Until the secondhalf of the 1990s, Western commentary about the former Soviet Union and the newRussia basically divided into two camps. On the one side stood those who not onlywelcomed the end of the USSR but looked forward to the ‘brave newworld’ they hoped would be built on the debris left behind by the oldorder. Having failed to anticipate the demise of Soviet communism,< theoptimists now predicted a bright new capitalist future for Russia. With excellent access to those in power, theywere clearly the most favoured group with Western governments in general and theAmerican government in particular. Certainly, within the US foreign policy eliteit was broadly assumed that successful reform in Russia and Russia'sintegration into the larger capitalist system, was both feasible and necessary.As Strobe Talbott, the architect of American strategy towards Russia, observed inthe early days of the Clinton administration, reform in Russia was not just aboutRussia but the shape of the new international order waiting to be born in thewake of the Cold War. Others were always moresceptical.