Over the first quarter of the 21st century, the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda became established as the most important policy framework linking gender issues to peace and security problems. WPS work has proceeded along two tracks: a nongovernmental track comprised of women’s rights activists and gender scholars; and a policy track directed by national governments and intergovernmental organizations (Brown and de Jonge Oudraat Reference Brown, de Jonge Oudraat, Myrttinen, Lewis, Touquet, Schulz, Yousaf and Laruni2025). Both tracks have been instrumental in advancing the WPS agenda, including the adoption by the UN Security Council of ten WPS resolutions—starting with Resolution 1325 in October 2000. The 25th anniversary of UNSCR 1325 is an appropriate occasion to assess WPS accomplishments to date and define WPS priorities for the years ahead.
The WPS agenda faces greater threats today than at any time in the past 25 years. The main threat comes from national governments, including three permanent members of the UN Security Council that voted in favor of UNSCR 1325—China, Russia, and the United States. The leadership in all three of these major powers is now openly hostile to the WPS agenda. In addition, the patriarchal backlash against women’s rights and gender equality has surged on social media and in misogynist, reactionary political groups in many countries.
The WPS nongovernmental track grew tremendously over the past 25 years, but today it is under siege, both financially and politically. WPS activists will have to pivot and mobilize in 2025 to withstand the grave crisis the WPS movement is facing. WPS advocates will have to play defense as well as offense in the years ahead. The single most important thing they can do is to launch a campaign to have a Women, Peace, and Security Treaty adopted by UN member-states via the UN General Assembly. A WPS Treaty would provide a bulwark to defend the WPS agenda against its adversaries. It would re-validate and provide a platform for WPS action at this precarious juncture.
The WPS Policy Track
The adoption of UNSCR 1325 marked the launch of the WPS policy track. UNSCR 1325 emphasized women’s participation in all aspects of conflict resolution, the importance of integrating gender perspectives in peacebuilding efforts, and the protection of women and girls from violence, including sexual violence—in that order of priority. The UN Security Council adopted nine additional WPS resolutions in the 2000s and 2010s.
Over time, 115 countries adopted National Action Plans (NAPs) to implement the WPS agenda. Some of these efforts were more serious than others. Some NAPs were genuinely supported by national leaders and backed financially. Others were token gestures and not backed by dedicated resources. Even so, it is significant that almost 60% of the UN’s member states adopted WPS NAPs in the quarter-century after the adoption of UNSCR 1325.
In the 2010s, a backlash against the WPS agenda, women’s rights, and gender equality began to intensify in many parts of the world. Vladimir Putin championed a more traditional, patriarchal vision of Russian society, even reviving a Soviet-era “Mother Heroine Award” for women who have 10 or more children (Suliman Reference Suliman2022). Xi Jinping broke a two-decade tradition and did not include a woman on the party’s 24-member Politburo (Stevenson Reference Stevenson2022). His government has also been aggressive in pushing women to have more children (Wang Reference Wang2024). In Russia and China, patriarchal leaders prefer to see women engaged in baby-making, not policymaking. In 2019, Russia and China became the first and only Security Council members not to vote in favor of a WPS resolution (abstaining on UNSCR 2467).
In the United States, President Barack Obama was succeeded by Donald Trump in 2017, and the WPS agenda lost an important ally. Although Trump signed the WPS Act of 2017—making the United States the first country to adopt a national law on WPS—his embrace of conservative anti-abortion positions complicated talks over WPS at the UN Security Council. WPS activists concluded that it would be too risky to work with the United States, China, and Russia on a 20th anniversary resolution (de Jonge Oudraat and Brown Reference de Jonge Oudraat and Brown2020).
The WPS agenda has faced even greater challenges in the 2020s. The COVID-19 pandemic and the global economic recession that followed reversed many gains in women’s rights, educational and economic opportunities, and personal security. Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine in 2022 led many countries in Europe, and around the world, to place more emphasis on hard military power, relegating WPS programs to the sidelines. It also reinforced traditional, masculinist, state-centric conceptions of security. The return of Trump to the White House in 2025 and his early policy statements have led many US allies to conclude that they can no longer rely on US commitments to come to their defense. As a result, many countries have increased their defense spending, drawing funds from foreign assistance and governmental WPS programs.
