The Anglo-Soviet trade fairs of 1961 were part of a series of international exchanges involving Eastern and Western nations that promoted national cultures and trade between the Cold War blocs.Footnote 1 British participation in exchanges with the Eastern bloc increased from 1959 as Harold Macmillan attempted to improve Cold War diplomatic and trading relations.Footnote 2 His visit to Moscow in 1959 is credited by Brian White with easing tensions over Berlin.Footnote 3 These reciprocal fairs marked differing approaches towards cultural diplomacy by Western nations. When Nikita Khrushchev opened Britain’s Moscow fair he praised its focus on industry rather than being an ideological presentation of the British way of life. This approach contrasted with his combative demeanour when visiting the more overtly propagandistic American National Exhibition in 1959. However, as this article suggests, trade and culture were complementary and the British government employed subtle propaganda to promote its way of life, despite claims to the contrary.
Before the Second World War British officials were reluctant to engage in cultural diplomacy, dismissing the promotion of national cultures as propaganda and misinformation.Footnote 4 However, by the late 1950s civil servants recognised that the exchange of people, ideas and goods could promote British interests and trade abroad.Footnote 5 This subtle approach contrasted with the USA’s policy, which primarily used cultural exchanges to ‘infiltrate’ the Soviet Union with American values.Footnote 6 The early 1960s became a period of renewed cultural and diplomatic rapprochement between Britain and the Soviet Union. The 1959 ‘Agreement on Relations in the Scientific, Technological, Educational and Cultural Fields’ formalised the previously ad-hoc attempts to improve trading and cultural relations.Footnote 7 Britain was at times detached from the more bipolar conflict and its pragmatic political approach has led Antonio Varsori to describe London as ‘a bridge between West and East’.Footnote 8 While Varsori argues that this policy failed from 1956, trade, exhibitions and cultural exchanges began in earnest in the late 1950s and became an important part of Britain’s diplomatic efforts to increase its overseas influence with the Eastern bloc nations.Footnote 9
Initial accounts of Cold War cultural exchanges tended to situate the display of technology and national cultures as part of the wider ideological competition.Footnote 10 Revisionist historians examined the commonality between Eastern and Western cultures, especially regarding popular acceptance and contestation of official narratives and ideologies.Footnote 11 These histories have increased knowledge about cultural diplomacy: the building of diplomatic relations using official transnational exchanges. Several previous accounts examine the reciprocal Soviet and American national exhibitions of 1959, which became theatrical displays of respective idealised ways of life.Footnote 12 Walter Hixson and Susan Reid have debated the degree of influence on the Soviet population of America’s display of consumer technologies.Footnote 13 This article similarly examines British official and press responses to the Anglo-Soviet exhibitions, suggesting that both fairs were deemed to be well received and led to increasing humanisation of the Soviets.
Historians have examined the motives behind British cultural exchanges.Footnote 14 Mark B. Smith argues that from the mid-1950s improved diplomatic relations and cultural exchanges between Britain and the Soviet Union ‘made possible the normalization of the cold war’.Footnote 15 This article expands Smith’s argument by suggesting that the media and population began to ‘normalise’ their relationships with the Soviet Union by depicting them as a modernised state – often negating the Cold War division. Furthermore, Verity Clarkson has built on Susan Buck-Morss’s application of Walter Benjamin’s concept of the ‘dreamworld’ to the Soviet Union by examining Soviet exhibitions in the UK including the 1961 display in London.Footnote 16 Presentation of a national ‘dreamworld’, or idealised reality, was, as Clarkson explains, a key part of cultural diplomacy, which was often labelled as ‘way of life’ propaganda by the civil service.Footnote 17 Clarkson focuses on Soviet exhibitions in Britain, downplaying Britain’s Moscow trade fair, stating that it was a commercial venture free of overt propaganda that allowed Whitehall to promote its interests abroad. This article presents the first in-depth examination of that fair from a British perspective. The article argues that not only was there considerable state involvement, but that the exhibitions were organised by a company whose leaders maintained links with the British government and civil service, therefore acting as a British ‘state–private network’. Despite attempting to present the 1961 exhibitions as organised by independent businesses and ostensibly about trade, the British government subtly promoted its idealised way of life, which centred on domesticity, pageantry and the freedom of business.
This article focuses on Britain’s cultural diplomacy efforts at both 1961 exhibitions. Organisers attempted to situate the exhibitions as solely about trade, but they contained subtle propaganda about the British way of life. With the British eschewing the term propaganda their public relations and press sections were restructured as information services under the Attlee government. The Central Office of Information generally handled domestic messaging, while the Foreign Office, including the British Council and the semi-clandestine Information Research Department, managed overseas information about Britain. The Cold War was officially recognised by the Foreign Office as ‘a struggle for Men’s Minds’ and it focused part of its attention on ensuring ‘a true and adequate picture of British policy, British institutions and the British way of life’.Footnote 18 Harold Macmillan’s impression, however, remained that ‘official information was not information at all … just propaganda’.Footnote 19 Utilising government documents the article outlines how Britain’s attempts to build influence through improved cultural and trading relationships were led by a state–private network of businessmen with close ties to the government and the information services who worked to achieve the respective aims of businesses and Whitehall. Scott Lucas observed state–private networks in American approaches to the Cold War’s economic and cultural theatres.Footnote 20 This article demonstrates a similar network as central to the British approach to cross-bloc diplomacy.
The first three sections examine Britain’s 1961 Moscow trade fair. I initially explore the organisation of the fair, examining co-ordination between government and business persons and their ability to influence each other. The government ensured that the British way of life and national symbols were visible, while publicly maintaining that the fair was solely about trade. The article then examines reactions by the British press, exploring how the media frequently presented the exhibition as a way of easing Cold War tensions. The newspapers examined broadly represent viewpoints from across mainstream British politics. Not all newspapers covered the fair but those that did often followed the friendly approach taken by either side, while expressing scepticism towards the Soviet Union. Although access to Russian archives is currently limited, the British sources do reveal some Soviet responses. Written comments from the Soviet public were generally positive, reflecting the state-led attempts to improve international relations. The third section examines the organisation of Britain’s cultural programme and the civil service’s attempts to ensure that elements of the British way of life were displayed in Moscow. Later sections use the same source base to explore the Soviets’ London exhibition, which was visited by Yuri Gagarin shortly after his space flight. The Foreign Office hoped that these exchanges would improve Anglo-Soviet relations but also attempted to reduce the Soviets’ propaganda gain from Gagarin’s visit by ensuring that it was facilitated by the exhibition hosts rather than a communist-sympathising organisation. The British press had, from the late 1950s, begun to extoll the Soviets’ technological achievements, including their advancements in space exploration. While there was often willingness to accept the Soviets’ narrative of being an ‘advanced’ nation, the press was sceptical about claims of a thriving Soviet consumer society. The moment became an incongruous one with warm and congratulatory feelings on either side and a determination from Britain’s population to know their Cold War opposites, despite the rising international tensions over Berlin.
