Hostname: page-component-7f64f4797f-bnl7t Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-11-04T07:56:43.778Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Working Parts: Reply to Mellor

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 June 2008

J. Robert G. Williams
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Whenever a material thing has parts, those parts are located where that thing is. This is a necessary truth, and needs explaining.

Information

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 62 , July 2008 , pp. 81 - 106
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2008

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Armstrong, D. M. (1978). Nominalism and Realism: Universals and scientific realism vol I. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.Google Scholar
Brzozowski, J. (forthcoming). ‘On locating composite objects’. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics.Google Scholar
Cameron, R. (2008). ‘What's metaphysical about metaphysical necessity?’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 77(3).Google Scholar
Dorr, C. (2002). ‘The simplicity of everything’. PhD Dissertation, Princeton University.Google Scholar
Dorr, C. (2004). ‘Non-symmetric relations’. In Zimmerman, D., editor, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
Dorr, C. and Rosen, G. (2002). ‘Composition as a fiction’. In The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics. Blackwell, Oxford.Google Scholar
Field, H. H. (1984). ‘Can we dispense with space-time?’. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1984, 33–90.Google Scholar
Hawley, K. (2006). ‘Principles of composition and criteria of identity’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 84, 481–493.Google Scholar
Hirsch, E. (1993). Dividing Reality. Oxford University Press, New York.Google Scholar
Hudson, H. (2001). A materialist metaphysics of the human person. Cornell University Press, Ithaca.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hudson, H. (2005). The metaphysics of hyperspace. Oxford University Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. K. (1968). ‘Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic’. Journal of Philosophy, 65, 113–26. Reprinted with postscript in Lewis, Philosophical Papers I (Oxford University Press, 1983) 26–39.Google Scholar
Lewis, D. K. (1983). ‘New work for a theory of universals’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61, 343–377. Reprinted in Lewis, Papers on Metaphysics and Epistemology (Cambridge University Press, 1999) 8–55.Google Scholar
Mellor, D. H. (2008). ‘Microcomposition’, This volume, 65–80.Google Scholar
Mellor, D. H. (1991). ‘Properties and predicates’. In Matters of Metaphysics, volume 52, pages 170–182.Google Scholar
Parsons, J. (2007). ‘Theories of location’. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics.Google Scholar
Saucsho, R. (forthcoming). ‘Parthood and location’. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics.Google Scholar
Schaffer, J. (2004). ‘Two conceptions of sparse properties’. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 85, 92–102.Google Scholar
Sider, T. (2003). ‘Reductive theories of modality’. In Loux, M. and Zimmerman, D., editors, The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, pages 180–210. Oxford University Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
Sider, T. (2005). ‘Another look at Armstrong's combinatorialism’. Noûs, 39, 680–696.Google Scholar
Sider, T. (2007a). ‘Ontological realism’. In Chalmers, D., Manley, D., and Wasserman, R., editors, Metametaphysics. OUP, Oxford.Google Scholar
Sider, T. (2007b). ‘Parthood’. Philosophical Review, 116, 51–91.Google Scholar
Sider, T. (2007c). ‘What disputes are substantive?’. ms.Google Scholar
Simons, P. (1987). Parts: A study in ontology. Oxford University Press, Oxford.Google Scholar
Van Inwagen, P. (1990). Material Beings. Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London.Google Scholar
Williams, J. R. G. (2006). ‘Illusions of gunk’. Philosophical Perspectives.Google Scholar
Williams, J. R. G. (2007). ‘Fundamental and derivative truths’. ms.Google Scholar