Trump and his administration have also launched a systematic attack on women’s rights, WPS programs, and what they call “gender ideology.” This started with Executive Orders signed in his first days in office and the shutdown of USAID, which funded many WPS-related projects. Trump’s Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, eliminated the State Department’s Office for Global Women’s Issues, which had been the department’s primary bureau dedicated to WPS. In April, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth posted on social media: “This morning, I proudly ENDED the ‘Women, Peace & Security’ (WPS) program inside the @DeptofDefense…. GOOD RIDDANCE WPS!”
In just a few months, Trump has inflicted massive damage on WPS programs in the US and globally. He has obliterated US federal programs on WPS as well as essential funding for US and international NGOs that work on WPS issues. Many of these organizations will shrivel or go bankrupt.
In March 2025, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres floated organizational reforms, including 20% staffing cuts and a merger of UN Women and the UN Population Fund. Many experts worry that these reforms will put gender work, including work on WPS, at the UN Secretariat on the chopping block (Banjo Reference Banjo2025).
The WPS agenda was never universally embraced by national governments, but it had built up a great deal of government support. It had also made substantial policy progress in the 2000s and 2010s. The backlash against women’s rights and gender equality in general intensified in the 2010s and 2020s, and WPS was collateral damage. Trump’s return to power in 2025 was not just another incremental step in this process: It was a nuclear escalation. Even so, it is important to remember that the world is not run by the White House or even by the UN Security Council. There are many national governments that genuinely support women’s rights and the WPS agenda, and they, too, are part of the WPS policy track.
The WPS Nongovernmental Track
The policy track is tremendously important, but it is not the entire story. Nongovernmental activists played a critical role in launching, shaping, and advancing what became known as the WPS agenda. They were the initiators of the WPS agenda, and they have been driving forces behind the agenda.
An early milestone was the 4th UN World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995, which generated the landmark Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action. The horrors of the armed conflicts in the 1990s—including extensive use of rape and sexual violence as weapons of war—led some women’s rights activists to build on the steps taken at Beijing and focus specifically on the participation of women in conflict resolution processes and the gendered dangers of armed conflicts. They recognized that UN Security Council engagement was essential to taking far-reaching policy actions on these peace and security issues. In the late 1990s, they systematically engaged in profile-raising, coalition-building, and agenda-setting: Defining the policy goals and actions, helping to draft text, and lobbying Security Council members to support UNSCR 1325.
During the first two decades of the 21st century, the WPS nongovernmental track thrived. WPS activists developed impressive networks of national and international civil society organizations. These activists have pressured national governments to adopt NAPs and integrate the WPS agenda into national defense policies. NGOs have also partnered with governments to implement WPS programs in conflict-affected states. A vast amount of WPS work has been carried out by NGOs at the community level. In addition, a growing wave of scholars generated important insights on the many connections between conflict and gender.
The tremendous growth in the nongovernmental WPS community since 2000 has been engendered to a large degree by sizeable growth in government funding. Unfortunately, many NGOs became overly dependent on this funding. Current governmental funding cuts already have had devastating impacts on the NGO community. In a March 2025 survey of 411 women’s rights organizations around the world, UN Women found that 47% of these organizations will have to shut down by September if current conditions prevail (UN Women 2025).
New Priorities: From WPS Resolutions to a WPS Treaty
Many WPS organizations will face a grim financial picture in the years ahead, and many will go out of existence. Those who remain should try to diversify their financial bases and think about sharing resources—money, staff, programs—and perhaps forming partnerships or even mergers. WPS organizations might have to set aside differences over policy approaches, form tactical alliances, and focus on the common crisis at hand.
Every WPS organization should redouble its efforts to build connections with allies at other NGOs and in national and local governments. WPS activists and organizations should launch a new campaign to explain to governments in the Global North and the Global South why WPS issues are important for national security and national interests everywhere. National governments and foundations should step up immediately to offset the Trump administration’s defection and enable the WPS nongovernmental community to weather the storm.
