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No Argument against the Continuity of Value: Reply to Dorsey

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 November 2010

JOHN BROOME
JOHN BROOME*
Affiliation:
University of OxfordJohn.broome@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
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Extract

Dorsey rejects Conclusion, so he believes he must reject one of the premises. He argues that the best option is to reject Premise 3. Rejecting Premise 3 entails a certain sort of discontinuity in value. So Dorsey believes he has an argument for discontinuity.

Information

Type
Discussion
Information
Utilitas , Volume 22 , Issue 4 , December 2010 , pp. 494 - 496
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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References

1 Utilitas, 21 (2009), pp. 36–58. The premises and conclusion are stated on p. 36; the claim that the inference is valid is on p. 37.

2 ‘A Continuum Argument for Intransitivity’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 (1996), pp. 175–210, at p. 180.

3 ‘Defending Transitivity against Zeno's Paradox’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (2003), pp. 272–9.