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Belief, credence, and faith

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 July 2018

ELIZABETH JACKSON Open the ORCID record for ELIZABETH JACKSON [Opens in a new window]
ELIZABETH JACKSON*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, 100 Malloy Hall, Notre Dame, IN 46556, USA
*
e-mail: ejackso9@nd.edu
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Abstract

In this article, I argue that faith's going beyond the evidence need not compromise faith's epistemic rationality. First, I explain how some of the recent literature on belief and credence points to a distinction between what I call B-evidence and C-evidence. Then, I apply this distinction to rational faith. I argue that if faith is more sensitive to B-evidence than to C-evidence, faith can go beyond the evidence and still be epistemically rational.

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Type
Articles from the 2018 Postgraduate Essay Prize
Information
Religious Studies , Volume 55 , Issue 2 , June 2019 , pp. 153 - 168
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This is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States.
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018

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