Beyond these tactical basics, the WPS community must think about playing defense and offense at the same time and developing a new, compelling strategy for the future. The centerpiece of this effort should be a worldwide campaign to have a Women, Peace, and Security Treaty adopted by UN member-states via the General Assembly. This would provide a legal, institutional defense against the assault coming from the Trump administration, other patriarchal powers, and misogynist militants. A WPS Treaty would be a powerful offensive platform for consolidating and expanding the WPS community. It would help to bring WPS supporters together, provide institutional mechanisms for WPS engagement, and create a framework for bringing new members into the WPS movement.
A WPS Treaty—Why?
In the late 1990s, WPS activists steered the agenda toward the UN Security Council because the Council is the body within the UN system with primary responsibility for maintaining and restoring international peace and security. WPS activists wanted immediate action to deal with conflict problems in many countries. They also sought to advance new principles that would guide policymaking in peace and security matters. The Security Council functioned relatively well at that time: The Cold War was over, and great-power vetoes were comparatively rare.
Today, the Security Council is a lost cause for WPS issues, and this is likely to be the case for the foreseeable future. China, Russia, and the United States all have vetoes over Council resolutions, and none of these powers supports the WPS agenda. The Security Council has other limitations. Its focus is on specific problems and actions, not the codification of broader principles. Its resolutions carry political weight, but they are not legally binding on UN member-states unless they are adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. None of the WPS resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII. Its resolutions, therefore, lack the added heft and authority of legal instruments.
The UN General Assembly has several important advantages as a sponsor for WPS action. The General Assembly is comprised of all UN member-states and is the main policymaking organ of the United Nations. Its functions and powers include the consideration of general principles to enhance international peace and security, the development of international law, and the advancement of human rights.
Transforming the Security Council’s WPS resolutions into a General Assembly treaty would have multiple benefits. For starters, a WPS Treaty would be shaped by a broader, more representative group of states. The treaty would be adopted by states on a voluntary basis, and it would be more likely to have true champions. A treaty would also be a singular, integrated, comprehensive framework that would bring together the main elements of the ten WPS resolutions, perhaps along with other good ideas the Security Council could not act on. States often fail to live up to their treaty obligations, of course, but they are more likely to do the right thing when they themselves have made formal pledges to specific norms and rules.
A WPS Treaty would formalize, relegitimize, revalidate, and elevate the WPS agenda at a precarious juncture. It would help to defend the WPS agenda from its attackers and detractors. It would give the many supporters of the WPS agenda—governmental and nongovernmental—a framework for action and a platform to build on. It would create mechanisms for convening the WPS community and assessing the behavior of state parties and others.
At a political and psychological level, a WPS Treaty would provide the WPS community with a goal and a cause. It would be a focal point for rallying the WPS community at a difficult and demoralizing time. It would mobilize the WPS community for a new campaign and new efforts. A WPS Treaty would enable the WPS community to go on the offense at a time when many might be tempted to crawl into a defensive shell.
A WPS Treaty—What?
This is not the place to outline the content of a WPS Treaty in substantive detail. The treaty’s focus, framework, and text would have to be developed over the course of a collaborative, interactive process involving WPS activists and governmental allies. This would probably be a multi-year process. That said, some of the main elements of a WPS Treaty are clear. The treaty should begin with a strong statement of the gender and conflict problems it seeks to address, noting that these problems materialize before, during, and after armed conflicts—not just during open warfare.
The treaty should also clearly enunciate its principles and objectives, which would be based on the key pillars of the WPS agenda. One set of objectives would be
participation
of women in peace and security policymaking at all levels, including conflict prevention and resolution efforts, negotiation and mediation processes, peace operations, and other field-based operations. Another set would include the
protection
of women and girls from the effects of armed conflict, along with support for relief and recovery efforts. The treaty should be explicit in prohibiting the use of sexual violence and rape as tactics of war. A third set could include the
promotion
of the rights of women and girls, before, during, and after armed conflicts.
The treaty text must be explicit about the commitments state parties will make and the actions they will (and will not) take to adhere to the treaty’s core provisions. The text must provide detailed guidance for implementation of the accord. This would include commitments to adopt, fund, and implement WPS NAPs. The accord should include the establishment of and commitments to fund a WPS Treaty secretariat with monitoring functions; the latter will be one of the keys to state party accountability. Provisions for regular meetings of the state parties should be spelled out. Ideally, the text would not allow for national “reservations” or opt-outs with respect to select treaty provisions: UN member-states should be all-in or all-out.
