer, Mink and Neumayer2013), which elaborates on the agency of memory actors through three practices: “historicizing strategies,” “reactive memory,” and “seams of memory.” In “historicizing strategies,” memory actors utilize these approaches to either generate consensus or reopen suppressed aspects of history, aiming for symbolic recognition or integration into the national historical narrative. This process is situated within the realm of symbolic politics, wherein groups seek political influence. Drawing on Bourdieu’s (Reference Bourdieu1986) concept, symbolic politics involves the production of meanings and the struggle for legitimacy. The concept of “reactive memory” elucidates that memory actors, engaging in “historicizing strategies,” strategically present “profitable” memory material in response to specific conditions, as stated by Mink and Neumayer (Reference Mink, Neumayer, Mink and Neumayer2013, 10): “People choose a certain past in order to use it and profit by doing so.” Lastly, the concept of “seams of memory,” inspired by Nora’s (Reference Nora1989) “lieux de memoire” (“places of memory” translated from French), refers to the stock of memory representations that can be exploited in “memory games”. These representations encompass symbols, physical monuments, or places strategically employed by memory actors in their historicizing strategies.
2.2 Mnemonic context of Kazakhstan
In examining Kazakhstan’s evolving historical narrative of the Golden Horde, particularly during the transition from Nazarbayev to Tokayev’s presidencies, it’s crucial to understand three main strands of the mnemonic context. Firstly, the state strategically employs memories for symbolic politics to gain both international and domestic legitimacy, as seen in its efforts to de-ethnicize victims of Stalinist repressions and leverage Soviet repressions for symbolic capital (Kundakbayeva and Kassymova Reference Kundakbayeva and Kassymova2016; Bekus Reference Bekus2021). Secondly, the production of historical knowledge in Kazakhstan is still influenced by Soviet historiography, evident in the persistence of Soviet narratives in history textbooks and the marginalization of internal debates on nationhood (Remnev Reference Remnev2011; Bissenova and Medeuova Reference Bissenova and Medeuova2016; Burkhanov and Sharipova Reference Burkhanov and Sharipova2023).
Finally, the role of historians and other actors in shaping historical narratives and commemorative monuments illustrates a “bottom-up” approach to history-making, with examples like urban planners and artists influencing the depiction of Kazakh Khanate founders in statues and historians having autonomy in constructing narratives about the 1930s hunger in textbooks (Fauve Reference Fauve2015; Dukeyev Reference Dukeyev2023). The agency is also attributed to memory practices generated by citizens who use their own resources to build monuments, mosques, and even museums in Kazakhstan, as discussed by Medeuova et al. (Reference Medeuova2016). The engagement of Kazakhs in tribal associations (rodoplemennye ob"yedineniya) and developing Shezire books to indicate individual genealogy reflects citizens’ keen interest in rediscovering their heritage and historical roots. Medeuova (Reference Medeuova2020) maintains that the emergence of new memorial complexes, funded by citizens and tribal associations, represents a process of political and cultural emancipation from Soviet collective memory patterns.
Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there has been a noticeable surge in calls for the decolonization and “desovetization” of Kazakhstan’s history. Zhussipbek (Reference Zhussipbek2024) highlighted a significant shift towards the “decolonial turn” in Kazakhstan, wherein both state and society are actively starting to revise the colonial Soviet and Russian historical narratives. Recent scholarly works, such as those by Sharipova, Bissenova, and Burkhanov (Reference Sharipova, Bissenova, Burkhanov, Sharipova, Bissenova and Burkhanov2024), as well as Sultangalieva (Reference Sultangalieva2024), underscore the crucial role played by various local actors, including historians, in reassessing previously entrenched historical narratives.
Therefore, this study explores the interconnection between historical narratives and memory politics in Kazakhstan, going beyond the state-centric approach. In the next section, we provide an extensive overview of the historical narrative of the Golden Horde in Soviet Kazakhstan and its broader context. For a brief timeline of Kazakhstan’s history, please see the appendix.
3 Background: The historical narrative of the Golden Horde in Soviet Kazakhstan and the emergence of the Tatar School
3.1 Golden Horde in Soviet Kazakhstan: Tatar-Mongol Yoke and “Feudal Past”
In Soviet Kazakhstan, the official historical narrative of the Golden Horde initially centered on the Tatar-Mongol Yoke, depicting it as a force that destroyed both Russian and nomadic civilizations in the vast Kazakh steppes. This perspective, rooted in Grekov and Yakubovskiy’s (Reference Grekov and Yakubovskiy1937) monograph based on the medieval source Natanzi, portrayed the Golden Horde negatively as a backward feudal state. Yet, the first academic history of Kazakhstan published in 1943 was more positive, linking the Golden Horde to the formation of the Kazakh Khanate (Shakiyeva Reference Shakiyevа2023). However, a 1944 decree by the Bolshevik party’s central committee imposed restrictions on research that “glorified” the Mongol period, branding the Golden Horde a “parasitic state” (Gallyamova Reference Gallyamova2019). This decree, affecting Soviet Tatarstan and Kazakhstan, led to the 1949 edition of the academic history (Omarov and Pankratova Reference Omarov and Pankratova1949) aligning with the ideological requirements, reflecting a Moscow-imposed narrative according to the 1944 decree.
Second, in the 1940s and 1950s, the “Soviet Paradigm” of the historical narrative on the Golden Horde was formed based on the works of Soviet and local orientalists. The Grekov-Yakubovskiy (Grekov and Yakubovskiy Reference Grekov and Yakubovskiy1950) work argued that Ak Orda (White Horde) existed as a vassal of the Golden Horde on the territory of Kazakhstan. The narrative stated that Ak Orda (predecessor of the Kazakh Khanate) fought against the Golden Horde for its independence and suffered from the Tatar-Mongol Yoke. Therefore, the Golden Horde was considered a foreign invader, and it did not lead to the formation of the Kazakh Khanate. Essentially, this Soviet Paradigm was a compromise between Moscow and local Kazakh historians who needed a “positive ancestor state” within the framework of communist ideology. This doctrine was developed and extended by late Soviet orientalists based in Almaty, such as Klavdia Pischulina, who was a leading scholar on the Medieval history of Kazakhstan (Bustanov Reference Bustanov2015, 106-108). Pischulina was one of the authors of the 1977 academic history of Kazakhstan that conveyed the negative image of the Tatar-Mongol yoke that led to “the destruction of productive forces, the mass extermination of people…” (Agadzhanov et al. Reference Agadzhanov, Kumekov, Margulan and Pischulina1977).
Third, in late Soviet Kazakhstan, a few historians and writers attempted to shape the Golden Horde’s historical narrative in Kazakhstan. Veniamin Iudin, an Almaty-based historian, published several works during the 1970s and 80s on the history of the Golden Horde, where he laid the scientific foundations for the rejection of the Soviet paradigm of the Golden Horde (Bustanov Reference Bustanov2015). Iudin, in his work, used the rediscovered historical sources to argue that the Golden Horde was a predecessor of the Kazakh Khanate; however, his last scientific articles were published in 1983 (the year of his death) and were not widely available to the public. Only in the 1990s and 2000s did his works circulate in independent Kazakhstan, such as Iudin (Reference Iudin2001). As Bustanov (Reference Bustanov2015, 103–106) noted, Iudin was considered a maverick among the Soviet historians/orientalists at that time.