The State–private network Britain’s exhibition in Moscow
Britain’s Moscow fair was organised by Industrial and Trade Fairs Limited (ITF), a subsidiary of the Association of the British Chambers of Commerce (ABCC) and the Financial Times. The appearance of freedom from state intervention was important in presenting the British way of life to the Soviet people. Britain’s government, however, acted as negotiator and facilitator of the Anglo-Soviet trade fairs. Lord Bracken, chair of the Financial Times, had approached the Foreign Office with the idea shortly before his death in 1958.Footnote 21 A network of businessmen who were either well connected to Whitehall or members of the House of Lords became key organisers. Bracken had been Minister of Information during the Second World War and was one of a number of organisers with connections in the media, government and business worlds, suggestive evidence that the fair was organised by a British state–private network. This network allowed the British government to appear lightly involved, acting solely as facilitator with the Soviet government, while using the opportunity to project an image which promoted freedom of business as superior to a command economy.
Prior to the American National Exhibition opening in July 1959 M. V. Nestorov, president of the All Union Chambers of Commerce informed a delegation of businessmen to Moscow that ‘The Russians would be interested in seeing the latest of British machine tools, medical, surgical and dental instruments and equipment, scientific instruments, electronic and automation equipment.’Footnote 22 The British strategy for improved relations involved responding to likely areas of Soviet demand. Nestorov later informed the Foreign Office that the Soviets were ‘disappointed with the American Exhibition in Moscow … as it had focused too much on propaganda’.Footnote 23 The British focus on increasing trade and improving diplomatic relations led the organisers to ensure that private companies were at the forefront of the negotiations and that the fair would differ from the Americans’ showcasing of their way of life.
However, certain elements of the British state desired a national exhibition similar to America’s. The Moscow embassy advised that the prohibitive costs made such a fair impractical. On 15 June 1959 the embassy compared Britain’s objectives with America’s and informed Ralph Murray, head of the Foreign Office’s semi-official propaganda unit, the Information Research Department (IRD), that:
We should try to avoid, at all costs, the impression that ours is a poor man’s imitation of theirs … If we are not prepared to go whole hog and spend a considerable sum of money to produce a first-class exhibition, then it would probably be better to content ourselves with a trade fair.Footnote 24
With the British fair scheduled to last seventeen days compared to the Americans’ six weeks it would attract fewer visitors. A large-scale official exhibition was also considered impractical because it would limit the space available to British firms.Footnote 25 It was felt that British interests would be best served by improving trading relations. However, the British civil service, as facilitators of Anglo-Soviet trade, remained in the organisation process; they ensured that the British way of life was promoted whenever opportunities presented themselves.
The government frequently liaised with the organising panel, which consisted of members of the ABCC and ITF. Lords Drogheda and Poole took prominent organisational roles, further demonstrating the involvement of a network of people whose employment was interchangeable between the state and private business. Drogheda had been Assistant Secretary for the Board of Trade and in 1953 produced a report that recommended expanding the British overseas information services including the British Council, the IRD and the Central Office of Information, which all promoted a positive image of Britain.Footnote 26 He was now Managing Director of the Financial Times and a director of ITF; at several points civil servants acted to avoid annoying him because he was deemed to retain influence with their superiors.Footnote 27 Poole had been a Conservative MP and party chair until 1959, before succeeding Bracken as chair of the Financial Times. The private’ nature of the British exhibition meant that, while the official reports claimed that the government ‘neither sponsored nor financed the fair in any way’, various former civil servants or current members of the House of Lords were intimately involved.Footnote 28 Improved diplomacy and trade benefitted both government and industry. The connections between government and business helped to facilitate the exhibitions; several members of this state–private network had a foot in either camp.
Both British and Soviet governments, in conjunction with ITF, negotiated the terms of these mutual encounters. The Soviets permitted free entry of material but requested that the British businesses deposit their publications in Moscow one month before their exhibition.Footnote 29 ITF agreed and they initially requested a reciprocal arrangement in order to dissuade Soviet censorship. While the Foreign Office had been keen to preview the Soviet exhibition, they ultimately declined this opportunity because the Soviets would be able to claim either that the British ‘practiced censorship, although we have always denied this’, or that the British government approved of the content.Footnote 30 The British embassy in Moscow later criticised the Foreign Office because they did ‘not say so publicly and thereby gain credit for our action’.Footnote 31 Communication of key British values, in this instance concepts of freedom of information, was promoted within Whitehall. The British Foreign Office and its Moscow embassy allowed ITF to coordinate the exhibition but regularly sought opportunities to improve Britain’s image. While ITF had formal responsibility for the fairs, its interaction with the government showed that the company participated in a network that relied on connections between businesses, the civil service and government. This network mediated the experience and ensured that the trade fair took place on terms within the British national interest.
Responses to the British trade fair
The British fair opened in Moscow on 19 May with 3,000 British exhibitors and staff. It facilitated contact between East and West in the spirit of competitive ‘peaceful co-existence’ as part of Britain’s objective to improve diplomatic, trading and cultural relations with the Soviet Union. New pavilions were erected at Sokolniki Park in anticipation of the British and French fairs both planned for 1961. The British architects Jack Howe & Partners designed the pavilions working with the French firm Maurice. D. Gauthier, but they were built with Soviet labour. This trilateral collaboration characterised the co-operative spirit in which the fairs were presented. Most of the 621 exhibiting companies were engineering and industrial firms with large displays by manufacturers Mather and Platt, Vickers, Rolls Royce, and Hawker Siddeley Brush; the chemical producers ICI; Kodak photography; Standard Electrical; and the alcoholic drinks firm Distillers. Smaller stalls included Meccano, Hoover, and Gillette. The participation of internationally successful British (and some non-British) firms allowed the fair to promote Britain as having an advanced industrial and consumer economy enabled by private enterprise. The diversity of goods on display meant that large-scale industrial products were showcased alongside toys, white goods and everyday consumables. The displays were accompanied by the Universal News Services teleprinter, which conveyed almost instantaneous reports to London. A small cinema ran by Pearl and Dean showed British films; it was reported that the projector operators required daily police protection when ending the shows because of the number of people still queuing.Footnote 32
The largest stall was the Board of Trade exhibition, one of three British government stands which, alongside the accompanying cultural programme, subtly promoted the British way of life. The Stationery Office (HMSO) stand exhibited translated books about industry and British life. All visitors had to pass through the Board of Trade exhibit, which showcased Britain’s ‘scientific and technological progress’, and included displays on Britain’s nuclear power and space programmes.Footnote 33 The stall demonstrated to the Soviets how ‘the government, the universities, the hospitals and private industry combine together in the research which leads to the production of modern technological equipment’.Footnote 34 The importance of private enterprise to Britain’s way of life was therefore central to official displays and was reinforced by loudspeakers leading to the exhibition centre which proclaimed: ‘This fair has been organised by one British firm on behalf of British industry.’Footnote 35
Some areas of the press presented the moment as one of reconciliation between Britain and the Soviet Union, despite the increasingly tense international atmosphere because of the ongoing Berlin Crisis that lasted until after the Berlin Wall was constructed during the autumn of 1961. The conservative Daily Mail contrasted Soviet volunteers who tidied the exhibition site with London dock workers, whose strike delayed Moscow bound supplies and manpower. The paper reported that ‘students falling over the mounds of earth like ants began to make an impression’.Footnote 36 The comparison suggested that British workers were lazy, but implicitly showed admiration of Soviet centralised organisation. This positive attitude towards the Soviet Union, especially from the Mail, is unsurprising considering that the trade fair formed part of Macmillan’s attempt to extend British trade across the Iron Curtain. The Mail’s report of the opening anticipated better international relations, warning that America must ‘wriggle free from the habit of seeing every question in the world in stark rigid terms of Communism versus anti-Communism’.Footnote 37 Britain was presented as more conciliatory in the Cold War than America, which they suggested was preoccupied with a bipolar conflict. This popular newspaper hoped that exchanges like this might ease Cold War tensions and promote understanding between divided populations.