A WPS Treaty—How?
The starting point, as in the late 1990s, will be WPS nongovernmental activists and organizations. They will have to launch the campaign and engage in rounds of profile-raising, coalition-building, and agenda-setting. This formula worked in the 1990s, when gender and conflict issues were barely recognized; it is even more likely to work now, when the WPS agenda is established and widely supported. Similar campaigns, using the same basic formula, have succeeded in adopting treaties in other peace and security areas, including the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty (which entered into force in 1999) and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (2021).
It is essential to remember that the WPS agenda has broad support worldwide in both governmental and nongovernmental circles. As noted earlier, almost 60% of UN member states have adopted WPS NAPS. Some of these efforts were half-hearted and the United States is now leading the opposition, but this is still a substantial base of support. This is reinforced by the political weight of approximately four billion women and girls, along with their allies. Many leaders and governments will want to be seen supporting a campaign that resonates with half or more of the country’s citizenry. Many leaders will be keen to support a cause that is derided by Donald Trump, who has alienated almost every US ally and imposed punitive economic tariffs on most countries on the planet. This is an opportune moment to mobilize the world to support a WPS Treaty that Trump would surely oppose.
A New Hope
It might seem strange to be proposing a WPS Treaty at a time when many WPS communities and the WPS agenda itself are under attack. The old adage—the best defense is a good offense—applies here. A WPS Treaty would be the best way to defend the WPS agenda, mobilize support for WPS goals, and establish a new platform for WPS action in the future. The key is to frame and launch a WPS Treaty campaign that can tap into the extensive albeit often latent support that exists worldwide for the WPS agenda and women’s rights in general.
A WPS Treaty campaign would give WPS activists an important, prominent project to focus on. It would help to mobilize the WPS community at a time when it has been battered and fragmented. It would give the WPS community a concrete, global goal. A WPS Treaty campaign would provide a focal point for hope at a time when hope is in short supply.
Over the first quarter of the 21st century, the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda became established as the most important policy framework linking gender issues to peace and security problems. WPS work has proceeded along two tracks: a nongovernmental track comprised of women’s rights activists and gender scholars; and a policy track directed by national governments and intergovernmental organizations (Brown and de Jonge Oudraat Reference Brown, de Jonge Oudraat, Myrttinen, Lewis, Touquet, Schulz, Yousaf and Laruni2025). Both tracks have been instrumental in advancing the WPS agenda, including the adoption by the UN Security Council of ten WPS resolutions—starting with Resolution 1325 in October 2000. The 25th anniversary of UNSCR 1325 is an appropriate occasion to assess WPS accomplishments to date and define WPS priorities for the years ahead.
The WPS agenda faces greater threats today than at any time in the past 25 years. The main threat comes from national governments, including three permanent members of the UN Security Council that voted in favor of UNSCR 1325—China, Russia, and the United States. The leadership in all three of these major powers is now openly hostile to the WPS agenda. In addition, the patriarchal backlash against women’s rights and gender equality has surged on social media and in misogynist, reactionary political groups in many countries.
The WPS nongovernmental track grew tremendously over the past 25 years, but today it is under siege, both financially and politically. WPS activists will have to pivot and mobilize in 2025 to withstand the grave crisis the WPS movement is facing. WPS advocates will have to play defense as well as offense in the years ahead. The single most important thing they can do is to launch a campaign to have a Women, Peace, and Security Treaty adopted by UN member-states via the UN General Assembly. A WPS Treaty would provide a bulwark to defend the WPS agenda against its adversaries. It would re-validate and provide a platform for WPS action at this precarious juncture.
The WPS Policy Track
The adoption of UNSCR 1325 marked the launch of the WPS policy track. UNSCR 1325 emphasized women’s participation in all aspects of conflict resolution, the importance of integrating gender perspectives in peacebuilding efforts, and the protection of women and girls from violence, including sexual violence—in that order of priority. The UN Security Council adopted nine additional WPS resolutions in the 2000s and 2010s.