The Kazakh literature writers made several attempts to bring back the Golden Horde. In 1983, the classic of Kazakh literature, Ilyas Esenberlin, wrote the Golden Horde trilogy, where he pointed out that the ancestors of the Kazakhs lived in this state and that this state was vital for the history of Kazakhstan. Dadabayeva and Sharipova (Reference Dadabayeva and Sharipova2016) stressed that the rigidness of the historical narrative underlined the drive of literature writers to rediscover the ancient nomadic past (including the period of the Golden Horde and Kazakh Khanate) in the historical genre. However, some attempts to deconstruct the Soviet narratives were swiftly crushed. Aitpaeva (Reference Aitpaeva, Sharipova, Bissenova and Burkhanov2024) highlights how quickly Olzhas Suleimenov’s effort to challenge the negative Soviet depiction of nomads in ”AZ I YA" was shut down by academic circles in Almaty, branding him as “unprofessional” and “unscientific.”
Overall, this period was characterized by the dominance of negative depiction of the Golden Horde in Soviet Kazakh historical science despite local historians’ resistance in the 1930s and 1940s. The Grekov-Yakubovskiy doctrine led to the foundation for the Ak Orda state approach pursued by Pischulina. The emphasis was made on Ak Orda, which was believed to be a state that led to the formation of the Kazakh Khanate. Thus, the Golden Horde was irrelevant to the history of Kazakhstan. However, Iudin formed a maverick approach using the original Tatar-Mongol sources to deny the existence of Ak Orda. Yet, Iudin’s works were published only in independent Kazakhstan, and his research would be a basis for the “new school” of historians that would develop significantly later.
3.2 The Golden Horde narrative and historical heritage worldwide: the Tatar School and others
The “Tatar School” of historians emerged in the 1990s amid Perestroika and democratization in the Soviet Union. It sparked a generational struggle within the community of historians in Tatarstan. The older generation upheld the “Soviet paradigm” known as “Bulgarism,” which traced the origins of the Tatar nation to Volga Bulgaria before the Golden Horde. Conversely, younger Tatar historians championed “Tatarism,” asserting the Golden Horde’s key role in the Tatars’ ethnogenesis (Cwiklinski and Kaplunovskiy Reference Cwiklinski and Kaplunovskiy2003).
The historical school of “Tatarism” established the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tatarstan in 1996 (also known as the Institute of Marjani)Footnote 2, institutionally separating from the “Bulgarists.” In 2003 the Institute created the Center for Research of the Golden Horde and Tatar Khanates (Tsentr issledovaniy Zolotoy Ordy i tatarskikh khanstv). Also in 2013, the Russian-language and Scopus-indexed Golden Horde Review [Zolotoordynskoye Obozreniye] journal was founded that became one of the first scholarly platforms specializing in the history of the Golden Horde.
According to Cwiklinski and Kaplunovskiy (Reference Cwiklinski and Kaplunovskiy2003), the dispute between the two schools settled in the 2000s, and the historical narrative incorporates their visions except for the views of some “extreme Bulgarists." Leading Tatar historian Iskhakov (Reference Iskhakov2011) highlighted that the “Tatarism school” ultimately prevailed in historical debates, thus establishing the Golden Horde narrative. The emergence of the Tatar School was affected by the works of the American historian Uli Schamiloglu, who greatly influenced Russian and Tatar historians. His numerous works were retranslated into Russian by Tatar historians such as Damir Iskhakov and Iskander Izmailov and later used in the struggle by young historians against the old school of “Bulgarism” (Iskhakov Reference Iskhakov2011). Bilz-Leonhardt (Reference Bilz-Leonhardt2008) argued that the deconstruction of the “Tatar Yoke” myth led to the growing pride and development of the Tatar nation.
While most of Tatar historians stress the connection between the Golden Horde and modern Tatarstan, their perspective on its heritage is inclusive. Marat Gibatdinov, a notable Tatar historian and deputy director of the Institute of Marjani, emphasized that the Golden Horde constituted a shared historical heritage for Kazakhstan, Tatarstan, and other ethnic groups such as the Nogai (Business Online 2021). Similarly, Schamiloglu advocated for all successor states, including today’s Kazakhstan, to embrace the legacy of the Golden Horde. Despite their small population (100,000) and lack of political autonomy, the Nogais also attach significance to the theme of the Golden Horde. However, Nogai scholars are underrepresented in discussions due to these constraints, a situation mirrored among the Karakalpaks.
For the Mongols, the Golden Horde holds importance as their state and historical heritage. Urangua (Reference Urangua2022) highlights that the Mongolian historians published a monograph on the history of Jochi Ulus in 2019, emphasizing the necessity of incorporating the perspectives of Russian and Tatar historians. This Mongolian monograph acknowledged the Golden Horde’s emergence as an independent state, albeit in 1264, a discrepancy from the date recognized in Russian and Tatar sources (1269) and later used for the commemoration in Kazakhstan in 2019.
4 Methodological Note
To answer our research questions, we have relied on qualitative inquiry encompassing both primary and secondary data. Our methodology centered on interviews with historians, aligning with recent scholarly approaches extending beyond analyzing official written texts discourse (Dukeyev Reference Dukeyev2023; Kitaevich Reference Kitaevich2014). This approach recognizes historians as active agents in knowledge production (Bissenova and Medeuova Reference Bissenova and Medeuova2016) and emphasizes their role in shaping collective historical narratives (Dukeyev Reference Dukeyev2025). By engaging with historians, we aimed to understand the local perspectives of historians as scholars who engage in the process of shaping the historical narratives in post-Soviet Central Asia, as highlighted by Sharipova, Bissenova, and Burkhanov (Reference Sharipova, Bissenova, Burkhanov, Sharipova, Bissenova and Burkhanov2024). Adopting the Mink and Neumayer (Reference Mink, Neumayer, Mink and Neumayer2013) concept of “historicizing strategies”, this work explored the role of historians as memory actors in shaping the official historical narrative of the Golden Horde in Kazakhstan. This article relied on purposive sampling as we targeted the broader community of historians as memory actors who create knowledge and interpret the memory of the Golden Horde in Kazakhstan, focusing on the followers of two primary historical schools, Pischulina (the so-called “old school”) and Iudin (“new school”).
The differentiation between the two schools largely originated from within the “new school,” whose members drew inspiration from the works of Iudin as they sought to reshape the historical narrative of the Golden Horde. This new wave of Kazakh historians aimed to distance themselves from the Soviet historiographical narrative represented by the “old school.” The “old school” predominantly upholds the “Soviet” paradigm of historical narrative, influenced by the works of K. Pischulina. It’s worth noting that those affiliated with the “old school” often dispute the notion of two distinct schools, rejecting this “labeling.” However, for this study, we very cautiously adopt this labeling of historians into two schools.
We targeted a wide variety of historians, including authors of textbooks, by intentionally seeking out a range of viewpoints. Our strategy endeavored to be inclusive, focusing on historians of various age groups and organizations (including private and state universities, research organizations, and state scientific organizations). Overall, we have conducted 14 semi-structured in-depth interviews with Kazakhstani historians, including nine “new school” historians who aim to reinterpret the memory of the Golden Horde and five “old school” who defend the existing constructions of the memory of the Golden Horde (table 1). The disproportion between the two schools in the sample explains that the former became more numerous in the historical science of Kazakhstan than the latter in the latter years.
Table 1. Conducted in-depth interviews with historians.
Each interview lasted for 1-2 hours, and recordings were taken. Interview respondents provided informed consent, and we have removed identifying information to preserve the confidentiality of our informants. All interviews were conducted in RussianFootnote 3 following the semi-structured questionnaire that focused on activities and perceptions of historians on the Golden Horde historical narrative and the Commemoration of the 750th anniversary. Data were coded and analyzed simultaneously using deductive and inductive thematic analysis (Braun and Clarke Reference Braun and Clarke2006). The former allowed researchers to generate themes informed by the literature and content analysis of documents. The latter methods enabled researchers to discover themes emerging from interviews. NVivo 12 was used in the process of coding data and data analysis.
