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Split brains: no headache for the soul theorist

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 April 2014

DAVID B. HERSHENOV  and
ADAM P. TAYLOR
DAVID B. HERSHENOV
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo NY, 14217, USA e-mail: dh25@buffalo.edu
ADAM P. TAYLOR
Affiliation:
Department of History, Philosophy and Religious Studies, North Dakota State University, Fargo, ND, 58108–6050, USA e-mail: aptaylor@gmail.com
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Abstract

Split brains that result in two simultaneous streams of consciousness cut off from each other are wrongly held to be grounds for doubting the existence of the divinely created soul. The mistake is based on two related errors: first, a failure to appreciate the soul's dependence upon neurological functioning; second, a fallacious belief that if the soul is simple, i.e. without parts, then there must be a unity to its thought, all of its thoughts being potentially accessible to reflection or even unreflective causal interactions. But a soul theorist can allow neurological events to keep some conscious thoughts unavailable to others.

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Type
Articles
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 50 , Issue 4 , December 2014 , pp. 487 - 503
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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