Over time, 115 countries adopted National Action Plans (NAPs) to implement the WPS agenda. Some of these efforts were more serious than others. Some NAPs were genuinely supported by national leaders and backed financially. Others were token gestures and not backed by dedicated resources. Even so, it is significant that almost 60% of the UN’s member states adopted WPS NAPs in the quarter-century after the adoption of UNSCR 1325.
In the 2010s, a backlash against the WPS agenda, women’s rights, and gender equality began to intensify in many parts of the world. Vladimir Putin championed a more traditional, patriarchal vision of Russian society, even reviving a Soviet-era “Mother Heroine Award” for women who have 10 or more children (Suliman Reference Suliman2022). Xi Jinping broke a two-decade tradition and did not include a woman on the party’s 24-member Politburo (Stevenson Reference Stevenson2022). His government has also been aggressive in pushing women to have more children (Wang Reference Wang2024). In Russia and China, patriarchal leaders prefer to see women engaged in baby-making, not policymaking. In 2019, Russia and China became the first and only Security Council members not to vote in favor of a WPS resolution (abstaining on UNSCR 2467).
In the United States, President Barack Obama was succeeded by Donald Trump in 2017, and the WPS agenda lost an important ally. Although Trump signed the WPS Act of 2017—making the United States the first country to adopt a national law on WPS—his embrace of conservative anti-abortion positions complicated talks over WPS at the UN Security Council. WPS activists concluded that it would be too risky to work with the United States, China, and Russia on a 20th anniversary resolution (de Jonge Oudraat and Brown Reference de Jonge Oudraat and Brown2020).
The WPS agenda has faced even greater challenges in the 2020s. The COVID-19 pandemic and the global economic recession that followed reversed many gains in women’s rights, educational and economic opportunities, and personal security. Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine in 2022 led many countries in Europe, and around the world, to place more emphasis on hard military power, relegating WPS programs to the sidelines. It also reinforced traditional, masculinist, state-centric conceptions of security. The return of Trump to the White House in 2025 and his early policy statements have led many US allies to conclude that they can no longer rely on US commitments to come to their defense. As a result, many countries have increased their defense spending, drawing funds from foreign assistance and governmental WPS programs.
Trump and his administration have also launched a systematic attack on women’s rights, WPS programs, and what they call “gender ideology.” This started with Executive Orders signed in his first days in office and the shutdown of USAID, which funded many WPS-related projects. Trump’s Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, eliminated the State Department’s Office for Global Women’s Issues, which had been the department’s primary bureau dedicated to WPS. In April, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth posted on social media: “This morning, I proudly ENDED the ‘Women, Peace & Security’ (WPS) program inside the @DeptofDefense…. GOOD RIDDANCE WPS!”
In just a few months, Trump has inflicted massive damage on WPS programs in the US and globally. He has obliterated US federal programs on WPS as well as essential funding for US and international NGOs that work on WPS issues. Many of these organizations will shrivel or go bankrupt.
In March 2025, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres floated organizational reforms, including 20% staffing cuts and a merger of UN Women and the UN Population Fund. Many experts worry that these reforms will put gender work, including work on WPS, at the UN Secretariat on the chopping block (Banjo Reference Banjo2025).
The WPS agenda was never universally embraced by national governments, but it had built up a great deal of government support. It had also made substantial policy progress in the 2000s and 2010s. The backlash against women’s rights and gender equality in general intensified in the 2010s and 2020s, and WPS was collateral damage. Trump’s return to power in 2025 was not just another incremental step in this process: It was a nuclear escalation. Even so, it is important to remember that the world is not run by the White House or even by the UN Security Council. There are many national governments that genuinely support women’s rights and the WPS agenda, and they, too, are part of the WPS policy track.
The WPS Nongovernmental Track
The policy track is tremendously important, but it is not the entire story. Nongovernmental activists played a critical role in launching, shaping, and advancing what became known as the WPS agenda. They were the initiators of the WPS agenda, and they have been driving forces behind the agenda.