Second, we analyzed essential secondary sources related to the interpretation of the historical memory of the Golden Horde. This method is consistent with the recent literature on memory politics and the politics of history in Kazakhstan (Dukeyev Reference Dukeyev2023, Reference Dukeyev2025). We conducted a content analysis of the academic history (akademicheskaya istoriya) textbooks published during the Soviet and Independence periods of Kazakhstan. The textbooks determine the interpretation of the past in schoolbooks for students and formulate the official historical viewpoint in Kazakhstan. We also included other sources that reflected the formation of the historical narrative of the Golden Horde in Kazakhstan. In addition, this work analyzed public statements and books written by Nursultan Nazarbayev (First President of Kazakhstan, 1991–2019), his successor Kassym-Jomart Tokayev (Second President, 2019-present time), and other relevant state officials. The variety of methods ensured the triangulation of data that strengthened the validity of this study.
5 The official historical narrative of the Golden Horde in Independent Kazakhstan
5.1 The Golden Horde under Nazarbayev in 1990s and 2000s
In 1991, Kazakhstan emerged as an independent country confronted with nation-building goals. Kazakhstan’s first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev (in office from 1991 to 2019), consolidated power by promoting a modern, multi-ethnic national identity focused on the future, while largely avoiding contentious historical events such as the 1931–33 famine (Richter Reference Richter2020). Kudaibergenova (Reference Kudaibergenova and Laruelle2016) noted that in a country with multiple ethnic and religious identities, the Kazakh regime under Nazarbayev implemented a strategy of largely preserving the historical narrative to demobilize the population. In the 1990s, the Kazakhs did not compose a majority group; hence, the regime and elite chose the strategy of neglecting and avoiding the memory of the past. The Soviet educational project legacy limited the attempts to redefine and reconstruct the historical narrative in independent Kazakhstan (Bissenova and Medeuova Reference Bissenova and Medeuova2016).
The establishment of the personality cult surrounding Nazarbayev marginalized the ancient history of the Kazakh state and hindered any efforts to question it. The first president was depicted as the most prominent historical figure responsible for building the independent nation of Kazakhstan (Isaacs Reference Isaacs2010). Respectively, Nazarbayev’s administration largely focused on preserving the pre-established (Soviet paradigm) historical narratives concerning the Golden Horde and the medieval past rather than endeavoring to question or dismantle them (Remnev Reference Remnev2011).
For instance, Nazarbayev reproduced the “Soviet Paradigm” in the historical narrative on Tatar Yoke in his book on the history of Kazakhstan:
“…the invasion (nashestviye) of Genghis Khan was directed at the Turkic peoples. The Mongolian expansion sharply slowed down the formation of the nationality in the territory of Central Asia.“ (Nazarbayev Reference Nazarbayev1999, 106–108).
Hence, the period of the Golden Horde and the whole Medieval Period of the History of Kazakhstan was considered irrelevant to the nationhood concept of the modern republic that originated in 1991. The state concept of development of historical consciences in Kazakhstan adopted in 1995 mentioned the nomadic civilization and the Kazakh Khanate, but it omitted the Golden Horde period (Concept 1995). The first-ever academic history of Kazakhstan published in 1997 reiterated the negative depiction of the Golden Horde as invaders (zavoyevateli) that devastated the cities and culture in the territory of Kazakhstan (Baipakov et al. Reference Baipakov, Kozybayev, Kumekov and Pischulina1997, 284–285). The academic history of early independent Kazakhstan was written by Soviet-trained historians and orientalists, including Klavdia Pischulina. The subject of the Golden Horde was classified as “global history” in the classificatory rubric of the Ministry of Education and Science of Kazakhstan until 2010.
Starting from independence, various historians and non-historians attempted to produce an alternative version of the history of Kazakhstan, including a new interpretation of the Golden Horde. For instance, Daniyarov (Reference Daniyarov1998) published an “Alternative History of Kazakhstan” that promulgated the idea that the Mongol Empire was a proto-Kazakh state. This non-academic book showed that the demand for the rediscovery of historical past on the part of the population of Kazakhstan had increased significantly compared to Soviet times.
5.2 The celebration of the 550 years of the Kazakh Khanate – the first recalibration of the historical narrative in 2014-2019
In March 2014, Russia occupied Crimea and started a belligerent foreign policy in the post-soviet space. In August 2014, Russian President Putin stated that Kazakhstan did not have proper statehood (gosudarstvennosti) until 1991 when Nazarbayev “created” the country (Kalikulov Reference Kalikulov2014). This statement challenged the sovereignty of Kazakhstan, and the Kazakh authorities started to exemplify a resurgent interest in “remembering” the past of previous statehood in nation-building. The aggressive Russian policy resulted in measures by Kazakh authorities to deepen national history and reject Russia’s irredentist claims (Olmos Reference Olmos2019).
The new strategy focused on commemorating the 550 years of the formation of the Kazakh Khanate, a medieval Kazakh state formed around the 15th century. This symbolic event held in 2015 was supposed to show the deep roots of statehood in the country. Nazarbayev famously stated right before he departed from power: “The Kazakh Khanate is the legitimate heir to the states of the Saks, Huns, Usuns, as well as the Great Turkic Khaganate, Desht-i-Kipchak, and the Golden Horde” (Prokhorov Reference Prokhorov2019). Furthermore, the first president urged restoring pride in the nomadic past of the Kazakhstani nation in his article “Seven Facets of the Great Steppe,” which urged historians to investigate the more profound history of Kazakh statehood (Nazarbayev Reference Nazarbayev2018). However, by omitting any reference to the Golden Horde in the article, Nazarbayev continued to focus solely on the commemoration of the Kazakh Khanate
In 2015, several historians attempted to persuade the Kazakh authorities to commemorate another historical anniversary – 750 years of the formation of the Golden Horde scheduled for 2019 (KazInform 2015). However, this initiative at that time failed and faced constraints. In 2018, one of the leading Kazakh medieval historians, Kanat Uskenbay, publicly opposed the Commemoration of the Golden Horde in Kazakhstan (Tatilya Reference Tatilya2018). Nazarbayev, until his resignation in early 2019, refused to commemorate the Golden Horde.
5.3 Commemoration of 750 years of Golden Horde – Tokayev envisions a new nation-building strategy (2019–2022)
The revision of the official historical narrative of the Golden Horde began after Kassym-Jomart Tokayev suddenly assumed power in Kazakhstan in March 2019. As the second president, Tokayev announced the “Listening State” and introduced a broad package of liberalization reforms aimed at fostering dialogue between the state and society (Kurmanov, Selteyev, and Almaganbetov, Reference Kurmanov, Selteyev and Almaganbetov2024). However, his political reform agenda remained constrained between March 2019 and January 2022, as Nursultan Nazarbayev continued to wield considerable influence over the country and control over Tokayev during this period (Abishev, Kurmanov, and Sabitov, Reference Abishev, Kurmanov and Sabitov2024). However, Tokayev had relatively greater autonomy in the domains of history and culture, which he used to promote a new narrative centered on the Golden Horde to establish a distinct source of political legitimacy.