When opening the British trade fair Nikita Khrushchev was brimming with confidence following the Soviets’ recent triumph in the space race. He labelled the fair ‘A wonderful show … an exhibition for trade and peace’.Footnote 38 The Soviet leader joked that Aston Villa had been allowed to win a friendly football match against a Soviet XI, and, when shown a display of corsets, said ‘what are you trying to do? Shape the curves of our women.’ The development of friendship and business appeared to be important for the Soviets. Khrushchev had invited 300 British businessmen to a dinner party in the Lenin Hills, but on viewing the exhibition he doubled the number of invitations and ended up bussing many more of the exhibitors to the venue. The official Moscow embassy report stated that the guests were ‘delighted by the frank and informal atmosphere and by the lavishness of the hospitality, which exceeded the normal A1 class reception at the Kremlin’.Footnote 39 No expense appeared spared in wooing the British visitors and attempting to make them amenable to the Soviet system. Khrushchev’s praise contrasted with his more combative approach taken when meeting Vice President Richard Nixon at the American exhibition in 1959. That televised meeting has been labelled the ‘kitchen debate’ and was situated within a line of exchanges that demonstrate how antagonism between East and West continued almost uninterrupted throughout the Cold War.Footnote 40
East and West were not homogeneous entities, however, and Cold War flashpoints were punctuated with long periods of more friendly relations. The British ambassador in Moscow, Sir Frank Roberts, reported that Khrushchev praised the exhibition for the absence of ‘“way of life” propaganda’, which he stated ‘was exactly right and in accordance with the traditionally “realistic” British approach’.Footnote 41 Roberts noted that Khrushchev ‘was most friendly’ and ‘clearly out to make a major Anglo-Soviet occasion of the opening’. Khrushchev’s warm reactions suggest that, despite high international tension, Anglo-Soviet relations appeared almost cordial. Roberts judged the Soviet press coverage of the fair to be ‘good and full by Soviet Standards’ and noted that ‘the fair itself has been crowded with visitors and is making great impact’. The British organisers and authorities, who were responsible for the return event in London, took seriously the principal of reciprocity, under which all Soviet exchanges took place. The positive reception of Britain’s fair obliged the British to offer a similar official welcome to the Soviets, including a personal appearance at the opening by Macmillan.Footnote 42
Among the British correspondents covering the exhibition was the liberal Guardian’s John Cole who, over several days, examined Soviet society.Footnote 43 He reported that the remaining churches were thriving – albeit with elderly congregations. Cole used his encounter ethnographically to demystify the Soviet people for the Guardian readership. Cole believed that the possibilities for trade and exchange between East and West had changed the Cold War from something that was waged solely by governments into ‘a new phase, conducted by the more or less common man’.Footnote 44 Therefore the fairs were intended to increase understanding between participants. When examining Moscow’s living standards Cole wrote:
what immediately strikes the visitor from Britain is the frightening internal contrast in standards – the fine new blocks of flats in Moscow and Leningrad … and the struggling pre-revolutionary wooden slums a few miles outside the Russian capital … Gagarin in space and an old woman not ten miles out of Moscow carrying two heavy buckets of water on a yoke.Footnote 45
The inquisitiveness towards the Soviet Union displayed by Cole and other journalists meant that Soviet technological triumphs were tempered by the supposed ‘backwards’ lifestyle they witnessed. Cole demonstrated how the primitiveness that British reports tended to emphasise coexisted with technological advancement. His observations added to the mystique of the Soviet Union, portraying it as a fundamentally unknowable country. He suggested that there was a contradiction between living standards and the supposed world-beating scientific advancement of the Soviets. Cole showed that material conditions were an important part of the Cold War competition, with Britain remaining ahead of a rapidly improving Soviet Union.
Other press outlets focused on the exhibition’s British participants, including display-builders, business-owners, salespeople and fashion models. The Mail reported advice given to models about their packing. The list included ‘marmalade … a bathplug … tinned food … and hard liquor’.Footnote 46 The items suggested that British conveniences needed to be taken abroad, although the need for hard liquor gives an image of an unbearable East. These home comforts, combined with Cole’s reports of exhibition builders’ protests about the scarcity of British cigarettes and their display of the CND symbol, reveals that participants sought to express their version of the British way of life in the Soviet Union, which was not always in line with the government’s favoured impression. Moreover, press coverage revealed differences between East and West: they emphasised shortages and restraints on freedom. When organising the fair both sides had agreed that sales would be facilitated solely by governments. Exhibitors were told not to request enquirers’ names and addresses because this might contain sensitive information like factory locations. The Mail made this official advice appear more sinister: ‘“the exhibitor is therefore asked to use his utmost discretion […] to avoid any unfavourable publicity.” Like disappearing overnight’.Footnote 47 This image was reminiscent of Stalin’s purges and the Soviet Union was commonly seen through this lens after his death. Alongside increased openness, areas of the British press continued to reinforce perceptions of a repressive Cold War other. Contradictory images of the Soviet Union were conveyed by the British press: modern and open to friendship but simultaneously repressive, primitive and ill-supplied.