An early milestone was the 4th UN World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995, which generated the landmark Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action. The horrors of the armed conflicts in the 1990s—including extensive use of rape and sexual violence as weapons of war—led some women’s rights activists to build on the steps taken at Beijing and focus specifically on the participation of women in conflict resolution processes and the gendered dangers of armed conflicts. They recognized that UN Security Council engagement was essential to taking far-reaching policy actions on these peace and security issues. In the late 1990s, they systematically engaged in profile-raising, coalition-building, and agenda-setting: Defining the policy goals and actions, helping to draft text, and lobbying Security Council members to support UNSCR 1325.
During the first two decades of the 21st century, the WPS nongovernmental track thrived. WPS activists developed impressive networks of national and international civil society organizations. These activists have pressured national governments to adopt NAPs and integrate the WPS agenda into national defense policies. NGOs have also partnered with governments to implement WPS programs in conflict-affected states. A vast amount of WPS work has been carried out by NGOs at the community level. In addition, a growing wave of scholars generated important insights on the many connections between conflict and gender.
The tremendous growth in the nongovernmental WPS community since 2000 has been engendered to a large degree by sizeable growth in government funding. Unfortunately, many NGOs became overly dependent on this funding. Current governmental funding cuts already have had devastating impacts on the NGO community. In a March 2025 survey of 411 women’s rights organizations around the world, UN Women found that 47% of these organizations will have to shut down by September if current conditions prevail (UN Women 2025).
New Priorities: From WPS Resolutions to a WPS Treaty
Many WPS organizations will face a grim financial picture in the years ahead, and many will go out of existence. Those who remain should try to diversify their financial bases and think about sharing resources—money, staff, programs—and perhaps forming partnerships or even mergers. WPS organizations might have to set aside differences over policy approaches, form tactical alliances, and focus on the common crisis at hand.
Every WPS organization should redouble its efforts to build connections with allies at other NGOs and in national and local governments. WPS activists and organizations should launch a new campaign to explain to governments in the Global North and the Global South why WPS issues are important for national security and national interests everywhere. National governments and foundations should step up immediately to offset the Trump administration’s defection and enable the WPS nongovernmental community to weather the storm.
Beyond these tactical basics, the WPS community must think about playing defense and offense at the same time and developing a new, compelling strategy for the future. The centerpiece of this effort should be a worldwide campaign to have a Women, Peace, and Security Treaty adopted by UN member-states via the General Assembly. This would provide a legal, institutional defense against the assault coming from the Trump administration, other patriarchal powers, and misogynist militants. A WPS Treaty would be a powerful offensive platform for consolidating and expanding the WPS community. It would help to bring WPS supporters together, provide institutional mechanisms for WPS engagement, and create a framework for bringing new members into the WPS movement.
A WPS Treaty—Why?
In the late 1990s, WPS activists steered the agenda toward the UN Security Council because the Council is the body within the UN system with primary responsibility for maintaining and restoring international peace and security. WPS activists wanted immediate action to deal with conflict problems in many countries. They also sought to advance new principles that would guide policymaking in peace and security matters. The Security Council functioned relatively well at that time: The Cold War was over, and great-power vetoes were comparatively rare.
Today, the Security Council is a lost cause for WPS issues, and this is likely to be the case for the foreseeable future. China, Russia, and the United States all have vetoes over Council resolutions, and none of these powers supports the WPS agenda. The Security Council has other limitations. Its focus is on specific problems and actions, not the codification of broader principles. Its resolutions carry political weight, but they are not legally binding on UN member-states unless they are adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. None of the WPS resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII. Its resolutions, therefore, lack the added heft and authority of legal instruments.
The UN General Assembly has several important advantages as a sponsor for WPS action. The General Assembly is comprised of all UN member-states and is the main policymaking organ of the United Nations. Its functions and powers include the consideration of general principles to enhance international peace and security, the development of international law, and the advancement of human rights.
Transforming the Security Council’s WPS resolutions into a General Assembly treaty would have multiple benefits. For starters, a WPS Treaty would be shaped by a broader, more representative group of states. The treaty would be adopted by states on a voluntary basis, and it would be more likely to have true champions. A treaty would also be a singular, integrated, comprehensive framework that would bring together the main elements of the ten WPS resolutions, perhaps along with other good ideas the Security Council could not act on. States often fail to live up to their treaty obligations, of course, but they are more likely to do the right thing when they themselves have made formal pledges to specific norms and rules.