Tokayev, in August 2019, just two and a half months after his election, announced the celebration of the 750th anniversaryFootnote 4 of the Ulus Jochi (Golden Horde). The event was to commemorate the 750 years of 1269 Talas Qurultay (meeting) that led to the establishment of the independent Golden Horde. The amount of 3.5 billion Kazakh Tenge (around 7.8 million US dollars) was provided for a range of activities that mainly focused on the reconstruction of the Jochi Mausoleum, organization of conferences, and the creation of tourist infrastructure to the memorial places of the Golden Horde in Kazakhstan throughout 2019–2022 (Decree 2019). The Jochi Mausoleum, located in the center of Kazakhstan, was refurbished from a poorly maintained historical monument to the grand memorial complex that the President visited in March 2022. To mark the symbolic meaning of this place, Tokayev organized the first meeting of the National QurultayFootnote 5 at the site of Jochi Mausoleum where the President stressed that the Golden Horde laid the foundations for the Kazakh statehood (Tokayev Reference Tokayev2022b).
The second president used the Golden Horde’s memory in his nation-building strategy that focused on the deepness of Kazakh history and its difference from the Soviet Union/Russian heritage. These endeavors occurred against the backdrop of assertive statements by Russian President Putin, who remarked that Russia had made territorial “gifts” [podarki] to former Soviet republics in 2020 (Lenta.Ru 2020). Tokayev, in his strategy, argued that the Kazakh statehood originated from the Golden Horde, challenging Putin’s statement about the formation of Kazakhstan in 1991.
“Our sacred land… was not gifted (podarena) to us by anyone. Our history did not begin in 1991 or 1936 [the foundation of the Kazakh Soviet Republic]. Our ancestors lived here during the time of the Kazakh Khanate, in the era of the Golden Horde…”. (Tokayev Reference Tokayev2021a)
The second president emphasized that, unlike his predecessor, he initiated the process of rediscovering Kazakhstan’s historical past. For instance, Tokayev highlighted that the history of the Golden Horde was previously “forgotten”: “In fact, the history of the Golden Horde still needs to be studied in depth… This centuries-old period of our ancestry has gone unnoticed ” (Tokayev Reference Tokayev2021b). The Kazakh government organized numerous conferences dedicated to the Golden Horde and initiated the creation of the Research Institute for Jochi Ulus to study the history of Kazakhstan from 1206 (the year the Jochi Ulus was allocated) to 1847 (the death of the last Khan of the Kazakh Khanate – Kenesary, who was a descendant of Jochi). Tokayev made a significant announcement regarding Kazakhstan’s forthcoming sixth version of academic history, scheduled for release in 2025-2026 across seven volumes. While initial media reports (Vaal’ Reference Vaal’2022) suggested his direct involvement in the writing process, his role appears more supervisory. The President’s Administration monitors the development of the country’s new academic history. Specifically, volume three of the new academic history will focus on the Golden Horde period, a decision that underscores Tokayev’s emphasis on its significance.
The renewed attention to the Golden Horde also resulted in the emergence of monuments and the renaming of the streets across Kazakhstan. In Aktobe, located in Western Kazakhstan, the monument to Edige Khan was erected for 30 million tenges paid by a private fundraising initiative (66.5 thousand US dollars) (Yendibayeva Reference Yendibayeva2020). The Aktobe governor [akim] attended the public ceremony and stressed that Edige was a batyr [warrior] who defended the motherland from enemies. A Kazakh Parliament member proposed renaming a street and erecting a monument to Jochi Khan in Astana that would “lift our national spirit and demonstrate our sovereignty (gosudarstvennost’)” (Radionov Reference Radionov2019). The commemorative practices illustrate politicians’ instrumentalization of the historical narrative of the Golden Horde under Tokayev in collaboration with societal actors.
In early 2024, Tokayev announced celebrations marking 800 years since the founding of Ulus Jochi in 1224. At the Qurultay in Atyrau, he highlighted the Golden Horde as the direct ancestor of the Kazakh state and proposed a documentary series on the topic (Tokayev Reference Tokayev2024). His remarks, however, sparked criticism from Russian media and politicians, who questioned Kazakhstan’s historical claim to the Golden Horde given its status as a young state (Iordanova Reference Iordanova2024). The growing emphasis on the Golden Horde following the January 2022 events reflects Tokayev’s broader effort to position Kazakhstan within a historical narrative distinct from Russia and different from Nazarbayev’s legacy. Critically, Tokayev has declared the formation of new civilization approach to history of Kazakhstan that highlights the state’s increased efforts in strengthening the state sovereignty (Tokayev Reference Tokayev2025). This shift, further driven by Russia’s aggressive posture after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, aligns with decolonial discourses promoted by Kazakh nationalists and intellectuals. For instance, Tokayev has also embraced the Alash-Orda legacy as a symbol of Kazakh sovereignty, framing it as both an aspirational ideal and a strategic response to recent geopolitical challenges (Dukeyev Reference Dukeyev2025). In this context, his administration has shown an increased openness to alternative historical narratives and collaboration with independent historians. This transformation signals an attempt by Tokayev’s leadership to build political legitimacy and propose a new nation-building strategy by reconnecting with a historical legacy less influenced by the Soviet (Russian) past.
This section showed how Kazakhstan under Nazarbayev embraced the Soviet-era narrative of the Golden Horde. After 2014, however, the regime began politicizing this history in response to Russia’s growing assertiveness and Putin’s remarks about Kazakhstan. Under Tokayev, the new Golden Horde narrative became central to a new nation-building strategy. The next sections present interview data and analyze the two historical schools.
6 The “new school” of historians
6.1 The emergence of new generation historians contesting the “Soviet Paradigm” of the Golden Horde
The ”new school" of historians arose in the 1990s and 2000s, led by younger scholars and some older historians reinterpreting the Golden Horde, centered in Astana. Their views were mainly influenced by the works of Veniamin Yudin. For instance, Abusseitova (Utemis-Haji 1992), one of the students of Iudin, rediscovered his unpublished work on Chingiz-nameFootnote 6 which she published in the early 1990s. This “new” source was an internal document of the rulers of the Golden Horde, challenging the idea of Ak Orda as a vassal state within the empire. According to this document, the Ak Orda and the Golden Horde were just the names of the nomadic residences of the Khans (ruler), not the states. Furthermore, the document underlined that Tuka Timur was the khan that ruled the Golden Horde, therefore, being the ancestor of the further Kazakh khans. This is a crucial implication linking the Kazakh khans to the wider territory of the Golden Horde and challenging the “Soviet Paradigm” that indicated that Orda Edzhen was the ancestor. Therefore, according to the new narrative, the Kazakh Khanate originated directly from the Golden Horde, thus marking the origin of the Kazakh statehood with the Talas Qurultay in 1269, when the Horde was formed. This document was critical in re-evaluating the role of the Golden Horde and providing a more consistent genealogy for its rulers. However, this work was ignored by the authors of Kazakhstan’s 1997 first academic history.
Interviews revealed that because of the economic crisis of the 1990s, there were few medieval historians in independent Kazakhstan. Moreover, the impact of the Soviet educational project limited the capacity of elites and intelligentsia to reconstruct the Soviet narratives.
“…In the 1990s - the political elite, like the rest of the intelligentsia of Kazakhstan, had the historical memory [of the Golden Horde] formed by Soviet school textbooks in the 1950s. They could not reconstruct the history” (Historian #4, 23.08.2022)
Only in the 2000s did more historians emerged who could engage in the debate on the Golden Horde. An informal coalition of historians of the self-labelled “new school” appeared, and its members worked together in various state and private organizations to promote the new narrative. This school represented the generational shift of historians that encompassed various ages. For instance, Radik Temirgaliyev, a young historian born in 1979 and a graduate of the Karaganda State University, is one of the activists of the new school of historians. He published several successful popular history books focused on the idea that the Golden Horde was paramount to Kazakh history (Temirgaliyev Reference Temirgaliyev2013). Aibolat Kushkumbayev (born in 1969), a professor at Eurasian National University since 2014, is a key figure in the new school. He earned his doctorate in 2010 with a dissertation on the military history of Golden Horde nomads (13th–15th centuries) and has published extensively in Kazakhstani and international journals challenging Pischulina’s Soviet paradigm. The “new school” historians contested the negative portrayal of the Golden Horde in the “Soviet Paradigm” as the “foreign invaders” and “feudal past” and the discarding of this period in the history of Kazakhstan:
“Grekov was the first ideologist of the Soviet historical school, an adherent of the Marxist theory of class struggle. His work on the Golden Horde is just written in this ideological stance. Grekov indicated that there was a Tatar-Mongol yoke in Rus’. The Golden Horde brought nothing but the yoke, destruction, deprivation because they were savages [dikary] and steppe dwellers [stepnyaki]” (Historian #2, 25.07.2022).