Several newspapers used the exhibition to compare the two populations. The Daily Express’s Jill Butterfield reported on a British fashion show held in Moscow, suggesting that:
If all the women lost a stone in weight and all the doors gained a coat of paint it could well be Manchester … Where a couple of years ago it was considered a bit decadent to be well dressed, well groomed, today it is considered ‘unkultured’ not to be.Footnote 48
Butterfield repeated common stereotypes about Russian women, reinforcing readers’ preconceptions. However, she also implied that emerging consumerism was beginning to improve living conditions. Butterfield, relying on earlier stereotypes of the Stakhanovite, praised the Soviet work ethic in creating a fashion sector which suggested that the ‘Russians’ have ‘undertaken an operation fashion with all the force, zeal and initiative they give to whatever they do’. This qualified praise was typical of the compliments that emerged in this period when the Soviets were frequently depicted as catching Western levels of production through centrally directed hard work.
Britain’s HMSO stand was the main part of its information campaign. During the first week an unnamed information officer reported between 75,000 and 80,000 visitors per day, with many viewing their display. The reports convey their impressions that the Soviets craved information about the outside world but ‘are literally starving for books’.Footnote 49 A week later they recorded slightly fewer visitors, with the stand itself experiencing between 6,000 and 9,000 per day. Furthermore, they noted interest in the exhibition from other communist countries: ‘there have been delegations from Rumania, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia’.Footnote 50 The British exhibition allowed specialists from across Eastern bloc countries to experience British culture and industry. The officer reported great interest in the books, especially those about life in Britain, with a pamphlet called ‘Britain Today’ being particularly successful. While part of the objective for HMSO’s stand was to secure sales outlets for translations of British literature the official believed that the Soviets would refuse most books, claiming ‘We may sell them science, but we must not give ideas to think about.’ The official believed that the Soviets were willing to buy British technology but wanted to prevent Western-influenced culture circulating in the Soviet Union. Their comments belie their responsibility for projecting Britain’s image abroad, but also show that the government used the fair to promote the British way of life.
The HMSO staff shaped their presentation of British life to meet Soviet expectations. The information officer wrote, ‘[t]he interest in the Royal Family, too, is very great, and I have asked the Embassy to let F.O. part and myself to have photographs of the Queen. I have the Annigoni one up now.’Footnote 51 By responding to local interest and displaying a copy of Pietro Annigoni’s 1956 portrait, the stand used royalty to represent British life. The interest in the Royal Family suggests that many Soviet people imagined Britain as a nation defined by tradition and aristocracy. The official also reported how they felt the fair was affecting the population and their belief that the British ‘free’ press could change Soviet minds commenting that, ‘[m]y Times I bring to the stand every day, and it is read from cover to cover not only by my student interpreter, but by visitors. One can do much information work on this stand.’Footnote 52 The establishment-aligned Times became another device to sell the British way of life. By casually displaying the newspaper, the officer hoped to challenge viewpoints on British life. The impact of these actions is difficult to judge and it is likely that the interest in royalty was mainly because of its incongruity with the Soviet system and an attempt to appear welcoming. The officer suggested that the British way of life was successfully promoted:
our exhibit has been a great success, and its information value from a specific and general point of view is incalculable, and although we were out there on a commercial basis I feel that, inter alia, we have left a good and lasting impression of what we are really like in Britain.Footnote 53
Propaganda about the official version of the British way of life was delivered subtly – but remained important to government workers who promoted familiarity and mutual understandings.
Throughout the fair HMSO collected visitors’ comments. Despite the Soviet press publishing several negative stories about British living conditions, the comments suggest that many visitors responded positively to the British fair, especially when compared with the American National Exhibition.Footnote 54 Out of forty-five comments, twenty-eight in Russian and seventeen in English, thirty were wholly positive. Nine comments contained both positive and negative statements, the latter of which were mainly criticisms of the exhibition’s layout. Only two were wholly negative, while four were neutral and merely expressed their desire to purchase the books on display. The positive comments often expressed endearment with Britain, including ‘Delighted! Wonderful! Will learn English. If I can get a ticket, I will come and see you (Engineer, Assistant at the Ponza Polytechnical Institute)!’ and ‘I received a great impression of your country.’ Others used their praise as a way to put the American exhibition down stating, ‘The exhibition is wonderful, beyond all comparison with the American one.’Footnote 55 Reid suggests that cultural convention shaped the reactions of commenters at exhibitions and that comments could be influenced by fear of being observed by communist party ‘snoops’.Footnote 56 The British exhibition, because of its commercial nature, contained less overt propaganda than America’s and there was less chance of it affecting Soviet social cohesion. Some criticisms of the American exhibition noted by Hixson and Reid related to its focus on consumerism over technology.Footnote 57 Britain’s fair was better received than America’s, partly because it showcased science and industry. However, the suggestions in some British sources that the machinery on display was subject to ‘nocturnal visits of inspection’ and some small-scale theft of items suggest that, perhaps at the official level, the Soviets’ desire for an industrial exhibition was driven by the wish to bring about technological transfer, even if it meant using underhand methods.Footnote 58
The Information Officer believed that commenters were frightened, stating that ‘[n]ot all had the courage to write. Of those who did, some omitted names; others boldly added names and addresses.’Footnote 59 Commenters may not have been solely driven by fear, as assumed by the officer. As Reid notes, Soviet citizens commonly wrote in exhibition comment books. Roberts noted that ‘there is no doubt that many Russians, either because it did not appear to be propaganda or because it contained more engineering exhibits, really did prefer the British fair’.Footnote 60 While the embassy acknowledged that commenters could have been following the party line, these positive statements from the supposed Cold War enemy contributed towards the warm official reception of the Soviets’ fair in London. The British embassy in Moscow suggested that the Soviet people’s friendly reaction to the British exhibition followed Khrushchev’s earlier enthusiasm, which was part of his attempt to improve relations with the West. The exhibitions themselves impressed the Soviets, but their effects were enhanced by a carefully planned programme of cultural activities.
The cultural programme
The IRD and the British Council’s Cultural Relations Department were responsible for arranging the supporting cultural events. Donald Hopson, head of the IRD, expressed their desire that ‘it would clearly be a good thing if the projected exhibition did represent the British way of life, etc.’, but accepted that financial constraints might reduce these opportunities.Footnote 61 Hilary King, the Commercial Counsellor at the Moscow embassy, prompted V. C. Sherren, ITF’s managing director, to create a series of technical lectures which they viewed as ‘an essential element in the success of the fair’. Few businesses were enthusiastic about participating but they eventually hosted a small series of talks.Footnote 62 British civil servants used their connections with the private company to influence the exhibition according to their interpretations of Soviet wishes. ITF, however, formally retained authority.Footnote 63
A planned visit by the Royal Ballet was postponed because of other commitments, leaving a display football match and a prolonged visit by the Argyll and Sutherlands Highlanders military band as the most overt ‘way of life’ elements.Footnote 64 The military unit of sixty-two spent three weeks on Soviet soil, performing daily. The British used the pomp and militaristic symbolism of these parades to impress the Soviet population. Several areas of British officialdom had reservations about the visit. Frank Roberts thought that underlying international tensions might cause a last-minute cancellation of the exhibition. He warned that ‘this “pageantry” of a military band might give the wrong impression of the British army to the Soviet public’.Footnote 65 Organising the visit was not straightforward: the presence of a foreign military unit appearing daily in public was unprecedented in the Soviet Union. The British embassy was therefore worried about gaining the Soviets’ permission.Footnote 66 The visit required intricate planning, but this did not deter the Foreign Office and the IRD.