A WPS Treaty would formalize, relegitimize, revalidate, and elevate the WPS agenda at a precarious juncture. It would help to defend the WPS agenda from its attackers and detractors. It would give the many supporters of the WPS agenda—governmental and nongovernmental—a framework for action and a platform to build on. It would create mechanisms for convening the WPS community and assessing the behavior of state parties and others.
At a political and psychological level, a WPS Treaty would provide the WPS community with a goal and a cause. It would be a focal point for rallying the WPS community at a difficult and demoralizing time. It would mobilize the WPS community for a new campaign and new efforts. A WPS Treaty would enable the WPS community to go on the offense at a time when many might be tempted to crawl into a defensive shell.
A WPS Treaty—What?
This is not the place to outline the content of a WPS Treaty in substantive detail. The treaty’s focus, framework, and text would have to be developed over the course of a collaborative, interactive process involving WPS activists and governmental allies. This would probably be a multi-year process. That said, some of the main elements of a WPS Treaty are clear. The treaty should begin with a strong statement of the gender and conflict problems it seeks to address, noting that these problems materialize before, during, and after armed conflicts—not just during open warfare.
The treaty should also clearly enunciate its principles and objectives, which would be based on the key pillars of the WPS agenda. One set of objectives would be participation of women in peace and security policymaking at all levels, including conflict prevention and resolution efforts, negotiation and mediation processes, peace operations, and other field-based operations. Another set would include the protection of women and girls from the effects of armed conflict, along with support for relief and recovery efforts. The treaty should be explicit in prohibiting the use of sexual violence and rape as tactics of war. A third set could include the promotion of the rights of women and girls, before, during, and after armed conflicts.
The treaty text must be explicit about the commitments state parties will make and the actions they will (and will not) take to adhere to the treaty’s core provisions. The text must provide detailed guidance for implementation of the accord. This would include commitments to adopt, fund, and implement WPS NAPs. The accord should include the establishment of and commitments to fund a WPS Treaty secretariat with monitoring functions; the latter will be one of the keys to state party accountability. Provisions for regular meetings of the state parties should be spelled out. Ideally, the text would not allow for national “reservations” or opt-outs with respect to select treaty provisions: UN member-states should be all-in or all-out.
A WPS Treaty—How?
The starting point, as in the late 1990s, will be WPS nongovernmental activists and organizations. They will have to launch the campaign and engage in rounds of profile-raising, coalition-building, and agenda-setting. This formula worked in the 1990s, when gender and conflict issues were barely recognized; it is even more likely to work now, when the WPS agenda is established and widely supported. Similar campaigns, using the same basic formula, have succeeded in adopting treaties in other peace and security areas, including the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty (which entered into force in 1999) and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (2021).
It is essential to remember that the WPS agenda has broad support worldwide in both governmental and nongovernmental circles. As noted earlier, almost 60% of UN member states have adopted WPS NAPS. Some of these efforts were half-hearted and the United States is now leading the opposition, but this is still a substantial base of support. This is reinforced by the political weight of approximately four billion women and girls, along with their allies. Many leaders and governments will want to be seen supporting a campaign that resonates with half or more of the country’s citizenry. Many leaders will be keen to support a cause that is derided by Donald Trump, who has alienated almost every US ally and imposed punitive economic tariffs on most countries on the planet. This is an opportune moment to mobilize the world to support a WPS Treaty that Trump would surely oppose.
A New Hope
It might seem strange to be proposing a WPS Treaty at a time when many WPS communities and the WPS agenda itself are under attack. The old adage—the best defense is a good offense—applies here. A WPS Treaty would be the best way to defend the WPS agenda, mobilize support for WPS goals, and establish a new platform for WPS action in the future. The key is to frame and launch a WPS Treaty campaign that can tap into the extensive albeit often latent support that exists worldwide for the WPS agenda and women’s rights in general.
A WPS Treaty campaign would give WPS activists an important, prominent project to focus on. It would help to mobilize the WPS community at a time when it has been battered and fragmented. It would give the WPS community a concrete, global goal. A WPS Treaty campaign would provide a focal point for hope at a time when hope is in short supply.