The “new school” historians sought to reshape the Golden Horde’s narrative at the regional level. In 2006, Kuzembaiuly and Abil’s university textbook, published by Kostanai State University, introduced the term Ulug Ulus (“Great State”) to describe the period, portraying the Golden Horde as the first centralized Kypchak (ancient Kazakh) state. Challenging the Soviet paradigm, the authors presented it as a powerful part of Kazakh history and denied Ak Orda’s existence as an independent state. The scarcity of Kazakhstan history textbooks led to numerous reprints of Kuzembaiuly and Abil’s textbooks, distributed beyond Kostanay to various publishing houses due to high demand. Despite limited specialists in Kazakhstani history, particularly in medieval studies, this textbook gained widespread use in the mid-2000s. However, this textbook was later criticized for the politicization of history by the “old school” historians, which we explore in detail below.
6.2 Designing the “historicizing strategies”
According to Mink and Neumayer (Reference Mink, Neumayer, Mink and Neumayer2013), memory actors employ “historicizing strategies” to build certain representations of historical facts (historical narratives) internalized through formal and informal socialization (schooling, family, society, etc.) with the goal of political influence. This is done to build symbolic capital. The “new school” historians employed the strategies to reshape the “Soviet Paradigm” through three major channels: academic publications and activity in the public media field, instrumentalizing the memory material to make it “profitable” for politicians and invoking the “seams of memory” through the commemorative activities and Jochi Monument.
In the 2010s, groups of “new school” historians mobilized their efforts to influence the Golden Horde historical narrative through academic publications. They challenged the “Soviet Paradigm” narrative in scholarship by publishing articles that argued that the Golden Horde was an heir to the Kazakh Khanate and that Ak Orda never existed as a separate state (Sabitov and Kushkumbayev Reference Sabitov and Kushkumbayev2013). The new school historians regularly met at academic conferences and meetings where they learned from each other and collaborated.
One example of such collaboration is the active participation of “new school” historians in Golden Horde forums organized by the Marjani Institute in Tatarstan. Since 2009, Tatarstan has hosted seven of these international conferences. New school historians collaborated, as seen with Sabitov and Kushumbayev (Reference Sabitov and Kushkumbayev2013), who presented a joint article on the new history of Ulus Jochi at the 2013 Golden Horde summit that led to the clash with the “old school” historians. Academic debates during the 3rd (2013) and 6th (2019) forums in Kazan saw disagreements between the two schools on historiographical issues such as the origin of the dynasty of Kazakh khans and the localization of Ak Orda and Kok Orda, along with their interpretation. Similar clashes occurred at the Faizkhanov Readings in St. Petersburg in 2016.
Interviews revealed that the “new school” historians relied on the works by Iudin and the new works of Tatar historians to challenge the “Soviet Paradigm” about the Golden Horde. “We were the first ones to travel to the conferences in Russia in the 2000s where predominantly Tatar specialists reformulated the Golden Horde history. We cooperated with the Institute of Marjani in Kazan, which focused on the history of the Golden Horde in Russia” (Historian #9, 25.11.2022).
Second, these new historians actively spread their ideas in social media and the broader media field. Leading historians established accounts on Facebook to engage in debates on the historical narrative of the Golden Horde. Radik Temirgaliyev published the book Ak Orda-History of the Kazakh Khanate [Ak Orda -Istoriya Kazakhskogo Khanstva], which became a best-seller in history in Kazakhstan in 2009; it argued that the Golden Horde was a part of the glorious Kazakh history, i.e., the Golden Age. Meanwhile, several historians from this group actively posted videos on YouTubeFootnote 7, launching educational channels to promote their historical narrative.
6.3 Engaging “reactive memory” – Making the new Golden Horde narrative “profitable”
The strategy of new school historians was to overcome the constraints of the “Soviet Paradigm” by making the new narrative of the Golden Horde “profitable” by relying on the “reactive memory” (Mink and Neumayer Reference Mink, Neumayer, Mink and Neumayer2013). Historians pursued a two-fold strategy: making the Golden Horde narrative acceptable as the inclusive project for nation building and positing the new narrative as the opportunity to “deepen history” to support the sovereignty of the Kazakh nation.
Recognizing potential resistance to a nationalist agenda among Kazakhstan’s diverse population, the “new school” historians advocated for utilizing the revised historical narrative of the Golden Horde to foster Kazakh nation-building. This approach suggested the potential for politicians to establish a civic Kazakhstani identity rooted in the Golden Horde’s multi-ethnic and multi-religious state (Historian #11, 14.12.2022). Hence, they presented their reinterpretation of the Golden Horde narrative as an inclusive project for nation-building.
“Appeal to the legacy of the Golden Horde - the great Eurasian imperial state, formed after the collapse of the united Mongol Empire - seems to be the most promising both from a pragmatic point of view and from the point of view of historical truth” (Kozyrev Reference Kozyrev2013, 18)
The new wave historians recognized the prominence of convincing politicians to delve deeper into Kazakh history by utilizing the narrative of the Golden Horde. Initially, the attention was on highlighting how the Golden Horde illustrated the longstanding existence of the Kazakh state and its ability to safeguard the country’s sovereignty against irredentist Russia.
“The reconstruction [of the historical narrative] of the Golden Horde also reduces the likelihood of claims to Northern Kazakhstan by Russia. Recently, someone stated that Western Kazakhstan is supposedly not Kazakh land and that it was the Nogai Horde, and the Nogais are allegedly the people of Russia. They say the Russians were in Northern Kazakhstan before the Kazakhs, and there was a Siberian khanate. However, the use of the Golden Horde can discard all this talk since both the Nogai Horde and the Siberian Khanate came out of the Golden Horde. (Historian #8, 28.11.2022)
The “new school” historians underlined how the Kazakh state could use the Golden Horde as the “Golden Age” or “Glorious Ancestors” (Coakley, Reference Coakley2004) for patriotic purposes by emphasizing the importance of history in nation-building. Hence, Kazakhstan could use the heritage of that period to nurture pride in the “golden age” of nomadic history and consolidate national identity (Historian #7, 21.11.2022).
“There is such a key link as the Golden Age in any national historiography. In Turkey, the golden age was the Ottoman Empire; we need to have our own imperial history that can contribute to the formation of a political nation, including on a poly-ethnic substrate… hence, the Golden Horde could become as our Ottoman Empire” (Historian #7, 21.11.2022).
The activity of historians was directed at influencing the Kazakh state to revise the narrative. “New school” historians promulgated the new narrative of the Golden Horde by participating in expert meetings of historians with state officials. Several interviews revealed how they wrote briefing notes to the President’s Administration and influenced the Institute of History at Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Education and Science. Therefore, the historians actively cooperated with leading Kazakh decision-makers, persuading them to start the history revision process.