As the exhibition’s major cultural element, the band’s visit was deemed important by ITF and the IRD. However, Whitehall’s trepidation and the slowness of Soviet officialdom delayed the arrangements. ITF used their influence to ensure that the visit proceeded. R. H. Mason from the Foreign Office’s Northern Department was anxious about interested parties, with both corporate and governmental influence, who might cause trouble with their superiors. He commented: ‘If this too were cancelled, we have reason to believe that [ITF] would put pressure on the Prime Minister through Lord Drogheda and Lord Poole; and if this failed they would create some very unfavourable publicity for the Foreign Office.’Footnote 67 The differences between government and business were obscured by members of the House of Lords taking a key role in the organising companies and, while there were hopes that British industry would benefit from the fair, the British exhibition was far from being a solely commercial venture.Footnote 68 R. H. K. Marrett of the Information Policy Department, which coordinated British information policy on overseas activity, responded to Mason by stating:
I do not think that the risk of an explosion from Lord Drogheda … should be the ruling factor in our decision. Surely the real question which has to be decided by ministers is whether they accept the advice of the Ambassador or Northern Department on what is essentially a political issue.
Marrett defined the fair as a ‘political issue’ with the implication that private business – in whose interests Drogheda and Poole were acting – was outside this decision-making process. At times the organisation of the exhibition and its accompanying cultural programme exposed differences between the objectives of the civil service, for whom maintaining a positive relationship with the Soviets was important for facilitating future trade deals, and private industry, whose focus was on increasing sales. While this state–private network operated under the broad aims of promoting business and the British way of life, different organisations competed to ensure that their objectives were prioritised.
The band presented an incongruous vision of British life to the Soviet people. Moscow’s Radio Home Service enthusiastically reported their opening performance, calling them ‘a picturesque and colourful spectacle’, and stating that ‘people are attracted by both the exotic appearance and by the unusual and tuneful music of the Scots players’.Footnote 69 Following the visit Roberts said they were ‘a very real success. The public approval of their appearances … was most empathetic, and even led on one occasion to the militia being unable to control the crowd.’Footnote 70 The disruption was,
due entirely to over-enthusiasm on the part of the spectators … when an insufficient number of militiamen failed to hold back an extremely enthusiastic and friendly crowd who broke through and followed the band as they marched and countermarched outside the fair. This made it totally impossible for them to finish the performance, and it had to be stopped … [T]he appearance of a virtually unknown example of what to the Russians is ‘British Folk Art’, has caused much interest and attention.Footnote 71
A thank you letter to the battalion’s commanding officer Major General F. C. C. Graham stated: ‘I am convinced that such visits play a very useful role in showing the Russian people something of our British way of life … such unexpected sides of our national traditions can capture the imagination of the Russian man in the street.’Footnote 72 While the British trade fair focused primarily on improving trading relations, the Foreign Office subtly promoted its favoured interpretation of the British way of life by using military pageantry and engagements between exhibitors and visitors. The novelty of the band appeared to enthuse some Soviet people who set aside the military symbolism and greeted the British musicians excitedly.
By connecting the Argyll and Sutherlands with the trade fair, the British government helped to increase the nation’s popularity in the Soviet Union. The performance of military brass band music suggests that the British presented a dreamworld, rooted in tradition, pageantry and empire. The band’s performances contrast with the original plan for a visit by the Royal Ballet which would have been less uniquely British and would have competed in an area of Soviet excellence. That visit, however, might have been popular, with a Royal Ballet tour later in 1961 receiving a warm welcome.Footnote 73 Moreover, the fair’s official report highlighted how the pageantry enhanced Britain’s reputation by promoting a positive view of the nation. Roberts noted that many participants aimed to reinforce pre-existing deals and protect sales from competitors rather than seeking new business.Footnote 74 Therefore, as far as the government was concerned, the most useful outcome of the fair was its ability to create a positive impression of Britain among the 1.25 million Soviet visitors.
The Soviet exhibition in London
The Soviets’ Industrial Exhibition, which opened in July 1961, used more obvious propaganda than Britain’s, but the British still waged the cultural Cold War at the London fair. The Foreign Office staff soon labelled the Soviet exhibition as a ‘propaganda jamboree’, which celebrated the Soviet way of life.Footnote 75 However, following high-profile political visits to the British exhibition it was decided that it would be ‘ungracious of us not to reciprocate’, meaning that, despite suspecting ulterior motives, the Prime Minister was obliged to attend the opening and to receive Soviet guests.Footnote 76 The trade benefits of the fairs often appeared less important than improving diplomatic relations. Therefore, the exhibitions, while seen as propagandistic, helped to facilitate improved relations between the political elites and the broader populations of Britain and the Soviet Union.
The Soviet exhibition was the USSR’s largest foreign display to date with the Foreign Office briefing that it was ‘larger than the Soviet Exhibit at the Brussels fair’ in 1958.Footnote 77 The Soviet pavilion at the Brussels World Fair had impressed many with its displays of satellites and was judged the most outstanding stand.Footnote 78 It was therefore unsurprising that at subsequent exhibitions the Soviets presented technological advancements as central to their way of life and they continued to exhibit replicas of technology such as spacecraft, airplanes and atomic ships. The Foreign Office’s report of the exhibition noted that the ‘Hall of Space’ was vast, especially in comparison to ‘the tiny corner dedicated to art’, featuring ‘the most laughable products of social realism’.Footnote 79 The Soviets attempted to impress the British with an image of scientific advancement.
