Hostname: page-component-6587cd75c8-6qszs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-04-24T05:21:09.791Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Financial Interest Groups and Interlocking Directorates

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2016

Beth Mintz  and
Michael Schwartz
Beth Mintz
Affiliation:
University of Vermont
Michael Schwartz
Affiliation:
SUNNY, Stony Brook
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Many recent studies of interlocking directorates have paid special attention to the possible existence of interest groups or cliques within the corporate world (Allen, 1978; Dooley, 1969; Mariolis, 1977; Mintz and Schwartz, 1981a; Mizruchi, 1982b). The search for economic groupings of this type dates from the early part of the twentieth century when financial domination of industrial firms was thought to characterize American business. Bank control theory, in particular, posited the coalescence of individual companies into a number of competing groups, each organized around banking interests. Thus, Baran and Sweezy (1966: 17) define interest groups as “a number of corporations under common control, the locus of power being normally an investment or commercial bank or a great family fortune.”

Early work in this area, therefore, attempted to identify separate groups of companies organized around either family or financial interests. Rochester (1936), for example, used information on stock ownership, banking dependence, service relationships, capital investments, and joint ventures to identify many autonomous cliques headed by founding families. Sweezy (1939) used a similar set of criteria to identify eight dominant financial interest groups. Perlo (1957) replicated these results 20 years later.

Type
Research Article
Information
Social Science History , Volume 7 , Issue 2 , Spring 1983 , pp. 183 - 204
Copyright
Copyright © Social Science History Association 1983 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Allen, M. (1978) “Economic interest groups and the corporate elite structure.” Social Science Quarterly 58: 597–615.Google Scholar
Baran, P. and Sweezy, P. (1966) Monopoly Capital. New York: Monthly Review Press.Google Scholar
Bearden, J., Atwood, W., Freitag, P., Hendricks, C., Mintz, B., and Schwartz, M. (1975) “The nature and extent of bank centrality in corporate networks.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, September.Google Scholar
Burch, P. (1972) The Managerial Revolution Reassessed. Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath.Google Scholar
Directory of Directors of New York (annual) New York: Directory of Directors Company.Google Scholar
Domhoff, G. (1970) The Higher Circles. New York: Random House.Google Scholar
Dooley, P. (1969) “The interlocking directorate.” American Economic Review 59: 314–323.Google Scholar
Dun and Bradstreet Million Dollar Directory (annual). New York: Dun and Bradstreet.Google Scholar
Fortune Magazine (Biweekly). Chicago: Time, Inc.Google Scholar
Glasberg, D. (1981) “Corporate power and control: the case of Leasco Corporation versus Chemical Bank.” Social Problems 29: 104–116.Google Scholar
Gogel, R. and Koenig, T. (1981) “Commercial banks, interlocking directorates and economic power: an analysis of the primary metals industry.” Social Problems 29: 117–128.Google Scholar
Hillstrom, R. and King, R. (n.d.) A Decade of Corporate and International Finance. New York: IDD, Inc.Google Scholar
Koenig, T. and Gogel, R. (1981) “Interlocking directorates as a social network.” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 40: 37–50.Google Scholar
Kotz, D. (1978) Bank Control of Large Corporations in the United States. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Larner, R. (1970) Management Control and the Large Corporation. New York: Dunellen.Google Scholar
Leinsdorf, F. D. and Etra, D. (1973) Citibank. New York: Grossman.Google Scholar
Mariolis, P. (1975) “Interlocking directorates and the control of corporations.” Social Science Quarterly 56: 425–439.Google Scholar
Mariolis, P. ((1977) “Interlocking directorates and finance control: a peak analysis.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Chicago, September.Google Scholar
Mariolis, P., Schwartz, M., and Mintz, B. (1979) “Centrality analysis: a methodology for social networks.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, September.Google Scholar
Menshikov, S. (1968) Millionaires and Managers. Moscow: Progress Publishers.Google Scholar
Mintz, B. and Schwartz, M. (1981a) “Interlocking directorates and interest group formation.” American Sociological Review 46: 851–869.Google Scholar
Mintz, B. and Schwartz, M. (1981b) “The structure of intercorporate unity in American business.” Social Problems 29: 87–103.Google Scholar
Mintz, B. and Schwartz, M. (1983) The Structure of Power in the American Corporate System. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Mizruchi, M. (1982a) The American Corporate Network: 1904-1974. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.Google Scholar
Mizruchi, M. ((1982b) “Interest groups in the American corporate elite, 1900-1975.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, September.Google Scholar
Moody’s Handbook of Common Stock (1967) New York: Moody’s Investment Service.Google Scholar
Moody’s Manuals (annual) New York: Moody’s Investment Service.Google Scholar
Palmer, D. (1980) “Broken ties: some political and interorganizational determinants of interlocking directorates among large American corporations.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, New York, September.Google Scholar
Patman Committee (1968) Commercial Banks and Their Trust Activities: Emerging Influence on the American Economy. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.Google Scholar
Pelton, R. (1970) Who Really Rules America? Somerville, MA: New England Free Press.Google Scholar
Perlo, V. (1957) The Empire of High Finance. New York: International Publishers.Google Scholar
Rochester, A. (1936) Rulers of America. New York: International Publishers.Google Scholar
Sonquist, J. and Koenig, T. (1975) “Interlocking directorates in the top United States corporations: graph theory approach.” Insurgent Sociologist 5: 196–230.Google Scholar
Soref, M. (1976) “Social class and the division of labor within the corporate elite.” Sociological Quarterly 17: 360–368.Google Scholar
Standard and Poor’s Register of Corporations, Directors and Executives (annual) New York: Standard and Poor’s Corporation.Google Scholar
Sweezy, P. (1939) “Interest groups in the American economy,” in National Resources Committee, The Structure of the American Economy. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.Google Scholar