For instance, in 2013, Kazakh State Secretary Marat Tazhin created an Interdepartmental Working Group to study national history with a focus on the revival of the memory of the Golden Horde. However, in early 2014, Tazhin was removed from the post of State Secretary, and all his activities in history revision were suspended. The first attempts during Nazarbayev, though fruitless, brought the new Golden Horde narrative to the state agenda.
However, this fervent work of new historians started to affect the state officials’ perspectives and promote commemorative events and more profound research of the Golden Horde. According to one of the respondents, the book by Kozyrev (Reference Kozyrev2013) promoting the new narrative of the Golden Horde was read by officials in the President’s Administration, and several briefing notes were submitted to the President on the importance of the narrative (Historian #4, 23.08.2022). The historians then engaged the second president, Tokayev, and subsequently, they participated in the development of the state program of events commemorating the 750 years of the Golden Horde. The “new school” historians also promoted the opening of the research institute of Ulus Jochi in Astana.
6.4 Utilizing the “seams of memory” – Commemoration of the 750 years of Golden Horde, Jochi Mausoleum, and cultural memory
The memory actors engage in memory mines, veins or “seams” as symbols or physical places that can support their activity. The new school historians sought to attract public and state attention by focusing on the Mausoleum of Jochi and the Commemoration of the 750 years of the Talas Kurultai, where the Golden Horde was allegedly formed. The idea for this commemoration was suggested by new school historians, who “wrote articles and made posts on Facebook on the necessity to celebrate this anniversary in Kazakhstan” (Historian #9, 25.11.2022).
Critically, new school historians based their new historical narrative on the cultural memory of the Kazakhs. Works by Medeuova et al. (Reference Medeuova2016) indicate a surge of citizens’ interest in their genealogy and historical heritage. The historians stipulated that the new narrative of the Golden Horde was based on citizens’ cultural memories of their nomadic past.
“Around the beginning of 2000s, another impetus [to the new historical narrative of the Golden Horde] was the publication of a large volume of documents of the Kazakh oral historical tradition, including this 100-volume work of Bapalan Sozi, where there was a huge amount of epic material, 40 Batyrs of the Crimea and numerous Shezhires, where it was visible that the Kazakhs consider themselves as the direct descendants of the Golden Horde” (Historian #11, 14.12.2022).
Several interviewed historians highlighted the role of the symbol of the Jochi Mausoleum located in Central Kazakhstan (figure 1). “Since Jochi mausoleum is located in Kazakhstan and the Kazakh Khans originate from the Jochi family, it is logical that we are ancestors of the Golden Horde” (Historian #7, 21.11.2022). For new school historians, this Mausoleum is the cornerstone symbol of the connection between the Golden Horde and today’s Kazakhstan.
Figure 1. Jochi Mausoleum in Kazakhstan. Source (Authors’ own picture).
The “new school” historians faced the backlash of the “old school” historians in engaging the symbols of the Commemoration.
“There was resistance to the celebration of the anniversary of the Golden Horde. The older generation, which followed the Soviet interpretation of history, according to which the Ak Orda allegedly existed as a state, did not support the 750th anniversary. These older historians posted on Facebook and openly opposed the Commemoration of the Golden Horde” (Historian #7, 21.11.2022).
In the next section, we discuss the “old school” historians who preserved the “Soviet Paradigm” and their resistance to the historicizing strategies of the new wave of historians.
7 The old school of historians – the redefined Soviet Paradigm
7.1 The old school of historians – roots in the Orientalist school in Almaty
In the 1990s, the orientalists who defined the medieval studies of the Golden Horde in late Soviet Kazakhstan determined the development of history in the independence stage. They formed their interpretation of the medieval past of Kazakhstan on the scholarship by Klavdia Pischulina and other orientalists. Bustanov (Reference Bustanov2015) emphasized that the Western approaches to criticism of Oriental Studies as colonial instruments have gone unnoticed in Central Asia, but the old connection between Oriental scholarship and state policies was still very much alive. Critically, the “old school” historians abandoned the negative depiction of the Tatar-Mongol Yoke but insisted that the Ak Orda was the heir to the Kazakh Khanate. Hence, the proper Golden Horde was not part of Kazakhstani history, according to their redefined “Soviet Paradigm.”
The old school is positioned at the center of Almaty’s Orientalist school of history. For instance, Kanat Uskenbay, born in 1966, is one of the leading historians of the old school. He defended his doctoral dissertation on the history of Ak Orda under the supervision of Pischulina in the 2000s. In one of his articles, Uskenbay (Reference Uskenbay2005) supported the “Soviet Paradigm” by noting the existence of Ak Orda. Hence, they stopped the historians’ attempts to revise the Golden Horde’s historical narrative. Masanov, Abylkhozhin, and Yerofeyeva (Reference Masanov, Abylkhozhin and Yerofeyeva2007, p.44) criticized this intrusion into history by non-scientific memory actors like Daniyarov. “Their coverage [of the history of Golden Horde] by A. Kuzembayuly and E. Abil is absolutely far-fetched fantasy-mystification and, in fact, grossly falsifies this historical past. (Masanov, Abylkhozhin, and Yerofeyeva Reference Masanov, Abylkhozhin and Yerofeyeva2007, p.76)”
7.2 Defending the “Soviet Paradigm” – “historicizing strategies” of the old school
The “old school” historians developed their “historicizing strategies” in defending the “Soviet Paradigm” through direct clashes with the new revisionist historians. The “old school” intervened in the historical narrative in two ways: criticism of the reconstruction of the Golden Horde in the media field and academic publications. They attempted to preserve the old narrative as “profitable material” for politicians, indicating that the Golden Horde could lead to nationalism and tribalization of Kazakhstan. They utilized the symbolic elements of the Soviet repertoireFootnote 8, dismissing the new narrative as the “incorrect science” and protesting the “politicization of the history”. The “old school” historians noted the emergence of pseudo-medievalists among self-confident professional historians who deny everything. The confrontation between two schools of historians in today’s Kazakhstan is a “struggle between history and myth-making” (Tatilya Reference Tatilya2023).
Several “old school” historians disagreed with the increased focus on the Golden Horde commemoration and the recognition of its links with the Kazakh Khanate. The historians based their views on the established science (Soviet Paradigm), the historical school of Pischulina, focusing on the separate state of Ak Orda. Though “old school” historians identify that the Golden Horde had some historical relevance to modern Kazakhstan, they refer to that state mainly as the Mongol invaders and foreign history:
“In Kazakhstan, the left wing was studied, known as the state of Ak Orda, since it was on the territory of Kazakhstan. Why should Kazakh historians study that part of the Golden Horde, which was on the territory of modern Astrakhan, Volgograd, Russia, and so on? This is not the history of Kazakhstan.” (Historian #1, 15.07.2022).
Hence, old school historians pressed that the whole Golden Horde was not the heritage of Kazakhs, but Ak Orda was a proper history of Kazakhstan. They sought to partially absolve the work of Soviet historians on the Golden Horde in Kazakhstan:
In Soviet Kazakhstan, there was no such vivid negative attitude towards the Golden Horde. There was an ideological directive not to glorify [hvalit’] the Golden Horde. Well, we know that we do not need it. (Historian #14, 20.01.2023).
7.3 Making the “Soviet Paradigm” profitable – Golden Horde as “bad history”
“Old school” historians voiced their opposition to commemorating the 750 years of the Golden Horde in Kazakhstan through media outlets, including social media. In December 2018, Kanat Uskenbay declared that celebrating the Golden Horde would be a significant error in Kazakhstan, as this idea had yet to be thoroughly studied by professional historians (Tatilya Reference Tatilya2018). Therefore, the “old school” historians protested the work of “unprofessional” new school of historians that emerged in Kazakhstan.