However, both the Soviets and British went further than exhibiting science and ‘high’ culture and showcased their versions of consumerism and home-life. The British employed a form of ‘people to people’ diplomacy utilising the homes of private citizens to impress Soviet visitors and increase goodwill; this version was less structured than America’s programme, which was launched in 1955 using exchanges to promote the American way of life.Footnote 80 The Soviet exhibition coincided with British life moving towards what Claire Langhamer terms the ‘home centered society’.Footnote 81 The Foreign Office requested that bureaucrats invite Soviet officials to dinner parties in their homes because: ‘We have found by experience that nothing is as effective as private hospitality i.e. entertainment offered in individual British homes, in removing the prejudices and misconceptions about this country which persist in the Soviet mind.’Footnote 82 British private life and domesticity were tied to a middle-class image of the home. While this affluent ideal remained unattainable for those at the margins of British society, the more lavish homes of employees of the civil service, political and business communities, whose overlapping networks formed the British political establishment, were showcased as part of Britain’s national identity. These homes, which were opened to Soviet guests, conveyed a middle-class sense of the British way of life. Moreover, they were a counterpoint to the idealised Marshall Plan houses that the USA had used to illustrate the ‘classless’ lifestyle of consumer abundance throughout Western Europe during the 1950s.Footnote 83
The British domestic ideal – represented by comfort, cleanliness and warmth – became part of their effort in the cultural Cold War. Civil servants made fifteen invitations to Soviet officials. The Foreign Office, however, felt that Moscow discouraged acceptance with only ten people attending dinners. The Foreign Office’s report stated that the extent of domestic hospitality was ‘consequently disappointing’. However, it continued that ‘there was a better response to invitations by individual businessmen’.Footnote 84 This unofficial success referred to newspaper reports that the barrister and former Labour MP John Platts-Mills had entertained 180 Soviets in his home with ‘some hearty souls [playing] a game of croquet’.Footnote 85 The British home – in this case that of senior civil servants and businessmen – was projected as part of the British dreamworld, consisting of the traditional and establishment utopia. However, domesticity also acted to familiarise the Cold War other and allowed a limited space in which to build relationships between certain members of either population.
The exhibition’s opening was attended by Macmillan and other cabinet members. As with Gagarin’s flight in April, the British press made allusions to Britain’s comparative failures in space exploration and the Guardian reported that Lord Hailsham, the Minister for Science, was ‘discovered alone in the Cosmic Hall starring wistfully into outer space’.Footnote 86 Newspaper advertisements encouraged readers to ‘Learn more about the Soviet people, Soviet commerce and trade’, suggesting that visitors might see beyond their preconceptions of the communist nation.Footnote 87 Moreover, the British press and television duly paid respect to Soviet technological advancement. Polished replicas of satellites and long-distance passenger planes shared the hall with an idealised flat, which was a far cry from the rapidly built khrushchevky housing estates that aimed to ease urban Russia’s housing crisis. Nevertheless, the home on display represented an aspirational ideal, which Reid associates with the Soviets’ attempts to build their own version of ‘comfort’ and domesticity.Footnote 88 The Daily Mail’s Carson Churchill commented that ‘a great many British families would be pleased to live in anything as advanced as this and still can’t afford to do it’.Footnote 89 Olga Franklin stated that the Russian ‘Spektakl’ was ‘no Ideal Home Exhibition’, but it showed the ‘Soviet idea of an ideal homeland’.Footnote 90 The focus on this small part of the Soviets’ exhibition revealed much about the British preoccupation with domesticity and how this was applied to examinations of the Soviet Union. In response to increasing Western prosperity the Soviets displayed consumer comforts including cars, dresses, wine and caviar, which the Daily Express viewed as a significant change, declaring: ‘When it comes to satisfying women’s taste, there is no substitute for free enterprise.’Footnote 91 ‘Free enterprise’ was presented as an important British value, which the Soviets must adopt to modernise. Britain’s gaze through the Iron Curtain raised comparisons with its domestic and consumerist ideals; while some commentators suggested the two societies were not that different, the Soviets’ attempts to emulate Western dreamworlds drew praise.
The arrival of a group of Soviet fashion models also drew the attention of British newspapers; the Daily Mail reported that ‘One thousand men stopped work in stunned admiration yesterday as these seven girls walked into the Earls Court exhibition hall … and dispelled the notion that Russian women are dumpy, dowdy, and dull.’Footnote 92 The newspaper revealed that ‘most of the girls hold degrees and all have jobs they do in addition to modelling’. A workman was quoted: ‘These women are marvellous. Clever. It isn’t much wonder they have responsible jobs.’ However, the women’s education was subsequently downplayed. The Mail evaluated the attractiveness of the models stating that ‘the Soviet Union turns on you and takes you by surprise [with] another version of Soviet woman – swinging her hips, delicately turning out her fingers, smiling under her blonde bouffant hair, looking sexy, cosy, and huggable in big furry sweaters and snappy trousers’.Footnote 93 Often the clothes drew less attention than the women themselves, with The Guardian reporting: ‘A pigtailed fair-haired girl in a pink nightdress was our introduction to Soviet sophistication … she was followed by a russet-haired beauty with most mischievous eyes and a most disturbing smile.’Footnote 94 The paper exalted the Russian models and bemoaned ‘If only we could persuade one or two of them to follow the naughty Rudolf’s example and not go back.’ This reference to the ballet dancer Rudolf Nureyev’s defection in Paris reminded readers of the Cold War division and reinforced the idea that Western-style freedom appealed to many Soviets. While British press depictions of women’s physical attributes were far from untypical during the 1960s, they expressed surprise that Soviet women contradicted their pre-conceived stereotypes. Newspapers from across the political spectrum tended to exoticise the Soviets by printing vivid descriptions of female beauty.
The exhibition was warmly received with a curious British public making 600,000 visits over twenty days. The right wing Daily Mail described the Soviet display as ‘undoubtedly one of the great exhibitions’.Footnote 95 As Clarkson demonstrates, correspondents were impressed by the technological exhibits but found that the consumer goods failed to reach the expected standard.Footnote 96 The Guardian’s John Davy thought that the ‘knockout blow’ was the Sputnik display.Footnote 97 Davy continued that the focus on heavy industry was justified but ‘[b]etween the basic foundations of an industrial economy such as coal, minerals, timber, chemicals, heavy machinery, and power, and the jam on the Soviet consumer’s bread which is just becoming available in the form of better clothes, fabrics and food, the exhibition reveals a gap’. Other Guardian reviews described the exhibition as being designed ‘to drive home to British audiences the achievements of Soviet technology, but to show them at the same time that the Soviet Union is not all power stations and agricultural machinery’.Footnote 98 While the Mirror was critical of the quality of Soviet consumer goods they still claimed that visitors had ‘rushed to buy Russian’, with an order worth £750,000 placed for goods ‘ranging from toys and cameras to liqueurs and “Cosmonaut” after-shave lotion’.Footnote 99 The Soviets might not have impressed with all aspects of their exhibition but there was enough warmth and goodwill to ensure a largely positive, though sometimes critical, response.
