Traditionally, comparative constitutional analysis has been anything but truly comparative—or, rather, the comparisons drawn by scholars were limited to a small number of canonical cases, generally in North America and Europe. Older scholarship focused on structure and text; it began to branch out into adjudication as judicial review of the constitutionality of legislation became a global norm rather than an exception in the second half of the twentieth century.

This article explores the challenges of drafting a post-conflict constitution for Yemen, with a focus on balancing the rule of law with emerging political forces, particularly in the context of the country’s ongoing civil war. It highlights the importance of inclusivity, adaptability, and public participation in creating a constitution that promotes peace and stability. Drawing on lessons from Yemen’s recent history and the broader Middle East, the study emphasizes the role of conflict dynamics, particularly those involving the Houthi movement and the Southern Transitional Council, and the implications of separatist aspirations for a unified Yemen. The analysis offers pathways for addressing transitional justice, reconciliation, and the failures of Yemen’s previous constitutional transition, and for laying a foundation for long-term peace and prosperity.

In the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring and subsequent revolution, Syria found itself in a rapidly changing environment. The fragility of the state and its constitutional contract led to disintegration into a period of civil violence that has yet to fully resolve. The historical process leading to the Syrian constitution of 1973 sheds some light on the legal and political values encompassed within the constitution and the relationship between the national and international politics of law. Although the current constitution of 2012 offered changes and adjustments, it did not pave the way for any change to the former legacy. A full resolution of Syria’s conflict will require not just a new constitutional text but also an inclusive constitutional process. Years after conflict erupted in Syria, the Baʿth Party had not experienced absolute demise, and the new 2012 constitution had not lead to a free election offering a safe transition. Although the constitution did succeed in eradicating explicit mention of the Baʿth Party, this was never reflected in a practical victory. The country remained a conflict-divided state with a constitution that disappointed expectations. This remained the case until 8 December 2024, with the sudden collapse of the regime that Syrians had longed for. This resulted in an interim government that suspended the constitution and ushered in a new era of de facto crisis with an as yet unclear constitutional legacy.

This paper introduces the term “Open Constitution” as a crucial element for fostering an “Open Society.” It explores the nature and adaptability of constitutions, emphasizing the balance between stability and the necessity for change. Specifically, it examines Iran’s 1906 and 1979 constitutions, highlighting their initial lack of clear amendment procedures and the subsequent modifications aimed at addressing this issue. The 1906 Constitution did not establish a clear amendment process, which was only partially rectified in 1949. Similarly, the 1979 Constitution remained silent on amendments until Article 177 was added during its 1989 revision, outlining a heavily controlled revision process. Both constitutions contain principles deemed unchangeable; however, historical precedents indicate that such provisions are not immune to alteration. The paper concludes that the rigidity of these constitutions, coupled with the absence of practical mechanisms for public or specialized input, poses a risk to political stability and may lead to revolutionary changes. It argues that these constitutions, due to their stringent emphasis on stability and resistance to public demands for change, are inherently self-destructive.

In recent years, constitutional amendments have emerged as a key tool for populist leaders who seek to undermine the rule of law and checks and balances. Abusive constitutionalism is central to democratic and rule of law backsliding, because it allows authoritarian leaders to reshape the legal and institutional framework of the state to entrench their power. By manipulating constitutional rules, these leaders can undermine judicial independence, weaken legislative oversight, and diminish the capacity of political opposition, all while maintaining a veneer of legality. Turkey is an exemplar of such processes. Turkey’s current constitution, introduced in 1982 during military rule, has been amended numerous times, with thirteen significant amendments established during the tenure of the current governing party. These amendments have played a critical role in Turkey’s democratic backsliding, transforming the country from a fragile democracy into a hybrid regime characterized by authoritarian governance.