“This [commemoration of the Golden Horde] “incorrect science” (nepravilnaya nauka) affects an entire generation of the population in Kazakhstan. Yes, some sections of society believe that the official historian is hiding, and they [unprofessional historians] showed us the truth - the Golden Horde is the Kazakh state. The problem is that any historical topic that is exaggerated ideologically and politically." (Historian #1, 15.07.2022).
Following the use of Soviet repertoire, the “old school” historians warned against the new narrative that could promote “nationalism” and “tribalization”. This group noted that the increased interest in the Golden Horde threatened to boost tribalization in Kazakh society. One of the historians highlighted that the focus on the Golden Horde risks glorifying khans and their autocratic rule (Historian #1, 15.07.2022).
The “old school” historians believe reinterpreting the Golden Horde memory may confuse Kazakhstanis. “Did Kazakhs defend Otrar against the Mongols? Or did they attack with Mongols that city? This creates chaos in the mind of people” (Historian #3, 16.08.2022). Hence, the “old school” historians argue that remembering and recognizing the new narrative of Golden Horde as a historical heritage of Kazakhstan is dangerous and has little use in the nation building of Kazakhstan.
7.4 Engaging the “seams of memory” – 750 years of Golden Horde as fake date and Jochi Mausoleum
The “old school” historians doubted the Commemoration of 750 years of the Golden Horde, arguing that it was a fake date. Historian #14 (20.01.2023) noted that the Talas Qurultay took place in 1269, but it did not announce the independence of the Golden Horde. They stated that the year 1269 was speculated by individual Tatar school historians that the new Kazakh historians later copied.
“On what basis did Tokayev come up [pridumal] with this Commemoration? We don’t have a single academic article where someone specifically said, ”I propose that the state hold an anniversary of Golden Horde this year." … as if Tokayev googled and came up with this Commemoration. Maybe he stole this idea from the Tatars… Okay, the 2013 year is over – one can forget about the Golden Horde. No, the state allocates funding for the next 3 years under the guise of an anniversary, but the anniversary has passed. For what?” (Historian #1, 15.07.2022).
In a recent video interview, Kanat Uskenbay argued that Jochi Khan was not buried in the Mausoleum located in the center of Kazakhstan, based on the research of archeologists (Uskenbay Reference Uskenbay2023). The Jochi mausoleum is a fake monument politicized and utilized by pseudo-historians – myth makers.
Numerous conferences in Kazakhstan, especially in Astana and Almaty during 2019, marked 750 years since the Golden Horde’s formation. Historians from two schools rarely interacted at these events, even if both were present, often refraining from engagement. Historians from the “old school” typically dismissed criticism from the “new school,” claiming that it was not “professional” historical science. However, this struggle should not be understood as a contest between professional and amateur historians. Rather, it represents a deeper struggle over the control of knowledge and the accumulation of symbolic capital, as conceptualized by Bourdieu (Reference Bourdieu1986). Within this context, the “old school” generation of historians appears particularly committed to preserving a rearticulated version of the “Soviet paradigm” regarding the Golden Horde historical narrative in Kazakhstan. They do so by employing specific historicizing strategies, including positioning themselves as defenders of an “apolitical” history and asserting resistance to what they perceive as the “politicization of history” or myth-making by a new school of historians.
8 Discussion: Reinterpreting the Official Historical Narrative of the Golden Horde
In the discussion, we should return to our two research questions: How has the official historical narrative of the Golden Horde changed in independent Kazakhstan? What role did the Kazakh historians play as memory actors in shaping the historical narrative?
Responding to the first question, this article unpacks a notable shift in Kazakhstan’s official historical narrative of the Golden Horde, transitioning from the “Soviet Paradigm” during Nazarbayev’s era to a new, albeit contested narrative under Tokayev. The background section delves into how Soviet orientalists, particularly Pischulina and others, crafted the initial “Soviet Paradigm,” marginalizing the Golden Horde in Kazakhstan’s history in favor of the Ak Orda state. In the 1990s, the Kazakh regime embraced this redefined paradigm with Soviet-trained orientalists’ support, as Bustanov indicated (2015).
During the 2000s, Nazarbayev fostered a cult of personality, positioning himself as a pivotal historical figure and founder of Kazakh statehood. He diminished the relevance of the ancient past and leveraged certain elements of historical memory for symbolic capital, as discussed by Bekus (Reference Bekus2021). Drawing from mnemonic literature, particularly Kudaibergenova (Reference Kudaibergenova and Laruelle2016), the Kazakh state and its historians aligned with Soviet-dominated narratives, falling short of challenging the dominant “knowledge production” (Bissenova and Medeuova Reference Bissenova and Medeuova2016).
The work also notes the impact of Russia’s assertive stance since 2014 on shaping historical narratives related to the Golden Horde and the Medieval period. The late Nazarbayev started to gradually change the historical narrative of the medieval past, using it to support nation-building, exemplified by the acknowledgment of the Commemoration of the 550 years of the Kazakh Khanate’s foundation in 2015. The entry of the second president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, in 2019 marked a comprehensive transformation in the historical narrative of the Golden Horde. In the wake of Russia’s growing belligerence, culminating in its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Tokayev has increasingly emphasized the Golden Horde legacy to assert Kazakhstan’s sovereignty and legitimize his leadership by promoting a nation-building narrative distinct from both Russia and the Soviet past, while engaging a broader range of historians in the process. This led to the establishment of the Ulus Jochi Research Institute, the reconstruction of the Jochi Monument, the announcement of the Commemoration of the 750 years of the formation of the Golden Horde, and the initiation of a new academic history slated for publication in 2025-2026.
Addressing our second research question, our investigation brought to light the presence of two distinct historical schools, showcasing the active role of historians in shaping the narrative surrounding the Golden Horde (Wuestenberg Reference Wuestenberg, Wuesternberg and Sierp2020). This study reveals the existence of two competing historical narrative projects among Kazakhstani historians. Table 2 illustrates their contrasting perspectives on the genealogy of the Kazakh nation. The “old school” historians regard the Golden Horde period as less crucial in forming the Kazakh Khanate, asserting its foundation based on Ak Orda. In contrast, a new school of historians emerged during the independence era, establishing a direct link between the Kazakh Khanate and the Golden Horde. This perspective emphasizes the Golden Horde’s pivotal role as the proto-Kazakh state, offering a divergent interpretation of historical connections.
Table 2. Key differences between two historical schools on the Golden Horde in Kazakhstan
Source: composed by the authors.
Utilizing the framework proposed by Mink and Neumayer (Reference Mink, Neumayer, Mink and Neumayer2013), this study investigates how the emerging “new school” of historians has challenged the established refined “Soviet paradigm” narrative of the Golden Horde. The analysis focuses on the “historicizing strategies” employed by this new school, demonstrating how these strategies render the “memory material” of the historical narrative “profitable” to the state and evoke cultural memory through the utilization of “seams of memory.” This wave of historians actively engages with officials and the broader society in the media arena, leveraging cultural memory to construct a new variant of symbolic politics. The new generation of younger historians unburdened by the Soviet educational project (Remnev Reference Remnev2011; Bissenova and Medeuova Reference Bissenova and Medeuova2016) engage as an informal coalition in the knowledge-production of the historical narrative challenging the dominant one (Daphi and Zamponi Reference Daphi and Zamponi2019). As Werth (1993, cited in Mink and Neumayer Reference Mink, Neumayer, Mink and Neumayer2013, 8) suggests, “Moves to rewrite history are closely linked to subsequent generations’ arrival on the scene.”
