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Universe Indexed Properties and the Fate of the Ontological Argument

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2008

James F. Sennett
James F. Sennett
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Pacific Lutheran University
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Extract

If the contemporary rebirth of the ontological argument had its conception in Norman Malcolm's discovery of a second Anselmian argument ([2]) it had its full-term delivery as a healthy philosophical progeny with Alvin Plantinga's sophisticated modal version presented in the tenth chapter of The Nature of Necessity ([8]). This latter argument has been the centre of a huge body of literature over the last fifteen years, and deservedly so. One is impressed that this version of Anselm's jewel is valid and sound if any is.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 27 , Issue 1 , March 1991 , pp. 65 - 79
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1991

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References

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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