Despite the success of the space display many reviews suggested that the Russian goods were dated or poorly made. The Observer reported that the furs often ‘looked like processed bear’.Footnote 100 Household goods were described as, ‘just the sort of thing we were doing … twenty five years ago’. Newspapers emphasised the differences between communist manufacture for needs and consumerist production for desire. As Clarkson suggests, this division in domestic production left many British commentators disappointed that style appeared trumped by utility.Footnote 101 The Foreign Office felt that many goods were ‘of inferior quality, and in poor taste’.Footnote 102 While Clarkson suggests that press accounts of the exhibition noted its lack of sophistication, there were expressions of admiration for the Soviet Union and its attempts to catch the West. The Guardian noted, ‘in a world of haves and have nots, Russia is now among the haves and we should be glad to see her there’.Footnote 103 Moreover, the Soviets were generally well received with the Daily Mail observing that ‘Russians “are people”. This discovery of the 1960s will be a familiar fact by the 1970s.’Footnote 104 While some scholars have noted that Western culture presented the Soviet Union as an undeveloped society, these comments suggest that this image existed alongside that of a Soviet Union that used its technological advancements and increasing availability of consumer goods to appear modern.Footnote 105
While the British embassy was satisfied with most coverage they advised that, ‘we do not wish to imply that the United Kingdom press should be encouraged to change its tune … But, as seen from here, we wonder whether the Russians may not have been rather disappointed at the press treatment.’Footnote 106 The memo suggests that press coverage could improve relations between the governments, but also that the state-controlled Soviet media wrote more positively about the British than vice versa. The letter continued ‘we think that there might be something to be said for discreetly encouraging suitable elements of the United Kingdom press to publish a small number of appreciative articles on some of the more technical and less controversial sections’. Some British civil servants saw the media as a tool in their attempts to improve trading relations with the Soviet Union, despite the official presentation of Britain’s press being free from state involvement. The Foreign Office politely declined to interfere because they thought that Gagarin’s visit generated enough positive publicity and that ‘IF [sic] the tone of these [articles] is sometimes ironical, that is only to be expected, given the nature of some of the exhibits, which can only be described as flatulent.’Footnote 107 The civil service desired a successful Soviet exhibition because it would maintain good relations and assist Anglo-Soviet trade, even at the expense of massaging public opinion about the display. However, as the correspondence suggests, the exhibition was unlikely to change vastly the British public’s generally low impressions of the standards of Soviet goods.
British observers often accepted the exhibition’s message that the Soviets were advanced and planned to pass the living standards of Western countries, at face value. British commentators were increasingly worried about their nation’s perceived loss of dynamism. Michael Shanks’s The Stagnant Society, which was published later that year, characterised a broader sense that Britain was losing industrial competitiveness, especially compared to the Eastern bloc.Footnote 108 This feeling became startlingly apparent following Yuri Gagarin’s space flight on 12 April, which was celebrated throughout the British press. The Daily Mirror situated the flight as a momentous event and could not ignore the Soviet achievement adding, ‘Today the Mirror salutes the Russians.’Footnote 109 Space advancement ran counter to presentations of the Soviet Union which relied on a folk image of peasant life. Space was linked to the Soviets’ self-depiction as a modern state strengthened by science and technology. Many British people believed that the Soviets’ use of planning enabled them to eclipse Western technological achievement.
Perceptions that the Soviets were ‘catching’ the British economy added to anxieties around perceived British national decline. The British press expressed the hope that the Cold War was over and that new technologies and increasing consumerism would improve the international situation. The Soviets occasionally impressed the British with their dreamworld, which the press compared to their own. However, these impressions rarely suggested that the Soviet Union was pulling ahead and, as Buck-Morss points out, ‘there was a political as well as an economic motivation behind the West’s promotion of consumerist dreams’.Footnote 110 The comparisons between a country whose fashions changed frequently and one focused on utility celebrated the Soviets’ advances, but overall newspapers emphasised the superiority of the West until the exhibition became associated with space flight: the Soviet’s emblem of modernity.
The Visit of Yuri Gagarin
Yuri Gagarin’s recent space flight and his subsequent visit to the Soviet exhibition captured the British population’s attention. Gagarin’s photograph had adorned British newspapers and his officially prepared biography was widely republished.Footnote 111 The cosmonaut was depicted as a family man with whom British people could associate. The Daily Mail’s opinion column had described Gagarin as ‘a human creature like the rest of us, with a heart, a brain – a soul’.Footnote 112 This positive attitude towards Gagarin continued with an examination of his family. The newspaper declared ‘Spaceman Yuri is also typical of thousands of Russians … stolid in appearance, a devoted family man. A man like Nikita Khrushchev. Of and from the earth.’ Such depictions of Gagarin as a ‘typical’ but courageous Russian family man, who remained a peasant at heart despite his space flight achievement, contributed towards a heroic image. Mrs Shirley Turner wrote to the Mirror stating that ‘To me, a mother, the event was humanised by the fact that he has a two year old daughter called Elena.’Footnote 113 The family values that Lynne Segal argues were a key part of remaking post-war British masculinity were visible in some newspaper presentations of Gagarin, with many encouraging readers to see beyond the Cold War.Footnote 114 Gagarin became a representative of all Soviet people and Britons would respond to his visit to the London exhibition with Yurimania.
Several friendship societies and peace organisations, which were allied to the Communist Party of Great Britain, invited Gagarin to visit the UK. These invitations from organisations which the Foreign Office labelled ‘undesirable’ were accompanied by one from the semi-official GB–USSR Association, part of the British Council, and another from ITF inviting Gagarin to visit the Soviet trade fair.Footnote 115 A Foreign Office memo suggested that the Soviets might exploit the visit for propaganda by accepting an offer from an undesirable organisation. Therefore, the memo stated that the government’s ‘principles would require [them] to have nothing to do with him officially while most of the people of this country would probably acclaim him as a hero’.Footnote 116 The memo also stated that an official visit was unrealistic because it might ‘rub the noses of the Americans in their comparative failure in the space race … Mr Sherren should be told that we do not think it appropriate to invite Major Gagarin here officially, but see no objection to his inviting him on behalf of Industrial and Trade Fairs.’Footnote 117 The British government recognised the need to provide leadership on Gagarin’s visit to limit the impact of the Soviet charm offensive on the British public; they therefore made official hospitality conditional on the acceptance of ITF’s invitation and excluded the communist sympathising organisations. While ITF hoped Gagarin’s visit would promote the Soviet trade fair, the government aimed to ensure that it neither aided the communist sympathising organisations nor caused problems with the Americans. The state–private network helped to ensure that both objectives were met.
Following Gagarin’s acceptance of ITF’s invitation the Foreign Office sought to raise the GB–USSR Association’s profile by arranging for them to host a reception. The Soviets were informed that members of the cabinet could only meet Gagarin at this event and also, ‘that if he comes as the guest of one of the bodies we do not approve of, this will prevent us from making any official recognition of the visit’.Footnote 118 The government’s connections with private companies turned Gagarin’s visit into a semi-official one, and ITF mediated between the Soviets and officialdom. The government balanced international diplomacy against Foreign Office concerns that the popular press was ‘already suggesting that H.M.G. [was] not paying adequate attention to him’.Footnote 119 They therefore manoeuvred between pacifying the press, who had heroised Gagarin, and the Soviets’ attempt to improve public opinion about them, meaning that they could not exhibit any ‘weakening of our resolution in the face of the coming crisis over Berlin’.