As Miller (Reference Miller, Miller and Lipman2012) suggested, a “battle of historians” is unfolding between “old school” historians, who defend the Soviet-era narrative, and the emerging “new school,” which seeks to redefine Kazakhstan’s historical foundations. The “old school” actively engages with the media, emphasizing the continued “profitability” of the Soviet paradigm and warning against the risks of nationalism and tribalism associated with the new narrative. In contrast, the “new school” strategically employs memory politics to support national revival through the new narrative of the Golden Horde, aligning with Coakley’s (Reference Coakley2004) framework for constructing unified state narratives. While both schools invoke the idea of “glorious ancestors,” their interpretations diverge. The “old school” centers on Ak Orda and portrays the Golden Horde as a common oppressor, reflecting a Soviet-influenced narrative of victimhood. The “new school” supports the new narrative of the Golden Horde as a powerful, multiethnic empire—a nomadic “golden age” that offers a more inclusive and aspirational foundation for Kazakh national identity. Within this framework, the Kazakh Khanate is positioned as the rightful heir to the Ulus of Jochi (Golden Horde), linking modern Kazakhstan to a globally recognized historical legacy and generating valuable symbolic capital (Bekus Reference Bekus2021).
The activities of this “new school” highlight the agency of historians in authoritarian Kazakhstan, as previously uncovered by Dukeyev (Reference Dukeyev2023, Reference Dukeyev2025), revealing the intricate nature of the memory landscape, where counter-state memory activities are evident, as demonstrated in the work of Medeuova et al. (Reference Medeuova2016). Thus, we reveal how “new school” historians participate in memory politics and collaborate with the state to alter the historical narrative of the Golden Horde. Their involvement has led to a shift in the nation-building efforts under Tokayev towards emphasizing the growing importance of the Golden Horde in Kazakhstan’s historiography.
9 Concluding remarks
This article contributes to the literature on memory politics in the post-Soviet space in two major ways. Firstly, drawing from Malinova’s (Reference Malinova2018) framework, it traces the evolution of the official historical narrative of the Golden Horde in independent Kazakhstan, highlighting the active role of historians as crucial non-state memory actors. This adds depth to the burgeoning literature on the third phase of memory studies (Miller Reference Miller, Miller and Lipman2012; Mink and Neumayer Reference Mink, Neumayer, Mink and Neumayer2013), explicitly emphasizing the agency and practices of memory actors (Wuestenberg Reference Wuestenberg, Wuesternberg and Sierp2020; Kurilla Reference Kurilla2023; Dukeyev Reference Dukeyev2025). The study moves beyond the early scholarship (Assmann Reference Assmann, Tilmans, van Vree and Winter2012) focus on politicians’ use of history, unveiling into how historians engage in memory politics and participate in “memory games” to advance specific historical narratives (Miller Reference Miller, Miller and Lipman2012). Despite working in diverse state and private institutions, the new school of historians collectively shaped the historical narrative of the Golden Horde in Kazakhstan.
The article reveals that historians maintain autonomy even within the authoritarian contexts of the post-Soviet space, similar to the active role of historians in post-Socialist Eastern Europe (Behr Reference Behr2022; Cusco Reference Cusco, Miller and Lipman2012). The emergence of the “new school” of historians predates Tokayev’s rise to power, and their agency led to the Golden Horde narrative shift. The case of the Golden Horde reinterpretation demonstrates that politicians do not always use historians for instrumental purposes; rather, historians employ “historicizing strategies” (Mink and Neumayer Reference Mink, Neumayer, Mink and Neumayer2013) to influence the public sphere and advocate for the new narrative. Ultimately, this is a process where politicians and historians collaborate to formulate history, i.e., engaging in memory politics. Therefore, there is a distinction between the contemporary revision of the Golden Horde and the state-controlled formulation of the Soviet Paradigm in the 1940s.
Secondly, this research stresses the complex and contested memory politics of post-Soviet autocracies, focusing on Kazakhstan. Despite its authoritarian character, Kazakhstan’s memory landscape is not uniform but shaped by diverse mnemonic actors engaged in reinterpreting the past. Moving beyond notions of a “nationalizing state” (Brubaker Reference Brubaker1994) or the use of the ancient past solely for symbolic capital (Bekus Reference Bekus2021), our analysis reveals the evolving interplay between political legitimacy and historical memory. While the Kazakh state remains central in crafting official narratives and organizing collective remembrance (Kundakbayeva and Kassymova Reference Kundakbayeva and Kassymova2016), it increasingly engages with ‘new school’ historians to reshape and elevate the historical significance of the Golden Horde. This collaboration reflects an effort to produce a legitimizing narrative that links Kazakhstan’s past, present, and future through the image of “glorious ancestors.”
This strategy mirrors broader regional trends where states under conditions of transition or uncertainty turn to idealized pasts to reinforce national identity. In Uzbekistan, the government revived the cult of Amir Temur as a symbol of continuity and national pride (Paskaleva Reference Paskaleva2015). In Turkmenistan, the defeat at Gokdepe was reimagined as a heroic victory and positioned as a cornerstone of national memory (Horak Reference Horák2015). Similarly, Hungary’s renewed focus on the Trianon Treaty underscores a politics of historical grievance used to construct identity in turbulent times (Feischmidt Reference Feischmidt2020). These cases demonstrate how state actors, often in cooperation with historians, strategically mobilize redefined histories to legitimize contemporary nation-building projects.
Though we cannot ultimately consider the “new school” of historians as non-state actors, this work shows their agency as the autonomous memory actors that engage and cooperate with the state. However, the study also reveals that the reconstruction of historical narratives faces limits due to the enduring impact of the Soviet educational project on knowledge formulation in Central Asia (Bissenova and Medeuova Reference Bissenova and Medeuova2016; Richter Reference Richter2020). The findings underline that memory politics in post-Soviet autocracies are not solely dictated by the state; memory actors actively shape the processes of historical narratives by engaging with memory.
Looking ahead, the trajectory of further history revision under Tokayev remains fluid, particularly as Kazakhstan contends with the lingering traumatic memories of its Soviet/Russian Empire experience—a topic yet to be fully addressed in historical textbooks (Burkhanov and Sharipova Reference Burkhanov and Sharipova2023). Nevertheless, we anticipate a growing demand among citizens to deconstruct historical narratives intertwined with memories. We estimate that the revision of history in future Kazakhstan, encompassing elements of decolonization and de-Sovietization, will unfold gradually and be galvanized by the decolonial turn accelerated by the Russian aggressive external actions. For instance, the recent work by Sharipova, Bissenova, and Burkhanov (Reference Sharipova, Bissenova, Burkhanov, Sharipova, Bissenova and Burkhanov2024) underscores the imperative of “decolonizing knowledge” by amplifying the voices of marginalized subaltern groups, both from the Soviet era and post-independence. It offers a compelling avenue for future research, inviting various scholars engaged in memory studies to delve deeper into this dynamic interaction between history, politics, and memory.
Supplementary material
The supplementary material for this article can be found at http://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2025.10106.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to express sincere gratitude to the Editor-in-Chief, Dr. Harris Mylonas, the Associate Editor, Dr. Gulnaz Sharafutdinova, and anonymous reviewers for their constructive and insightful comments. The article has also benefited from discussions at the seminar at the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies, seminar at University of Lincoln in May 2024, presentation at the Central Eurasia Studies Society conference in Almaty in June 2024 and symposium at King’s College London in April 2025. The authors are also grateful to Raushan Abylkassymova and Dr. Ikboljon Qoraboyev for their valuable feedback on earlier drafts of this manuscript.
Financial support
This work was supported by a grant from the Ministry of Higher Education and Science of Kazakhstan (AP13268866).
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