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Theroy of Mind in Non-Verbal Apes: conceptual issues and the critical experiments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 January 2010

Andrew Whiten
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Extract

It is now over twenty years since Premack and Woodruff (1978) posed the question, ‘Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?’—‘by which we meant’, explained Premack (1988) in a later reappraisal, ‘does the ape do what humans do: attribute states of mind to the other one, and use these states to predict and explain the behaviour of the other one? For example, does the ape wonder, while looking quizzically at another individual, What does he really want? What does he believe? What are his intentions?'

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Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 49 , March 2001 , pp. 199 - 223
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Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2001

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References

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