Gagarin arrived on 11 July 1961 and received a rousing reception. Crowds gathered and The Daily Mirror demanded: ‘Make him Sir Yuri’, reporting that ‘[t]he people of London gave a roaring welcome to Space hero Yuri Gagarin’.Footnote 120 The enthusiasm was greater than expected and celebrations transcended both national and Cold War divisions. Gagarin attended receptions, mingling with guests, including Macmillan and the queen, and the press reported the impressions from some who met him. A number of newspapers printed photographs of 23-year-old Olivia Brayden, who had run up and kissed Gagarin as he was about to be driven to the exhibition. Several newspapers reported Brayden as saying ‘he’s the most kissable man in the universe. I’m just mad about him.’Footnote 121 Contemporary commentators noted the aspects of Gagarin’s visit, including this incident, which drew most press attention: Michael Frayn bemoaned that the Mirror was an example of the kind of coverage that had ‘taken on an embarrassingly sexual overtone’.Footnote 122 Some sections of society had changed his image from family man to sex symbol. Similar excitement was visible during Gagarin’s appearance at the Trade Fair when a surge of people meant that police had to hold back excited crowds.Footnote 123 In that commotion one woman lost her shoe and billed the exhibitors for the price of a new pair of shoes and stockings.Footnote 124 For the British, and in particular younger sections of society, Gagarin’s association with ‘the space age’ generated something approaching fervour.
Throughout Gagarin’s visit ITF mediated between the British and Soviet governments and coordinated his activities. When the Soviets suggested that he lay a wreath at the cenotaph in Whitehall the organisers checked that this was appropriate with the Foreign Office.Footnote 125 This cooperation by ITF shows the network of private and public organisations operating to benefit official and business interests, while achieving maximum diplomatic advantage. By supporting the ITF invitation and liaising over the visit the British government used its business connections to limit the Soviets’ propaganda gain.
The Foreign Office report of Gagarin’s visit noted that the crowds had welcomed him so warmly because ‘there is in this country a great deal of goodwill towards the Russians as people – almost certainly more than there is towards the Germans East or West’.Footnote 126 The government insisted that their hospitality was appropriate but Frank Roberts wrote ‘I had not quite expected the hysteria of the British crowds.’Footnote 127 This surprise was echoed by the representatives of the Federal German Republic whose diplomats expressed their worries that Britain was ‘not firm’ on the Berlin question.Footnote 128 The American press also reported Gagarin’s ‘hero’s’ welcome. The British embassy in Washington noted that ‘those who are already convinced that the British are “soft on communism” will see this as further confirmation of their view’. The report also noted, however, that ‘On the whole, I do not believe that Gagarin’s visit will do us harm here.’Footnote 129 The British people’s celebration of the first man in space angered some of Britain’s allies, but it was not expected to cause lasting divisions.
The civil service saw Gagarin’s visit as part of the same battle for public opinion as the exhibitions themselves. The Foreign Office felt that despite the Soviets’ efforts their exhibition was not effective in improving the British public attitude towards them, which ‘could be defined as one of rueful scepticism’.Footnote 130 Some areas of the popular press such as the Daily Mail were perhaps more receptive to Soviet modernity than the government acknowledged. Moreover, the warmth of Gagarin’s reception suggests that many British people saw beyond the Cold War and celebrated his achievement in line with the narrative of domestication that the Soviets and the British press had created between his flight and visit to the Soviet exhibition: he was seen as someone who had advanced not communism, but humankind. Nevertheless, the cosmonaut’s visit still increased the popularity of the Soviet Union with Britain’s public much more than the exhibition itself.
Conclusion
The Anglo-Soviet trade fairs show that the Cold War had moments of cultural interaction that punctuated crises. Furthermore, differences in national foreign policy show that the Western bloc was not a homogeneous entity. Even so, the nature of the cultural Cold War meant that ‘beating’ the other side remained important in all engagements. The British and Soviet exhibitions of 1961 both contained elements of what the British civil service termed ‘way of life’ propaganda. The British presented their exhibition as a private venture solely concerned with trade, but the Foreign Office was involved throughout. The fair’s organisers had often worked within the British state and they regularly consulted with the Foreign Office. While the British appeared to have ‘eschewed blatant propaganda’, as Clarkson claims, they showcased their perceived way of life in both Moscow and London, albeit more subtly than the Soviets’ exhibition and the Americans’ Moscow fair in 1959.Footnote 131 Britain’s Moscow exhibit focused on trade, but the organisers included examples of its way of life through government stalls and the cultural programme. Conversely, the government was convinced that the Soviet fair did not have a positive impact on the British public. Reaction to Gagarin’s visit, however, suggests that Britons in 1961 had a dual impression of the Soviet Union, the Cold War and Communism: they happily celebrated the modernity of their technological advances linked to space exploration, despite the impression of underdevelopment and underlying fear that the conflict might turn hot. Furthermore, they desired improved relations with the Soviet population and expressed a distinct desire to learn about their everyday life.
At either exhibition the respective nations showcased their perceived national characteristics. The British state–private network worked together to ensure that their version of the British way of life was displayed in Moscow and intervened to limit communist propaganda gains. The performance of a British marching military band presented the nation’s traditions as rooted in pageantry and royalty. This self-perception contrasted with the modernity and technological advancement in the form of space travel and emerging consumerist ideals that shaped the Soviet’s own dreamworld. The reaction of the British press to both exhibitions suggests that, while there continued to be some depictions of repression or backwardness in the Soviet Union, British newspapers were often comfortable with presenting the Soviet Union as modern and capable of making technological and consumer advances. At times the coverage was frivolous or congratulatory. Many Britons expressed their wonderment to the extent of celebration. The coverage of the exhibitions and of Gagarin’s visit revealed a desire by many Britons to know and to humanise the Cold War other. In the context of the Cold War it shows that even as the conflict entered a ‘hot’ period, it was presented to the British population as normalised – almost as part of their everyday experience. Britons’ attitudes towards the Soviet Union fluctuated, but in the very early 1960s, prior to the construction of the Berlin Wall, many were willing to see beyond the Cold War.
While the British government’s primary objective at the exhibitions was to improve diplomatic and trading relations, they also achieved other aims such as promoting the values that they felt represented the British way of life. Transnational networks were formed and reinforced between Britain and the Soviet Union during 1961 and the reciprocal exhibitions facilitated communications between civil servants, business people and members of the respective publics who travelled and worked on each installation or visited the displays. The media coverage of the fairs meant that each public began to learn about the other beyond Cold War crises, which had something of a demystifying effect. While the exhibitions allowed each nation to challenge the common preconceptions that had formed within the other country over several decades, the distorting lenses of the media (whether state-controlled or seemingly ‘free’) limited the ability to change ingrained opinion.
Open access
